Category: Iran-Iraq

Most news accounts of the reaction of Iranians to Saddam Hussein’s hanging have spoken of the glee with which Iranians at many different levels of society greeted the news. For example, AFP’s Hiedeh Farmani wrote from Tehran that,

Top foreign affairs officials and ordinary Iranians alike, many of them veterans of the 1980-1988 conflict, applauded the execution even though Saddam was never tried over the
Iran-Iraq war.
“With regards to Saddam’s execution, the Iraqi people are the victorious ones, as they were victorious when Saddam fell,” Deputy Foreign Minister Hamid Reza Asefi said, according to the IRNA news agency…
Ordinary Iranians did not mince words in applauding the execution of a man whose actions they blame for taking the lives of loved ones and leaving countless others wounded.
“When I heard the news I was so thrilled I let go of the steering wheel and applauded. His fate should serve as a good lesson to any dictator,” said Saeed Raufi, 53, a war veteran and former fighter plane pilot.
Leila Sharifi, a 27-year-old advertising executive, grew up in the western city of Kermanshah close to the border, which was a frequent target of Iraqi air raids.
“I hated him so much. I would have liked to put the noose around his neck myself. Execution served him right,” she said.

Etc., etc.
But here is a different reaction, from Karim Sadjadpour, who is the chief Iran-affairs analyst for the International Crisis Group:

When as an Iranian passport holder I felt a strange but profound sympathy for Saddam watching him being executed—the same man who instigated a war which produced 500,000 Iranian casualties, attacked Iranians with chemical weapons, and whose last words were “down with the Persians”–I can only imagine what a Sunni Arab feels…
I’ve always disagreed with the notion that there exists an inherent hostility between Sunnis and Shia and believe this issue has been misunderstood and exaggerated as of late—as if Sunnis come out of the womb hating Shia and vice-versa. But the vengeful and sectarian fashion in which Saddam was killed may be the tipping point for a sustained sectarian war—Sunni rage against the Shia, followed by Shia reprisals (or vice-versa)–both inside and outside Iraq. I’ve read several reports thus far of pro-Saddam rallies in various Arab capitals where his supporters (who have suddenly mushroomed) rail against the nefarious “Persians” (code for Shia), and vow revenge. The NYT ran a piece yesterday saying that as a reaction to Saddam’s death many more Sunnis are now sympathetic to the insurgency.
In my opinion the country that benefited the least from the way in which Saddam was executed (apart from Iraq of course) is Iran. Iran’s leadership aspires to be the vanguard of the entire Ilamic world, not just the Shia world, and the last thing they want is a divided umma and rising Sunni enmity towards Shia and Persians.

I have always had respect for the intellectual level of Sadjadpour’s work as an alayst. I think that this latest comment of his– which was made to a private group and is reproduced here with his permission– shows that he brings a noticeable level of humanistic understanding to his work, too.

So today, I heard the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Sayyed Mohammad Khatami, give
a prepared
lecture
to a small audience at the University of Virginia.  I had submitted a question in advance, as we were invited to do.  And since only three questions were submitted,
at the end of the lecture they all got asked.  

Mine was, “As a neighbor of Iraq’s and someone who cares about the wellbing
of the Iraqi people, do you think it is in their best interests that the
US army stay in Iraq or leave?”

Khatami gave a nuanced answer but soon came to the point: “If you ask
me should the Americans leave tomorrow, I’d say ‘No, don’t do it’.”

The reasoning behind his answer was as follows.

First, he noted that he would give a “personal response” to the question.

“We were very opposed to the US invasion of Iraq,” he said. (He had been
President of Iran at the time, remember.)  Then he made a little joke
and said, “Of course, we were not opposed to the fact that they had removed
two of our greatest enemies from the scene!  [That would be the Taliban
and Saddam.]  But we were opposed to way it was done.”

He continued:

 I think for the Americans, going into Iraq was difficult,
but getting out will very tough indeed!  What America has done there
has increased terrorism, and maintaining the American presence there is very
expensive for you.  But the most horrible thing is the number of civilians
killed there every day.

