Do Israel and the US really want the Lebanese Army in the south?

24 thoughts on “Do Israel and the US really want the Lebanese Army in the south?”

1. …those Israeli strategists who would prefer not to have any meaningful Lebanese-and-UN force deployed in south Lebanon at all, since that would constrain Israel’s ability to act just as it wants to in and over Lebanon.
   I would be interested in hearing exactly who these “Israeli strategists” are and what their strategy is, apart from being able to do what they want in Lebanon (which I don’t think is the case). The principal concern here appears to be that there will not be a period of vacuum during which Hizballah can retake positions in southern Lebanon, rearm and continue to threaten Israel’s northern cities and settlements.
   Are you suggesting that Israel wants to reoccupy southern Lebanon? If so, then the IDF is certainly going about it in a strange way, particularly in the systematic destruction of bunkers and fortresses and other positions, many of which Israel left behind intact that were later occupied by Hizballah “fighters”, that it would require should the IDF plan to stay on as an occupier.
   I think that it is perfectly reasonable and rational that Israel should be concerned with what the plan is for the future, considering the large degree of violence directed against our civilian population over the past four weeks. However, I don’t understand why you think that the initial response of Olmert, or anyone else in Israel, should be “enthusiastic” before enough clarifications are provided as to exactly what the plan is for the handoff in southern Lebanon and what sort of mechanisms will be in place in southern Lebanon to prevent a repeat of the past month.
   On the positive side, I am encouraged to see that elements of the Lebanese government, including Fouad Siniora, have had the courage to state that following a ceasefire they would not be opposed to negotiations with Israel leading to a bilateral peace agreement. I also take Hizballah’s rapid agreement as an indication of the true nature of the military and political damage inflicted on the organization.

2. Sadly, one is always forced to view these questions in a pure Machiavellian light, because of the power disparities between the sides.
   Consider: — an abstract force designed to keep the peace in this conflict would have serious anti-aircraft capabilities and a charge to shoot down IDF aircraft as well as to suppress Hizbollah rocket fire and guerrilla actions. The suggestion is preposterous in reality, even though it would be even-handed. After all, the UN personnel killed in the last month were not gunned down by Hizbollah. They were targetted by the IDF, despite hours of communication, years of residence at the same location, and clear markings on buildings.
   Any objective view would conclude that the commander of any international peacekeeping force would want some serious ground-to-air missiles in his arsenal.
   The fact that this would never even be considered is a pretty clear demonstration that the U.S. and Israel have no interest in a truly “robust” peacekeeping force in south Lebanon. They only dream of some fantasy force that would take over the failed military campaign against Hizbollah from the bogged-down IDF.

3. to negotiations with Israel leading to a bilateral peace agreement.
   This the saga JES Israeli would not like to negotiating the peace with Arab as one body, they like to do negotiations individually that give them the bounce of strong position with each individuals and put their pressures like what you proposed here about Lebanon while the country under heavy war and crises and you bring the country to its knees and asking them for negotiations! Is this the right way to do peace?

4. ammonite,
   You raise a hypothetical question and answer it based on a priori “facts”. My understanding is that what the US, France and Israel initially proposed is a serious force under Article VII. I’m not certain whether that would or would not take into consideration the need for “serious anti-aircraft capabilities”, because I’m not certain that there is a case to be made that Israel would launch air attacks if not significantly provoked. To make this a hypothetical requirement and then to assume that this requirement would never be met, or even discussed, certainly does not strengthen your case.
   It is interesting how little mention there has been about the four Chinese UNIFIL observers wounded last week by Hizballah rockets despite that group’s “years of residence at the same location”, but I guess this is par for the course.
   As for a “failed military campaign” and “bogged down IDF”, I think we’ll have to await the lifting of the fog of war to see how true this statement is. If one is to believe Hizballah propaganda, then Israel has lost two warships and Hizballah has only suffered the loss of around 50 “fighters”. Somehow, I don’t believe that these assertions are true and, as I said previously, I find Hizballah’s rapid agreement to the Siniora proposal as possibly indicating a great deal more damage to the organization than Nasrallah’s addresses on al-Manar suggest.

