Bush’s project in Iraq: Is the end nigh?

Yesterday, I was back on the street corner again with our local weekly
peace presence, after having been out of town the previous Thursday.  Yesterday,
too, we shifted our timing as we always do when the clocks change: in winter
we vigil from 4:30 through 5:30 p.m., and in summer we do it from 5 through
6.  So yesterday’s vigil was the first one under the summer time rules.
 Many of the drivers who come through our busy intersection outside
the Federal Office Building there on a regular basis– those who came between
5:30 and 6– hadn’t seen us for six months.

It’s been an interesting experience, standing there throughout the years,
seeing the seasons turn.

We got a fabulous response!  People were honk-honk-honking for peace
constantly and repetitively throughout our whole hour there.  (One of
the nice things about this action is that at this intersection, traffic from
only one of the four approach roads is allowed to pass through it at any
one time. So all the drivers coming in from the other three directions have
to sit at the lights there and wait their turn.  As they do so, they
can hear the honks coming from other drivers, and this often spurs them to
join in.  It becomes a particular form of a public “conversation”–
and most importantly, people who are there who are against the war can reconfirm
that they are indeed not alone in their feelings.)

I would say that throughout 2006 so far, the amount of anti-war honking
has increased in an almost linear way, week by week.

On several occasions throughout the past couple of years, my friend and
co-vigiller Heather has said to me, “Helena, I can’t believe we’re still
here.  Don’t tell me we’ll still be here this time next year!”  And
I’ve always said to her, “Heather, expect to be here for the very long haul.”
 Heather wasn’t there yesterday.  But as I peered into every car
that passed trying to establish eye contact and see who all these people
were who were honking for us, I suddenly thought, “Hey, maybe we won’t
have to be here this time next year.  Maybe the Bushies really can
be persuaded to pull all the troops out of Iraq before April 2007.”  And
since then, this feeling has started to take a stronger hold of me.

I’ll note later on that even if this proves to be the case, there are
many other aspects of the administration’s militarism that we still need
to be very concerned about.  Not least among them, the prospect that
they might seek to “cover” a chaotic military collapse in Iraq, politically,
by launching an opportunistic military attack against Iran….  As
in, the way the Reagan folks– who of course included both Cheysfeld and
Rumney– “covered” their withdrawal from Lebanon by invading Grenada, back
in 1983.)

But first, I want to pull together all the pieces of evidence I currently
have that indicate that the end-point of the US project in Iraq might be
closer at hand than I had previously thought.

1.  US opinion has been swinging consistently against
the war this year. And this is not simply the evidence from
my expreiences on the street corner.  If you look at the AP/Ipsos opinion-poll
figures here
, you’ll see that the the public’s judgments on the Bushites’ handling
of the Iraq issue run as follows:

Disapprove (%) 
Approve (%)
Early Jan ’06
58
39
Early Feb ’06
60
38
Early Mar ’06
58
39
Early Apr ’06
63
35

Compare those figures with, for example, the early-January
of 2005 figures of 54 percent disapprove/ 44 percent approve.

2.  Throughout 2004 and 2005, the US public was continuously being
promised that there were political ‘watershed events’ ahead in Iraq that would
make the US invasion and occupation of the country all look (relatively) worthwhile.
 Those events included the “handover of sovereignty” (!) in 2004; the
holding of the January ’05 election; the August ’05 “completion” of the Iraqi
constitution; the Iraq-wide referendum on the same; and then the holding
of the “definitive” election for a “permanent” Iraqi government in December
2006.  Those pronmises, and indeed the staging of all of those events
more or less as promised, kept a non-trivial chunk of US opinion on board
the administration’s project in Iraq.  (Regardless of the effect of these
events on opinion in Iraq, which for the Bushites’ purposes is almost an
irrelevant consideration.)

American people sincerely wanted to believe that something good could
come out of the whole venture in Iraq– and the Bushies were promising them
that these good things were “just ahead”.

