Okay, I know I’m a little late writing about the news that came out last week (here and here) that (1) the Bush administration had decided to hire a new “Iraq war czar” (also briefly, and quite infelicitously, titled an “execution manager”) who would sit in the White House and provide a direct operational link between the Prez and David Petraeus, the US commanding general in Iraq; and (2) no fewer than five retired generals have now turned down an invitation to take up this post.
But I actually think this new plan is a more serious sign of disarray in the highest levels of the US chain of command than most people have so far realized.
Crucially, I think it signals that the President has a serious lack of trust in Defense Secretary Robert Gates. This, because– in line with longstanding US practice, as written into US law– the chain of military command currently runs from the President, through the (civilian) Secretary of Defense, and from him to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thence to the commander on the ground.
This is not, in practice, too onerous a process to go through. Especially with the speed and convenience of modern-day communications. And meanwhile, it ensures the effectiveness of the civilian command of the military, the integrity and predictability of the chain of command at those high levels, and the ability of both the military and the civilian leaders in the Pentagon to be able to act strategically (that is, to be able to deploy military assets around the world in an informed and balanced way.)
But now the President wants to disrupt this longstanding system. Why?
Well, according to the WaPo’s Peter Baker and Tom Ricks, one key impetus for the change was a memo that former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (who for unknown reasons fancies himself a strategic thinker) sent to the White House several weeks ago. This was one of 18 recommendations he made in the memo.
Baker and Ricks write:
- “The slowness and ineffectiveness of the American bureaucracy is a major hindrance to our winning, and they’ve got to cut through it,” Gingrich said in an interview yesterday.
Under the proposal [as subsequently developed] by national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, the execution manager would talk daily with the military commanders and U.S. ambassadors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The official would then meet with Bush each morning to review developments. The goal to meet requests for support by Petraeus and others would be “same-day service,” the proposal said.
Right. When what you’re doing in Iraq isn’t working, why not re-scramble the wiring diagram, play musical czars, and figure out a new bureaucratic fix?
Makes perfect sense. (Not!)
In their April 11 article, Baker and Ricks revealed that the three generals who (as of then) had turned it down included retired Gen. Jack Keane– who was one of the main intellectual authors of the “surge” proposal!– and retired Marines General Jack Sheehan.
They wrote,
- Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. “So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, ‘No, thanks,’ ” he said.
At this point, three things seem clear to me:
- (1) There is a widespread distrust among senior retired generals in either the content of the present policy, or the conditions under which this new post is being created, or both;
(2) The Prez definitely looks as if he’s wanting to cut the Secdef out of the loop. (I believe this may even be illegal? It is, anyway, very very unwise.) And,
(3) The scrambling around and trying to find a new bureaucratic “quick fix” for the policy is a sure sign that the senior administration people themselves realize the policy isn’t working well.
In this regard, the situation in Washington seems highly reminiscent of what was happening in Israel in the third week of their war against Lebanon last summer. At that point the IDF’s increasingly desperate chief of staff Dan Halutz summarily appointed a new commander to come in and take command of the Northern Sector over the head of the sector’s existing commander… Now, in Washington, Bush seems to be trying to bring in a new (preferably military) person to come in and, in effect, replace Bob Gates.
All this is potentially very disquieting. On the other hand, the administration has already seen fairly high levels of (high-level) distrust, second-guessing, and general administrative flailing around throughout the disastrous course of this war in Iraq. One thing that struck me from reading Tom Ricks’s book “Fiasco”, for example, was how often Condi Rice or Don Rumsfeld or other high-level actors felt they needed to send their own personal envoys out to Baghdad to get a feel for what was going on there. That gave me the distinct sense that these officials didn’t trust the reports they were receiving through the normal channels, that is, from each other. (And therefore, they didn’t trust each other.) Meeting and dealing with this constant stream of high-level envoys must quite often have been a real headache for the Iraqis, and for the US generals on the ground.
So this latest development is, it seems to me, a continuation of a long-running flailing around within the upper reaches of the Washington bureaucracy. But it’s probably the most serious to date.
(Maybe it marks the ‘beginning of the end-game’ for the US military presence in Iraq? Let’s hope so!)
Meanwhile, I’d love to know what Bob Gates is thinking about all this…