I was planning to do a series of blog posts from the big conference I went to early this week at the Al-Waleed bin Talal al-Saud Center for American Studies and Research (CASAR) at AUB, in Beirut. But I confess I got a bit busy doing a few other things– some of them nitpicky editorial things to do with finishing the manuscript of my book, some having to do with actually spending some good time with some good people. So I postponed and postponed doing that blogging… And now, Stan Katz, the former head of the American Council of Learned Societies, who was also there, has beaten me to it and done a pretty good job of blogging the conference.
He did so in these three posts on the blog of the Chronicle of Higher Education: 1, 2, 3.
As Stan noted there, it was truly international gathering– even if not yet sufficiently so. The 50 or so presenters included scholars from Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, occupied East Jerusalem, Turkey, Germany, the UK, Netherlands, France, along with roughly 25 from the US. The conference’s title was “Liberty and Justice: America and the Middle East”. It was certainly notable that it was taking place just days before His High Excellency President G.W. Bush launched on his imperial-scale tour of his Middle East outposts… Checking up, no doubt, on the state of “Liberty and Justice” in Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other countries he’s visiting. But that was a very different kind of “east-west” interaction!
One lack at the conference that I noted was the absence of any Iraqi scholars. Iraqis have, after all, been at the receiving end of most of the US’s policy in the region over the past five years. What do they have to say on the conference’s topic? I do not know whether the conference organizers had invited any, and they failed to attend; or whether none had ever been invited. The inviting process did seem a little haphazard in some ways. But one thing that was clear was the outreach and effort the organizers had undertaken in order to secure the participation of four or five scholars from Tehran. That was an excellent thing to do. I wish I’d spent more time trying to get to know the Iranian participants.
One of the sessions that Stan Katz attended, but I didn’t, was on the challenge of teaching American studies in the Middle East. He wrote:
- The speakers included the head of a new MA program at Teheran University in Iran (who seems, from his utterly colloquial language, to be an American), the director of the program at the University of Jordan in Amman, and a young graduate student from Al Quds University in East Jerusalem… In each case, though, there seemed to be considerable student interest in studying America, which in the year 2008 is both surprising and encouraging.
I don’t know why he finds this surprising? The US is the dominant power in this region, and members of subordinated or “challenger” nations always have an intense need to understand the inner workings of the big imperial power. It is often a matter of sheer survival to be able to do so. I have always found that any random group of non-Americans, anywhere in the world, knows a lot more about the internal workings of US politics and society than any random group of US citizens knows about the internal workings of any other society, including neighboring Canada or Mexico. It is not just a question of the near-saturation of the world’s public media with US-made cultural products, though that is one factor. But even more concretely, it is dictated by the intense need that members of weaker nations have to be able to understand the imperial power so they can optimize their chances of surviving under its domination…
And then, I’m not sure that Stan or anyone should easily jump to the conclusion that the desire of Middle Easterners to study America is “encouraging”, as such– except inasmuch as it indicates that there exists a large desire to understand other people across even some extremely thorny political divides. But if, as presenter Scott Lucas said– and I agree– we should be trying to decenter America within the global discourse, then we should applaud efforts by Middle Easterners to study Chinese society, or Indian society, or the cultures of Latin America or Europe as being equally “encouraging.” Perhaps, above all, we should consider the efforts of academics anywhere to look objectively at– and do something about– the situation of their own societies to be the most encouraging step of all?
From this perspective, I think maybe one of the biggest and most lasting outcomes the conferences might have been the participation in it of around two dozen US scholars. These were mainly not scholars of the Middle East, but scholars in one or another portion of “American studies”. So by coming to Lebanon– a country that throughout the past decades of US hegemony in the Middle East has been buffeted around by the political forces loosed on the region by that hegemony– these American Americanists probably had a bigger chance to learn something about their (our) country’s real role in the world than they would have from consuming thousands of hours of CNN or other parts of the MSM. They had the chance, in Beirut, to meet as colleagues with peers from Iran, Palestine, and other “exotic” and demonized countries. They had the chance to go and witness at first hand some of the effects that the US’s strong support (and heavy mid-war military re-supply) of Israel’s 2006 assault had on the people and country of Lebanon… What an excellent way for them to learn some more about America’s role in the world.