At the time of the invasion, I was still President.  I proposed then
that the US should work closely with Iraq’s six neighbors and the UN to find
a solution to the problem of Iraq in the most economical and efficient way
possible.  My proposal was accepted by Kofi Annan, by Saudi Arabia–
and by Egypt, whom we had also approached.  But the US didn’t accept
our suggestion, and went ahead with its own plan, with the support of the
British government.

The result was a transfer of the problem of terrorism from Afghanistan to
Iraq.  The terrorists used that occupation there as an excuse to destabilize
Iraq.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism has risen to unprecedented
levels, in an unexpected way.  And meantime, the military occupation
there has cost the US government quite a lot.  The liberation of Kuwait
in 1991 was paid for by the Arab governments.  But this one is paid
for solely by the US.

So we are at a paradox.  The occupation must end so there can be peace.
 But also, you can’t leave the present Iraqi government at the mercy
of the terrorists.

If you ask me should the Americans leave tomorrow, I’d say ‘No, don’t do
it’.

The solution of America’s problem in Iraq can’t be unilateral.  It needs
the cooperation of the neighbors in the region and of the UN.

He alluded to the fact that this would most likely take some time to organize.

(I would note, for my part, that many people in Iran right now must
be just delighted to have 140,000 US soldiers strung out throughout Iraq
and playing the role of sitting ducks or “hostages to fate” in the event
the US should attack Iran militarily.  So why the heck would any Iranian
want the Americans to leave Iraq?)

—————

I’m afraid I don’t have the energy to give a fuller critique of the lecture
right now.  Another attendee made notes on the Q&A session, and
underlined the following highlights from Khatami’s answer to the other two
questions:

Continue reading “Khatami in Charlottesville, wary of too-rapid US exit from Iraq”

My latest column for al-Hayat was posted on their English-language website Thursday. I’m not sure which day it was in their Arabic edition, but most likely a little earlier…

Update Sunday a.m.: Actually it is in the October 9 edition. Thanks to Gilbert Achcar for that link.

In the column, I warned of the danger of another full-scale war breaking out between “Iran” (though perhaps, to be more specific, with some ethnic-Arab Shiites also in their camp) and the “Arab world”, with this war spurred by, and indeed also foreshadowed by, the existing grave Sunni-Shiite tensions inside Iraq.
From this perspective, the ghastly sectarian killings that are already taking place inside Iraq could just be a small prelude to what many countries in the region might see in the months ahead.
The “transmission belts”, if you like, for this magnification of sectarian strife, have already started to appear. We have had Jordan’s (Sunni) King Abdullah II warning of the dangers of “Shiite crescent” starting to operate throughout the whole Mashreq… We have had a high official in Iraq’s (Shiite-dominated) transitional government publicly deriding Saudi Arabia’s extremely urbane– and indeed, Princeton-educated– Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, as “a bedouin riding a camel.” I think the Iraqi official in question was not, actually, a Shiite but a Kurdish Iraqi (and therefore probably himself a Sunni). Still, that kind of an insult, voiced in public from Baghdad evidently stung a lot.
In my Hayat column, I recall that during the Iranian-Arab war that continued throughout most of the 1980s, “around one million people—nearly all of them Muslims—died and the economies of two sizeable countries were devastated.” I did not recall there, though perhaps I should have, that the policies of the Regan administration did a lot to foment that war and keep it going when its energy seemed to lag. Back then, Washington shoveled arms shipments to whichever of the two sides looked as though it might lose the war– including during Donald Rumsfeld’s notorious 1983 visit to Baghdad and later the whole Iran-contra arms shipment episode…
In the column, I look at the broader dynamics of the current US-Iran interaction, inasmuch as it’s an important factor in the whole regional dynamics of the Gulf.
Up near the lead of the column, I wrote,

I am hopeful that cool heads will prevail, and that ways can be found for everyone’s fears and concerns to be aired, for differences to be discussed and resolved through means other than warfare and killing, and for intra-regional hot-lines and other mechanisms to be put in place to limit and prevent any escalation. I remain hopeful even though I know that inside Iraq today, sectarian and apparently sectarian killings are already being perpetrated on a completely unacceptable scale.

