I mainly want to bookmark here, for future reference, the US government’s own count of the number of terrorist incidents in Iraq in calendar 2005, as released last week by the National Counter-Terrorism Center. Okay, I also want to comment on it.
The NCTC’s count is here, (PDF file– go to page 8.)
What we see counted there are 3,474 incidents of terrorism in Iraq in 2005, resulting in 20,711 “victims”, counting those killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of the counted incidents.
I was trying to look at trend lines. If you go to this page on the NCTC’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, you’ll find it’s the first of 176 linked web-pages there that list and give some info about all the counted terrorism incidents in Iraq between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2005.
So the total for those two years was 4,413 incidents involving 30,643 victims.
So in 2004, there had been 939 incidents involving 9,932 victims.
So in 2005, the number of incidents increased by 270 percent over its counted 2004 rate, and the number of victims increased by 109 percent.
What a truly terrible record for the US occupation regime there, all round.
You have to know, too, that the counting system used was extremely partial, and doesn’t convey the total amount of “terror” inflicted on Iraqi civilians through politically motivated violence (which is what the NCTC purports to count). Crucially, it fails to count all incidents of violent actions that inflicted death and other harms on Iraqi civilians that were carried out by the US military and forces allied with it including the Iraqi “security” forces. If we add in those incidents, we can see that the total amount of terror inflicted on the Iraqi citizenry in 2004, 2005, and until today is almost unimaginably high.
Just think how terrifying everyone in Israel finds it if, say, three Israeli civilians are subjected to politically motivated violence. And multiply that by many thousands over the course of a year. (Guess what, Iraqi people are just as much human as Israeli people; and they have the same capacity for inter-human empathy, solidarity, and feelings of pain.)
And of course it is not just the counted individuals who are impacted when anti-civilian violence occurs. It is their families, those who love them, and everyone who lives in that same community.
… Sometimes, Bush administration officials and their apologists have argued, with quite unpardonable cynicism and disregard for human life, that “it is better to fight the terrorists ‘over there’ than ‘over here’.” I find this argument revolting, and racist (in the global definition of that term, not the skin color-related US definition of it.)
Indeed, the US occupation presence in Iraq has not only attracted and helped to motivate the actions of new generations of Sunni-extremist terrorists there; but it has also inflicted its own often wanton violence on the Iraqi citizenry, and has empowered and trained some of the Shiite-extremist and Kurdish militias that have inflicted even more violence on the Iraqi citizenry. Nearly all the manifestations of those forms of violence– including the US military’s violence– are “politically motivated”, in the sense that that they’re not motivated by, say, hopes of personal gain or outright thievery. (Though that happens too.)
Certainly, if Iraq is ever lucky enough to have something like South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, then acts of rights-abusing violence undertaken by the occupation regime and its allies would come under exactly the same public microscope as similar acts undertaken by anti-occupation forces.
Quite rightly so, from the human rights perspective.
… And meantime, the Taliban are steadily making a comeback in many parts of southern Afghanistan.
So what on earth kind of a “counter-terrorism” policy has the Bush administration been running?
Anyone?
Author: Helena
150,000 American hostages?
Riverbend had a good new post on her blog Tuesday. In her inimitable way, she sketched some of her memories of the US capture of Baghdad back in early April 2003… She also penned her (highly critical) reactions to more recent political developments in Iraq.
At the end, though, she writes:
- The big question is- what will the US do about Iran? There are the hints of the possibility of bombings, etc. While I hate the Iranian government, the people don’t deserve the chaos and damage of air strikes and war. I don’t really worry about that though, because if you live in Iraq- you know America’s hands are tied. Just as soon as Washington makes a move against Tehran, American troops inside Iraq will come under attack. It’s that simple- Washington has big guns and planes… But Iran has 150,000 American hostages.
Until recently, I would have agreed wholeheartedly with that conclusion. (I also really applaud Riverbend’s ability to differentiate between her feelings toward the Iranian government and the solidarity she expresses for the Iranian people.)
However, now I have a few doubts creeping into my mind as to whether the “hostage” nature of the huge US troop deployment in Iraq really is enough to deter (we could say “self-deter”) the Bush administration from launching a completely reckless military adventure against Iran.
After all, there were many of us with great experience in Middle East affairs who, in the run-up to his assault against Iraq, were warning Pres. Bush that to launch that assault would be counter-productive folly. That did not stop him then.
This time around, will he heed such warnings regarding the folly of attacking Iran? I would most certainly hope so. But at this point, I don’t feel as certain of his rationality–and, equally importantly, the rationality of key advisors like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld– as I did, say, six weeks ago.
Of course, the fact that Condi Rice seems to have been given new presidential authorization to outrank Rumsfeld, as evidenced in all the accounts of their recent trip to Baghdad, gives me some heart that her form of rationality might reign. She strikes me as significantly less reckless, stubborn, and ideological than Rumney or Chefeld.
However, hidden away in the back reaches of some portions of US “strategic thinking”, however, is something called “the madman theory of history”. This was pioneered especially by Henry Kissinger; it held that, in facing down the Soviet Union (at that time) there was strategic value in keeping or even cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and recklessness…
If the Bushies want to distance themselves decisively from that theory, then they should be working very hard right now to give assurances to the governments and peoples around the world (including the US citizenry here at home) that they are aware of the dangers of escalation– including even”inadvertent” escalation– in US-Iran relations and that they intend to act cautiously, rationally, and always with the best interests of the US citizenry and their (our) friends around the world front and foremost in their sights.
Note that to say this is to say nothing about the content of the policy they should pursue. (Though of course I have thoughts about that, too.)
But I have heard no such reassurance from the Bushies yet. That is a strong cause for concern.