“Liberty” and “justice”, indeed.
I wish the conferences organizers had put the words in scare-quotes like that in the conference title? But I suppose the multiple ironies embedded within the title as it stood were plain enough to see.
Many of the American Americanists were interesting people. In his introductory remarks, CASAR director Patrick McGreevey did an effective job of underlining the ironies embedded in the “Liberty and Justice” title. Including, he reminded us of George W. Bush’s fall 2001 vow that he would “bring Osama bin Laden to justice– or bring justice to him,” which always struck me as a classic example of the misuse of the discourse of (true) justice.
First of all, what kind of justice would it be, that we would seek to bring OBL to? Would it look anything like the form of (miscarriage of) justice to which Saddam Hussein was brought? A hastily convened, US-dominated kangaroo court, which issues a death sentence and then carries it out in an extremely inflammatory manner?
I’m reminded of the words of ANC leader Rejoyce Mabudhafasi when I asked her what she wished had been done to the authors and upholders of the apartheid system– and she said something like, “We could never be the kind of people who do to them what they did to us, and nor would we want to be. So I think only the Almighty can decide what to do to ‘bring justice’ to them.” I do feel that way about OBL– though I am of course also strongly of the opinion that the man’s capacity for doing harm and violence, which he retains to this day, urgently needs to be incapacitated, a goal that can be achieved in any number of ways…
And then, what sort of justice might it be, that we would seek to bring to OBL? I don’t imagine that GWB was thinking of assembling a traveling courtroom and then parachuting the whole thing in, black robes and lawyers and lawbooks and all, once the US military had found OBL, wherever he might be by that point. I rather strongly suspect that the “justice” GWB was thinking of bringing to him instead was a targeted assassination– such as the US and Israel have made something of a habit of carrying out against suspected adversaries over recent years.
But that is, it seems to me, a profound abuse of the whole concept of justice. And not one that we should just slyly wink at, or go along with.
… Anyway, I realize I’m getting off the topic a little here. I just want to say I really appreciated the opportunity to be at the conference. I met some really interesting people and heard some great discussions. It also felt really good to be able to re-connect a little with some of my friends in Beirut, though sadly I didn’t have nearly enough time to re-connect with everyone I wanted to.
Oh, I did learn something very interesting indeed about the cluster bombs issue while I was there. This was from Timur Goksel, the wise and well-informed Turkish diplomat who was head of UNIFIL’s info operations from 1978 through 2002 or so. He said that one explanation he had heard for the Israelis stunningly large scale of use of cluster bombs was that the bombs were out of date and needed to be disposed of. So since disposal of any kinds of bombs is a not-cheap and sometimes risky business, the relevant decisionmakers in the IDF had thought why not lob all of those out-of-date cluster bombs into Lebanon and force Lebanon and the UN pay the price?
And as we all know, the price in human lives and livelihoods lost, as well as in $$$, has been huge– and it continues to be exacted to this day. I don’t have the figures easily to hand, but this late 2006 report from Haaretz says that the battalion commander of an IDF rocket unit “stated that the IDF fired around 1,800 cluster bombs, containing over 1.2 million cluster bomblets. By 30 August, 2006– just 16 days after the ceasefire went into effect– UN clearance experts had found “100,000 unexploded cluster bomblets at 359 separate sites” in south Lebanon.
The “dud rate” of the bomblets was reported at the time to be extremely high, and I do recall that some reports also noted that many of the cluster bombs that had been fired into Lebanon had had a production date of “1974” on them… So yes, the idea that the IDF might need to dispose of them seems to make a lot of sense.