5. Israel need some assurance that an armed Hezbollah will not return to “business as usual” the instant the IDF pulls back. An international peacekeeping force might fail to enforce any militia disarmament. Lebanese forces might fail too. But if Israel needs to launch any punitive “get off your duffs” strikes to deter inaction, less messy to hit Lebanese forces (sorry, an accident) than a contingent of French or American troops. As in the case of the destroyed UN post, flags and phone warnings seem to be of no avail. On the other hand, some have already discarded use of German troops because the urge to hit them might be too strong.

6. On the face of it Israel has taken Lebanese diplomatic efforts uncontradicted by Hezbollah as a sign that Hezbollah is in disarray and seeking an armistice to recover. So “widen the attack”. Much like it would be if the opposite had happened and greater threats were coming from the north. Surely, if the enemy are seeking peace already we will wipe them out in a few more days, weeks or years? Especially if we destroy more of their cities and starve Lebanon of aid. That surely will make them turn on Hezbollah(?). If that is the real logic it lacks common sense or depth.
   Maybe it’s just an effort to end this military fiasco on a high note, but that level of subtlety has till now not been evident in the field. I am unsure what Olmert and his advisers are planning politicly, I’m feeling pessimistic, but we’ll soon all see if any realistic peace plan can come out of the UN. Resolution of such a crisis by credible UN-based diplomacy would represent a sea-change that many of the actual players would not welcome.

7. I’m not certain that there is a case to be made that Israel would launch air attacks if not significantly provoked.
   On the contrary, Israel regularly does launch air attacks, without significant provocation. This is public knowledge,jes. Why do Israelis and their supporters fail to view Lebanon as a sovereign nation ? They have an absolute right and duty to defend their territory from an invading army. Yes, it’s sad that the defense had to fall upon guerrillas but due to Israels stranglehold on US military aid Hizbuallah are the only ones who will stand up to the IDF.

8. “I think that it is perfectly reasonable and rational that Israel should be concerned with what the plan is for the future”
   I do too, JES. Here’s what I don’t understand – how do you Israelis expect to benefit from this war?
   As you know, I’m no supporter of the Zionist cause. But I try to understand what other people are thinking. Help me out here. What’s the plan? Where is this heading?

9. Joseph,
   You’ll have to excuse me, but your statement just doesn’t make sense to me. First, you say that “Israel regularly does launch air attacks, without significant provocation.” I guess we don’t agree on what provocation is. I think that firing rockets on civilian populations – or even on military posts when your country is not really occupied – are significant provocations. Sending armed “fighters” across the border to kill and kidnap soldiers is definitely a significant provocation, in my book. Perhaps you can provide some examples of unprovoked air attacks by Israel on Lebanon?
   You then go on to make the curious statement that “it’s sad that the defense had to fall upon guerrillas but due to Israels stranglehold on US military aid Hizbuallah are the only ones who will stand up to the IDF.” This, I must say, is one of the most ridiculous cases of spin I’ve seen since Nasrallah’s last TV address. Let me point out a few things to you here.
   First, not one inch of Lebanese territory has been occupied since 2000 by Israel, irrespective of what Hizballah, Gorgious George Galloway, or you say, and, changed by agreement, “blue line” is internationally recognized as the border between Lebanon and Israel.
   Lebanon has had six year to get its act together and place a regular army on the border. (I believe they have a trained and equipped military of 85,000). I can understand that the Syrians, who occupied most of Lebanon, prevented this, but a “free” Lebanon has had nearly two years to do so or to ask for international help in doing so. To argue that they couldn’t do this sounds a bit hollow when, all of a sudden, the Government of Lebanon claims they can and even goes so far as to mobilize its reserves. They could have done this before our soldiers were kidnapped and before the first shots were fired. And if they felt that they couldn’t, then they should have asked for international help at the time.
   No state that allows a guerilla force numbering in the thousands to tend its border and, moreover that acquieses to that force dictating its security policy and matters of war and peace can honestly claim to be a sovereign state.

10. John C,
    You are more than welcome to bring your family and take up residence in Kiryat Shmona or Nahariya for a week. We can talk about it then.