—
Addendum Just one last thought. Back in 1980, Jimmy Carter lost an election because of his inability to solve the problem cuased by 57 US government employees who had been taken hostage by Iran. So how about the propsects for GWB and his party in the 2006 and 2008 elections if anyone points out that he has gratuitously given to the Iranians as hostages 150,000 US government employees?
Just a thought.
Cole, Hitchens, and the threat of a US attack on Iran
I’ve known Chris Hitchens for, gosh, 35 years now. He was two years ahead of me at Oxford, where we engaged in many of the same political activities. I kept bumping into him over the years that followed. When I was living and working in Beirut, he would come swanning through every so often, on a quick reporting trip. When I moved to DC in 1982, he was already there. He and his then-wife Eleni came to my second wedding, in Washington DC in 1984… etc, etc.
I haven’t, however, seen him in person since that point in the late 1990s when he swung inexplicably around the back-side of the political spectrum and changed from being a fairly moderate lefty to being an extremely bitter and pro-war rightist.
So today, the big issue on Juan Cole’s blog is Was Chris Hitchens drunk when he wrote a vicious piece about Juan on Slate recently– or was he just, as Juan puts it, ‘only an asinine thief’?
Earlier in the day, Juan had put up a lengthy post refuting Chris’s smear-job. In that post, Juan wrote:
- How to explain this peculiar behavior on the part of someone who was at one time one of our great men of letters?
Well, I don’t think it is any secret that Hitchens has for some time had a very serious and debilitating drinking problem. He once showed up drunk to a talk I gave and heckled me. I can only imagine that he was deep in his cups when he wrote, or had some far Rightwing think tank write, his current piece of yellow journalism. I am sorry to witness the ruin of a once-fine journalistic mind.
Yes, for a long time Chris Hitchens did have a glib facility with words, though I wouldn’t go as far as to describe him as ever having been, “one of our great men of letters”. Juan overdoes the lapsarian aspect of Chris’s career trajectory quite a bit there.
But still, anyone who’s known Chris for even one-fourth as long as I have would have to admit the guy has long had a very serious drinking problem. Was it ad-hominem for Juan to mention that? Yes, probably, although he was doing so in a quasi-exculpatory way– and Juan, like many of the rest of us, has had solid evidence of Chris’s performance of professional duties having been impaired by his evident drunkenness…
Today, though, Hitchens’ friend Andrew Sullivan wrote on his blog that he was with Chris when he wrote the latest Slate piece, and Chris was not drunk at the time. So Juan was left with no explanation for Chris’s crass writing except that Chris is “an asinine thief.”
The theft issue has to do with something Chris quoted directly in the article there, which was a private contribution Juan had made to a private listserv called Gulf 2000. Juan and I are both members of the, fairly large, membership of this group. Chris Hitchens is not.
Now, the whole point of having this private list is that its members– who include citizens of many different countries, of many political complexions, and with many different areas of Gulf-related expertise– can all explore ideas together in a safe space without the fear that what they write for it will get quoted in the public media. It might sound a little elitist (and probably is). But still, it is a remarkable place, where people who are citizens of many countries, including of course the numerous fairly repressive countries bordering the Gulf, can explore and exchange ideas.
For many list members, the promise of discretion for what they write is a completely necessary element of their personal security against the intrusions (and worse) of authoritarian state bodies.
So Chris Hitchens had just– by some unknown means– gotten hold of something Juan wrote for the list ten days or so ago, and published it there in his Slate article. By doing that, he (and whoever sent him Juan’s contribution there) just blithely violated that requirement for privacy.
Yesterday, and on a few occasions prior to that, I have also cited things posted on the G2K list. But always with the permission of the authors. In fact, when Juan first put up the post in question April 23, I wrote and asked him if I could cite it here– and he wrote back and said No, because he was still finetuning some of his analysis there.
Fair enough.
… Well, I glanced at Chris’s piece. It is mainly a nasty hatchet-job against Juan– blessedly, quite short. Juan does a superb job of refuting it. Hitchens, in the course of his piece, wrote:
- Cole is a minor nuisance on the fringes of the academic Muslim apologist community. At one point, there was a danger that he would become a go-to person for quotes in New York Times articles (a sort of Shiite fellow-traveling version of Norman Ornstein, if such an alarming phenomenon can be imagined), but this crisis appears to have passed.
He also attempted– on the basis of his absolutely nul knowledge of the Persian langauge to produce absolute refutation of a translation Juan had done of one of the key recent speeches by President Ahmedinejad.
Hitchens, it goes without saying, is currently part of the rightwing crowd in the US that is baying for some form of large military attack against Iran. Juan, by contrast, is extremely strongly against any such attack … Indeed, the main portion of his first rebuttal of Hitchens was a pained plea for the US not to launch a war against Iran.
As JWN readers know, I have voiced several criticisms of the positions Juan has expressed over the past three years. Including, yesterday. But those criticisms don’t for a moment dent the huge admiration I have for his scholarship and for the personal qualities of caring and commitment that he brings to all his endeavors.
I hope it goes without saying, too, that whereas Juan and I currently have some differences of opinion over US policies toward Iraq, I applaud and completely support the firmly antiwar position he has expressed regarding US policies toward Iran.
As for Chris Hitchens, I have been really saddened to watch his degeneration over the years. I have a number of friends who are recovering alcoholics. Being a recovering alcoholic is something they have to deal with every day of their lives: the alcoholism is so strong a force over them that they have to continue to battle it, every day, for ever. In the US, the main way people do this is through regular and frequent participation in the meetings of Alcholics Anonymous. In those meetings, people go through something called a “12-step program.” The very first step (I think) is to recognize that you have a problem with alcoholism, rather than continuing to deny it or cover it up. Further down, one of the other steps is to recognize the damage you have caused in the world, and to other people, by virtue of your alcoholism.