Also, a large proportion of the cluster bombs that were fired were fired in the very last days of the war– during that strange and terrifying three-day period during after the terms of the ceasefire had already been agreed, but before it went into effect.
If Israel’s intent was primarily to be rid of old cluster bombs, why are the Israelis so reluctant to provide the coordinates for the places where these continue-to-be-lethal bombs were dropped?
There was a lot made of Israel’s use of cluster bomb munitions, and rightfully so, but no mention of even more widespread use by the US in its various wars.
from Human Rights Watch:
[The US used] cluster bombs in the Persian Gulf War, in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan [and in the current Iraq War]. During the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and its allied coalition dropped bombs containing about twenty million submunitions, and also reportedly fired artillery projectiles containing more than thirty million submunitions. These resulted in millions of hazardous duds, each functioning like an indiscriminate antipersonnel landmine. At least eighty U.S. casualties during the war were attributed to cluster munition duds. More than 4,000 civilians have been killed or injured by cluster munition duds since the end of the war. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/18/usint5409.htm
A particular problem with cluster bomb duds is that are are colorful plastic things which children love to pick up and play with when they find them.
I believe that there are newer types which produce fewer duds.
“In the morning I heard a panel on ‘Islamic Conceptions of Justice,’ with speakers from American Studies programs in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Palestine and Wake Forest University. The papers varied in academic quality, but all attempted to convey in non-technical language a range of meanings attributed to shari‘a. The most interesting was the one from a young Iranian female graduate student on the Shi’a notion of justice. There was lively disagreement among the four Muslims (there were two Palestinians presenting) on the panel.”
Thus Dr. Katz, who leaves one with scarcely a clue what anybody substantially said. However, a little digging turned up the advance advertisements for each paper. The one he likes best comes last alphabetically, and unfortunately leaves it a mystery still what the lady said and what the gentleman liked about it. The other three give more away in advance, but I’m not sure they are all playing in the same ball park.
De gustibus non disputandum, but I’d recommend Prof. Browers , Item [B], to anybody who can tolerate abstract political science. She sounds promising on Egypt in particular also, yet a question like whether “moderation” has any particular connection with “notions of Justice and Liberty” could arise in anybody’s politics, as for instance those of Senator Goldwater of Arizona in 1964.
[A] Fahad A. Alhomoudi / Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, Saudi Arabia
Homoudi@hotmail.com
Islamic Law and the Modern State: Conflict or Co-existence?
Can Islamic Law and the Modern State peacefully co-exist or are these institutions inherently contradictory? Ever since legal and political reforms began in the 19th century, when the Nation-State emerged in the Near and Middle East and the Shari’a was largely supplanted by its law, this has been a perennial issue of intellectuals and statesmen; from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to American hegemony, the problem of negotiating religious and legal authority with the State has been of dominant concern. This paper will broadly identify and evaluate how a spectrum of political and religious leaders have attempted to settle this relationship until the present, from the radical rejection of Western legal and political forms, to the outright abandonment of Islamic Law. Moving towards a greater consensus, this paper also offers a nascent solution to the impasse between Shari’a and the Modern State, based upon a new reading of Prophetic tradition, which promises an evolutionary approach to Islamic statecraft; attention will be paid to such concepts as civil society, International law and human rights, especially as they relate to developments in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
[B] Michaelle Browers / Wake Forest University, USA / browerm@wfu.edu
Wasatiyya Notions of Justice and Liberty in the Age of American Empire
The Islamist movement has long been criticized for lack of specificity of political thought coming out of their movement. However, a number of Islamic intellectuals, associated with what has come to be called the moderate or centrist (wasatiyya) trend and consisting primarily of Egyptians, such as Muhammad al-Ghazali, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fahmi Huwaydi, Kamal Abu al-Majd, Muhammad al-‘Imara, and Muhammad Salim al-‘Awa, claims to be filling that intellectual vacuum in Islamist discourse. While only recently garnering the attention of western scholars, the careers of these individuals span several decades and the origin of this turn to moderation dates at least to 1981, when the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat by the Islamic Jihad group led many of the leading theorists of the Islamic revival (al-sahwa al-islamiyya) to seek to clarify their position from the political turmoil and the extremist forces that contributed to its emergence. Historical consideration of these figures permits study of the development of such central political notions as justice and freedom in what some have termed the “American period” in the Middle East and amidst claims (chiefly by American scholars) about the global triumph of liberalism.
