It is now official: The US government will not be imposing on the Iraqi government any of the ‘conditionality’– as a precondition for the US troop pullback/withdrawal– that the Bush administration, Congress (and numerous Washington think tanks) had all previously demanded.
I called this outcome back in June when I started noting (e.g. here) that the political balance in Baghdad between the US and the Iraqi government had tipped in the Iraqis’ favor. That meant that Washington would no longer be able to impose its conditions on the Iraqis as a “prerequisite” for any drawdown or full withdrawal of the US troop presence in the country. And today we can see that that has indeed been the case.
The main forms of conditionality required by the Democratic-controlled Congress was a set of “benchmarks” the Baghdad government should reach regarding Iraq’s own internal governance system. The Bush administration placed some emphasis on those benchmarks, but it was probably far more intent on winning as much freedom of action for the US military inside Iraq as possible, and if at all possible not to have any terminal date placed on this.
All those forms of conditionality have now been tossed overboard.
The latest– possibly final?– version (Word doc here) of the US -Iraqi SOFA makes clear that all US troops must be out of Iraq by the end of 2011; that the US troops must be withdrawn from all Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009; that control of the “Green Zone”– once also known as the “International Zone”– will pass into Iraqi hands as of January 1, 2009; that US-employed contractors will enjoy no special immunity from Iraqi jurisdiction after that date; and that in most other respects Iraq will regain its real national sovereignty on January 1, 2009.
Neither this SOFA nor any other current agreement between the two parties that I know of makes any mention of the US having any veto power over Iraq’s internal governance system.
I describe the current version of the SOFA agreement only as “possibly final” because the Iraqi parliament has yet to ratify it, an action that it proposes doing next Wednesday. Inside Iraq, despite the many concessions PM Maliki has wrung out of Washington during the six-month course of this negotiation, there is still significant opposition from the Sadrists to having any American troops remaining for as long as the next three years; and some Kurds and Sunnis have other objections to the current text. So the agreement is not yet a done deal; and it is possible Maliki may yet seek– and win– further concessions from the US side, especially regarding the timing of the final withdrawal.
On the US side, it has been notable both that (a) the Bush administration has argued that this agreement does not, as treaties do, require any ratification from the Senate in order to go into force; and (b) the Democratic leaders of the Senate have made no attempt whatever, throughout the months this SOFA has been in negotiation, to claim this prerogative.
Indeed, after all the bluff and bluster the Congressional Democrats generated last year when they spelled out the “benchmarks” they wanted to impose on the Iraqi government, their silence now that this SOFA is coming close to fruition has been quite deafening. Only Rep. William Delahunt, the chair of a relatively low-level sub-committee in the lower house, has shown any real interest in the subject at all.
Why won’t our Congressional leaders start asking some of the very real hard questions that need asking about why this outcome– the restoration of real Iraqi sovereignty with no longterm US troop presence– was not achieved back in late 2003, instead of the two countries having to go through all the terrible pain, suffering, and costs that have been imposed on them both, but especially on Iraqis, in the five years that have passed since then?
(Maybe because so many members of Congress still clung to the neo-imperial illusion that the US not only could re-make distant nations according to its own plan– but also that it had somehow the right to… Hence the whole shameful history of “benchmarking”.)
I note, too, that just about the whole of the US MSM has colluded in this reluctance to pay serious attention to the question of the SOFA. Only McClatchy has done some– as usual, excellent– real reporting on it.
In this important article November 19, McClatchy’s Nancy Youssef started to unpack some of the negotiating history of the SOFA, from the US side. She identified some serious disagreements on the issue between different portions of the Bush administration, writing,
- senior military officials are privately criticizing President Bush for giving Iraq more control over U.S. military operations for the next three years than the U.S. had ever contemplated.
She quoted an un-named “senior administration official” as giving this explanation for the politics behind what happened:
- The officials said the biggest factor in the outcome was the Iraq government’s decision to re-schedule provincial elections from October until the end of January, which gave its negotiators strong arguments to drive a hard bargain.
At the same time in Washington, political pressures generated by Obama’s victory, first in the primaries and then in the general election, led Bush to meet the Iraqi demands.
I don’t wholly buy that explanation. But there is a lot more of value in Youssef’s piece, which should certainly be required reading.
My question, though: Why have the “big” US MSM not thrown some of their own considerable resources into reporting on the “inside story” and the real, ever-evolving content of this negotiation?
Meantime, we should absolutely not forget that back on June 10, the Maliki government did sign a security agreement– with Iran.
Some of the implications of that agreement became evident yesterday when US forces who had detained an Iranian man at Baghdad airport were forced to release him, after Iraq’s deputy foreign minister interceded on his behalf…
For my part, I think the current text of the SOFA is worth supporting. I wish the deadline for all US troops to get out of Iraq was a lot sooner than the end of 2011 (though if both sides agree to terminate the presence sooner, that is still possible under the agreement; but extending its term is not.) But I am really glad that– in contradistinction both to longheld Bush administration and to Barack Obama’s long-held position on the matter– there is no provision in the text for a “continuing” US troop presence in Iraq of any type at all, even as a “non-combat” force.
I am concerned that there seems to be no reliable mechanism for mediating the internal political disputes that have already risen inside Iraq over the governance questions that will arise as the US troops withdraw from the cities over the coming months– and then later, from the whole country. Those disputes may well become a lot more intense in the months ahead. I would feel a lot more reassured if an explicit role for the UN had been written into this US troop withdrawal agreement– both to help the Baghdad government mediate any internal disputes and also, even more importantly, to help build a structure of agreements among Iraq’s neighbors to ensure that none feel they need to intervene militarily inside Iraq for whatever reason or pretext.
I note, however, that there is nothing to stop the Baghdad government from requesting such help from the UN (or, the Arab League; but that wouldn’t necessarily be the best way to draw Iran and Turkey into the needed negotiation.) Plus, the UN has a small but possibly quite effective presence inside Iraq, that could certainly be increased as necessary.
… Anyway, bottom line here: All of us who want to see the “rule of law” and rules of basic good, respectful behavior applied in the interactions among the world’s different nations should applaud this accord because it gives the US government no lasting reward for the act of international aggression it committed against the government and people of Iraq in 2003. We can still all work for more accountability for the US officials responsible for that act of aggression, and for some form of adequate reparations to be made to all those who have suffered from their heinous decision.
But seeing Washington being denied the chance to reap any direct and overt longterm political fruits from that act of aggression is an excellent first step.