Allawi’s blond beasts

I don’t think I’m an anti-white racist… But am I the only person who’s a bit perplexed by all the repeated pictures of Iyad Allawi, the ‘prime minister’ of the supposedly ‘independent’ transitional government of Iraq always appearing in public being very publicly guarded by a squad of very Aryan-looking and heavily armed blond beasts? Is this, I wonder, quite the image that he wants to project?

17 thoughts on “Allawi’s blond beasts”

  1. Nothing new. Didn’t the Ottomans prefer palace guards “recruited” (kidnapped?) from the cradle in Bosnia? These Janissaries, being of European extraction, had an exotic appearance that distinguished them from the local populations. More importance than appearance, however, was the fact that, being outsiders and raised as a special elite, they were loyal to the top ranks and were less likely to be partial to local interest groups.
    If Allawi’s guards were all Asian or African, would that open him to the counter-charge of making cannon-fodder of non-Europeans?
    Or should a clever minority entrepreneur set up a security firm, call it Rainbow Water, and offer Allawi a diversity quotient to his present bodyguards?
    Anyway, given the tendency of the local police to defect or refuse to shoot on insurgents, whom would you want as your guard in Baghdad?
    I suspect the job to be extremely dangerous. No salary would entice a sane person of any color. Nutty or not, pray for them.

  2. Well, despite the tone, having foreign mercenaries does make good sense from the perspective of an unpopular ruler–the Swiss Guards, at least as long as the Bourbon gold lasted, were the most reliable of pre-Revolutionary armed forces of France. Of course, when things began going wrong, the Swiss Guards were wiped out to a man in particularly brutal fashion by the outraged French revolutionary masses, but that’s a different story.

  3. Do I “not get it?” asks one.
    Honestly, that’s all the situation allows.
    Points:
    1) Did the whole Iraqi Army, Revolutionary Guard, and personal body guard of Saddam protect him?
    2) Not wiser to pick guards that don’t face daily temptations to spy, defect, run, join a coup conspiracy, or shoot the wrong way?
    3) Are they “repeated pictures,” or only some taken on July 14? Not all the guards were blond, though probably none Iraqi, and none with much life expectancy.
    Iraq is dangerous. The only “locals” with ample vitaes in security are former regime employees that Allawi can ill-trust. Most daily acts of terror, even if done without the active connivance of the police, probably occur without much fear of police interdiction. Some police and guard “cadets” get a pathetic 5 days training. Pay is modest and the ranks are probably riddled with insurgent agents, kin, and sympathizers.
    Would it be better for Allawi to imitate the insurgents and use civilians and religious shrines as shields? Sean Penn and Jose Bove are not available.
    Allawi’s only choices seem to be between hard and harder. And, at this point, who else but Allawi? Why relish his demise simply out of spite for Bush or simply to see the policy of “regime change” discredited? That’s not a very happy high ground.

  4. And, at this point, who else but Allawi?
    I only hope that the Iraqis get an opportunity to choose somebody else besides him. Looking at Allawi’s face one wonders.

  5. at this point, who else but Allawi?
    How about a democratically elected leader? Why has the Bush administration gone through so much to 1) avoid elections, 2) thwart Ibrahimi’s pursuit of his mandate, 3) keep Iraqis virtually completely out of any and all decision making about Iraq’s present and future?
    Why relish his demise simply out of spite for Bush or simply to see the policy of “regime change” discredited?
    Mr Koch, you don’t know me, and you know next to nothing about me, so I wonder on what basis do you assume that I 1) relish `Allawi’s demise, 2) do so simply out of spite for Bush, 3) do so simply to see the policy of “regime change” discredited.
    For your information I do not relish `Allawi’s demise. As far as I am concerned he can live a long and happy life – as long as he stays out of Iraq. The same for Chalabi and all the other opportunists, crooks, charlatans, thieves and murderers who rode in with the conquerors to take their appointed roles.
    Also for your information `Allawi is an unsuitable person to have in power in Iraq for many, many reasons having nothing to do with my feelings about Bush or the policy of “regime change”. Shall we start with his life-long history of murderous thuggery? Shall we discuss his career with Saddam’s Mukhabarat and all the Iraqi blood on his hands from that? Shall me then talk about his career with the CIA – during which, among other things, he arranged a few car bombings – and the Iraqi blood on his hands as a result of that?
    Shall we then move to the fact that when the going got tough he and the rest of his ilk got going right out of Iraq to wait out the bad times in comfort, safety and luxury while the people they now aim to rule suffered years of incredible deprivation and horrors? Shall we then talk about the fact that were the Iraqi people given a choice he and his ilk would be the last people on earth they would want for their leaders, yet somehow he has been foisted upon them by their “liberators” in the name of democracy?
    That’s not a very happy high ground.
    There is no high ground and nothing happy to be had out of this hideous situation.