But since December15, 2005 they’ve run out of politically stage-managed rabbits
to pull out of their magician’s hat.  Indeed, they haven’t even been
able to “win” the formation of an Iraqi government as a result of the December
election.  (Of course, as I’ve argued elsewhere recently, they could
have gotten an Iraqi government formed if they’d been prepared to go
with the Iraqi people’s duly decided choice
. But they haven’t been ready
to do that, because “the people’s choice”, Ibrahim Jaafari, is not their
chosen puppet.  And furthermore, he has also committed himself to seeking
a firm timetable for a — presumably complete– US troop withdrawal, which
they don’t like.)

The US-caused (or at the very least, US-aggravated) “impasse” in the formation
of an Iraqi government accountable to the elected parliament there has caused
great hardships for the Iraqi people.  But it has also caused great
political problems for the Bush administration
, who now have literally
no more political rabbits to pull out of their Iraqi hat.

3.  Based on my close following of both the events in Iraq and the Bush
administration’s record there over the past three years, I conclude the following:
(a) they still really don’t have a clue about what’s going on there– apart
from whatever it is that their legions of bought-and-paid-for lackeys choose
to tell them, and (b) at the political level they have no plan, workable
or otherwise, for how to get of the mess they’re in.  Let’s hope, at
the very least, that the military has some workable plans for peaceable force
extraction?

4.  There are mid-term elections coming up here in November.  To
try to stabilize the politically disastrous record of its Iraq project as
much as possible before then, the Bushies will need to have some non-trivial
“victory event” sometime before the end of September.  Ideally, from
their point of view, this should include the very visible return home of
a significant chunk of the soldiery currently deployed there– maybe 50,000
of them at a minimum.  “Welcome home” parades in major US cities, etc,
etc.  (But maybe they should not use the “Mission Accomplished”
banner and the flight-suit thing again.)

Even that might not do it– in terms of allowing the Republicans to win their
goal of keeping control over both Houses of Congress in November.  (Let’s
hope not!)  But of course, if they do pull a large chunk of the soldiery
out of Iraq before a reliably pro-US administration has been installed,
then the likelihood that such an administration could ever be installed there
will plummet to near-zero, and the likelihood of a really serious debacle
befalling the depleted forces that remain will also rise.  (It’s
a strange fact of the current US deployment in Iraq that the vast majority
of those troops have now been pulled back into performing purely “force
protection” tasks– i.e., guarding their own enclaves and supply-lines.)

…Anyway, based on the above confluence of what has been happening politically
inside Iraq with what has been happening politically inside the US– that
is why I now think it’s possible to conclude that the end of the US troop
presence in Iraq may well be nigh
.  Okay, that there is now, 
say, a 60% chance that all US troops will be out of Iraq by this time next
year.

Let’s check back in at that point and see how this prediction holds up, okay?

But if it does happen… if all our efforts out there on the street corners
of the real communities of the world, here in the more global arena of the
blogosphere, and everybody’s antiwar efforts from all around the world,
should show some real fruit… what then?  Do we declare victory and
go home?

No, of course not.  Firstly, as I mentioned above, we will need to redouble
our efforts to make sure that any withdrawal from Iraq (whether partial or
total) is not accompanied at the same time by any aggressive US military
adventure elsewhere.

Secondly, we really need to open up a serious discussion inside the US (and
outside it) on how we want to see the US’s relationship with the rest
of the world developing as the US project inside Iraq winds down
… Do
we US citizens really still think of ourselves as constituting an “indispensable
nation”, as Madeleine Albright used to say, or as one that has any kind of
“manifest destiny” to regulate the affairs of the rest of the world (as the
Bushies– and also many Democratic pols– have long aspired to do)?

And thirdly, we need to start having a much deeper kind of discussion on
what kind of a world it really is that we all– US citizens and that 96%
of humanity that makes up “the rest of the world”– seek to build over the
decades ahead.  Surely, it should be one that moves away decisively
from any toleration of warmaking or investment in the instruments of war;
that is truly committed to lifting up the conditions in which the world’s
poorest and most marginalized communities live, and giving those people full
voice in the regulation of the world’s affairs; and that seeks to erase both
the gross economic equalities that exist and the use of any economic or other
unfair advantage for purposes of coercion and social control?

