I am getting really fed up with media and other depictions of the indigenous people of any country/state/region as “locals.” It very often has the same patronizing, imperialistic overtones to it as the now debased term “natives.”
Does anyone else feel the same way?
Author: Helena
Barnett Rubin on Afghanistan
Talking of Afghanistan
While Obama is in Kabul, I hope he gets the chance to talk to Rory Stewart, whose recent piece on Time.com “How to Save Afghanistan” has a lot of good sense in it. (Hat-tip Bob Consoli.)
Stewart is the former British SAS officer who published a very well-received book about walking across Afghanistan and who then returned to Kabul to set up a work project in the Old City. He’s on his way to head the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard.
The main point in Stewart’s essay that I applaud (and that I really hope Obama hears from him in person, while he’s in Kabul) is his argument that the solution in Afghanistan is not to deploy more US or other NATO troops there. He argues that the mission of the US/western troops who are there should be limited to counter-terrorism– leaving the Afghan government to get on with counter-insurgency and strengthening its administrative and political capabilities throughout the country.
Stewart is right to note that strengthening the Kabul government’s hold on the country (and its ability to deliver services to it) cannot be the job of westerners.
However, I think he is still arguing from within far too westocentric a perspective. He makes no mention of the possibility of any other actors than the western powers doing anything useful to help Afghanistan. Why not? After all, what the heck is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization doing in Afghanistan in the first place. Except prop up US power there, that is. But why should either the US or NATO be the prime providers of outside support to Afghanistan, and the prime deciders on the many, very tough security decisions that need to be made in that country. Afghanistan is– has anyone else noticed this?– very far indeed from both the US and the North Atlantic. It truly defies logic to suppose that the US and NATO should have any longterm special role there at all.
Maybe, too, Stewart should follow the logic of his argument that the “solution” in Afghanistan is not a western military solution a good bit further. He strongly suggests that western militaries would be better involved in Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, or Lebanon than in Afghanistan. But those would all be terrible mistakes! Under what mandate would they intervene in any of those countries? And what, pray, would US or other NATO troops actually do in Iran, Egypt, or anj of those other countires?
Bring the US and NATO troops home. Let their skills be put to good use rebuilding our own countries. Further military adventures overseas would be disastrous. The challenges in all those countries mentioned by Stewart have many, much sounder solutions than any that would involve the application of western military power.
Who influences whose elections?
In 2004, when the US occupation authorities in Iraq went along with Ayatollah Sistani’s insistence that his country be allowed to elect its new leaders, the assumption among the Bushists was that they could hope to pretty easily sway the results of those elections. In the event, after the final round of “purple finger moments” was held in December 2005, it took the ouccpiers a long time to be able to find the one person capable of filling their specs for the job of PM, namely that he be (a) pliable enough to go along with most of their demands, but also (b) representative enough of the Daawa-Sadrist majority that had emerged from the election that his leadership was not immediately called into question.
Eventually, after many months of searching, they found their man. Nouri (Kamal) al-Maliki.
Now, the tables have turned. Maliki has told Der Spiegel outright that his strong preference is for Barack Obama’s fixed-term plan for a US withdrawal from Iraq.
The Spiegel account said,
- When asked in and interview with SPIEGEL when he thinks US troops should leave Iraq, Maliki responded “as soon as possible, as far as we are concerned.” He then continued: “US presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about 16 months. That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes.”
Though he was careful to say he did not support Obama outright, Maliki’s words– and the fact that on Thursday, he got Pres. Bush to agree for the first time that he would go along with the idea of a “time horizon” for withdrawal– cannot but be good for Obama’s campaign, and bad for McCain, with his much more longterm view of the US presence in Iraq.
Okay, I know Obama’s position on withdrawal is not yet good or complete enough, as I wrote here just last week. But still, Maliki’s statement is another item of good news for Obama’s campaign.
As for Obama himself, he is now in Afghanistan, where he’s visiting as part of a “congressional delegation”, along with Sens/ Chuck Hagel and Jack Reed.
