The Bush administration has been working with PM Nouri al-Maliki’s government in Iraq since at least November to try to win the Iraqi government’s agreement to both a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a broader agreement on defense, economic, and political cooperation.
Today, Iraq’s Defense Minister did indeed sign a defense cooperation agreement. But oops, it was not with Washington but with Iraq’s looming eastern neighbor, Iran.
That Reuters report there explained that the signing occurred during a meeting that Iraq’s Defense Minister Abdul Qader Jassim, held with his Iranian counterpart Mostafa Mohammad Najjar. It cited the official Iranian news agency IRNA as saying that, “Mine clearance and the search for soldiers missing in action would be part of the planned cooperation.”
Also,
“The two parties, stressing the importance of defense cooperation in the balanced expansion of ties … called for development of this sort of cooperation with the aim of strengthening peace and stability in the region.”
Jassim has been in Tehran as part of the delegation accompanying PM Maliki on his three-day visit there. During the visit, Maliki has met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and then today with “Supreme Leader” Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
This later Reuters report spells out some of the dilemma that Maliki now finds himself in:
Iran’s supreme leader told visiting Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on Monday that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was the biggest obstacle to its development as a united country.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hit out at the “occupiers” in Iraq at a time when Baghdad is negotiating with the United States on a new agreement aimed at giving a legal basis for U.S. troops to stay in Iraq after Dec. 31, when their U.N. mandate expires.
Iran and the United States blame each other for violence in Iraq and are also sharply at odds over Tehran’s nuclear programme…
Maliki’s government treads a fine line in its relations with the Islamic Republic, seeking support while mindful of U.S. accusations that Iran supports Shi’ite militias in Iraq.
Iran denies this and blames the presence of U.S. troops, currently numbering about 150,000, for the bloodshed that has followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
Iraq’s government spokesman said before Maliki’s three-day visit started on Saturday that the issue of Iranian interference would be raised, but it was not clear whether it had been discussed in his meetings so far in Tehran.
But the piece hints– imho correctly– that Tehran is also treading a careful path:
Analysts say Iran does not want Iraq to descend into chaos but nor does it want U.S. forces to have an easy ride, which might give Washington ideas about military options against Iran.
Meanwhile, back home in Baghdad, opposition to the SOFA-plus deal being proposed by the Americans has continued to be strong. AP says that this opposition has even been voiced by the head of the Badr Organization, which is closely allied to Maliki. (But oh, Badr is also even more closely allied to Iran. So I suppose there’s no surprise there.)
Indeed, the main thrust of that last AP article is this:
The Bush administration is conceding for the first time that the United States may not finish a complex security agreement with Iraq before President Bush leaves office.
For all those of us working for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq that is speedy, total, and orderly this is excellent news. It means that the Bushists’ attempt to lock in longterm– or even “permanent”– agreements with Iraq on security and economic issues before they leave office will have failed.
We therefore need to redouble our calls to both the main presidential candidates that they take a clear-eyed look at the balance of forces in the Gulf region– which is still tipping every week further in Iran’s favor– and work for a UN-sponsored agreement on the speedy pullout of US troops from Iraq as soon as possible. (Go look at some of my earlier writings for guidelines on how this can most effectively be done.)
To be durable, any longterm agreement that Washington concludes with Baghdad needs to be concluded with a government in Bagjdad that is truly sovereign. No agreement concluded while US forces dominate the Iraqi strategic environment, including the center of the Iraqi “government” in the Green Zone can win the longterm legitimacy, both inside Iraq and in the broader international community, required for it to endure. (See “May 17 agreement” for an object-lesson in that regard.)
If, as now seems just about certain, the Bushists will not be able to conclude any form of SOFA or SOFA-plus agreement with Baghdad before the end of this year, then the question of the basis in international law for the presence of US troops in the country after December 31 will have somehow to be agreed before December 31 arrives. Currently, the US forces are there under a “mandate” extended to them by the UN Security Council on the grounds that the situation in Iraq falls under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (That was a nice bit of diplomatic finessing, achieved in UNSC resolution 1511, that the Bushists won from the UNSC after their invasion of Iraq was a done deal, even though the invasion itself had been quite unsanctioned by the UNSC and indeed, as even Kofi Annan admitted later, had been enacted in clear violation of international law.)