If Chris Hitchens is not in an AA program, I am sure he needs to get into one. In the meantime, the rest of us should hold him quite accountable for his sleazy actions. Being an alcoholic does not give you a “carte blanche”, or indeed any other kind of an excuse, to disregard the rules of human society and decent behavior. From that perspective, it really does not make any difference whether he had been drinking when he wrote the Slate piece or not. He needs to take full responsibility for his actions.
So, too, more to the point, does Slate, which has been publishing his ramblings for quite a long time now.
Wolfensohn steps down; End of Quartet?
Jim Wolfensohn, the former World Bank President who has worked for the past year as the representative of the “Quartet” in furthering Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, has stepped down.
As is clear from this transcript of the press conference he and Condi Rice gave yesterday, he is not being replaced.
So is the “Quartet” now going to disband?
The Quartet, which comprises the US, the UN, the EU, and Russia, was formed in 2002, in response to the crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations of spring of that year. (That included Ariel Sharon’s extremely lethal assault on the institutions of the PA, and a number of Palestinian suicide bombers who blew up Israeli civilians and soldiers.)
Back then, remember, the political map of the world looked quite a bit different. The US stood at the apex of glopbal sympathies and global power. Under the Quartet arrangement, the other three parties all knowingly subordinated themselves to the Bush administration’s “leadership” in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking….
At the time, that “leadership” was manifested mainly in Washington’s generation of something called the “Road Map to Peace”, which had a number of fuzzy deadlines on the way to a quite indeterminate future… Regardless of the Road Map’s many evident flaws, however, the UN, EU, and Russia all rallied around it.
All the fuzzy deadlines spelled out in it have passed, of course. And though Sharon and his government paid a tiny amount of lip-service to the Road Map, they went ahead with their completely unilateral exercise in boundary-drawing, regardless. So the Road Map is, these days, yet another sad casualty of the international “community’s” decision to subordinate itself to the Bush administration on this matter.
RIP.
… Well, the Road Map may have been flawed from the very beginning. But Jim Wolfensohn is probably a very decent man. That much seems clear from the text of the Monday press conference. For example, he said,
- [I]t would surprise me if one could win by getting all the kids out of school or starving the Palestinians. And I don’t think anyone in the Quartet believes that to be the policy, although sometimes it is made to appear that that’s what it is. I think that’s a losing gambit.
He did, of course, also say, right after that:
- But I do think that the Palestinians need to understand that it is not business as usual. Here you have a Palestinian group which has said that it wants to destroy its neighbor. I think the Palestinians need to understand and to accept that the future has to be one where the issues, however difficult, need to be resolved, but that you don’t start by telling the other side that you’re going to shoot them. I find that quite understandable and I think the situation that we’re now in is to try and find our way through that situation to a point where there can be a negotiated solution that is acceptable to both sides.
Meanwhile, the reporters over at Bloomberg’s have gotten hold of the text of Wolfensohn’s final report to the Quartet. They wrote this today:
- “Over the past few years, the international community has spent about $1 billion annually on assistance to the Palestinians, much of it directed at ensuring that credible and well-functioning Palestinian institutions are built,” according to Wolfensohn’s report, a copy of which was provided to Bloomberg News by e-mail. “Will we now simply abandon these goals?”
… The report includes a warning that failure to address Palestinian economic and government problems may cause “other Middle Eastern states and political organizations” to have a greater role in the region, with “regional repercussions.”
Well, I won’t be sorry to see the Quartet fall apart. It’s long past time that the United Nations– and indeed, also, the EU and Russia– returned to some respect for the requirements of international law, including international humanitarian law, regarding the Palestinian question. Enough pussyfooting around and kowtowing to the Great Imperial Master in Washington and its ally, Israel’s Machine of Military Coercion. Let’s see the international “community” develop some strong strategies to win an outcome in which both Israelis and Palestinians can flourish.
If international diplomacy is truly focused on that goal, in an evenhanded way, then the diplomats of the world will not find either Hamas or anyone else on the Palestinian side blocking that outcome, or resorting to further violence. But the structural violence of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (and of Gaza’s access points) has to end.
Playing at being Percy
Les Gelb, the former President of the influential, New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, has long been an active supporter of splitting up Iraq into three mini-states. In November 2003, he produced this plan for Iraq, called The Three-State Solution. (You now have to pay gobs of money to read it on the NYT’s website there, which is a pity. But commenting on it on JWN at the time, I described it as “almost lunatic and extremely dangerous.”)
Juan Cole’s reaction to Gelb’s partitionist proposal at that time was very similar:
- the idea is frankly dangerous. All we need is to have the Iraqi nationalists convinced we intend to break up their country. That will produce more blown-up US troops, God forbid.
Well, times change, eh?
Yesterday, Juan picked up his own red pencil, and going one step further than the British administrator of Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, did in 1922 he decided to redraw a bunch of boundaries inside Iraq.
He wrote:
- Personally, I am against breaking up Iraq. I don’t think it is more unworkable than Nigeria or Lebanon. [Last sentence not exactly clear? ~HC] And, the consequences are unforeseeable and potentially very, very dangerous.
I do, however, believe that the tendencies toward separatism must be recognized and managed.
I say that we make 5 superprovinces: Deep South, Middle Euphrates, Baghdad, Sunnistan, and Kurdistan, along with two smaller ethnic enclaves, of Turkomanistan and Chaldeanistan in the north. Bear with me…
Turkomanistan? Chaldeanistan? What on earth has he been smoking?
