Rami Khouri has some excellent commentary today on the currently very evident contraction of US diplomatic power in the Middle East. He surveys the past week’s breakthroughs in intra-Lebanese reconciliation and Israeli-Syrian diplomacy– as I did here, on May 21.
Regarding the intra-Lebanese agreement, he wrote:
- The US was not fully defeated, but it was fought to a draw…
The US is a slow learner in the Middle East, where the terrain is strange to it, the body language bizarre, the fierce power of historical memory incomprehensible, and the negotiating techniques other-worldly. But the US is not stupid. It learns over time that if you retread a flat tire over and over again, and it keeps going flat on you, perhaps it’s time to buy a new tire if you hope to move forward. Now that we have a draw in the broad ideological confrontation throughout the Middle East that pits Israeli-Americanism against Arab Islamo-nationalism, we should expect the players to reconsider their policies if they wish to make new gains.
This, however, is not the most significant development this week that reflects the limits of American power in the Middle East. The remarkable manifestation of how the US has marginalized itself is the conduct of the Israeli government. The US has pushed the Israelis hard to do two things in the past two years: to not negotiate with Syria and to not engage Hamas. What has Israel done? It has been wisely negotiating with Syria via Turkey, and engaging Hamas on a truce deal through the mediation of Egypt. Hold on, Condi, this gets even worse.
It is no big deal in Washington when nearly 500 million Arabs, Iranians and Turks ignore and defy the US. But when Israel – the only democracy in the Middle East, America’s eternal ally, and the bastion of the epic modern struggle against fascism, totalitarianism, Nazism, communism and terrorism – ignores the United States, that is newsworthy.
So we now have a rare moment in the Middle East: Iran, Turkey, all the Arabs, Hizbullah, Hamas and Israel all share one and only one common trait: They routinely ignore the advice, and the occasional threats, they get from Washington. Condoleezza Rice was correct in summer 2006 when she said we are witnessing the birth pangs of a new Middle East. But the new regional configuration is very different from what she had in mind and tried to bring into being with multiple wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia and Lebanon, and threats against Iran and Syria. The new rules of the political game in the Middle East are now being written by the key players in the Middle East, which should be welcomed.
Rami may, however, be a little too generous when he writes, “the US is not stupid. It learns over time.” Well, I guess it’s a question of over how much time the US government can “learn” what it needs to learn about the realities of the Middle East, and adjust its policies accordingly. As J. M. Keynes so memorably noted, “Over the long run, we’re all dead.”
So how steep can we expect the US government’s learning curve to be? Given the record of the past few years, I am not optimistic– unless the US public and government can both undergo a broad re-assessment of how they see the US’s relationship with the rest of the world, going forward.
Evidence about the slowness of the Middle East-related learning curve here is quite abundant… Back in 2002, just about everyone inside the US who knew much of anything about the strategic realities of the Middle East was warning vociferously that any kind of an essentially unilateral (i.e., not UN-sanctioned) US invasion of Iraq would end up as a disaster. All those voices of wisdom and understanding– which existed within various government bureaucracies and outside them– were systematically marginalized from having any impact, undercut through bureaucratic maneuverings and the wilful manufacturing of false “evidence”, and publicly derided.
Those of us who forecast that the invasion would be a medium- and long-term disaster were, however, right.
Some of us then argued that sufficient attention to running a “successful” post-invasion occupation could at least minimize the negatives arising from the decision to invade.
Due attention was not paid to that vitally important task. Instead, Iraq’s capacities for re-emerging self-governance were systematically ripped apart through Bremer’s wilfully destructive actions. (Bremer was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Wolfowitz got that plus the World Bank.)
Those of us who have argued for broad diplomatic re-engagement with Iran on a basis of mutual respect have been marginalized, undercut and publicly derided.
Those of us who argued against the strong support the Bushites gave Olmert’s disastrous assault against Lebanon in 2006 were marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us who argued that the results of the 2006 elections in Palestine should be respected and the US should explore the many potential ways to deal with the elected government were marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us have argued for robust and fair-minded US re-engagement in the remaining tracks of Israeli-Arab peacemaking have been marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us who have argued that, given its track-record, the US is uniquely ill-suited to bringing internal reconciliation to Iraq, and that therefore it should request the UN to find a way to do so that will allow an orderly withdrawal of US forces from their expensive, vulnerable, and essentially dysfunctional positioning throughout Iraq have been marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us who have argued that the US can and should find a way to include broadly supported popular movements like Hamas and Hizbullah into the diplomacy of the region rather than seeking to subvert and crush such movements have been marginalized and subjected to often withering waves of public derision…
So I’m not exactly holding my breath for “the US learning curve” suddenly to become steeper and to conform to the demands of our still-evolving present era any time soon. The Manichean mindset of “You’re either with us or against us”, the too-ready recourse to the rhetoric of a glibly anti-“terrorist” discourse that obfuscates rather than explains the realities of life in most Middle Eastern societies– these aspects of US public life are still far, far too prevalent.
But perhaps the fact that actors long considered stalwart supporters of the broad “GWOT” campaign in the region– actors like Ehud Olmert and Fouad Siniora– are now quite prepared to go off the GWOT reservation and to act in their own best interests as they perceive them, rather than as Elliott Abrams or other fevered minds in Washington might see them, might give us an opportunity, here in the United States, to start looking at the situation in a much more realistic way? Let’s hope so.
For the facts of the matter are:
- (1) the GWOT hasn’t “worked”, even in its own terms. Worldwide fatalities from terrorism in 2007 were 430 percent the level of fatalities from terrorism in that fateful year 2001– and that’s by the State Department’s own counting system; and
(2) the US has lost a considerable degree of the ability it once had to assemble and essentially control region-spanning coalitions of its own supporters throughout the Middle East.
Time for a broad conceptual re-tool, I think.
Meanwhile, we can have some fun speculating which of Condi Rice or George W. Bush might turn to the other in the weeks ahead and confess to the truth: “Honey, I shrunk the superpower.”