So yes, we should keep all these longer-term goals in mind as we proceed.
 But meantime, I have to tell you, yesterday for the first time, mixed
in with the smell of the sweet spring blossoms over the road, I could also
for the first time in this long struggle against the Bushite project in Iraq
catch the faint scent of victory ahead.

Impasse in Iraq

Just one last thing before I “go” back to Africa today. Global Policy Forum has just– with my permission– put up on their website a short text I wrote for a private listserve yesterday, that draws together things I’ve been writing on JWN in the past ten days to provide an explanation of what’s going on politically in Iraq.
It might seem a little circular if I put the whole text up here? But anyway, y’all can read it there and then come back and discuss it in the Comments zone here, if you so desire.
(I should note that since I wrote that, I’ve had a couple of further thoughts on the issue which would add further wrinkles to the analysis. But I totally need to get back to my Africa piece and I shan’t come back to JWN until it’s done… )

Iran, the nuclear issue, the NPT

Javad Zarif, the Iranian ambassador to the UN, has a significant op-ed piece on the nuclear issue in todays NYT. Titled “We Do Not Have a Nuclear Weapons Program”, the piece says:

    There need not be a crisis. A solution to the situation is possible and eminently within reach.
    Lost amid the rhetoric is this: Iran has a strong interest in enhancing the integrity and authority of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has been in the forefront of efforts to ensure the treaty’s universality. Iran’s reliance on the nonproliferation regime is based on legal commitments, sober strategic calculations and spiritual and ideological doctrine. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, has issued a decree against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.
    Let me be very clear. Iran defines its national security in the framework of regional and international cooperation and considers regional stability indispensable for its development. We are party to all international agreements on the control of weapons of mass destruction. We want regional stability. We have never initiated the use of force or resorted to the threat of force against a fellow member of the United Nations. Although chemical weapons have been used on us, we have never used them in retaliation — as United Nations reports have made clear. We have not invaded another country in 250 years.

Zarif makes a potent argument. One potential problem, though: the Bush administration has been running away from the NPT faster than a person could ever hope to run from the fallout from a nuclear weapon… Yesterday, Condi Rice was up on the Hill trying to drum up support for the deal the Prez reached with India recently, that would reward India in a major way for having bypassed the NPT completely and produced its own, now well-demonstrated and very robust nuclear weapons program.
Worse still, that WaPo report and the NYT report both said that Kerry and Biden said they were inclined to support the deal. Maybe we should write the obituary for the NPT and move on? No! That is ways too scary a prospect… I really think we all need to work together to find a way to save (and indeed strengthen) it. And we should fight for implementation of its Article 6, too.

Iraq: Kerry, Cole, Ignatius

I’ve been working on a conference paper on (mainly) African topics these past couple of days. So I failed to produce “instant” commentary re the plan that John Kerry proposed for exiting from Iraq, in yesterday’s NYT.
Maybe I’ll come back to it later. But here, I’ll just note the following:

    (1) Kerry has come a long way since the time– not so long ago!– when he was urging the administration to deal with the Iraq situation by increasing the troop levels.
    (2) He is now urging “a schedule for withdrawing American combat forces by year’s end.” This is good– even though it’s not spelled out exactly as being the “speedy, total, and generous” US withdrawal that I’ve been urging for nearly a year now. I’m particularly worried about the qualifier “combat” that Kerry put there… What other kinds of US forces are there that might remain according to his plan? Perhaps special ops forces, or MPs, or…
    (3) In addition, when Kerry advocates this withdrawal schedule, it’s still conditional on the Iraqis “putting together a government” first….
    (4) In fact, this business of placing conditions and demands on the Iraqis is integral to the general approach of his piece, which is to seek to “cover” what is actually a call for (some kind of) withdrawal behind a lot of imperialist-sounding rhetorical bombast… “Iraqi politicians should be told… !”
    (5) But this is precisely the point at which his approach is shown to be thin, blustery rhetoric, because what they are to be told is this: “that they have until May 15 to put together an effective unity government or we will immediately withdraw our military.” Excellent idea! So, John, why don’t we just make plans to “immediately” (i.e., as rapidly as possible) withdraw the military anyway, and forego all the bluff and bluster?? And not just make the withdrawal plans, but also announce and implement them?
    (6) For all the operational thin-ness of what Kerry proposed, at least it’s an important development in the upper ranks of the Democratic Party leadership that he has moved this far toward a pro-withdrawal position. (Even if he still feels he has to cover his behind with the rhetorical bombast.)
    (7) So when will Hillary and the rest of the party leadership be following him?

There are actually a couple of other things from yesterday that I want to comment on when I have time.
One was Juan Cole’s argument that,

    Exit is easy. Exit with honor will be the hardest thing the United States of America has ever done in its over two centuries of history. Exit without honor will endanger the security of the United States for decades.

I’d love to engage with Juan on what exactly he means by “honor.” I guess I have no plans to see him any time soon; but it will be a good thing to talk about.
For my part, I’m fairly distrustful when guys start to talk about “honor” in any context– but particularly in the context of a still-aspiring world hegemon like the mainstream US, it sounds like a cover for keeping the hegemonic aspirations well in place. Personally, I believe the longterm interests of the US citizenry are best served if we seek to reintegrate ourselves into the world community on a respectful, nonviolent, and egalitarian basis that recognizes that actually, we make up only around 4% of humankind… So any aspiration to act hegemonic, boss other people around, change their regimes, invade their countries, etc, is one of pure arrogance (and actually, of zero “honor.”) And in the longer-than-tomorrow term it is doomed not only to fail but to bring great human suffering as it does so.
… In addition yesterday, there was an intriguing piece about Iraqi politics from David Pugnacious in the WaPo, that featured reports of phone conversations he’d had with Zal Khalilzad and Barham Saleh, among others.
It includes this:

    Khalilzad recounted the items that the Iraqi political factions have agreed on in private negotiations over the past month. On Sunday, the leaders signed off on the last of these planks of a government of national unity. The Iraqis have saved the hardest issue for last — the names of the politicians who will hold the top jobs. That bitter fight will play out over the next several weeks.
    An example of what’s in these unity documents is a passage that calls for “a timetable so the Iraqi forces assume the security tasks completely and end the mission of the multinational force in Iraq.” That timetable language is vague, but it would allow the new government to say it is committed to ending the American occupation. Interestingly, U.S. officials said yesterday that this passage on troop withdrawal is consistent with Bush administration policy.

Just worth spending an extra moment pondering there: the amazingly hubris-revealing content of that first sentence… But all of that excerpt is very, very interesting.
And then there’s this:

    the Iraqi factions agreed on two bodies that weren’t mentioned in the constitution. They endorsed a 19-member consultative national security council, which represents all the political factions. And they agreed on a ministerial security council, which will have the Sunni deputy prime minister as its deputy chairman. Shiite leaders have tentatively agreed that the defense minister will be a Sunni. And for the key job of interior minister, the dominant Shiite faction, known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, appears ready to accept the replacement of one of its members by an independent Shiite, perhaps Qasim Dawood, a man acceptable to most Sunni leaders.

Interesting, huh? Qasim Dawood (a.k.a. variously as Kassim Daoud, etc etc) was of course the person who last week was reported to be the first of the UIA parliamentarians to speak out openly against Jaafari’s nomination as PM…
I’ll write more about all of this– and more about the real reasons behind the political ‘impasse’ in Iraq, as best I understand them– as soon as I can. For now, I have to get back (conceptually) to Africa.