He then gives us– yes!– his very own map. More colors on it than old Percy ever had! Then he continues by discussing various details of what his plan is, and how to make it work. Along the way, he writes some extremely patronizing and imperialistic things… As in, saying that entering and controlling Kirkuk would be, “a good training wheel mission for the Iraqi army.” (Training wheels, of course, being what parents put on young kids’ bikes when they’re still learning to ride ’em.)… As in, decreeing baldly that, “The Coalition should dictate an oil profit sharing agreement before they go.”…
Well I could go on and on pointing out the follies my esteemed friend in Michigan engages in there. But the fundamental folly, surely, is his assumption that the US government has any right to determine the future shape of governance structures inside Iraq.
Then of course there is also (b), the folly of assuming that the US is still in any way capable of implementing any such scheme.
Today, he was backpedaling a bit. This was in response to yet another partitionist screed from Les Gelb– one in the writing of which Gelb was joined, indeed, by US Senator and long-time presidential wannabe Joe Biden (Democrat, of Delaware).
Yesterday, Juan had described his own proposal as being one for the formation of a bunch of “stans” (which is sort of a buzzword in some US circles for obscure, generally Muslim states located, well, someplace further east over there in Central Asia). Today, he rebranded his proposal, saying it was one for the establishment of “provincial confederacies.” He added:
- I do not see them as autonomous as Biden and Gelb propose, and, indeed, I have argued that the federal government should parcel out petroleum income to them in such a way as to bind them to the central state.
Whatever.
Hey Juan, maybe it’s time to sheath the red pencil and start acting a little less like Percy Cox?
Another interesting aspect of this whole story is that finally Les Gelb seems to have been able to persuade Joe Biden (Secretary of State in the next Democratic administration? Joe would love that!) to come on board his partition plan.
One aspect of what they write that I find extremely childish is that they leap right into their article by making a completely unexamined analogy with the situation in another, significantly different part of the world where the US has also in the recent past engaged in imperialistic (though in their view, successful) meddling. Namely, Bosnia.
Let me quote that whole introductory para to their piece:
- A decade ago, Bosnia was torn apart by ethnic cleansing and facing its demise as a single country. After much hesitation, the United States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords, which kept the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations, even allowing Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of American and other forces, Bosnians have lived a decade in relative peace and are now slowly strengthening their common central government, including disbanding those separate armies last year. Now the Bush administration, despite its profound strategic misjudgments in Iraq, has a similar opportunity. To seize it, however, America must get beyond the present false choice between “staying the course” and “bringing the troops home now” and choose a third way that would wind down our military presence responsibly while preventing chaos and preserving our key security goals. The idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintain a united Iraq by decentralizing it, giving each ethno-religious group — Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab — room to run its own affairs, while leaving the central government in charge of common interests.
So let’s just glide right over all the atrocities of the ethnic cleansing campaigns by which those “ethnic federations” were created in Bosnia, shall we?
… My friend and esteemed colleague Gary Sick, who’s the Executive Director of the Gulf/2000 Research Listserv and an Adjunct Professor of Middle East politics at Columbia University, has picked up on many problems in the Biden-Gelb proposal in this commentary, which I am putting up on the JWN archive with his permission (and with my thanks to him.)
Gary writes there:
- Is Bosnia a fair comparison? There we have a country surrounded by European allies who offer willing cooperation and a per-capita troop level that would make Gen. Shinseki proud. Is it realistic to expect the same in Iraq, which is surrounded by malevolent powers on all sides and plagued with a perpetual troop deficit?
Note that a great deal hinges on what Gelb calls “international police protection.” In other words, we must enlist the United Nations or a coalition of the willing to come in and do what we have been unable to do with our 130,000 troops and $10 billion per month. Is it reasonable to expect that a regional conclave with U.S. (Sunni) allies Saudi Arabia and Jordan, U.S. enemies Iran and Syria, plus Turkey, which is preoccupied with the Kurds, will produce a harmonious and enforceable regional compact?
Let’s just imagine that after we adopt a policy of separation under a weak central government, the militias remain vicious, the insurgency accelerates, ethnic cleansing becomes endemic, rights of women and minorities do not improve, and regional powers prove to be more interested in their sectarian interests than in saving Iraq. According to this plan, we have now accepted responsibility for making all of this work. Will we really be better off than we are now?
Good questions, indeed.
…Inside Iraq, meanwhile, there is lots of real, national-level politics going on, as the representatives of all the parties negotiate over how to form what will almost certainly be a government of broad national unity. Beyond that, under PM-designate Nouri al-Maliki it will almost certainly be a government dedicated to maintaining the unity of the country’s administration as far as possible, as well as to negotiating a total and fairly rapid withdrawal of the US troops.
So I guess the pretensions of those Americans inside and outside the Bush administration who want to see the US act in as imperialistic a fashion in Iraq in 2006 as Sir Percy and the British India Office were able to in 1922 will have to come to naught?
Surely, the only “maps” and “red pencils” the US planners will be needing in the months ahead are those that will help them organize the most orderly and efficient form of troop withdrawal… Bring the troops home, and let’s leave Iraq’s future to its own people.
L.A. Times’s Daragahi got the Sistani story
The L.A. Times’s talented Baghdad correspondent Borzou Daragahi wrote me to say it was not true, as I wrote here, that “no-one” in the mainstream media had gotten the story about the impact of Ayatollah Sistani’s re-entry into Iraqi public politics.
He sent me the text of this story, datelined April 28, which he co-authored along with Bruce Wallace and special correspondent Saad Fakhrildeen in Najaf.