When is a timetable not a timetable?
… When it’s a time “horizon”, of course!
As accepted yesterday, regarding the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, by no less a personage than (drum roll, please) President George W. Bush.
Bush is still, notably, not advocating a timetable, or even a time “horizon”, for a complete US troop withdrawal. But still, as Satyam at ‘Think Progress’ so helpfully recalled here, over the years Bush has been notably resistant to the idea of anything approaching a timetable for the US troop withdrawal.
But as I have been arguing consistently since June 2005, announcing a firm timetable for a total troop withdrawal will be a factor that greatly helps the negotiations needed to assure that US commanders can ensure that this withdrawal is orderly, that is, one during which the troops are not being shot at and harassed as they leave.
… I find it fascinating that Bush has been forced to move so fast, so far, toward actually accepting that a substantial– or even, as I still push for, total– withdrawal of troops from Iraq is the best way forward. (As far back as June 8, I concluded that his attempt to force a longterm “Status of Force Agreement” onto the Iraqis already seemed “clearly destined for failure.”)
At the political level inside this country, however, Bush having moved toward accepting the necessity for a substantial drawdown in Iraq, and moreover, for a time “horizon” for this drawdown– as long advocated by Barack Obama– could help Obama rebuff John McCain’s accusations that his troop-drawdown proposal is defeatist and destabilizing.
So it might well help Obama politically.
Interesting.
Benny Morris’s nuclear blackmail scenario
For the Israeli government, using its very robust nuclear-weapons capability for purposes of blackmailing other parties– including, certainly, the US– is nothing new. (See my 1988 World Policy Journal article– PDF— on that topic.) However, that blackmail is usually carried out in a subtle and behind-closed-doors fashion.
But now, here comes Israeli citizen Benny Morris openly expressing (and expressing support for) the most blatant form of nuclear blackmail imaginable. In this op-ed prominently featured in today’s NYT Benny writes:
- ISRAEL will almost surely attack Iran’s nuclear sites in the next four to seven months — and the leaders in Washington and even Tehran should hope that the attack will be successful enough to cause at least a significant delay in the Iranian production schedule, if not complete destruction, of that country’s nuclear program. Because if the attack fails, the Middle East will almost certainly face a nuclear war — either through a subsequent pre-emptive Israeli nuclear strike or a nuclear exchange shortly after Iran gets the bomb.
I have read and re-read Benny’s piece, and it terrifies me. (It also concerns me greatly that the NYT purveys without comment this extremely crude and mendacious endorsement of nuclear blackmail.) It is terrifying for a number of reasons, including the way it so easily reproduces some quite unsubstantiated claims about the status of Iran’s nuclear program and the status of current diplomatic efforts.
He writes,
- Every intelligence agency in the world believes the Iranian program is geared toward making weapons, not to the peaceful applications of nuclear power. And… everyone knows that such measures have so far led nowhere and are unlikely to be applied with sufficient scope to cause Iran real pain, given Russia’s and China’s continued recalcitrance and Western Europe’s (and America’s) ambivalence in behavior, if not in rhetoric. Western intelligence agencies agree that Iran will reach the “point of no return” in acquiring the capacity to produce nuclear weapons in one to four years.
None of these claims about what “everyone” or even just all “Western intel agencies” know or judge or agree to be the case can be substantiated, and in the case of all of them there is also some significant counter-evidence. (November ’07 NIE, Benny?)
The reason I mention Benny’s extremely sloppy (mis-)use of evidence is because he is a historian. He is not, actually, someone who has ever delved deeply into deterrence theory. So at least his historian’s skills regarding use of evidence should be of a decent caliber. But sadly, they are not.
(Personally, for me, this is all extremely sad. I’ve known Benny Morris for more than 20 years, and have liked him a lot even though in recent years we’ve disagreed more and more. But with this article he crosses a new bridge.)
But the main problem with the piece is the argument it carries, which can be broken down as follows:
- 1. Iran is, without a doubt, pursuing a nuclear-weapons program which will achieve a capacity to produce NWs “in one to four years.”