Jordan to host religious leaders’ gathering on Iraq

AFP is reporting that Jordan will be hosting a gathering of Islamic religious leaders April 22, to discuss reconciliation in Iraq.
Actually, I’m going to be in Jordan April 17-21. I’ll be giving a lecture at the inauguration of a new U.N. University leadership institute there.
Convening this religious leaders’ gathering seems to me like a good move. (You can read my recent paper on “Religion and Violence” to see how I identified the important kinds of contribution that religious precepts, practices, and institutions can make to peacemaking.)
AFP quotes an official statement as saying that the gathering,

    will be attended by “a large number of key Iraqi religious leaders who represent the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish Iraqis”…
    The conference will be placed under the patronage of King Abdullah II who will “join his voice to those of the Iraqi religious and tribal leaders in calling for an end to violence and religious tensions in Iraq.” [tribal leaders??? Well, I guess that’s a Hashemite thang… ~HC]
    It is expected to produce a statement signed by all the participants and indicating “that there is no religious legal basis for hostility and fighting among Shiites and Sunnis,” it said.
    “The tension and fighting underway in Iraq is taking cover behind religious and sectarian motives … which is not justified by our noble Muslim religion,” the statement said.
    Religious leaders from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and Turkey, as well as from other Arab countries are also expected to attend.
    Participants are to include Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi of the Cairo-based Al-Azhar, the highest authority in Sunni Islam, as well as Arab League secretary general Amr Mussa.

Zahhar, Annan, China

So Palestinian FM Mahmoud Zahhar has sent an intriguing letter to UN chief Kofi Annan. In the portions of the text seen by the AFP reporter, Zahhar assures Annan that,

    “We are looking for freedom and independence side by side with our neighbours and we are ready for serious discussions with the quartet… We look forward to living in peace and security, as all countries in the world, and that our people enjoy freedom and independence side-by-side with all our neighbours in this holy place.”

Note that he does not say that the PA government is ready for any kind of discussions with Israel.
The letter does mention the two-state solution that is favored by the international community, including the Quartet of the US, UN, EU, and Russia. But it does not express any actual attitude toward the concept, either for or against. It merely notes that, “Israeli procedures in the occupied territories will put an end to all hopes to reach a final settlement based on the two-state solution.”
Of course, if the Hamas-led government is really prepared to live, “in peace and security… side-by-side with all our neighbours”, you would think that should include Israel. But he’s not spelling it out.
Soon, anyway, Zahhar will be off to visit China.
China’s representative to the Palestinians, Yang Wei Guo, reportedly

    said that China respects the “democratic” choice of the Palestinians, referring to Hamas’ election victory two months ago.
    “We discussed the joint relations and the bilateral projects and we hope to continue and strengthen the cooperation and friendship in the future,” he said. “China was and will continue to support the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore their national rights.”

Israeli escalations against Gaza

Read Laila el-Haddad’s account of how Israeli F-16s today bombed President Mahmoud Abbas’s presidential compound near the area of downtown Gaza where she and her family live:

    Israeli fighter jets have been roaring forbodingly, and with great intensity, over Gaza’s skies all morning. So we figured it was only a matter of time before an aerial attack ensued. Predictably, we soon heard two consecutive powerful explosions that rocked the city-again we wondered, sonic boom or bomb attack? Since we could hear the jets roaring beforehand we could only assume it was a real attack.
    The local radio stations and Palestine TV confirmed this: Mahmud Abbas’s presidential compound was under attack. Israeli F-16s bombarded Abbas’s helicopter launchpad/runway which is located near his office in the presidential compound in Gaza City, and another location in northern Gaza that security forces use to train.
    Hospitals reported two injuries.
    So the question becomes, why would they attack the presidential compound? Most certainly, there are no Qassam rockets being launched from there…

Further north, nearer the area from which renegade Palestinian factions intermittently launch extremely primitive Qassam rockets into Israel, a 42-year-old Palestinian man was killed by the Israeli assault as he stood in a field. And seven Palestinians, including a 6-month-old baby were injured– two of them reportedly in a critical condition.
That AFP report cited there continues:

    [President] Abbas condemned the air strike and called on the international community to intervene to stop the violence, in a statement issued by his office in the West Bank town of Ramallah.
    “Continued arbitrary shelling in Gaza is an unjustified escalation,” he later told reporters.
    “They (Israel) are trying to complicate the life of Palestinians and finish destroying Palestinian institutions after destroying so many in previous years.
    “I address myself to Arab countries, the UN, Russia and the European Union to explain that these acts complicate the lives of Palestinians and have serious repercussions on the humanitarian, social and economic situation.”
    An Israeli military spokeswoman said a wave of air strikes was ordered after Palestinian militants fired four rockets that exploded near Israeli communities without causing damage or casualties.
    “We attacked an open area that it is unpopulated inside Gaza City. There was no intention of attacking the building that is near it,” she told AFP.
    “We wanted to pass a message. We want to make it understood that Israel and the IDF (army) will not tolerate the firing of Qassam rockets,” she added.
    Israeli strikes have repeatedly failed to put a halt to the rocket attacks, with the armed wing of the ultra-radical Islamic Jihad claiming to have fired five rockets towards the southern town of Ashkelon on Tuesday. The army could confirm four rockets had been fired without causing injuries or damage.

I can certainly tell you, from my recent trip to Gaza, that the presidential compound is surrounded by residential buildings. Dropping bombs on it from F-16s certainly provides no indication at all that the IAF exercized the “due diligence” required of it under international humanitarian law, that in its military operations it limit itself to striking only legitimate military targets while also taking active steps to avoid civilian casualties.
Anyway, I urge you all to read the rest of Laila’s post about life in Gaza, too.

… And Adel makes three

Iraqi political chameleon Adel Abdul-Mahdi today joined his UIA colleagues Qasem Daoud and Jalaleddine al-Saghir in calling openly on Ibrahim Jaafari to withdraw his candidacy for the PM post.
So that makes three of the UIA’s 128 National Assembly members who have thus far succumbed to intense US/UK arm-twisting to come out openly against Jaafari.
It is now 51 days since Jaafari was nominated, Feb. 12. At this rate– one open UIA defection won every 17 days– it will take the US/UK outside agitators “only” a total of 1,105 days to win the open defections of the 65 UIA members required to overturn the Jaafari nomination.
And 51 of those days have already passed… So “only” a further 1,056 days will be required for Washington to win its goal of having a compliant PM nominated by the UIA.
Why, that’s less than three years! Surely the Iraqi people can see what’s good for them and wait those further years before they get a government?? (Very heavy irony alert there.)
… Yes, of course I realize that Jaafari only originally won his February nomination by a margin of one vote. But that’s not the point here. The UIA people who are speaking out openly now against his nomination are doing so expressly against the wishes of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose few recent declarations on Iraqi political matters have all stressed the supreme need for his followers to maintain their political unity. That is why we haven’t seen a cascade of 63 UIA parliamentarians (those who voted against the Jaafari nomination back in February) all now streaming into the openly anti-Jaafari camp.
Once again, it seems to me, there is something about Ayatollah Sistani that the Americans just don’t get.
(And let’s face it, getting Adel Abdul-Mahdi to come out openly against Jaafari probably wasn’t terrifically difficult, since he has consistently been described by US officials as the person whom they would like to see in the PM post.)