But resolution 1511 did require that the UNSC review the mandate it gave the US in Iraq every year. And in December 2007, PM Maliki flexed a nationalist muscle or two when he told the SC that his government would agree for the mandate– then due to run out at the end of 2007– to be extended “for the last time”, by just one further year.
In the immediate run-up to the coming deadline, all parties in the region and on the SC will know who the next US president will be, though the final content of this man’s policies will probably not yet be known, or perhaps not even yet finally decided. But there will have to be some deft diplomacy among the UNSC principals, the governments of Iraq and Iran, and probably both the outgoing and incoming US presidents to try to figure what to do on December 31. Perhaps a “holding pattern”, whereby the UNSC mandate is extended a further six months, might be one way forward.
But who knows what the domestic-Iraqi, regional, and international balances will look like by then?
I just want, finally, to note some of the contortions in the way that an (un-named) US official spoke to the AP’s Lolita Baldor about whether the US had indeed been, as part of the now-failing negotiations, requesting permanent bases in Iraq or not.
Baldor wrote:
The Bush administration is seeking an agreement with Baghdad that would provide for a normal, permanent U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Iraq. The word “permanent” has been a flashpoint for many who oppose the war, both in the U.S. and Iraq. But the U.S. official stressed that the agreement will not call for permanent U.S. bases on Iraqi soil.
Instead, the proposed agreement would allow U.S. troops or personnel to operate out of U.S., Iraqi or joint facilities through either short or long-term contracts, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the negotiations are not public.
“The idea that the U.S. will have a normal, diplomatic and military presence, and need access to facilities — not necessarily our facilities, but need facilities — is permanent,” said the official, who is close to the ongoing talks.
Those facilities, the official said, could belong to the Iraqis, and the U.S. would simply be using them on a renewable basis. Or they could be existing U.S. facilities that over time would be taken over by the Iraqis.
So what this official– my money is definitely on Crocker– is saying is that the presence of US troops in Iraq would be permanent, though perhaps they might, over time, move from one base to another; and perhaps the bases (“facilities”) they would operate from might have some nominal Iraqi ownership.
It strikes me that this US official simply does not understand the strong distaste for most Iraqis for any idea of a “permanent” presence of any foreign troops on their soil. It’s not the bases the Iraqi object to as much as the permanent presence of US troops on Iraqi soil.
For what it’s worth, this (Arabic only) is what the Sadrists’ Al-Kufiyeh website posted today as being their version of “The secret clauses in the security agreement between the Iraqi government and America.”
Here’s a quick translation:
1 – American forces have the right to build military camps and bases; and these camps will be to support the Iraqi army; their number will be dependent on how the Iraqi government sees the security conditions, in consultation with the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and with the American [military] command and the officers in the field, and also in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the competent authorities.
2- ضرورة ان تكون اتفاقية و ليس معاهدة . 2 – It should be a convention and not a treaty. [In an attempt to escape the scrutiny of legislators at either end, I imagine. ~HC]
3- لا يحق للحكومة العراقية ولا لدوائر القضاء العراقي محاسبة القوات الاميركية وافرادها، ويتم توسيع الحصانة حتى للشركات الامنية والمدنية والعسكرية والاسنادية المتعاقدة مع الجيش الاميركي . 3 – Neither the Iraqi government nor the Iraqi justice authorities have any jurisdiction over the American forces or their personnel, and immunity would also be extended to security, civilian and military companies, and contractors working with the American Army.
4- صلاحيات القوات الاميركية لا تحدد من قبل الحكومة العراقية، ولا يحق للحكومة العراقية تحديد الحركة لهذه القوات، ولا المساحة المشغولة للمعسكرات ولا الطرق المستعملة. 4 – The powers of American forces would not be not determined by the Iraqi government, and nor would the Iraqi Government have the right to define the movement of these forces, the areas used by the military camps, or the roads they would use. used.
5- يحق للقوات الاميركية بناء المراكز الامن بما فيها السجون الخاصة والتابعة للقوات الاميركية حفظا للامن . 5 – The American forces would have the right to build security centres, including special prisons that would belong to the American forces in the interest of security.