2. In an attempt to forestall that development, either the US or Israel must launch a “pre-emptive” attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, using non-nuclear weapons. He completely rules out the idea that pursuit of negotiations or other non-military means might succeed in this.
3. But the US seems unwilling to launch the necessary attack. “Which leaves only Israel.” And the period between the US election and the inauguration of the next president in January is the best time for this.
4. And Americans should support this Israeli, conventional-weapon attack on Iran, because if it doesn’t, Israel will “almost certainly” have to use its nuclear weapons against Iran.
I do not have time right now to undertake the detailed critique that Benny’s article requires at so, so many points along the way.
For now, I just want to identify his article for what it is: the crude blackmail note of someone urging the use of nuclear blackmail.
One great relief: Benny is speaking only for his own fevered mind in writing this article, and thankfully not for the Israeli government. But of course we can also wonder what kind of communications his compatriots in government are having with their US counterparts on this topic, at this time of intense consultation among them.
I also want to note the arrogance with which this Israeli citizen effortlessly brandishes his country’s long well-known nuclear-weapons capabilities. In a way, this is a breath of fresh air within the US body politic (and within the pages of the NYT.) Israel’s long-pursued posture of deliberate ambiguity regarding its extremely robust nuclear arsenal– or, large arsenal of ten-minutes-to-full-assembly nuclear weapons– has been echoed, within most of the US national discourse, by a studied ignoring of that arsenal. That has led to repeated use of such blatant mis-statements of fact in the media and elsewhere as the allegation that Iran might be about to “introduce” nuclear weapons into the Middle East, etc etc.
At least Benny Morris– and along with him, the NYT– has now blown away all that miasma of long-maintained denial and obfuscation.
As a US citizen, I also want to note the breath-taking arrogance with which he minimizes the quite predictable jeopardy into which any Israeli attack on Iran– nuclear or “conventional”– would immediately place the US’s very vulnerable troop deployments in Iraq and elsewhere near Iran’s borders.
He writes quite blithely about the Israeli strike force being “allowed the use of Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (and perhaps, pending American approval, even Iraqi air strips)…” But he expresses no recognition at all that the use of Jordanian or Iraqi airspace, all of which falls within the US’s present theater of operations in the Middle East, would under international law justify Iranian counter-attacks against the US and its numerous long and vulnerable supply lines in the region.
He has a short reference to the “likely result” of the Israeli non-nuclear attack on Iran, that,
- The Iranians will also likely retaliate by… activating international Muslim terrorist networks against Israeli and Jewish — and possibly American — targets worldwide (though the Iranians may at the last moment be wary of provoking American military involvement).
No, Benny Morris. It would not be “international Muslim terrorist networks” that would “possibly” retaliate against American targets worldwide. Much more likely, it would be the Iranian military, acting from its own homeland to respond to an attack on this homeland, that would launch a military response against the troops of Israel’s US ally that George Bush has seen fit to deploy in large numbers, in numerous very vulnerable positions that are extremely close to Iran.
And no. In the event that their homeland is attacked by members of the US-Israel alliance, the Iranians are not likely to be “wary of provoking American military involvement.” They have read the same US war-gaming reports that all the rest of us have, that say that any military attack against Iran would likely lead to consequences that would be disastrous for the US military (though also extremely costly for Iran.)
For Iranians, after all, Iran is their country. Of course, regarding the balance of interest and the balance of wills involved in any military confrontations along its borders, their will to fight and die would be 1,000 times as strong as that of the Americans. Especially given that the consequences of this war would also be devastating for the already deeply troubled world economy.
It ain’t going to happen, Benny Morris. Take your cheap but terrifying nuclear threats and stop trying to blackmail my country and the countries of all your neighbors in the Middle East.
Best of all, a note to Benny Morris and anyone else who thinks like him: there is an alternative to war. It is called negotiations. And it is starting to happen, just a little bit, right now.
So far, the US-Iranian-EU talks in Geneva are only about some details of the future negotiations over the Iran nuclear program. Talks about talks. But still, much, much better than the alternative..