The aim of this paper is to critically analyze the writings of the wasatiyya trend since 1981, during a period where these individuals have had to grapple with the persistence of authoritarian regimes, lack of progress in liberating Palestine and other territories occupied by Israel, and renewed foreign military intervention in the region, undertaken by the US, purportedly in name of freedom and democracy. What my study reveals is that wasatiyya intellectuals have developed notions of freedom and justice less tied to notions of community in an exclusively Islamic sense and, thus, created a space for accommodation of seemingly liberal notions such as democracy, pluralism, freedom of thought, and the rights of women and minorities. But this has been done at the same time that the country many associate with liberalism [Egypt?!] has lost whatever credibility it might have once had in the region. Thus, my study pays particular attention to the role negative constructions of American injustices, illegalities, and violations of the rights of people in the region have played in the development of these ideas.
[C] Munther S. Dajani / Al-Quds University, Palestine / msdajani@art.alquds.edu
Western and Islamic Conceptions of Justice
American values of liberty and justice are strongly contested by many Islamic scholars. As the United States attempts to promote its own concepts of liberty and justice in order to create its own vision of a new Middle East, the issue raised is whether such concepts mean the same to Western and Islamic people. American political thought proclaimed that “all men are equal,” however, in practice, for quite some time in American history, all men and women were far from being equal. Similarly, Islam proclaimed that “there is no difference between men except in faith,” however, on the ground, many differences existed between men and between men and women. The question this raises is: Why? Is it that the text is not clear enough?
The classical definition of justice is formulated by Plato, Aristotle, Saint Ambrose, and Saint Augustine of Hippo, as expressed in a single phrase: suum cuique, or “to each his own.” Aristotle maintained that the prevalence of injustice makes clear the meaning of justice. The word justice [w]as explained in Scripture: “Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do to them.” It supposes an exchange of one good deed for another good deed. Justice is described [in the Epistle to the Romans]: “Render to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor; owe no man anything but to love one another.” Many verses in the Quran express its concept of justice.
This paper will discuss the Western meaning of justice in the text [of Scripture?] as compared with the Moslem concept of justice. It will examine similarities and differences between Western/American and Islamic notions of justice. Does the text of the Holy Quran offer different or similar notions of justice than Western values? Why wasn’t practice in compliance of the teachings?
[D] Zohreh Nosrat Kharazmi / University of Tehran, Iran / zkharazmi@ut.ac.ir
Discursive Differences in Defining the Humanitarian Concept of Liberty: American and Shiite Define Liberty
No one may deny that humans have so many common points that on which they can learn and live peacefully together. Simultaneously there are huge gaps root in different languages in which meanings are constructed. Considering US on one side and the Middle East on the other side, it seems very complicated to explain the gaps and interrelations between them. But historically it’s crystal clear that the very deep misunderstandings took place between US and Shiites. As Iran, Hezbollah and the majority of Iraq population are Shiites, so it includes a great population of US-announced enemies and on the other hand Shiites, who are not satisfied with US global policies and count the US as an aggressive country in many respects.
Here I’m going to have a comparative study to examine how the concept of liberty is defined in these two discourses and what results in misunderstandings between these two. I also will give a content analysis with concrete examples of both American and Shiite leaders` lectures in terms of liberty.
H,
Any sense from your time in Lebanon on the Presidential impasse? Who is blaming who?