- Note: Jonathan Edelstein is one of the best-informed and wisest analysts of Israeli-Palestinian matters– among other matters– whom I have the honor of knowing. He is not, currently, keeping up the “Head Heeb” blog that was a great resource for us all for so long. But he came over here to JWN today and posted some lengthy comments that are worthy of close consideration. So with full atrribution to Jonathan Edelstein here they are…
Helena, I wonder if the bust-out and associated developments represent a revival, or possibly a culmination, of the “parallel unilateralism” strategy that you postulated for Hamas after the January 2006 election. [Note from HC: Actually, as I later told Jonathan, I already wrote a bit about this yesterday.] During the spring and summer of 2006, some of the Hamas ministers were talking about ending Gaza’s economic dependence on Israel and realigning the economy with the Arab world, which at least for the time being means Egypt in practical terms. Hamas has now taken a rather forceful step toward doing just that.
This might also lead, to some extent, to a revival of Israeli unilateralism. After the initial shock, some senior Israeli officials began spinning the bust-out as an opportunity for Israel to disengage from Gaza economically, and I don’t think that’s entirely spin. There’s some interesting analysis along those lines in today’s Yediot.
As for Bob Spencer’s speculation that Gaza might “become some sort of loosely associated part of Egypt,” I wonder if it might end up more the other way. I did some speculating of my own about the Gaza-Sinai relationship in late 2005, at the time the Rafah crossing reopened and before the rocket-closure-raid cycle started developing its own logic. The key points were that Gaza has six times the population of North Sinai governorate, that there was more money in Gaza than in that part of Egypt, that Egyptian security control in that region was tenuous and that the ports of al-Arish and Port Said had the potential to become a key Palestinian import-export route. All these, except possibly the second, remain true, and given that it will be a political impossibility for Mubarak to re-close the border (although he has built walls against his own Bedouin citizens), Sinai al-Shamaliyya might end up becoming a de facto Palestinian economic appendage. Interesting times.
I’ll close by questioning received wisdom, noting a legal paradigm shift, and indulging in some wild speculation.
Questioning received wisdom: I think we’ve been wrong all along in describing the siege of Gaza as an Israeli siege. In fact, ever since Israel left the Philadelphi route, it’s been an Israeli-Egyptian siege, and Egypt has maintained its end for its own reasons. Hamas correctly perceived Egypt as the military and political weak link, and chose to break the siege at the Egyptian border. I’ve actually wondered why it took so long; there have been partial breaches of the wall before, and I remember thinking at the time that Hamas would gain an advantage by widening them. Maybe it wasn’t yet ready, but I think it’s now very clear that they and Israel were never the only players.
The paradigm shift: now that the Egyptian border is open, Gaza can no longer be regarded as Israeli-occupied territory. Some scholars such as Dugard maintain that the occupation continued after the 2005 withdrawal because Israel continued to control the access points. I’ve argued in the past that international law precedents, such as the ICJ’s judgment in the DRC-Uganda case, don’t support this interpretation and that the occupation ended once Israel gave up effective control on the ground. At this point, however, the argument is moot: as long as the Egyptian border stays open, Gaza can’t seriously be regarded as occupied even under Dugard’s interpretation. This would mean that the law of belligerent occupation no longer applies to Gaza, although the humanitarian law of war, including the provisions relating to siege, still do. Israel is no longer legally responsible (note: legal and moral responsibilities aren’t necessarily the same) for the general welfare of Gaza, or for supplying its people with goods like electricity or fuel.
And now the wild speculation: On the hopeful side, this is a potential chance for Gaza to get its act together. The Palestinians have, to put it bluntly, choked on Gaza several times, and neither the PNA nor Hamas has been able to control the place sufficiently to govern it or to institute an effective cease-fire. Israel has been partly responsible for this state of affairs but so has Palestinian infighting and the prevalence of splinter militias. If Hamas can re-establish an economy in Gaza and use the popularity that it has surely gained from this move to consolidate its authority, then it might be able to work out a mutual cease-fire on the Israeli border, position itself as a responsible diplomatic player, and maybe even reduce the perceived risk of Gaza by enough to attract foreign investment. This would in turn increase the pressure on both Israel and Fatah to move toward ending the occupation in the West Bank, because otherwise Hamas would be able to point to its success in Gaza as the only viable alternative.