  6. Sad there is so much angst over a sighting of “blond beasts.” Specimens of same ruddy tribe can be spoted in Kabul. Mr. Karzai evidently also relies on US contractors whose prior employers may have been the Secret Service or some special military unit. I may not hold their world view, but bear them no grudge and don’t envy their task.
    “How about a democratically elected leader?”
    Fine idea. Laudable goal. But can you imagine organizing parties or holding meaninful polls while public security is poor and black-turbaned hooligans intimidate voters, kill candidates, and steal ballots?
    At some point, elections will be held. But be careful for what you wish. What if Saddam, his daughter, or a proxy win a plurality nation-wide or a majority in Sunni districts? What if a Babel of sectarians and tribalists win in other regions? Larry Diamond provides a very sobering view of the challenge.
    “Allawi is an unsuitable person to have in power in Iraq for many, many reasons…”
    Wouldn’t it be very difficult for Mr. Allawi or even (for heavens sake) Chalabi to be as bad as Saddam? Could either be worse than Moqtada al-Sadr?
    Please share at least one reason why Allawi is no good. And, by all means, please suggest a better person than Allawi and furnish some reasons. A null candidate is not a sufficient reply. How about Sayyid Farqad al-Qizwini?
    Concerning Kabul, I know little about Mr. Karzai, but he gives a very decent impression, and I cannot imagine that he could be worse than his predecessors. Yet even he has many detractors, hires “beasts,” and will have a hard time orchestrating national elections or pacifying the country.
    This is a quandary posed by any venture posed by humanitarian intervention, nation-building, or just plain imperialism. Anyone you appoint will be hated, and any elections held will be denounced as corrupt. Yet there is no escaping the “You broke it, you own it” principle.

  7. Please share at least one reason why Allawi is no good.
    I tend to believe that story about his executing six prisoners personally. Allawi was as eager as Chalabi to exaggerate the prewar “threat” of Iraq – his organization supplied the guy who made the “45 minute WMD” claim. He is reported to have been personally involved in the liquidation of Saddam’s enemies in London in the 1970s. Finally, he holds a British passport.
    That’s four reasons for you.
    As for who the Iraqis pick, that is their own business. I hope that Iraq winds up with a government they regard as legitimate, unlike the current one. But it’s their job to decide what that is.
    If the US was sincere about allowing Iraqis to find a decent future for themselves, it would be genuinely seeking to turn that country over to the UN. If the past 15 months show anything, it’s how unfit we are to run the place. But we are not sincere. Our bottom line is not a government that the Iraqis want, but one that suits our purposes. We don’t really want to leave it up to the Iraqis to decide for themselves. In that context this puerile sorting-through of candidates really turns my stomach.

  8. No security, no democracy. If the streets are run by hoodlums, there can be no political parties, voter registrations, campaigning, or fair ballot counts.
    No security, no UN role either. Look what happened to Mr. Melo. Ditto for the NGOs, most of which have withdrawn.
    “I hope that Iraq winds up with a government they regard as legitimate…”
    Hope is not a policy. Making decisions is not “puerile.” And if Allawi is no angel, just remember that saints are uncommon in public office and, being perfect, are just impossible. Gandhi could not prevent an ugly partition and did not survive a fanatic’s bullet.
    Consider:
    http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4988293

  9. No security, no UN role either. Look what happened to Mr. Melo. Ditto for the NGOs, most of which have withdrawn.
    You nake good points, but the basic question is whether any government under the aegis of the US can provide security in Iraq. I don’t think it can. Again, the problem is that most Iraqis are aware of American ulterior motives. This can’t be swept under the rug.

  10. The blondeness of the guards is as incidental as the Vatican guards who are not local but also blond Swiss mercenaries.
    Now for a novel idea on how to kill two birds with one stone: transfer the Sudanese Janjaweed to fight the insurgency in Iraq.
    You would have leveraged two of the ugliest fight methods modern (?) Islam has to offer: Cutting live enemies’ heads, and impregnating their women.
    Only good can come of having them fight one another until there is one standing on each side.
    E. Bilpe

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