So Cheney might be trying to persuade the largely-client government in Egypt to help pull the Bush administration’s burning chestnuts out of the fire in Iraq?? [That’s an Arabic-language link; hat-tip for it to Juan Cole.]
Or, is the story that Cheney is trying to set the conditions for a large-scale conventional war inside Iraq between Iranian and Arab armies?
It certainly wouldn’t be the first time that troops deployed on so-called “peacekeeping” missions have actually been sent to further sordid political interests, or that such troops have themselves become embroiled in the conflict they were allegedly trying to peacekeep.
I remain pretty confident however that despite the many ways in which the Mubarak government in Egypt is dependent on Washington, and the many means of leverage that Washington has over it, the Cairo regime is not about to fall for such a scheme– even if it does come dressed up in the guise of “saving the Sunnis of Iraq from being over-run by the Shiites”, or whatever.
It is possible– though by no means inevitable– that the day may come when the Sunni Arabs of Iraq might need some major physical protection, and “saving”. If that day comes, then it should of course be the legitimacy of the United Nations that is brought to bear on the issue, not the Machiavellian maneuverings of imperial Washington.
However, we are still some what distant from that day. As this Reuters piece yesterday noted, the country’s politically dominant United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) list is still locked in internal negotiations over who will represent it at the prime ministerial level. This, contrary to so many recent expressions in the western media (including Juan Cole’s blog) of the assumption that SCIRI’s man, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, would easily win the job. As I have noted since Dec. 20, that hasn’t necessarily been true.
The outcome of the intra-UIA struggle will have a huge impact on the approach pursued by the next Iraqi “government”. If SCIRI wins, we can expect an exacerbation of Shiite-Sunni hostility. If Jaafari wins, we can expect much mor weight to be given to the approach of followers of Moqtada Sadr– which is still one of building active alliances and coalitions with the Sunnis, rather than seeking only to settle past scores (real and imagined) against them.
That’s why I have always said that one of the big narratives inside post-election Iraq is the question of what happens inside SCIRI. (Self-correction, Friday: Oops, sorry, I meant “inside the UIA.”)
That is why I say, too, today, that there may well be a chance for an inter-sect entente inside Iraq that can save the country and the region from all-out sectarian war.
A couple of other quick points:
(1) Most Egyptians, though devote Muslims, and Sunnis, are not particularly hostile to Shiites. Indeed, some of their country’s most intriguing and powerful history was tied up with various Egyuptian rulers who were Shiites; and artefacts and expressions of Shiite popular culture are widespread inside Egypt.
(2), It may or may not be true, as Juan says, that most Arab states fear Iran’s development of a bomb. (What are they going to tell the Americans, anyway?) But recent polling of public opinion in the Arab states of the Gulf region showed a high and fairly surprising level of support for the Iranian nuclear program there, with respondents seeing it as the best way to achieve some “balance” in the region with Israel’s existing nuclear arsenal.