Working against this is the fact that Egypt will now take a major security interest in Gaza, given that a linkup between Hamas and the Egyptian ikhwan is Mubarak’s worst nightmare. As noted above, it’s politically impossible at the moment for him to close the border, but he isn’t going to just leave a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political organization alone. I think we can expect to see Egyptian security forces infiltrate Gaza in the near future, primarily in covert roles, and there’s a potential for major disruption if this turns into an undeclared Hamas-Egypt war.
Of course, the reverse might also happen – that Hamas would expand its security interests to include north Sinai. If the route to al-Arish becomes its lifeline, then it will want to protect its access to that route, and might find allies among the local Bedouins who are in effective revolt against the central government. I think Hamas wants to avoid this kind of entanglement, which is why it’s trying so hard now to come to an agreement with Egypt on border control, but I don’t think the possibility of Hamas strongholds or patrols in Sinai can be ruled out. This in turn would raise tensions along the Israel-Egypt border due to the increased possibility of infiltration.
There is now an opportunity for the Gaza crisis to either resolve into a new metastable arrangement, or to expand. I know which one I hope will happen, and I also know that I’m afraid the other will.
- Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at January 24, 2008 11:45 AM
I see that about two thirds of the above comment came after I said I was going to “close.” Famous last words.
Anyway, two more observations: First, I wonder if Hamas will open Gaza to the Palestinians living in the Lebanese refugee camps, who are the worst-off of the refugees and have recently been hard hit by the Lebanese security forces. If Hamas wants propaganda victories – which it obviously does – then that could be a big one, and possibly a humanitarian victory as well.
Second, water will continue to be the bottleneck for Gaza even if the border stays open. It can get fuel, food and other supplies either from Egypt or through Port Said and al-Arish (the latter of which has recently been upgraded), but Egypt can’t supply water given its own scarcity, and importing the volume that Gaza needs to develop would be logistically difficult. This may preclude a complete economic disengagement between Gaza and Israel, at least in the immediate term. Do you have any idea how Hamas intends to go about resolving this situation?
- Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at January 24, 2008 11:57 AM
On a not-entirely-unrelated topic, this may also be of interest.
- Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein at January 24, 2008 12:35 PM
Thanks, Jonathan!
Gosh, I wish I had time start thinking more about all the questions you raise… But I really don’t as I’m crashing on several deadlines. It would be great for everyone else to jump on in with their responses to these questions.
Fascinating stuff.
A few random questions for you experts!:
Doesn’t this latest development cement the seemingly inexorable division of Palestine into two separate statelets that began with the Sharon unilateral withdrawal/disengagement?
Hasn’t it long been been the case that the economic viability of Gaza could only be achieved by an expansion into Egypt?
What are the implications for the West Bank and Jordan? With the Gaza Palestinians now looking south rather than north for their future, will the WBankers start looking east rather than west?
“now that the Egyptian border is open, Gaza can no longer be regarded as Israeli-occupied territory.”
I’m assuming you’re not a lawyer, so I’m not sure why you’re making legal pronouncements at all.
But since you have, I’ll ask you: are you suggesting that despite the fact that the IOF still blocks Palestinian access to the sea (all but destroying gaza’s fishing industry), that Gaza is now free of Israeli control? Not to the mention the “routine operations” the Israeli military is constantly conducting, and I’m not referring just to the recent raids?
And how is Hamas’ 18-month self-imposed unilateral ceasefire not “effective”?
By the way, Gaza had plenty of water until Israel began destroying its aquifers.
Your commentary is less than impressive, to say the least, and your barely veiled “they-just- can’t-govern-themselves” arrogance is a real turn off.
I never saw Hamas as the obstacle to a cease-fire with Israel.
If Israel wanted a cease-fire – that would include ending the blockade maybe a prisoner swap it could have had one all along.
