The current guessing game in the US and Israel is over “which of the Arab states will participate, and at which level.”
Actually, for many ardent pro-Israelis inside and outside the two governments, those questions about Arab representation are the sole focus of their concern about Annapolis, rather than, as good sense would dictate: “What is the best way to ensure that this gathering contributes to the speedy conclusion of sustainable final-status peace agreements between Israel and all their neighbors?”
There is very frequently a sort of “scalp-collecting” aspect to the way many Israelis, inside and outside of government, think about the possibility of encounters with Arab state nationals.
But anyway, the biggest questions right now about attendance at Annapolis are those over the responses of Syria and Saudi Arabia These two will be among the Arab states that are sending their foreign ministers to Cairo for an all-Arab confab tomorrow, at which many Arabs hope they will be able to find that long-sought Holy Grail, a “unified Arab position.”
AP’s Zeina Karam has a good report from Damascus today, in which she presents the evidence backing up her lead, which is “Syria is softening its refusal to attend the Annapolis peace conference and already has won dividends.”
And Al-Hayat’s Ibrahim Hamidi has an interesting report (in Arabic) in today’s paper, explaining the various strands of analysis that have been pursued by government insiders in Damascus.
People seeking a rendering of Hamidi’s article in English are strongly advised not to rely on the version presented by the usually sound young US professor Joshua Landis, who for some reason seems to have pasted in a commentary on the Hamidi report from elsewhere– most likely, the Israeli press– instead of presenting his English-language readers with the promised direct translation of it.
It is Thanksgiving here in the US, so I can only imagine that Landis just quickly used that commentary instead of working on his own translation of the piece. But the result is very inaccurate and misleading.
There is so much finegrained diplomacy going on around the question of the prospects for Annapolis that I don’t have time to assess it all here. I will just quickly note the following:
- (1) This is in many ways reminiscent of the lead-up to the Madrid Peace conference of October 31, 1991, but with some very important differences. These are that: a) Madrid was an extremely serious peace conference whose main participants were the direct parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, not a hodge-podge of rapidly enlisted states and governments from all around the known world. b) Madrid was extremely well-prepared, through a diplomatic process that lasted seven months and included winning the prior agreement of all parties on the language of the invitation letters, etc. Annapolis is a hastily-cobbled-together Amateur Hour, by comparison. c) The Bush I administration administration showed at and after Madrid that it was prepared to explicitly link the levels of US financial and political support to Israel to Israel’s continuation of its settlement-building program in the occupied territories. No-one in Bush II has dared breathe a word of any such linkage!
(2) As always, the Israelis seem to be primed once again to try to “play off” the Syrians against the Palestinians. During the whole of the post-Madrid diplomacy, their use of that tactic was evident. (As noted in my 2000 book on the Syrian-Israeli negotiations of those years.) The result of the Israeli tacticians being “too clever by half” in that regard was that they ended up with neither a peace agreement with Syria nor a peace agreement with Palestine in hand… Unless that was what they had aimed for all along? Well, for some of the Israeli decisionmakers in those years, it is almost indisputable that that was their aim. For others, probably not. But the settlers in East Jerusalem, the rest of the Wset Bank, and Golan all got to continue their lovely lifestyles– and expand!
(3) It is of course extremely relevant that poor old Lebanon is currently poised on the brink of constitutional disaster. In my work on my 2000 book, I examined the question as to whether, for this Baath Party regime in Syria, their interests in Lebanon or in Golan were weightier. And I concluded that at that time, it was their Lebanon interests. This time, of course, Syria’s situation in Lebanon is very different. But as a general rule, we can say that periods of intense Israeli-Arab peace diplomacy are often accompanied by an intensification of fighting (often, foreign-power-backed fighting) inside Lebanon. Why so many Lebanese people are so happy to allow foreign powers to jerk them around in this way is a subject for more consideration, another time. It would be wonderful if this time around, all parties, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese, could at least agree that the intervention of all outsiders in Lebanon’s internal politics is a no-no, and should be ended… And yes, that should most certainly include interventions from the US, Syria, Israel, and Iran.
And now, back to revising Chapter 4 of my current book project…
(Neither Bill nor I have time to cook a turkey today. We’re having our Thanksgiving meal at restaurant. Personally, I feel I have a lot to give thanks for this year. But the performance of the US Congress leaders we all helped elect a year ago is sadly nowhere near the top of that list.)