In the future, the US-Iranian negotiations will need to go much further, and deal with a broad range of issues. But at the nuclear level, the single clearest way forward is to work aggressively for the creation of a Middle east that is verifiedly free of all nuclear weapons capabilities.
At that point, the world would no longer have to put up with all this tiresome and destabilizing instances of Israeli nuclear blackmail.
Hometown C’ville speaking gig on Iran, Monday
I will be speaking– along with Iran analyst Carah Ong– at this event next Monday evening, in Charlottesville. If you’re anywhere near, come along and bring your neighbors.
It is important for Virginians, like all Americans, to get a vivid understanding of the dangers of the escalatory moves that some of our fellow-citizens and congressional reps are continuing to push for, regarding Iran… and to continue to build the constituency for de-escalation and meaningful negotiations, even with governments with whom we have disagreements. (That’s called “diplomacy.”)
And yes, copies of my Re-engage! book will also be for sale there.
Planning US-wide speaking tour, Sept. and Oct.
One thing I’ve been pretty busy with this week has been doing some detailed planning for the nationwide speaking tour I’ll be conducting, in connection with my book Re-engage! America and the World After Bush, for September and October.
My colleagues at the Friends Committee on National Legislation and the World Affairs Councils of America have been extremely helpful in suggesting priorities and soliciting invitations, respectively. As of now, if the present tentative plans work out, it looks as if the tour could involve gigs in Kansas City, Chicago, Tennessee, New Jersey, Delaware, southern Texas, the Boston area, LA, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, and Philadelphia. See the more precise– though still tentative– schedule here.
However, a lot of these arrangements still need to be solidified. So if you live in one of those areas– or Portland, OR, or Seattle, WA– and would like to host* a book-related event, or can offer suggestions of bodies that could do this, we would still have time to consider it. Please email me as soon as you can.
(And if you would like to host a book-related event in some completely different place– and can offer a good-sized honorarium as well!– then I could probably find a way to fit you in, too… Well, either into this tour or into a follow-up tour I’ll likely do in early 2009.)
Look, folks, I’m not seeking to make any significant amount of money from any of this work… Either from sales of the book itself, or from the speaking events. (No, I am not like Mr. “Likes his luxury and likes triple-billing for it, too” Ehud Olmert.) Nor do I get any income from all this blogging; and nor do I have a well-paid day job like so many of those lucky bloggers from the professoriat.
I am a humble scribe. That’s what I am.
And no, annoyingly enough, Paradigm Publishers does not have any budget for the book tour, either.
Mainly, I want to do whatever I can over the months ahead to get the ideas in the book more widely circulated and discussed. So it would be really nice if any of you JWN readers could help out with the book tour a bit.
Thanks for anything any of you can do!
—-
* In this context, “host” = to organize, publicize, and pay the relevant expenses for an event.
Khamenei speaks, endorses nuke negotiations
Today, Iran’s most powerful figure,Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Tehran “is ready for negotiations over the nuclear crisis” but warned it would not step over any “red lines” in the search for a deal.
Khamenei’s remarks come a day before a key meeting at which Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, EU negotiator Javier Solana, and top US diplomat Bill Burns will all gather face-to-face to discuss (I hope) measures to defuse/de-escalate the tensions aroused by Iran’s nuclear program.
That report from AFP notes that Khamenei’s statement is his first direct intervention in the continuing standoff over the nuclear issue. This is, obviously, very significant, and could signal that the crisis is on its way to being ramped back down. (Related evidence: the recent agreement between Tehran and Washington that the US can re-open an “interests section”, even if not yet a full embassy, in Tehran.)
Here’s what, according to AFP, Khamenei actually said:
- “Iran has decided to take part in negotiations but it will not accept any threat,” state television quoted Khamenei as saying.
He said Tehran would not step over any “red lines”, repeating Iran’s insistence that it will not suspend uranium enrichment activities, which world powers fear could be used to make a nuclear weapon.
But Khamenei also appeared to give his wholehearted backing to the idea of talks.
