Transitional justice and Iraq

I’ve just been reading a really intriguing report about the attitudes of Iraqis towards reconciliation and ‘justice’ that has been published by a body called the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), in New York.
The report is called Iraqi Voices. It’s 74 pages in that PDF version, and quite a lengthy read. The data in it are a little old, since they all date from last July and August. Also, the ICTJ did not use a totally “scientific” social-science methodology in their investigation (and as a result, their findings are presented in narrative rather than quantitative form, which is fine by me.)
What they had done to get their data was conduct fairly detailed interviews with 38 “opinion leaders” around the country and then hold smallish focus-group discussions among a total of some 340 Iraqis from different background. Their sampling was not “representative” at all. For example, of the 38 “opinion leaders”, only six were from the south, while 20 were from the much more sparsely populated “north” of the country.
But still, I find the report really interesting. I don’t know that attitudes on these important issues have necessarily changed very much inside Iraq in the past ten months. (What does anyone else think?) And honestly, that method of taking an unrepresentative but broad sampling from throughout a society, and doing some individual interviews and some small-group discussions, is almost exactly what I did in Mozambique last year, and it was incredibly revelatory and productive for me.

I should tell you a little about the ICTJ, in case you’ve never come across it yet. It was founded three or four years ago with mucho money, as I understand it, from the Ford Foundation and other big US charitable foundations. The idea was to try to provide a resource center for societies undergoing big transitions from dictatorship to democracy– a place where they could brainstorm with people from other societies that had earlier gone through those kinds of transitions and figure out what kind of mix of policies might work best for them.
It’s probably fair to say, however, that most of the people who founded the ICTJ were ardent fans of South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. The first Executive Director of the ICTJ–he’s just stepped down–was Alex Boraine, the Executive Secretary of the TRC; and many other top staff people have been people with experience in “truth commissions” of one sort or another in Latin America, Eastern Europe, or elsewhere.
So they do have some real expertise there. But their work is tilted somewhat to using one of the two currently-dominant western paradigms for dealing with the legacies of past atrocities: either truth commissions or war-crimes courts. What they don’t look at so much is efforts like the remarkably successful one in Mozambique where reconciliation has taken very clear precedence over any effort to establish full and highly individualized “accountability” for the misdeeds of the past.
Having said all of which, let me just present a few of the main findings from their field research for you. (They also have a large section of their own recommendations regarding Iraq, which I may go into in a later post; but I don’t have time to do that now.)
Okay, starting at the bottom of their p.47:

A. Past Human Rights Abuses
This report reveals what can be described only as a common national experience of widespread exposure to human rights abuses. The survey also shows that Iraqis were mostly aware of the violations suffered by different ethnic, religious, or political groupings at the hands of the regime’s intelligence, security, or military forces in other parts of the country. For example, Kurds knew of the abuses suffered by the Shi’a in the south, and residents of Baghdad were knowledgeable about the Anfal and the Arabization campaigns in the north…
In a forward-looking way, human rights were broadly understood as a set of preconditions for a life with dignity and respect and, in that sense, were viewed positively and associated with a hopeful future. They were represented by such ideas as employment, provision of basic services, legal protection from arbitrary action by the state, or freedom to speak and associate without fear of persecution. While there was a great deal of emphasis on the restoration of civil and political rights, many reflected on economic, cultural, and social rights, such as the right to education, the right to be treated with dignity, support for women, and an equitable share in the country’s resources.
B. Justice and Accountability
Similar to their understanding of human rights, participants also saw the concept of justice as an inverse image of the old regime–a just society is everything that the old order was not. A just society was described in terms of nondiscrimination, good governance, transparency, rule of law, and respect for women’s and children’s rights.
There was strong support across the various regions and groups for holding accountable through a legal process those responsible for human rights violations…
Revenge and retribution were principal motivating forces, especially among victims and their families, and were expressed in terms of the need for punishments that fit the crime.
Most respondents pointed to Saddam Hussein, his family, and his closest followers and supporters as those who should be held most accountable. Ali Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali), Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (vice-chair of the Revolutionary Command Council), and Uday and Qusay Hussein were among those specifically named. Most stressed the need to differentiate between Ba’ath party leadership and mere members, pointing to the fact that membership was often a strategy for survival and not necessarily evidence of direct participation in violations.
Responsibility for the violations in Iraq over the past few decades was also laid squarely at the doorstep of the international community and the United States for the support given to Saddam’s regime. Comments indicated distrust of the U.S. on two main counts: the historical support provided to the former regime, and the disorder, lack of security, and looting that followed its demise and the beginnings of the occupation. The shortcomings of the postwar planning made daily living conditions difficult and also raised suspicions about the U.S. motivations in going to war. Additionally, the daily friction with occupation forces fed feelings of humiliation. Respondents from Baghdad and the southern regions expressed mistrust of a U.S.-dominated trial process for the former regime figures.
The UN was specifically criticized for its ineffectiveness in restraining the violations of the previous regime. Suspicion and distrust was most evident among respondents from the north–both Kurdish and Turkoman–who regarded the UN as further strengthening the hold of the regime through the role it played in what is widely perceived as a corrupted process, involving kickbacks and ‘shady’ transactions during the Oil for Food program…
Participants were nearly unanimous in their criticism and resentment at the support Arab states gave to the regime of Saddam Hussein, and the perception that those states had profited in a variety of ways from the suffering of the Iraqi people…
Respondents expressed strong preference for an Iraqi-controlled process of accountability, presenting this in terms of the need for Iraqis to be in charge of decision-making. Iraqi lawyers and judges also spoke about the need to restore the dignity of the legal system and saw such trials as a way to re-establish such professional and national pride…
C. Truth-seeking and Remembrance
One major reason for the overwhelming support for a ‘public’ legal process of accountability was that it would expose the full details of the regime’s crimes. Consistent with the level of interest in a public accounting of violations through prosecutions was broad support for an official process of truth-seeking and preservation of historical memory.
A number of specific needs were articulated, which respondents felt could be achieved only through a process of truth-seeking culminating in a form of remembrance. These ranged from special days to honor those who had died under Saddam to teaching children to establishing museums that would tell the stories of the Ba’athist era. Participants expressed a desire for the rest of the world to be shown the truth. This was seen as necessary because the ‘outside world’ either did not know the full details or, worse, turned a blind eye. It was also seen as a way of ensuring nonrecurrence and constantly reminding future generations not to repeat those mistakes. Truth-seeking processes and memorials were also seen as ways that victims and their families, especially those with missing relatives, could process personal experiences through a larger national narrative. Families of the missing were anxious to institute a process by which perpetrators of human rights violations could come forward and reveal information about their whereabouts.
Notwithstanding their limited or nonexistent knowledge of truth and reconciliation processes elsewhere in the world, respondents were quick to suggest their own versions of how a truthseeking process should commence…
It should be noted that several individuals questioned the wisdom of opening old wounds and counseled for energies to be put into more forward-looking or constructive exercises. Most felt that such a process would not be viable if it was seen to replace holding accountable those responsible for the most serious violations. Some participants, mostly Marsh Arab and Chaldean Christians, expressed opposition to going back over the past. Instead of keeping records, some preferred a pragmatic approach oriented toward moving on and rebuilding a normal daily life. There was also a concern that a truth-seeking process might become politicized.
D. Amnesty
Insight into many groups’ attitudes regarding amnesty can be gleaned by understanding their feelings about punishing the guilty. While several groups did not discuss amnesty specifically, their discussion of punishment indicates that they do not consider amnesty an option for those considered guilty. (This reflects the fact that the groups tended to focus their discussions on those who committed very serious crimes.) However, respondents tended to agree that amnesty was possible, even necessary, for those who committed lesser crimes.
E. Vetting
While the research did not specifically focus on the process of deba’athification that began in May 2003, the issue of removing individuals from positions of public authority on the basis of their conduct came up during discussions on justice and accountability. While most respondents blamed the Ba’ath party for entrenching authoritarian habits and perpetuating repression, they also felt it was unfair to penalize individuals solely on the basis of their party membership and sought to draw distinctions between members of the Ba’ath party (Ba’athis) and supporters of Saddam Hussein (Saddamis). There was, however, clear support for the dismissal of Ba’ath party members–and anyone else–who participated in criminal or corrupt activity as a means of reforming Iraqi institutions. None of the respondents referred to or drew on international standards regarding vetting or lustration. Rather, their views were based on direct experiences of the importance of joining the party to ensure reasonable career development…
F. Reparations
While recognizing that their suffering and losses were incalculable and that ‘nothing will fix it,’ participants expressed widespread support for both material and symbolic compensation. Respondents spoke about reparations in terms of the need to rebuild lives, restore dignity, and help people recover lost opportunities, rather than as one-time financial payments. Much emphasis was placed on the need for assistance in social reintegration and recuperation of lost
livelihood. Most felt that a program of compensations and rehabilitation was necessary if Iraqi society was going to be able to move beyond the legacy of Saddam Hussein.
The need for restitution of lost lands and property was raised by Kurds and Marsh Arabs, reflecting the impact of Arabization programs that led to more than one million internally displaced (according to international human rights groups)…
G. Social Reconstruction and Reconciliation
… Given the narrow scope of questions about reconciliation, most groups could not find agreement on the topic. Many believed that unity already exists between the Iraqi people, which implied that reconciliation was unnecessary. Others believed that the current division between the groups was the construct of the previous regime; as such, ethnic and sectarian tension would dissolve with the
fall of Saddam. Several respondents reflected that, race and religion aside, they were united by the injustice endured under the previous regime. Viewing it as a process for improving relations and rebuilding trust, Kurdish respondents identified with the need for improving Kurd/Arab relations and restoring trust. Other ethnic minorities gave less clear answers and views appeared more split than in agreement. Respondents from among the Shi’a and ex-political prisoners
indicated that neighboring countries are also responsible for continued ethnic conflict in Iraq. However, responses to indirect questions demonstrated that some process for national reconciliation is desirable. For example, promoting interethnic harmony and social integration through education, media, awareness programs, and community projects was suggested as way to encourage interaction among the groups. Participants also demanded ensuring justice, security, and freedom for all.
In terms of social reconstruction, securing basic needs, maintaining security and stability, and improving economic conditions were the three most pressing issues for all groups. Without rule of law and basic necessities to sustain daily routine, the ensuing social unrest would undermine any efforts in rebuilding. Education was a widely mentioned topic, with multiple dimensions encompassing education for youth, human rights, re-education for adults, skills trainings, and culture/value inculcation. Many perceived it as a cornerstone to help Iraq step into the future.
Overall, participants in all groups articulated hope for the future and an eagerness to control their own destiny…

Well, I reckon anyone who was reading Riverbend, Salam/Raed, and other blogs written by thoughtful, well-rooted Iraqis over the past months could have learned just about all those things.
However, it is really nice to have ICTJ having gone out and asked all those questions–rather than just marching out and saying, “Look you backward, benighted natives, this is what you should do!” Also, if you get a chance to read the whole report, check out some of the really poignant and thought-provoking quotations they have in there from their “respondents”.