Eyes on Najaf

There are many hotspots of confrontation in Iraq these days–let’s say, in practically every major city. But easily the most politically potent, right now, is the one in Najaf.
In today’s (Sunday’s) WaPo, there was a long story about how the still-rebuilding Iraqi forces were going to be taking the lead in fighting the Sadrist forces in Najaf. Then, on AP at 20:26 this evening, I read this:

U.S. tanks and troops rolled back into the center of Najaf and battled with Shiite militants Sunday, reigniting violence in the holy city just as delegates in Baghdad opened a conference meant to be a landmark in the country’s movement toward democracy.

Okay. First question: What happened to the supposed “Iraqi” forces? Did they refuse, at the small-unit level, to do the job the US had assigned to them? Or, did the orders for them not to undertake the mission come from higher up their chain of command?
Quite possibly, it was some fairly chaotic combination of the two things?
Or maybe Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s account in Monday’s WaPo of the “election-prep” conference in Baghdad gave the best explanation of what had happened in Najaf. (This seems like some really world-class reporting he has there, by the way.)
Chandra wrote that early in the conference:

dozens of Shiite delegates jumped to their feet in a loud protest of the interim government’s decision to mount military operations to evict followers of the cleric, Moqtada Sadr, from a Shiite shrine in the holy city of Najaf. Chanting “Yes to Najaf!” and raising their fists, the Shiite dissenters demanded that the participants call on the interim prime minister and Sadr’s followers to refrain from violence and for a special committee of delegates to negotiate a solution to the crisis.
The outburst triggered a succession of events that quickly reshaped government policy toward Najaf and instilled the first measure of checks-and-balances in Iraq’s nascent political system. The Shiite protesters, along with several non-Shiite participants, caucused and drafted a letter to interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his cabinet that called for a dialogue with Sadr and “an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all military activities in Najaf and other Iraqi cities.”
A four-person delegation from the conference then met with Allawi. When the meeting was over, the government announced that its plans to use force to expel Sadr from the Imam Ali shrine were on hold. In a reversal from its position a day earlier, Allawi’s cabinet issued a statement pledging to refrain from military action against Sadr’s militiamen and to keep an “open door” to a negotiated settlement.
“This is democracy in action,” said Ibrahim Nawar, a U.N. adviser who helped organize the conference. “For now, at least, they have succeeded in changing the government’s approach toward the situation in Najaf.”

Okay, so maybe it was Allawi, under pressure from the conference delegates, who changed the policy on the Iraqi forces intervening.
But then, what were the American forces doing going ahead to intervene on their own account??
This seems like a completely politically suicidal decision.
If indeed they did send US forces into Najaf without any “cover” from Allawist forces–then Moqtada Sadr indeed has the Americans exactly where he wants them… If US forces go ahead and storm the Najaf shrines complex, then even Iyad Allawi will find it hard to stay in any kind of a political relationship with them.
What the heck body part are the US commanders “thinking” with? Their elbows?
Anyway, here’s some more of Chandra’s great reporting from the conference:

The Shiite protest over Najaf … revealed the degree of Sadr’s influence and the extent to which Iraqi society remains riven by differences that could impede its democratic transition.
Speaker after speaker rose to condemn the use of force against Sadr and his militiamen. “What is happening in Najaf is much more important than this conference and demands our immediate attention,” one man intoned. Another likened the tactics used by U.S. and Iraqi security forces to those employed by the military under Saddam Hussein’s government to crush Shiite dissent. A woman rose to criticize Sadr, saying “it is not American cannons” that are responsible for the bloodshed there, but was shouted down.
Members of the interim government have maintained that few Iraqis endorse Sadr’s lawlessness and that many back Allawi’s tough tactics to restore order in this strife-torn country. But the delegates, who are supposed to represent Iraq’s 25 million people, took a more nuanced approach to the standoff in Najaf, where scores of fighters from Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia have been holed up in the Ali shrine. Despite strong support for aggressive action to combat criminals and insurgents, many of the conference participants — not just Shiites, but rival Sunnis as well — rejected the idea of using force to liberate the shrine and apprehend Sadr, who is a descendant of the prophet Muhammad.
“We want the immediate stoppage of bloodshed in Najaf,” said Hussein Mohammed Hadi Sadr, a Shiite cleric who is a distant relative of Moqtada Sadr and served as the conference’s chief emissary to the prime minister. “It is a holy place. We should not fight there. The language of dialogue should be the overruling language.”
Others were more blunt. “How can we have a conference if we have a war in Najaf?” growled Nadim Jabbari, the leader of a small Shiite party in Baghdad. “We must solve that problem first.”
Solving that problem delayed other business at the conference. The delegates are supposed to select a 100-member interim national assembly by Tuesday. By the end of the day Sunday, they had not even agreed on the rules by which members would be elected. The organizers want delegates to vote on slates of 81 candidates — 19 members of the former U.S.-appointed Governing Council have been guaranteed seats — but some participants, particularly those who are political independents, say they believe that method favors political parties and instead want assembly members to be elected individually.
The assembly, which will have the authority to veto decisions issued by Allawi’s cabinet, will be replaced after national elections are held…

I still can’t believe the Americans–going on into Najaf on their own???
And another small technical footnote to the Najaf story (and one which seems to confirm the idea that the Allawi “government”‘s policy changed in the middle of the day, Sunday.) That has to do whether there were or were not firm orders from the Allawists to ban journalists from city.
AP at 17:23 had this little story:

Iraqi police ordered all journalists to leave the holy city of Najaf on Sunday, just as a new U.S. offensive against militants hiding out in a revered shrine began.
Four police cars surrounded a hotel in the city where journalists were staying and presented the order signed by Najaf’s police chief, Brig. Ghalib al-Jazaari.
It did not spell out a punishment for those who did not comply, but police who delivered the order said any reporters remaining would be arrested, according to journalists at the hotel. The police said any cameras and cellular phones they saw would be confiscated. In response to the threat, many journalists left the city.
Later Sunday, the government appeared to be backing down.
Government spokesman George Sada said he contacted Interior Minister Falah Hassan al-Naqib, who informed him that police will be “taking it easy on the journalists.”
“They are doing this out of concern over the journalists’ safety,” Sada said. “The interior minister decided that if the journalists want to stay, it will be at their peril and they will then have to bear the consequences.”
Interior Ministry spokesman Adnan Abdulrahman denied anyone was threatened with arrest…

No comment needed from me on that. I will just note, however, that the “election-prep” conference is turning out to be a lot more interesting than I had expected.