They wrote there:
- A cleric close to Sistani acknowledged that the statement did signal a new role for the Shiite clergy, that of “monitoring” the performance of the next government and weighing in, perhaps more frequently, on broad policy issues.
“The marjaiyah intends to interfere in some issues,” Sheik Abu Mohammed Baghdadi, a Najaf cleric, said in an interview. “This monitoring and direct interference is an essential matter that has never before been proposed by the clergy. The marjaiyah, through this act, is expressing the voice of the people.”
Sistani’s statement followed a meeting with Prime Minister-designate Nouri Maliki, a conservative Shiite leader. Maliki came to Najaf to solicit Sistani’s views in the midst of efforts to form a government, reinforcing a growing relationship between Shiite politicians in Baghdad and their religious counterparts in Najaf.
Sistani, the most senior of the marjaiyah, the four top Shiite clerics in Najaf, has weighed in on political matters before, notably in 2003 when he demanded that direct elections for a national government be held before a constitution was drafted.
More recently, he criticized the government for its inability to protect Shiite holy sites from a series of bombings by insurgents.
But Sistani’s statement Thursday was among his bluntest and comes at a time of sensitive discussions over the selection of the Iraqi Cabinet and on the status of armed political groups.
“Now we have to go to Sistani,” quipped Saleh Mutlak, a Sunni Arab lawmaker. “What kind of democracy is this?”
… In his statement, Sistani called for a government of “qualified figures, technically and administratively, who have integrity and decent reputations” without regard to “personal, party, sectarian or ethnic interests.”
… [I]t was the unusually direct intervention from Sistani that rang loudest here. The cleric, who is regarded as the voice of Shiite moderation, often prefers to exercise his influence through backroom talks.
Last week, Sistani apparently nudged interim Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari into abandoning his quest to keep the top job in the face of opposition from Sunni Arabs, Kurds and secular politicians.
On Thursday, Maliki emerged from his meeting with Sistani to tell reporters that the cleric had “advised us, as always, to be Iraqis first.”
Maliki also said his government would merge militias into the legitimate state security forces, a proposal that challenges the power of some of his own strongest backers, notably [Muqtada] Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric.
Maliki and Sadr held a news conference in Najaf on Thursday afternoon in which Sadr denounced the Rice-Rumsfeld visit, calling it “blatant interference in Iraqi affairs.” The cleric repeated his call for U.S. troops to leave Iraq but dodged the question of whether he would disband his own militia, known as Al Mahdi army.
In his statement, too, Sistani derided the U.S. presence, calling for the new government to “work seriously to remove all traces of the occupier.”
Daragahi and his colleagues in the Iraq bureau have been doing some great reporting recently. They seem to have an ability to gather news outside of the US-controlled Green Zone that is notably superior to that of either the WaPo or the NYT.
See, for example, this Daragahi piece from April 29, which is mainly about the inter-party contacts over forming the government.
Or this piece, datelined today, to which Daragahi and unnamed “special correspondents in Baghdad, Najaf and Ramadi” all contributed. Most of this piece is about the “Biden plan”, which I’m planning to blog about next. But at the end, it noted that Sistani had held a meeting (presumably in Najaf) with some leaders from the Turkmen community in the tinder-box northern city of Kirkuk. It says,
- Yalmaz Najar, leading the Turkmen group, said after the conference that Sistani had promised to defend the rights of Shiite Turkmens fighting with Kurds for political control of oil-rich Kirkuk.
A fasacinating piece of information. (Though I imagine that for clarity it should have said “fighting against Kurds”? )
Altogether, though, a significant journalistic operation there. Sorry, Borzou, that I’d failed to read that April 28 piece before I posted last week.
Emily Wax’s 5 truths about Darfur
Eight days ago on that Sunday I was still reeling from my recent trip to Jordan, dealing with my chaotic travel home from Philadelphia, etc., and come to think of it I don’t think I even read the WaPo that day. I should have, because it carried Emily Wax’s extremely interesting piece 5 Truths about Darfur. (Hat-tip to a Jeffersonian friend who urged me to read it.)
She is the WaPo’s East Africa bureau chief, and a reporter on Africa whose writing I have come to admire over the past few years.
She writes,
- much of the conventional wisdom surrounding the conflict — including the religious, ethnic and economic factors that drive it — fails to match the realities on the ground. Tens of thousands have died and some 2.5 million have been displaced, with no end to the conflict in sight.
Note, please, her carefully non-alarmist representation of the number of people who have died because of the conflict in Darfur: “tens of thousands”. That, as opposed to the decidedly alarmist figures that are bandied about with no accompanying evidence… I have even seen some unauthenticated reports of “200,000 killed”.
Even one person killed because of political violence is bad enough. “Tens of thousands”, and we should be very concerned indeed. But Wax is close to the ground, and close to the aid coordinators and AU officers who are probably the people who have the best sources of information inside Darfur on the true scale of the casualties.
As a matter of basic integrity and ethics in human-rights work opr journalism, one should always try to get the best authenticated sources of information possible, and when using estimates of casualties to err on the side of conservatism
Anyway, here’s how Wax continues:.
- Here are five truths to challenge the most common misconceptions about Darfur:
1 Nearly everyone is Muslim…
2 Everyone is black
Although the conflict has also been framed as a battle between Arabs and black Africans, everyone in Darfur appears dark-skinned, at least by the usual American standards. The true division in Darfur is between ethnic groups, split between herders and farmers. Each tribe gives itself the label of “African” or “Arab” based on what language its members speak and whether they work the soil or herd livestock. Also, if they attain a certain level of wealth, they call themselves Arab.