Hamas breaking the blockade does not change that. I would only go so far as to say Hamas wanted the blockade lifted as a cease-fire condition and Israel did not and the matter has now been solved on the ground in Hamas’ favor. I think Israel gets a cease fire as soon as it asks for one now. And agrees to supply electricity and water until other arrangements can be made.
I’ve always thought of the siege as Egypt cooperating with an Israeli siege at US insistence and in exchange for US aid. Egypt was the weak link, but left to its own devices, I don’t think Egypt ever would have participated in any siege.
Other than whatever the US gives, I don’t see what Egypt ever got from the siege. Hamas recognizes Egypt and the threat is poses to Egypt cannot be compared by any stretch to the threat it poses to Israel.
Will Israel at this point use water as a bargaining chip? The withdrawal of fuel for the electrical plant backfired so spectacularly that I hope it would not. Withholding life necessities is inherently a PR move, and one that just does not work, especially against Hamas.
I don’t see how Abbas, Dahlan and the PA can survive this. They can’t get road blocks lifted while Hamas has, against furious Israeli opposition, gotten its people freedom of movement across international borders when they already had internal freedom of movement.
For Hamas to have kept this secret until now, showed extraordinary capability on the part of that organization. I would have to see Hamas fail to impose a cease fire to believe it would have trouble doing so.
Hamas has credibility that the PLO does not have by not recognizing Israel. Falling in line with a Hamas cease-fire is not collaboration the way it is with a PLO cease fire.
I don’t see what Egypt and Hamas would fight over. As long as goods flow into the Sinai, as they have and there is no reason for them not to continue, Hamas is a content political actor as far as Egypt is concerned. The US will pressure Egypt to increase its anti-smuggling efforts, but Hamas is used to bringing goods across the border under tunnels. Anything Egypt can do will strike Hamas as a great improvement for the foreseeable future.
The onus is still on the Palestinians re statements such as “if Hamas can reestablish an economy in Gaza. . .” Does this mean Israel will stop bombing? Was it not Israel that bombed the Gaza power generators that supplied Gaza with electricity? Was it not Israel that bombed the Gaza airport and all and sundry infrastructure? What guarantees are there that Israel will stop its incursions and bombs?
And only after Hamas “reestablishes an economy in Gaza” will it be regarded as a “responsible diplomatic player”. Sorry. I just hear the same old same old “we have noone to negotiate with” refrain.
It was Israel that built the Ghetto Wall between Gaza and Egypt. I agree with Arnold that Egyptian cooperation with Israel has come about using US aid to Egypt as bait.
Sorry. Not impressed with the analysis.
The onus is still on the Palestinians re statements such as “if Hamas can reestablish an economy in Gaza. . .” Does this mean Israel will stop bombing? Was it not Israel that bombed the Gaza power generators that supplied Gaza with electricity? Was it not Israel that bombed the Gaza airport and all and sundry infrastructure? What guarantees are there that Israel will stop its incursions and bombs?
And only after Hamas “reestablishes an economy in Gaza” will it be regarded as a “responsible diplomatic player”. Sorry. I just hear the same old same old “we have noone to negotiate with” refrain.
It was Israel that built the Ghetto Wall between Gaza and Egypt. I agree with Arnold that Egyptian cooperation with Israel has come about using US aid to Egypt as bait.
Sorry. Not impressed with the analysis.
BB:
Doesn’t this latest development cement the seemingly inexorable division of Palestine into two separate statelets that began with the Sharon unilateral withdrawal/disengagement?
I’m not sure anything’s “inexorable” in this region. Gaza and the WB have endured a prolonged period of separation in the past (1948-67) but came together once they were again mutually accessible. They still have, at least from where I sit, more similarities than differences, and they still share an overriding identity. They have some different political and social traits but no more so than, say, New York and South Carolina. If they are made geographically contiguous in the near future – i.e., by an access corridor through Israeli territory – then I’d guess that the process is reversible.
Remember that the last thing to be described as “inexorable” was the Israeli settlements.
Hasn’t it long been been the case that the economic viability of Gaza could only be achieved by an expansion into Egypt?
