The Prez and his people continue to crow to the US citizenry about the Iraqi negotiators’ “agreement” on the text of a Constitution– even while Viceroy Zal Khalilzad is also reported by AP as saying that further “edits” might be made to the text.)
I would be very happy if the Bushies could somehow just “declare victory” and, more to the point, pull all the US troops speedily out of Iraq. But they aren’t about to do that. Indeed, in the US press today, administration people were quoted as saying there would be an increased troop deployment at least through January, to try to “assure safety” for both the October referendum and the December election.
The administration’s entire attempt at the political reconstitution of Iraq is crumbling into chaos with every minute that passes.
Is there the text of a constitution– or not?
Has the conclusion of an agreement on this text met the (arbitrarily made-in-the-USA) TAL deadline– or not?
Should it be the Prime Minister who represents “Iraq” at important international gatherings like next month’s UN Summit– or not?
Indeed, is there even an elected Iraqi Transitional Assembly in place in Baghdad these days– or not?
The answers to all these questions appear to be “no.” (How many of you went to the link that Juan Cole provided that went to this Reuters story about the National Assembly not even nowadays being able to reach the required quorum to make a decision? That’s a reveealing and sobering piece of reporting.)
Some people on JWN and elsewhere have asked, quite reasonably, what anyone’s specific objections are to the text of the constitution. As I understand it, nearly all Arab Sunnis in Iraq and an unknown (but probably not trivial) number of other Iraqis have two kinds of objections to the constitution:
(1) They object to specific clauses (or absences) in its text. Most of these center around the decentralization question– the devolution of powers previously held by the central government to the provinces or the new entity of “regions.”
In particular there is opposition to Art. 110, part 2, which states “The federal government and the governments of the producing regions and provinces together will draw up the necessary strategic policies to develop oil and gas wealth…” This mandates central government power-sharing with the regions in the case of new (but not existing) oil developments. Also, Art. 150 states that contracts that the Kurdish region has already, earlier, concluded are effective; and the Kurdish has already– according to a rceent piece in Al-Hayat signed a number of oil-development contracts in recent years.
There is also objection to the absence from the text of any mention of Iraq being “part of the Arab world.” (This could be a concern to people who are worried about Kurdish separatism– but also those worried about Iran’s influence in the new order.)
(2) In addition to those and other objections on matters of the content of the constitution, many Iraqis– and certainly, nearly all Sunni Iraqi leaders and personalities– have expressed very strong objections to the way the constitution negotiations have been conducted. Especially, as they see it, the fact that the “final” draft– or as it now turns out, perhaps the “near-final” draft– was rammed through by Khalilzad acting in concert only with the Kurds and with the pro-SCIRI Shia.
There are all kinds of other allegations of misdoing out there, as well, including reports of massive bribes being offered by the Americans and taken by some Iraqi pols.
I think these objections to the process of constitution-making are much more serious than the objections to the content of draft now being discussed.
To succeed, this constitution– like any other in a situation of radical transition– needs to be seen by the vast majority of the electorate involved as being the result of a credible and legitimate negotiation. So far, this looks far from being the case with the various pieces of paper being floated around Iraq.
Credible? Legitimate? Negotiation?
I don’t think so… Especially not on a day in which US forces were reported as having killed 47 people in an air-strike in the west of the country.
The problem with the “negotiation” over the Iraqi constitution at this point has little to with the representativity or otherwise, or the degree of organization or otherwise, of the various Iraqi parties to it. (Though over the long haul those are certainly legitimate concerns.) It has to do with the credibility and legitimacy of its US sponsors– in the eyes of the Sunnis, and others.
Hint to the Bush administration: “You don’t win ‘legitimacy’ as a political-diplomatic coordinating force through the barrel of a gun. All you win that way is continued enmity, strife, suffering, and division.”
You’d think they might have learned that lesson with their brutal and unnecessary escalation against Fallujah, last November? But no. Now it looks as if the preparations for the October referendum and the election to follow might similarly include US escalation rather than any attempt at skilled and inclusive diplomacy.
(You also might think that at a time when their faithful friend Hosni Mubarak is up for re-election in Egypt, they might have tried to avoid arousing Sunni passions throughout the Arab world… But again: no. What do they care?)
A tragedy, a tragedy. With these cynical and deeply ignorant people in charge in Washington, the future can only bring further terrible suffering to the Iraqis– and also, to use Americans.