Sudan melds African and Arab identities. As Arabs began to dominate the government in the past century and gave jobs to members of Arab tribes, being Arab became a political advantage; some tribes adopted that label regardless of their ethnic affiliation. More recently, rebels have described themselves as Africans fighting an Arab government. Ethnic slurs used by both sides in recent atrocities have riven communities that once lived together and intermarried.
“Black Americans who come to Darfur always say, ‘So where are the Arabs? Why do all these people look black?’ ” said Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh, editor of Sudan’s independent Al-Ayam newspaper. “The bottom line is that tribes have intermarried forever in Darfur. Men even have one so-called Arab wife and one so-called African. Tribes started labeling themselves this way several decades ago for political reasons. Who knows what the real bloodlines are in Darfur?”
3 It’s all about politics
Although analysts have emphasized the racial and ethnic aspects of the conflict in Darfur, a long-running political battle between Sudanese President Omar Hassan Bashir and radical Islamic cleric Hassan al-Turabi may be more relevant.
A charismatic college professor and former speaker of parliament, Turabi has long been one of Bashir’s main political rivals and an influential figure in Sudan. He has been fingered as an extremist; before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks Turabi often referred to Osama bin Laden as a hero. More recently, the United Nations and human rights experts have accused Turabi of backing one of Darfur’s key rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement, in which some of his top former students are leaders…
“Darfur is simply the battlefield for a power struggle over Khartoum,” said Ghazi Suleiman, a Sudanese human rights lawyer. “That’s why the government hit back so hard. They saw Turabi’s hand, and they want to stay in control of Sudan at any cost.”
4 This conflict is international
China and Chad have played key roles in the Darfur conflict.
In 1990, Chad’s Idriss Deby came to power by launching a military blitzkrieg from Darfur and overthrowing President Hissan Habre. Deby hails from the elite Zaghawa tribe, which makes up one of the Darfur rebel groups trying to topple the government. So when the conflict broke out, Deby had to decide whether to support Sudan or his tribe. He eventually chose his tribe.
Now the Sudanese rebels have bases in Chad; I interviewed them in towns full of Darfurians who tried to escape the fighting. Meanwhile, Khartoum is accused of supporting Chad’s anti-Deby rebels, who have a military camp in West Darfur. (Sudan’s government denies the allegations.) Last week, bands of Chadian rebels nearly took over the capital, N’Djamena. When captured, some of the rebels were carrying Sudanese identification.
Meanwhile, Sudan is China’s fourth-biggest supplier of imported oil, and that relationship carries benefits…
5 The “genocide” label made it worse
This portion is particularly interesting. Wax makes, basically, two arguments under this heading. Firstly,
- in September 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell referred to the conflict as a “genocide.” Rather than spurring greater international action, that label only seems to have strengthened Sudan’s rebels; they believe they don’t need to negotiate with the government and think they will have U.S. support when they commit attacks. Peace talks have broken down seven times, partly because the rebel groups have walked out of negotiations. And Sudan’s government has used the genocide label to market itself in the Middle East as another victim of America’s anti-Arab and anti-Islamic policies.
In other words, Powell’s attaching of the ‘genocide’ label has been extremely politically polarizing within Sudan, hardening the attitudes of both “sides” to the conflict in Darfur and setting back the chances for reaching a negotiated peace…
And secondly, she makes this,quite distinct argument under the rubric of No. 5:
- Perhaps most counterproductive, the United States has failed to follow up with meaningful action. “The word ‘genocide’ was not an action word; it was a responsibility word,” Charles R. Snyder, the State Department’s senior representative on Sudan, told me in late 2004. “There was an ethical and moral obligation, and saying it underscored how seriously we took this.” The Bush administration’s recent idea of sending several hundred NATO advisers to support African Union peacekeepers falls short of what many advocates had hoped for.
“We called it a genocide and then we wine and dine the architects of the conflict by working with them on counterterrorism and on peace in the south,” said Ted Dagne, an Africa expert for the Congressional Research Service. “I wish I knew a way to improve the situation there. But it’s only getting worse.”
I think Wax is probably right here. After all, the whole point of the 1948 Convention on Genocide was that it actually obligates its signatories to act to “prevent, suppress, or punish” any act of genocide regardless of where in the world it is committed… That was why there was such a big fuss made in 1994 over whether the Clinton administration would declare that the killings in Rwanda constituted a genocide, or not. At least Clinton and his people seemed to take quite seriously the commitment that, if the Rwandan killings did indeed constitute genocide, then the US would be obligated to intervene to suppress that genocide.
As for the Bush administration– as we all know– it takes the power and truth-value of words extremely lightly when it chooses. I can imagine Karl Rove saying something like,”Sure, call it a genocide if that seems politically advantageous to do, here at home, with all these people clamoring for it. But you don’t think we’re going to do anything about it, do you?”
And thus, the value of the whole approach pioneered by the authors of the Genocide Convention has been completely annulled. (Rove: “Who cares? The Genocide Convention is no better than the Kyoto Treaty or the NPT, is it?”)
…Anyway, belatedly, I’d like to thank Emily Wax for a well-grounded and well-argued article there. I wish I’d read it earlier.
Truly saving the people of Darfur
Let us first focus our energies on making sure that we and our governments are doing all we can to get literally life-saving basic humanitarian aid to the people of Darfur. They are women, men, and children with pressing physical, social, and psychological needs. They are not a “cause” to be taken up (or dropped) by well-meaning outsiders.
And yet, the international “community” has not yet responded in even a halfway acceptable way to the pleas of the World Food Program and others for enough basic food aid to be sent there.
The NYT reported Saturday that the WFP,
- said it had received just a third of the $746 million it had requested from donor nations for all of its operations in Sudan. As a result, individual rations that include grain, blended foods, beans, oil, sugar and salt for people in Darfur, where a brutal ethnic and political conflict has raged since 2003, will be reduced from 2,100 calories a day to 1,050 calories — about half the level the agency recommends.