I wouldn’t say so. There are two ways to grow: by getting more territory, or by making the territory you have more productive. One thing I’ve been arguing for years is that land and resource competition isn’t zero-sum, and that the best way to resolve it is to increase the size of the pie. In this case, the very fact that the border is open and goods can come into Gaza will make a big economic difference even without expansion into new territories.
What are the implications for the West Bank and Jordan?
I couldn’t begin to guess. A great deal will depend on who’s in charge there in a year’s time.
Yasmin:
I’m assuming you’re not a lawyer
You’re assuming wrongly.
But since you have, I’ll ask you: are you suggesting that despite the fact that the IOF still blocks Palestinian access to the sea (all but destroying gaza’s fishing industry), that Gaza is now free of Israeli control?
Occupation, in legal terms, is a specific type of “control” – it’s generally interpreted (including by the ICJ judgment I referenced) as the ability to exercise effective police power. Israel can control entry and exit to Gaza on three sides, and can do military damage, but that adds up to a siege rather than occupation as defined by international conventions.
And how is Hamas’ 18-month self-imposed unilateral ceasefire not “effective”?
Because every other ideology-with-an-army in Gaza isn’t bound by it, and Hamas has thus far been either unable or unwilling to enforce it against them. Without a monopoly of force, Hamas can’t negotiate a ceasefire for Gaza; it can only negotiate for itself.
BTW, I’m not suggesting now, nor have I ever suggested, that Palestinians “just can’t govern themselves.” What I’m saying is that, thus far in Gaza, they haven’t established an effective government on the ground. I have no doubt that they can if the conditions are right – whatever my disagreements with its ideology, I don’t deny that Hamas in particular is a disciplined and intelligent organization. The question is whether those conditions can now be established and, if so, what strategy will be pursued.
Arnold:
I would only go so far as to say Hamas wanted the blockade lifted as a cease-fire condition and Israel did not and the matter has now been solved on the ground in Hamas’ favor. I think Israel gets a cease fire as soon as it asks for one now.
There’s still the possibility of an Israeli attempt to reclose the border – for instance, by reoccupying the Philadelphi corridor. I think you’re substantially correct about this, though.
Other than whatever the US gives, I don’t see what Egypt ever got from the siege.
Protection from a strategic hookup between Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. You’re correct that Hamas “recognizes Egypt,” but its relationship to the current Egyptian government – and just as importantly, to the opposition – is more fraught.
Also, the Egyptian state media have occasionally regarded the possibility of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian labor migrants in a less than welcoming way, although I don’t have the references offhand.
I don’t see how Abbas, Dahlan and the PA can survive this.
They’ll have to bring something home damn soon. As more-or-less noted in the last of the three comments Helena posted, this may be a start, but it’s no more than that.
“Occupation, in legal terms, is a specific type of “control” – it’s generally interpreted (including by the ICJ judgment I referenced) as the ability to exercise effective police power. Israel can control entry and exit to Gaza on three sides, and can do military damage, but that adds up to a siege rather than occupation as defined by international conventions”
This analysis is quite shallow and conclusory. Control of movement of the population is a major factor in determining whether the area is occupied. And as I observed earlier, blocking the population’s access to its own coastal waters is a quite significant limitation. Firing into the Gaza strip from just outside the border would also limit movement within the Palestinian territory.
Control of movement into and out of territory isn’t the same thing as being able to exercise police power within the territory.
Anyway, what I’m talking about is the way occupation has been interpreted by international tribunals. If you’re interested, you might want to read the DRC-Uganda judgment, which contains a discussion of the law of occupation (and which differentiates between control of the ground and control of access points such as the Kisangani airport – the relevant discussion is at paragraphs 167-180). There are other cases on the ICJ web site as well as scholarly discussions and arbitral decisions that make a similar point.
You are, of course, free to argue that I’m misreading the relevant legal decisions or that the decisions themselves are too narrow. Some scholars have argued that, because of modern weaponry and methods of control, the definition of belligerent occupation that existed at the time of the Hague and Geneva Conventions has become obsolete. I don’t agree with that analysis but you are free to do so. In the meantime the legal decisions are what they are.