Am I actually hopeful today that cooler heads will prevail? The trouble is, is it so darned hard to remain hopeful when the daily news is saturated with news of killing and sectarian strife. We really need to find ways to reverse the dynamic whereby despair, grief, and fear can so easily fuel more and more of the same and then also the kinds of escalatory and nihilistic actions that can easily flow from that…

Attentive JWN readers will remember that a while back I was asking some questions about the nature of the Iranian regime’s interests in Iraq. Today, a friend referred me to this March 2005 report from the International Crisis Group (registration required.)
In the Execituve Summary of this document, the ICG analysts write:

The starting point to understand Iran’s role must be a proper assessment of its interests. These are relatively clear and, for the most part, openly acknowledged. Tehran’s priority is to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat, whether of a military, political or ideological nature, and whether deriving from its failure (its collapse into civil war or the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan with huge implications for Iran’s disaffected Kurdish minority) or success (its consolidation as an alternative democratic or religious model appealing to Iran’s disaffected citizens). Iran consequently is intent on preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity, avoiding all-out instability, encouraging a Shiite-dominated, friendly government, and, importantly, keeping the U.S. preoccupied and at bay. This has entailed a complex three-pronged strategy: encouraging electoral democracy (as a means of producing Shiite rule); promoting a degree of chaos but of a manageable kind (in order to generate protracted but controllable disorder); and investing in a wide array of diverse, often competing Iraqi actors (to minimise risks in any conceivable outcome).
These interests and this strategy, more than a purported attempt to mould Iraq in its own image, explain Iran’s involvement, its intelligence collection, its provision of funds (and possibly weapons), and perhaps its occasional decision to back armed movements. They explain, too, the paradox of Iran’s simultaneous ties to Iraq’s political elite, which is hoping to stabilise the country, to Shiite clerics, who aim to Islamicise it, and to some rebellious political activists or insurgents, bent on fuelling unrest.
Finally, they explain why Iran so far has held back rather than try to undermine any chance of success. But this relatively cautious attitude may not last forever. Above all, it will depend on the nature of relations between Washington and Tehran: so long as these remain unchanged, Iran is likely to view events in Iraq as part of its broader rivalry with — and heightened fears of — the U.S. Highly suspicious of a large U.S. presence on its borders, concerned about Washington’s rhetoric, and fearing its appetite for regime change, Tehran holds in reserve the option of far greater interference to produce far greater instability.

Actually, as I write this, I’m waiting for the ICG website’s slightly byzantine “registration” process to complete… (Does it know I exist? Do I exist? Am I who I say I am? Beats me… ) So I’ll just have to go with the Executive Summary for now.
One of the first things that strikes me is how incredibly similar this description of Iran’s policies toward today’s Iraq is to the set of policies Syria has pursued toward Lebanon over the past 30-plus years.
In both cases, you’ll note, you have a weighty regional power flanked by a less weighty, somewhat “flighty”, and potentially very unstable neighbor with which it has many historic ties and also a historic record of antagonism. The weightier power is in a long-term situation of hostility with one or more key wetsern powers; and these western powers have gotten themselves into a situation of intervening masively in the affairs of the less weighty neighbor
So it’s complex. There are ties of blood and ideology between the two countries concerned, but also strong resentments of blood and ideology. And overlaid onto that is a contest that the weightier local power has with “the west” which involves political stakes that — for that power– is, or seem to be, truly existential.
In the immediate short- and perhaps medium-term, what ensues from Teheran is a classic realist “balancing” policy inside Iraq, as the ICG summary noted. But once the powers-that-be in Teheran judge that balance of power vis-a-vis “the west” has started to tip in their favor–? Who knows?
Well, I’ll wait to post further thoughts on this topic till the ICG’s full-site “registration” process has gone through its mysterious workings. I also have a question out there on an interesting list to which I belong– the “G2K” list– regarding whether opinion inside Iran is actually united around policy toward Iraq, or not… Maybe I’ll get fuirther answers on that one in the days ahead?
Commenter Albert Kwong suggested on JWN ten days or so ago that I ask Dr. Abdel-Aziz Sachedina about this when I see him here in Charlottesville… Well, I did go to the talk Aziz gave here about the Iranian elections; and it was very interesting. (Notes from it temporarily misplaced, I’m afraid.) However, I couldn’t stay through the end of the talk and never got a chance to ask my question on this particular topic. And now I gather Aziz is heading back for Mashhad?
C’est la vie. But anyway, I’m pretty sure some of my other potential sources of information on this will come up with some good information and analysis over the days ahead.
You have to admit, though, it is an interesting set of questions.