This is beyond tragic. It is also, surely, the very first thing we should be campaigning about. Go to Oxfam’s site and send them a donation. Then call your representatives in Congress or your local parliament and tell them to quadruple the government’s food aid to Darfur-– and to do it now.
Then, we have to recognize that it is not only the pro-government forces in Sudan who are impeding the delivery of such aid as is available. This sobering press release issued last Friday by he UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) states:
- Over the past few weeks aid workers operating for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and U.N. agencies have come under continuous attacks and harassment by armed groups in the area of Shangil Tobayi, Tawilla and Kutum in North Darfur. Several reports indicate that many of these attacks have been waged by SLA factions [that is, factions of an anti-government force ~HC]. Armed robbery and hijackings have endangered humanitarian workers assisting over 450,000 vulnerable people living in the area. Moreover, credible information point to the use of hijacked vehicles for military purposes by these armed groups. This is unacceptable and contrary to International Humanitarian Law.
The SRSG [Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General] Jan Pronk appeals to the SLM/A to take all necessary steps to assure the safety of humanitarian personnel and property in areas under their control and the consistent implementation of agreements. Unless these attacks and harassment stop immediately, the U.N. and its partners will be obliged to suspend all relief assistance to this particular area till effective safety for humanitarian personnel and assets is guaranteed. The U.N. will hold responsible the armed groups, including those related to the SLA, and their leaders, for the failure to assist the vulnerable populations under their control.
I noted, too, that on last Friday’s BBC t.v. news report, Orla Guerin– whose reporting from Darfur I had earlier criticized– spoke openly about Darfuri villagers having been expelled violently from their village or villages by the rebels, and having sought refuge inside one of the bases for the AU forces. She spoke as a crowd of the expelled villagers could be seen behind her in the frame…
Now, of course, there is the additional political development of the nearly-secured peace agreement between the Sudan government and the rebels, that AU negotiators have been working on for two years now.
Yesterday, the Government of Sudan expressed its acceptance of the deal. But today, the two main rebel groups still seemed unprepared to accept it. In this piece, Reuters’ Estelle Shirbon writes:
- Chances of a peace agreement for Sudan’s Darfur region looked slim on Monday despite a 48-hour extension to negotiations, observers said, citing rebel inflexibility.
Mediators from the African Union (AU) agreed in the early hours after a deadline expired to give the government of Sudan and two rebel groups until midnight Tuesday to agree on a proposed peace plan, the result of two years of talks.
But on Monday morning, Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha left the Nigerian capital Abuja, venue of the talks. Taha had arrived three weeks ago and held face-to-face meetings with rebel leaders that had raised hopes of a deal.
A diplomat who is closely involved in the talks said Taha left because his latest meetings with rebel leaders had given him the impression they were not open to substantial talks.
“His meetings with the (rebel) movements yesterday were so bad. They were, frankly, so insulting to the government,” said the diplomat, who described his mood as “depressed”.
So it looks as though the rebel leaders’ inflexibility may now be consigning the people of Darfur to further months or even years of civil war. This, when we know that far too many of the civilian people of Darfur have already had their homes, communities, and livelihoods wrecked by the gunmen from both pro- and anti-government groups… Surely, the most urgent imperative should be to find a formula that will allow everyone to de-escalate, disarm, return to their home communities, and start rebuilding lives and livelihoods shattered by the violence!
I have to ask whether the rebel groups’ intransigence was perhaps stoked by the one-sidedly anti-Khartoum tenor of much of the Darfur-related mobilization in the US over the past few weeks? (Did that mobilization perhaps give the rebels the idea they could get more political support from Washington than they have been able to win, so far, from the African Union? If so, I suspect they will be sorely disappointed…)
Wouldn’t it, honestly, have been better if from the get-go the people involved in the US “Save Darfur” coalition had focused their efforts somewhat less on one-sided finger-pointing, and much more on the urgent need for solid humanitarian aid, and the creation of the political climate of civil peace which is the only climate in which such aid can both be delivered in the shorter term and help to rebuild and heal war-torn communities over the longer term?
By the way, Jonathan Edelstein recently had a good post on the draft peace agreement out of Abuja, on his blog, here.
His analysis of the draft was this:
- If I’m reading between the lines accurately, the proposal falls somewhat short of what the southern Sudanese got in the Machakos protocol, offering some degree of local control over land and resources but not a full-fledged autonomous government or a secession option. This is probably to be expected. Unlike the south, Darfur has a significant pro-government constituency (the pastoralists), and the rebel movements can’t claim to speak for the region as a whole. In addition, the Darfur rebels aren’t as militarily powerful as the SPLA/M, and thus don’t have the leverage to overcome Khartoum’s opposition to regional autonomy. The AU draft is, in practical terms, the most that the rebel movements are likely to get.
Finally, maybe the only thing we can do at this late hour in the diplomacy is to pray for peace and rebuilding in Darfur… And to hope that wisdom, compassion, mercy, generosity of spirit, and restraint can guide the actions of all concerned… Including our own.
Taboo #2: Israel and the bomb
In addition to discussion of the role of the pro-Israel lobby, another major Israel-related taboo within the US mainstream media has to do with the topic of Israel’s nuclear weapons.