BTW, the argument we’re now having – i.e., as to whether control of movement in and out represents occupation – is exactly what I’m arguing is now a moot point, because Israel no longer controls movement across the Gaza-Egypt border. Unless Israel re-closes the border, which I don’t think it has the capability of doing at present, then it will only control movement across its own frontiers.
The conditions for lifting the siege that I’m aware of, all Israeli conditions. The main condition is recognizing Israel’s right to continue as a Jewish majority state, which means to deny the refugees the ability to alter that majority.
I don’t think there are any Egyptian conditions for lifting the siege. For example, Mubarak has not said that if Hamas denies the Muslim Brotherhood in some way, or pledges to take some action regarding Palestinian labor or takes any action at all regarding Egypt, he would lift his end of the siege. So I don’t think there is any question that the siege was carried out as a policy on Israel’s behalf. Egypt’s cooperation was paid for by the US, but it was always Egypt cooperating with Israel’s siege, rather than a joint Israeli/Egyptian siege.
A settlement freeze that is reported today – a start but people are going to give Hamas part of the credit even as insistent as the article is that this freeze has been (silently) in effect for weeks. Hamas may still get more credit than the PA.
I wonder if Egypt really is switching sides. The Saudis have been refusing to play along with “isolate Iran” for a while now. Egypt doesn’t seem to be as wholeheartedly playing “isolate Hamas” as it had been.
This situation is so big, with possible effects so far reaching that I’m not confident in my ability to change my understanding of the region quickly enough. I wonder who is, if anyone.
Thinking out of the box: Hamas should immediately negotiate with Syria for an aquaduct
to Gaza. Bring Isreal into the deal with a share of the water and Volia!!! Water unites all. Bring it in from Turkey if necessary. Let Egypt have a share too.There are no losers, only winners.
Lodgepole: that’s exactly the sort of thing I mean by non-zero-sum solutions to resource problems. I could only wish that the players in this drama were thinking along such lines.
Arnold:
I don’t think there are any Egyptian conditions for lifting the siege. For example, Mubarak has not said that if Hamas denies the Muslim Brotherhood in some way, or pledges to take some action regarding Palestinian labor or takes any action at all regarding Egypt, he would lift his end of the siege.
He hasn’t said any of that in public. None of us here are privy to what has been said in the private contacts between his government and Hamas. For that matter, we don’t know if Hamas has asked about Egyptian conditions for ending the siege, or if it made any offers prior to the bust-out.
More to the point, while Mubarak hasn’t said anything in public, the state media – which are often guides to what his administration is thinking – have expressed such reservations.
A settlement freeze that is reported today – a start but people are going to give Hamas part of the credit even as insistent as the article is that this freeze has been (silently) in effect for weeks.
It’s actually been at least partly in effect for months – no building permits have been issued east of the Green Line since June 2007. What’s changing now is that the Israeli government is no longer allowing anything to be built even with existing permits.
Agreed that it’s just a start, though – not taking anything new isn’t equivalent to giving something back.
I also missed this from your first post:
Hamas has credibility that the PLO does not have by not recognizing Israel. Falling in line with a Hamas cease-fire is not collaboration the way it is with a PLO cease fire.
You may be right. If you are, though, I can’t help wondering what a ceasefire is really worth. The Israelis aren’t going away any more than the Palestinians are, the two will have to come to a modus vivendi eventually, and if the only way to get credibility and avoid being labeled a collaborator is through studied denial of same, then it’s not a happy commentary.
Then again, I can answer my own rhetorical question. Non-recognition at the diplomatic level doesn’t preclude political entities from coexisting. Syria doesn’t recognize Israel, but the two have managed to mostly leave each other alone for the past 35 years. A world in which Israel was back behind the 1967 borders, a free Palestinian state existed on the other side and the two were formally-but-not-actually at war would be immeasurably better than the one we’re living in now. It’s just that I’d rather see a real peace, and while Israel isn’t innocent, it’s not the only party whose ideology and actions are an obstacle to that.
Anyway, I will be out of town so will probably not be able to answer comments until after the weekend. Everyone feel free to tear me apart.
Isn’t Gaza now a little like a toothpaste tube with the cap taken off? All Israel has to do now is start squeezing even more, and a large number of Gaza’s inhabitants will head for the exit.