So finally, 39 months into Iraq’s “liberation”, there is some hope that an outside power will be able to help it get back on its feet.
That would be mega-neighbor Iran… And by an amazing coincidence it would not be the distant (and politically disengaged) US.
AFP tells us that,

–
Iran signed a deal with
Iraq to exchange crude for refined products desperately needed by its western neighbour as a result of persistent insurgent sabotage.
The two countries’ oil ministers — Bijan Namdar Zanganeh for Iran and Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum for Iraq — signed the deal as Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari wrapped up a landmark visit to the former foe, the Iranian oil ministry’s Shana news agency reported.
The swap will require three new pipelines across the neighbours’ southern border, which will be funded and built by Iran within 10 months, Zanganeh said on Monday.
“The idea is for Iran to buy 150,000 barrels per day of Basra light crude. In return, Iran will provide petrol, heating oil and kerosene,” Zanganeh said, adding that the latter two products would come from Iranian refineries but that the petrol would have to be imported.

This, while Iranian ally Hizbullah (Lebanon) is now set to join the Lebanese government for the first time ever.
This is Hizbullah high-up Muhammad Fneish, who’ll be in a bit of a hot seat as Minister for Power and Water. But Hizbullah has a reputation for getting things done– and moreover, without the terrible cronyism and racketeering that have dogged ministerial management of the vital utilities for many decades.
The Foreign Minister will also be a Shiite– a professional diplomat who is not a member of any party, but deemed “acceptable” by both Hizbullah and the other main Shiite party, Amal.
Meanwhile back in Iraq– oh, sorry, I mean Iran– there is this from Monday’s edition of the pro-Khomeini daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Islamic republic):

News Service: “Sadun al-Dulaymi,” the Iraqi defense minister, who has
traveled to Tehran, said at a press conference accompanied by Admiral Shamkhani, our country’s defense minister: “I have come to Iran to ask for forgiveness and apologize for what Saddam did.” According to this report, the Iraqi defense minister also emphasized he has to ask forgiveness from Kuwait and all of Saddam’s victims.

Well, apologies for wrongdoing are always good– a vital social lubricant, I’d say. (Not that Mr. Dulaimi personally was in the Iraq government at the time… but still.)
Then, from the same source, translated by FBIS and sent to JWN by helpful reader WSH, this:

This report adds that Hojatoleslam val-Moslemin Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the president, also met with “Sadun al-Dulaymi,” the Iraqi defense minister, on Thursday. As reported by the president’s media affairs office, Mr Khatami referred to the hardships the Iranian people have endured for the sake of independence and liberty, and said: “The maturity and growth of the Iraqi nation in determining a transitional government and the elections they held are noteworthy.” The president considered Iraq’s move toward the establishment of democracy to be correct and expressed hope the move would continue with the will of the Iraqi nation…

Very bizarre. Khatami (who is on his way out, btw) seems to giving huge credit to the “political system” the US occupation has been running inside Iraq.
Well, I guess there’s a reason. Iran seems, after all, to be making huge geopolitical gains, day after day, in Iraq and elsewhere, with every days that passes so long as the US troops are still deployed– in an extremely vulnerable fashion– throughout the whole of Iraq.
It’s amazing how rapidly the geopolitical balance has been tipping inside Iraq in recent weeks. Watch that space.