Thus, today, we have the amazing spectacle of Dennis Ross, the former longtime Arab-Israeli “peace process coordinator” for the Bush I and Clinton administrations, writing an oped in today’s WaPo about the Iranian nuclear issue without even mentioning the word “Israel” once…
Well, I imagine there are many contexts in which one could do that. But not in the context in which Dennis is writing his piece, since he is looking specifically at the Middle East regional implications of any move Iran might make toward developing nuclear weapons…
And in the course of doing that he comes up with zingers like this:
- If Iran succeeds, in all likelihood we will face a nuclear Middle East.
Hullo?? Earth to Dennis!! Um, Dennis, the Middle East already has nuclear weapons in it– thanks to Israel.
And then he goes on to examine likely responses from other Middle Eastern countries to any Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, arguing with a degree of dogmatic certainty that then Saudi Arabia “will seek” their own nuclear weapons capability, etc etc…
But still no word– anywhere in this whole piece about Middle East nuclear matters!– about Israel.
This, I note, just one day after the WaPo itself had published a very informative article by Avner Cohen and William Burr that described how US officials behaved back in the late 1960s as they became increasingly convinced that Israel had already developed its first nuclear weapons:
- Apparently prompted by those high-level concerns, Kissinger issued NSSM 40 [that’s short for National Security Study Memorandum, no. 40]– titled Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program — on April 11, 1969. In it he asked the national security bureaucracy for a review of policy options toward Israel’s nuclear program. In the weeks that followed, the issue was taken up by a senior review group (SRG), chaired by Kissinger, that included [CIA Director Richard] Helms, Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard and Joint Chiefs Chairman Earle Wheeler.
The one available report of an SRG meeting on NSSM 40 suggests that the bureaucracy was interested in pressuring Israel to halt its nuclear program. How much pressure to exert remained open. Kissinger wanted to “avoid direct confrontation,” while Richardson was willing to apply pressure if an investigation to determine Israel’s intentions showed that some key assurances would not be forthcoming. In such circumstances, the United States could tell the Israelis that scheduled deliveries of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel would have to be reconsidered.
By mid-July 1969, Nixon had let it be known that he was leery of using the Phantoms as leverage, so when Richardson and Packard summoned Rabin on July 29 to discuss the nuclear issue, the idea of a probe that involved pressure had been torpedoed. Although Richardson and Packard emphasized the seriousness with which they viewed the nuclear problem, they had no threat to back up their rhetoric…
Cohen and Burr based much of their article on a collection of newly declassified US documents on the topic that is now available on the website of the DC-based “National Security Archive.”
That’s a valuable-looking collection of documents there. (Just scroll down on that page for the links to them.) There are still, though, many other relevant docs that have not yet been declassified.
The main outline of this story was already pretty well-known back when, for example, I wrote an article titled Israel’s Nuclear Game: The US Stake, and published it in the Summer 1988 edition of World Policy Journal. (Shortly after I published that, Helms, whom I had come to know a bit, wrote me telling me I had got the basic facts and the analysis there quite right.)
I guess I should work to get the text of that article– and the follow-on piece I published in Foreign Affairs in Summer 1989, along with former US arms-control czar Gerard C. Smith– up onto the internet. It shouldn’t be too hard…
But what I want to note here is the kind of amazing self-censorship at work over at the WaPo: that the editors could publish that entire piece by Dennis Ross today without insisting that he at least make some reference in it to the big elephant in the room in any discussion of Middle East nuclear issues– namely, Israel’s longtime possession of a significant nuclear arsenal.
That’s about equivalent to writing about terrorism in the world without writing about Al-Qaeda. (And of course, it makes Dennis’s entire analysis correspondingly nonsensical.)
My 2005-2006 issue of the IISS’s “Military Balance” describes Israel as possessing “up to 200” nuclear wraheads– the same number, I think, that it has attributed to Israel for a number of years now.
I imagine, though, that Israel’s nuclear arsenal has, if anything, grown over recent years, rather than shrunk or stayed the same size?
Certainly, Israel’s ability to deliver these warheads has grown significantly over the years. Even back in a 1993 essay, the Israeli strategic analyst Gerald Steinberg was writing that Israel’s Jericho-2 missile,
- is credited with a range of 2000 to 2800 kilometers, and, according to Fetter … “can probably deliver at least 2 tonnes on any Arab country”.
My 2005-2006 Mil Bal says Israel has “about 100” Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles.
But Dennis Ross– and his editors there at the WaPo– think that with a straight face they can publish an article about Middle East nuclear-weapons developments without even mentioning Israel?
Now that’s self-censorship.
Islamic-Gregorian date converter
In response to my earlier query on this, Reidar Visser sent me this handy link, which is to a site that automatically does either Gregorian-to-Hijri (Islamic) or Hijri-to-Gregorian calendar conversion.
A linked page there contains this listing of the various, lunar-based, Hijri months:
- (1) MuHarram
(2) Safar
(3) Raby` al-awal
(4) Raby` al-THaany
(5) Jumaada al-awal
(6) Jumaada al-THaany
(7) Rajab
(8) SHa`baan
(9) RamaDHaan
(10) SHawwal
(11) Thw al-Qi`dah
(12) Thw al-Hijjah
The most important dates in the Islamic (Hijri) year are: 1 MuHarram (Islamic new year); 27 Rajab (Isra & Miraj); 1 RamaDHaan (first day of fasting); 17 RamaDHan (Nuzul Al-Qur’an); Last 10 days of RamaDHaan which include Laylatu al-Qadar; 1 SHawwal (`iyd al-FiTr); 8-10 Thw al-Hijjah (the Hajj to Makkah); and 10 Thw al-Hijjah (`iyd al-‘aDHHae).
So, using the converter, I can now tell you that the next of those liturgical-calendar dates that is coming up is the 27th of Rajab 1427 which is…. 22 August 2006 CE (with a small probability of a one-day error, depending on moon-sightings.)
Handy, huh?