It’s not as if there has been no precedent for this. It was a modus operandi for the Israelis in 1948, again in 1967 in the West Bank, yet again with the ‘Security Barrier’ which has stolen precious aquifers and farming land, and the Israeli-only roads in the West Bank, which have reduced the Palestinian areas to crowded ghettoes.
They could always start slowly by shelling Beit Hanoun yet again. Careful users always start squeezing a toothpaste tube at the end opposite the cap.
As for your careful prancing about on the legal niceties of ‘belligerent occupation’, Mr Edelstein, don’t you think that’s rather an airy-fairy notion, and all the rest faff, where an aggressive and land-hungry neighbour seals off the three longest sides of a virtual prison camp, allows no-one in or out, whether mortally sick or not, indiscriminately bombs public buildings of all kinds (even if, as in the case of the ‘Hamas Interior Ministry’ it has been empty and unusable for 18 months) and regularly assassinates political leaders, together, always, with a few bystanders? Plus conducting indiscriminate house clearances, etc; the list of atrocities goes on.
The best way to get a solution to the Israeli problem is for the US to turn off the money-tap.
The way things are going, it may be that the US may not be able to afford to keep the money-tap flowing much longer.
Richard
There is litte doubt that in the 1990-ies, Israeli actions against Gaza would be internationally condemned, but this is not the case now. Quite on the contrary, international pressure appears to target Egypt (not Israel), Egyptians are supposed to “stabilize the border situation” aka close the border and participate in the Israeli blockade.
My underdstanding is, by breaking the Gaza-Egypt fence, Hamas made an important symbolic move. What we have is an explicit demonstration that Egypt cannot be effectively used as a proxy to project the Western (i.e. Israeli) pressure on them.
Whatever legal and diplomatic moves are made, they are still in the state of war with Israel and won’t be prevented from doing whatever they want to do.
And how is Hamas’ 18-month self-imposed unilateral ceasefire not “effective”?
It is of little consolation to the traumatized Sderot residents that the unremitting stream of rockets that have made normal life impossible for them are fired by “Islamic Jihad” and not by Hamas.
Thanks for your insightful thoughts, Jonathan. The Head Heeb is sorely missed. Best wishes to you.
Regarding the arguments about what constitutes “occupation”, since Gaza is not a nation state, but merely one small part of Palestine – which is most definately under occupation, by just about any legal definition – is it even possible to talk of Gaza as a discrete entity? Even if Israel relinquished all control over the strip (which it clearly won’t) could it legally be said not to be occupied when the rest of the PT so obviously are?
“They’ll have to bring something home damn soon.”
Dear Jonatahn, [only a little more about it]
Fayyad increased the use of the Paris-money for the cover of the PAs budget deficit from US$ 3,92b [IMF, early December 07] up to US$ 5,39b [Samir Abdullahm, 01/20/08] = He has US$ 1,47b in three years to spend without any regulation. Its intresting quite about that/all of the money, so we can think of a broad understanding tat he will use the money discretionary. And the old Fatah-style. In Berlin, Wednesday he signed a additional deal with Germany, worth 600 000 €. The projects will be conducted of http://www.gtz.de/en/praxis/3648.htm [Schools, kindergarden, meeting place]. Munib al-Masri and Bassam Chaudry joint him [and I think they all even wore blue ties] and received some additional promises of German hightech-industries and foundations. […..]
They bring very much home, but the reformists [like in Syria] do not represent the political masses. They may represent only 5% of the voters.
If Abbas, Dahlan and other Fatahist only use them to “survive”, they will survive and I think that this is the critical point of the current story.
correction: And NOT the old Fatah-style.
Hamas was founded to resist 60 years of brutal occupation this occupation is empowered by the international community.
eldestein will like us to believe that Hamas was victorious in liberating the Gazans, when in fact Hamas was able to ease the humanitarian crisis, “… Hamas wants propaganda victories – which it obviously does -…. ”
Eldestein wants us to believe that Hamas controls all its borders and the only obstacle is water scarcity, he went further to elude to Hamas interest in land grab.