6- يحق للقوات الاميركية ممارسة حقها في اعتقال من يهدد الامن والسلم دون الحاجة الى مجوز من الحكومة العراقية و مؤسساتها . 6 – The American forces would have the right to arrest those who threaten peace and security without the need for consent from the Iraqi government and its institutions.
7- للقوات الاميركية الحرية في ضرب أي دولة تهدد الامن والسلم العالمي والاقليمي العام والعراق حكومته و دستوره، او تستفز الارهاب والميليشيات، ولا يمنع الانطلاق من الاراضي العراقية والاستفاده من برها ومياهها وجوها . 7 – The American forces are free to attack any state that [in the US judgment] threatens world or regional security or peace, in general, or Iraq, or its constitution, or that provokes [instigates?] terrorism and militias; and nothing prevents [the American forces] from starting out [on such missions] from Iraq’s land or from using Iraq’s terrain, or waters, or airspace for this.
8- العلاقات الدولية والاقليمية والمعاهدات يجب ان تكون للحكومة الاميركية العلم والمشورة بذلك حفاطا على الامن والدستور . 8 – The American government must be informed of and consulted on all [Iraqi] International and regional relations and treaties, in order to defend security and the Constitution.
9- سيطرة القوات الاميركية على وزارة الدفاع والداخلية والاستخبارات العراقي ولمدة 10 سنوات، يتم خلال هذه المدة تأهيلها و تدريبها واعدادها حسب ما ورد في المصادر المذكورة، وحتى السلاح ونوعيته خاضع للموافقة والمشاورة مع القوات الامريكية . 9 – U.S. forces would have control of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Intelligence for a period of 10 years, and during this period they would be rehabilitated and trained and prepared as described in the sources mentioned, and even weapons and their types would be subject to approval of and consultation with American forces.
10- السقف الزمني لبقاء القوات هو طويل الأمد وغيرمحدد وقراره لظروف العراق ويتم اعادة النظر بين الحكومة العراقية والاميركية في الامر، الا ان الامر مرهون بتحسن اداء الموسسات الامنية والعسكرية العراقية وتحسن الوضع الامني وتحقق المصالحة والقضاء على الارهاب واخطار الدول المجاورة وسيطرة الدولة وانهاء حرية وتواجد الميليشيات ووجود اجماع سياسي على خروج القوات الاميركية . 10 – The timetable for the forces remaining in place would be a long but undefined period, depending on the circumstances in Iraq, and would be reviewed by the Iraqi government and the U.S.; but this matter would be dependent on improved performance of the Iraqi military and security institutions, the improvement of the security situation and the achievement of reconciliation, dealing with terrorism and the dangers of neighboring countries, the extension of state control, ending the militias’ freedom freedom of action and presence of militias, and the achievement of political consensus on the exit of U.S. forces.
These reported terms are very similar to those that Patrick Cockburn reported on, here, June 5, though his report was more specific at some points, and Al-Kufiyeh’s more specific at others.
Lolita Baldor’s well-reported piece for AP today gave indirect confirmation that both accounts had described the Bushists’ original “ask” from the Iraqis in the agreement essentially correctly. She wrote,
On Monday two Iraqi lawmakers who saw the proposed draft said the document, put forward Sunday, … seeks to address some of Iraq’s concerns. It adds an explicit promise that U.S. forces in Iraq will not attack neighboring countries and that Iraqi authorities will be notified in advance of any action by U.S. ground forces, the lawmakers said.
While it gives U.S. forces the power to arrest suspects, it says any detainees would be handed over to Iraqi authorities, said the lawmakers, Mahmoud Othman and Iman al-Asadi.
That does seems to imply that an earlier draft of the proposal had not had those assurances in it, I think?
Anyway, as noted in the main body of this post, at this point the details of the text the US side was proposing have now all become OBE, operationally irrelevant– and of interest only to afficianados of diplomatic arcana.
So Sunday was the day the US side suddenly proposed the changes described by Baldor. M6nday was the day Iraq signed a security agreement– with Iran.