“Our red lines are clear and if the other parties respect the Iranian people, the dignity of the Islamic republic and these red lines, our officials will negotiate as long as no one makes any threats against Iran.”
In the west, the Iranian leader who garners most attention is usually the often bellicose President, Mahmoud Ahmahinejad. But Khamenei has always– as I’ve noted here often– been the chief center of power in the regime.
Karim Sadjadpour recently published this informative little study of Khamenei’s thinking and leadership style.
He argued that,
- “Iran’s Islamic government is more powerful than it has ever been vis-à-vis the United States, Khamenei is more powerful than he’s ever been within Iran, and in order to devise a more effective U.S. policy toward Iran a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.” Though Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as weak and indecisive, Sadjadpour writes, “his rhetoric depicts a resolute leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view.”
Given that the real political power of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Sadjadpour argues, “It’s time for the world to focus less on Ahmadinejad and more on Khamenei. His speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.” …
“Given Iran’s centrality to urgent U.S. and European foreign policy challenges—namely Iraq, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, Arab–Israeli peace, and Afghanistan,” Sadjadpour writes, “the United States does not have the luxury of shunning dialogue with Tehran until Khamenei’s death or the arrival of a more accessible Iranian leader. This could be a long time in coming.”
Sadjadpour argues that any successful approach toward Iran must take into account Khamenei’s pivotal role in Iran’s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions of the United States. “Trying to engage an Iran with Khamenei at the helm will no doubt be trying, require a great deal of nuance and patience, and offer no guaranteed chance of success. But an approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei is guaranteed to fail.”
I just checked out the English-language portion of Khamenei’s official website, seeking their exact translation of whatever it was he said. However, nothing has been put up there in English since June 25.
But some of the other materials posted there, from earlier in June, are pretty interesting and revelatory. Like this, on Iraq, and this, on his view of the need to confront US power.
Anyway, good news from Tehran today. May the trend continue.
Afghanistan’s opposition as a peasant-based insurgency, by Bob Spencer
Long-time JWN commenter Bob Spencer sent me the text of a thought-provoking small essay he has written, that takes as its starting point that the opposition movement in Afghanistan can best be considered as similar to most or all other peasant-based insurgencies.
I applaud this intentional attempt to get beyond (or quite out of) the discourse of “fighting terror” and to contextualize what’s happening in Afghanistan.
Here’s how Bob’s essay starts:
- In a peasant-based insurgency, the side that is least politically effective is the side that will escalate the violence. Also, the side that is least politically effective will most often lose the conflict.
Not wanting to buy (or in this instance, publish) any pigs-in-pokes, I asked Bob to tell us a little about himself. Here’s what he wrote:
- My background is somewhat unorthodox. I guess you can say that I have spent a lifetime writing and managing foundation and government human development grants. At the same time, I have spent most of my adult life studying about political development and insurgencies.
If anyone asks for any details—and probably, nobody will; here’s the scoop.
I worked in Viet Nam for four years during the war. I worked in refugee camps and village development. I was in the most intense part of the country and found myself backing into Vietnamese politics. Several of the most highly skilled Vietnamese political operators had the patience to teach me every day about Vietnamese politics. They included a prominent monk, the highest level spies, a highly admired and effective community organizer, and good civil servants. Life became pretty exciting and my life often depended upon my understanding of Vietnamese politics, so I tended to be as good a student as I could.
I don’t know if it is good or bad, but much of my motivation came from anger and sadness at what I saw.
So, now you can go read his thoughts on Afghanistan here.
Please note that, as nearly all editors do, I put the headline onto the piece. Also note that, though I am happy to publish it because I think it pushes the discussion of what-all is happening in Afghanistan forward in helpful ways, still I don’t agree with everything Bob writes. Or rather, I think there are a couple of important questions that he fails to ask about the US-NATO project in Afghanistan.
But I don’t want to prejudice the discussion by bringing up those questions now. I invite readers to go read Bob’s piece and comment on them here.
Thanks for honoring JWN with your essay, Bob.