In short he wants us to believe that the problem is solved and Egypt is responsible and Israel now is merely a spectator.
“Control of movement into and out of territory isn’t the same thing as being able to exercise police power within the territory.”
The sea IS part of Gaza’s territory. Mr Edelstein’s ‘scholarly’ argument is the kind of thing that gives lawyers a bad name.
Hope nothing will take place on the world stage that will diverge attention from the humanitarian crisis in Gaza .
You have to want to believe Egypt enforced the siege on its own impulses to believe it. There is no public information available that would lead to that conclusion, but maybe there is something we don’t know about.
There is plenty of public explanation of the siege. The US and Israel are very explicit that they are punishment for electing a government that does not accept Israel as a Jewish majority state. The US and Israel are very clear that they interpret the border arrangement with Egypt in such a way that Israel has the right to order Egypt to keep the border shut and Egypt’s cooperation is required by that arrangement which is part of the post-treaty US/Egypt relationship.
Egypt’s behavior is perfectly explainable without a secret agenda. There is no good evidence of a secret agenda, so to say there may be a secret agenda, while technically true, is not persuasive to me.
About labor, that was a problem before the election of Hamas, but Egypt did not impose a siege until the election. About links to the Muslim Brotherhood it is very unclear how the siege prevents Hamas from linking with them. The idea that Egypt is motivated by that and not by the very open and public relationship with the United States, as I say earlier is something you have to want to believe to believe.
Rice has been very clear that to have the siege lifted Hamas has to recognize Israel, and essentially nothing else.
Israelis aren’t going anywhere, but Afrikaaners didn’t go anywhere. Yet there is no Afrikaaner state. The Muslim Brotherhood has said it has no problem with Jewish individuals, just not a Jewish state.
Disagree or not, the Hamas position is essentially the ANC position with respect to no Afrikaaner state in southern Africa.
For the US/West to starve or threaten to starve Palestinians for expressing that position through elections is the most evil policy I know of being perpetrated by the West.
A sympathizer for that position, or an apologist for that position, and I read you, Jonathon as an apologist for that position, is analogous to a supporter of Apartheid, Jim Crow or US chattel slavery, a well-meaning supporter of evil.
I think everyone agrees that Hamas has shown itself to be capable enough that we can presume that it could enforce a cease-fire. Hamas does not have to prove that. Hamas does not want a cease fire until the siege is lifted. Israel does not want to lift the siege until Hamas recognizes the right to a Jewish majority state that superceeds the right of refugees to return.
Israel’s position is both wrong and evil here. If not for that wrong and evil position, the act of getting Islamic Jihad to cooperate with a cease-fire would be trivial for an organized, resourceful and perceived legitimate group like Hamas.
Now I’m understanding that when you say Hamas has to prove it can maintain a cease-fire controlling the other ideologies with guns, you mean Hamas has to prove that it will submit to your, Israel and the United States’ requirement that Hamas stop expressing its opinion that the right to return for refugees is more important that Israel’s right to have a Jewish political majority.
As bad as it is that you hold that requirement, stretching the language so that you say “cease fire” when you mean “recognize Israel” moves toward being deceitful.
The US/Israeli strategy regarding Hamas and Gaza depends on Egyptian cooperation. If Egypt becomes unwilling to cooperate, that strategy dissolves. It becomes impossible to prop up Abbas or present him as more effective than Hamas, or present cooperation with Israel as more effective than non-cooperation.
That is a huge huge huge development.
When PA’s scheduled presidential election passes without Abbas standing for election there will be serious problems keeping him in power. But he cannot stand for election without being at least arguably more effective than Hamas – which right now he is not.
The US/Israeli project of keeping him, as a “moderate”, in power regardless of the wishes of his electorate is part of the same evil US policy regarding the Middle East.
That project though has taken a blow over the past week and we’ll see if and how it can recover.
Arnold Evans’s blog has always been “Middle East Demonization of Israel in Everything”, falsely named “Middle East Reality”. He’s repeatedly argued that every single conflict between the West and Muslim cultures is ONLY because of the conflict in Israel, and no other reason. And he benignly portrays even al-Qaeda as merely a group that opposes Israel, that just happens to do so with violence. Every single blog entry is an attempt to contrue the news into a obituary for Israel.