Muqtada Sadr featured in Newsweek

At last an American MSM publication (other than JWN) seems to be starting to find the right way to approach the question of the continuing government-formation impasse in Iraq. Newsweek’s Rod Nordland has a mid-length piece in this week’s Newsweek titled Sadr Strikes. The subtitle is: Deadly Vision: U.S. forces once had the renegade cleric in their cross hairs. Now he’s too strong—and too popular—to confront.
And for good measure, alongside that article, they’re running this interview with Fatah al-Sheikh, described as “a trusted confidant of Moqtada al-Sadr and editor of the cleric’s personal newspaper, Ishraqat al-Sadr”.
Nordland is quite right to focus right now on the “kingmaking” role that Sadr now plays. He writes:

    The American military no longer talks about killing or capturing Sadr; in fact, they’re careful to not even point a finger of blame at him. Why not? In part because Iraq has become an unstable democracy, and Sadr has massive support where it counts—in the streets. He has also learned the art of crafting different messages for different audiences. Even while his black-clad militiamen struck at Sunni targets recently, Sadr took the moral high ground and appealed for calm. “It is one Islam and one Iraq,” he said.
    Sadr has joined the political process, with stunning results. The current prime minister, Ibrahim Jaafari, effectively owes his job to the renegade cleric. “Despite the fact that Sadr was not himself an elected official, he and his followers were able to play the role of ‘kingmaker’ within the Shiite coalition,” says Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Sadr’s group has 30 seats in the new assembly that was elected last December, but the Sadrist party is allied with a larger Shia coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance. With Sadr’s blessing, his followers cast the deciding vote making Jaafari the choice of the UIA for prime minister.

One of the refreshing things about the Nordland piece is that not once does he refer to SCIRI or its leader Abdul-Aziz Hakim as being “the most powerful force in Iraqi politics”, or the like. Indeed, he doesn’t mention either SCIRI or Hakim at all!
Boy, that makes a change, after all the pumping-up of SCIRI’s role we’ve heard from the US MSM over the past few months.
Here on JWN, I’ve been consistently noting the Sadrists’ success in the Dec. 15 election– back as long ago as this Jan. 1 post, this Jan. 20 post, and this Feb. 11 post. Or even this Dec. 22 post.
In all of those, I was leaning heavily on the detailed, expert work of the western world’s leading UIA-ologist, Reidar Visser, and also on my own other readings, gut feelings, and analysis… But meanwhile, Juan Cole and just about the whole of the US MSM have been continuing to parrot the description of SCIRI/Hakim as “the most powerful force in Iraq”, etc, etc….
All of which must have made it very difficult for anyone to understand why Zal Khalilzad was so unsuccessful in imposing his favored candidate (SCIRI’s Adel Abdul-Mahdi) on the rest of the UIA, as I noted here recently. In this early-February analysis, Visser provided his own best explanation for the misperceptions of western analysts, most of which he attributed to SCIRI’s fairly successful, west-oriented (or should I say occidented?) media operation…
But enough of my longstanding “Why doesn’t anyone listen to me and Reidar?” rant. What about Nordland’s piece?
Well, for starters, he’d have done well to have read or spoken to Reidar Visser about all this… a long time ago! As long ago as early February, Visser calculated that the Sadrists (pro-Muqtada plus Fadila flavors) accounted for a total of 45 seats— as opposed to SCIRI’s total of 29. (And as opposed to Nordland’s own figure of “30” seats for the Sadrist party in the new Assembly.)
And then, in much of the body of his piece, Nordland seems to be following the very standard, US-government-issue line that portrays Muqtada as only a violent and divisive troublemaker. For example, he writes of Muqtada’s behind-the-scenes role as the real power behind the Jaafari nomination that:

Continue reading “Muqtada Sadr featured in Newsweek”

Opinions of Palestinians in Lebanon surveyed

An interesting recent survey of opinion among (camp-residing) Palestinian refugees in Lebanon found that,

    Hamas leads the Palestinian polls with 48 percent, followed by Fatah with 24 percent and the Popular Front ranking third with 12 percent. More than 83 percent of the Palestinians support Hamas’ stance of not recognizing Israel, and about 86 percent support maintaining martyrdom operations within 1948 lines.

(I note that Hamas, like the central leadership of Fateh– though not the militant Fateh offshoots– until now remains committed to the self-restraining tahdi’eh agreement concluded in March 2005, under which signatories unilaterally suspended their operations inside the 1948 line.)
The pollsters found more support for the PFLP in the north, and more for Hamas in the south.