I had a coffee today with an old friend of our family who is a Palestinian who was born and grew up in one of the great cities of the West Bank, graduating high school there in the early 1950s… That was shortly after the Jordanian King annexed the (previously Palestinian) West Bank to the East Bank land of (Trans-)Jordan that had been allocated to the Hashemites in the great post-WW1 carve up of the Arab-populated Near East.
In those post-annexation days, the official ideology was that “West Bankers” and “East Bankers” had all alike come together within the single happy family of “Jordan”.
Our friend had some politically colorful years in his young manhood there. But by the mid-1960s he’d decided to throw his lot in with the monarchy… and he stuck to that position, through Jordan’s “loss” of the West Bank to Israel in 1967 and even through the brief but lethal civil war that broke out in Jordan in September 1970, after King Hussein decided to expel the Palestinian guerrilla groups that were starting to sink some serious roots inside his kingdom. (Especially near the Jordan River.)
As he told me today, his judgment at the time was that “It would be far easier for us Palestinians to take our Palestinian state from Jordan than directly from Israel. So let Jordan get the land away from Israel and then we can discuss its future with Jordan.” Not a crazy judgment– but diametrically opposed to the tactics being pursued by Fateh and its allies at the time.
So he rose impressively high in the King’s service. But as he told me today, “About 20 or more years ago, the King started blocking Palestinians systematically out from access to the kingdom’s pathways of advancement.” Jordan is a very state-centered country, one in which the main way in which young men can get jobs or technical training or access to edication is through either the army or one of the other branches of the state…
So at that point (and I should check with him again, exactly when he thinks that started happening), he said that these pathways started being blocked to the Palestnians– who nowadays make up around 65% of the national population. “We have now had a complete social restratification here,” he said.
- The Palestinians in Jordan used to be the ones who had a good education, good skills, ran the companies, had access to capital. And the Jordanians were poor. Now, apart from a few very rich Palestinians who just look out for themselves, the opposite is true. It’s the Jordanians who have the state jobs, the education, the social status, all of that. And it’s the Palestinians who are poor. And the thing is, the Palestinians here don’t protest!
He had an explanation for that, too, saying the regime seemed to have done an excellent job of “divide and rule” among the Palestinians. “There is not one Palestinian community here; there are five,” he said.
- The first are the ones like me: people who came to the capital for jobs and advancement between 1950 and 1967. The second are the ones who’d fled here as refugees in 1948… The third group are the ones who came as refugees during and after the 1967 war– and even that group is divided into two: those who have rights to jobs and benefits, who have a yellow ID card, and those who don’t, who have a green card. The fourth group is the Palestinians from Gaza who ended up here. nd the fifth are the Palestinians from the Gulf– mainly Kuwait– who fled here during and after the Gulf War of 1991.
Some of those Gulf Palestinians had money and resources– but what they totally lacked was any concept of acting like a citizen– in terms of participating in the work of professional unions, or lobbying for their rights, or joining any political organizations… All they had was the concept of being ‘residents’, that they had learned from being in the gulf. I can tell you– I was there for a while, too. I know what it’s like. Every year you’re terrified that your residency rights will be revoked, and it just gnaws and gnaws at you, and you’ll do anything to please the boss just so you can get your renewal.
And they brought that mentality here, to Jordan. Even though they have Jordanian nationality and can’t be thrown out of here the way they were from the Gulf, they still think like that…
He noted that among the “Jordanians” (East Bankers), the regime has also played a clever game of divide and rule– but in this case, doing so among the reported 1,100 clans and tribes that make up the country.
- Besides, the ‘Jordanians’ have a fear of losing what they have now, in terms of access to resources. So of course they don’t want to see a democratic opening here, because then they would have to share more equally with the Palestinians.
And the Palestinians here have a fear of losing more than what they’ve already lost. So that’s why you don’t see them protest more, why you don’t see them doing any political organizing.
But on both sides, what the regime is able to play on, is a fear of loss…
Along the way there, I should note, the late King Hussein also made a significant change in the way he looked at the West Bank– the territory that had been annexed back in 1949 by his grandfather. Forty years later, in 1989, Hussein publicly divested himself of any claim to rule the West Bank, to represent its people, or to take responsibility for its fate. He did that in response to the “Declaration of (Palestinian) Independence” that Yasser Arafat had promulgated in late 1988. In 1993, when Arafat and the Israelis negotiated the Oslo Interim Accord, the Palestinian residents of both the West Bank and Gaza were given Palestinian ID cards and Palestinian passports. The Jordanian passports that West Bank-resident Palestinians had previously held were all taken away from them… So I think it really does matter some whether Hussein started his “Jordanianization” program of the army and the civil service before or after that point.
One other thing I noted about our conversation. Completely gone from our friend’s conversation was any use of the once-common terms “West Bankers and “East Bankers”, to denote those two different subsets of the Jordanian citizenry. Now, it was all “Palestinians” and “Jordanians” that he talked about… Implying, of course, that the people here of West Bank origin aren’t really considered to be “Jordanian” at all. Complex things going on…
Anyway, I didn’t have too much time to ask him about the party-political status of the Palestinians here. He did say he thought Fateh was a completely spent force… but I wish I’d probed him more on what he thinks of Hamas’s political organizing efforts here right now.
(I see that yesterday, a Jordanian government spokesman claimed that the security services recently intercepted a shipment of arms of explosives that, he claimed, Hamas was trying to smuggle into Jordan… and because of that, the kingdm has canceled a visit by Hamas Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar that was planned for today. This looks like a pathetic pretext– used, presumably, to hide the fact of the regime’s having caved in to US pressure on the matter, as Egypt also did, last Friday. The English-language