I don’t think Johnathan has ever been an apologist for acts that starve people. But it seems to Arnold just being supportive of Israel is automatically the same as embracing every single policy. Arnold doesn’t seem to care that support for Israel has a political spectrum, that Haaretz and Peace Now are different from Kahane and Avignor Lieberman.
And Arnold keeps mixing “Jewish State” and “Jewish Majority State”. Israel just has to be the Jewish homeland, the center of Jewish cultural heritage, to be a “Jewish State”. But Arnold won’t let Israel exist even as that.
South Africa is an Afrikaaner state, as well as a Zulu and Xhosa state, and many others. This assertion that the ANC was fighting for “no Afrikaaner state” doesn’t make any sense.
Frankly, if Johnathan Edelstein gets branded as evil by Arnold Evans, I congratulate him and cheer him on to defying Arnold.
Keeping in mind that Jonathon can speak for himself, and only answering this here in the mean time:
I took Jonathon Edelstein’s initial questioning of the value of a ceasefire by Hamas if Hamas does not recognize Israel as a Jewish state as an expression of sympathy for the Israel/Rice/Bush position that negotations on other issues such as a cease fire and ending the siege should follow a recognition of Israel as a pre-requisite.
Jonathon answers his own question, that there is some value to negotiations without that as a pre-requisite. But then says he prefers “real” peace in a way that strikes me as sympathetic towards Israeli efforts to starve the people of Gaza to acheive what he considers the pre-requisite for real peace.
Starving the people of Gaza for that reason is evil. Expressing sympathy for it is expressing sympathy for evil.
I have not come across a Zionist who considers a homeland for Jews in the sense that South Africa is a homeland for Afrikaaners acceptable. I doubt Jonathon considers that acceptable. Inkan, I doubt you consider that acceptable. Prove me wrong.
A South Africa-style homeland for Jews is fully compatible with a full right to return for Palestinian refugees – who would make far less of the final population of Israel than Blacks make up of South Africa.
I didn’t invent the idea that a right to return for Palestinians is incompatible with Israel’s remaining a Jewish state. Olmert and Livni are clear that they believe it does not. I doubt Jonathon considers a full right of return compatible with Israel’s remaining a Jewish state as he would like. I doubt you consider a full right of return compatible with Israel remaining a Jewish state as you would like. Prove me wrong.
As you correctly has gathered from my blog, I argue that there is one major conflict between the Muslim and Western cultures, the legitimacy of Zionism. Other conflicts are either derivative or not important.
For example, burqas are not important, there is no comparable conflict with cultures that perform genital mutilation. The dispute over the legitimacy of the regimes of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are mainly disputes about those regimes’ policies toward Israel, and relative lack of opposition to Israel. Either unimportant or derivative of the major dispute.
I’d rather you argue that point with me at my blog since it’s off topic here, but if you insist we can discuss it here unless Helena Cobban would prefer we not.
I’ll acknowledge here, because I have not been asked to before, that there are differences between a Zionist such as Leiberman and a Zionist such as Jonathon Edelman. But there are also similarities. In some contexts the differences are more important, in some contexts the similarities are more important. They are never the same, but I’ve never asserted, and I don’t know what would make anyone think I seem to assert that there is no difference.
I’ve thought about this more.
Wanting the Palestinians to accept a Jewish state is not evil.
Olmert/Bush/Rice have set about accomplishing a goal that is not evil in itself in an evil way. Starving Palestinians to make them change the opinion they have expressed through legitimate elections, or even “putting them on a diet” for that purpose is evil.
I made the mistake of associating support for the goal with support or sympathy for the means employed by Israel and the United States to accomplish that goal.
It is a mistake because I’m essentially certain that many Zionists, including Jonathon Edelstein (not Edelman, sorry) do not support the US/Israeli strategy for reaching that goal.
I do think the architects of the siege could take some small amount of comfort from the fact that they share their goal with more reasonable people and I see that as a bad thing. But it is too far to describe that as sympathy or apology for an evil policy.