11. JES,
    First let me say that it is refreshing to exchange views with someone who doesn’t use sarcasm or name-calling. Thank you. I will try to be less “over the top” on a subject which I feel strongly about, as obviously you do too.
    I categorize all of Israels current air attacks as unprovoked. There is some dispute over where the capture of the two soldiers took place. For the sake of argument, lets assume the incident took place in Israel. This is a border dispute, the type of unfortunate action which takes place in many areas across the world. An incursion by the IDF could then be justified as responding to a provocation. But nothing was done by Hizbuallah which justified the massive attack. Their rocket attacks followed the air strikes. Same with 1982. Israel massively attacked Lebanon, which the Lebanese had not provoked. The PLO was the ostensible target but had Israel not driven them out of Palestine the PLO would not have been in Lebanon.
    It seems obvious to me that the Lebanese army either can’t or won’t fight, since they haven’t responded to the IDF. If they were as well-equipped from US aid as the IDF perhaps they could defend themselves. That is why I stated that only Hizbuallah was defending Lebanon.
    Regards,
    Joseph

12. Joseph,
    First of all, thank you and I agree about the the issue of sarcasm and name calling. Let’s leave it at that.
    Regarding provocations, I recommend that you go back and review the events of July 12 as presented here:
    http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L12710330.htm
    The timing is pretty clear. Hizballah fired two rockets at Shlomi – a civilian cooperative farm in Israel – and then crossed the border and kidnapped the soldiers (and not even Hizballah, today, denies that they did so on the Israeli side of the “blue line”. In fact, they’re proud of that fact).
    Israel then responded in hot pursuit to come to the aid of the two captured soldiers. This was not only legal, but perfectly reasonable given the fact that the previous kidnapping resulted in years of uncertainty and, ultimately, in the return of three bodies. It is still unclear to the public what exactly those three soldiers went through and when and how they died, but I think it is reasonable to assume that, had the IDF been able to stop the kidnapping immediately, their lives may have been saved. (We can leave aside the role of the UNIFIL contingent from India that filmed the incident.)
    Bombing of the bridge (and I don’t think that there were any casualties in this incident) was also a perfectly reasonable response to prevent the two soldiers from being moved out of the area. In any even, the report clearly indicated that this only occured following Hizballah rocket and mortar fire that wounded Israeli civilians.
    Regarding 1982, I will only say that it is quite true that Lebanon did not provoke the invasion. The PLO, however, did with rocket attacks on civilian populations in northern Israel (although not immediately preceeding the invasion), and these strikes continued pretty much until Israel reached the Litani. These facts tend to be forgotten with time and spin. Personally, I thought at the time, and still believe, that continuing to Beirut was a terrible mistake brought about by serious strategic delusions on the part of Arik Sharon.
    I do not agree at all with your last statement. The Lebanese army has, first and foremost, been unwilling to deploy to the south to implement UNSC Res. 1559 or the at-Taif agreements. The lack of willingness to deploy the Lebanese Army has had nothing to do with their training or equipment vis-a-vis the IDF. It has to do with their perceived lack of ability to deal with an illegal terrorist organization that is armed, not by the US, but by Syria and Iran. If you’ll excuse me, to make up some story about Israeli occupation of Shaba as justification for then calling this terrorist or guerilla group “resistance fighters” is just plain bull. I think it is also quite understandable that the response to an offer now to deploy these forces is met with something less than “enthusiasm”.

13. Helena: the operating assumption of your writing at this moment seems to be that a UN force in southern Lebanon is a good thing. Given the constraints on the use of force UN peacekeeping forces often operate under, the fact that on several occasions the IDF seems to’ve targeted UN personnel (Qana ’96, and perhaps this more recent incident as well), and the fact that unnamed Israeli officials have said UN engineers “would become a target if they attempted to repair the bridge” in southern Lebanon, this seems like a prohibitively difficult position in which to place
    such a force. Essentially, the UN is being asked to clean up Israel’s mess.
    On the other side of the border, I find it difficult to read Sinoria’s motivation. As I recall, he’s in the anti-Hizballah faction of the Lebanese government. Is the conflict therefore an opportunity for him to back government forces with international ones and attempt to stamp out Hizballah? Setting aside any feelings about such a strategy, it would obviously guarantee civil war and make a hypothetical UN force’s position that much more untenable.
    In the end though, most of the parties (including Hizballah, if they have indeed seconded Sinoria’s proposal) seem to agree that some sort of international force is needed. I’m wondering what your thoughts are on all this, particularly as relates to demands of any putative international peace movement.
    JES: my understanding is that the Chinese UNIFIL observers wounded by the Hizballah mortar round were treated and remained at their post. As their wounds don’t seem to have been particularly severe, and as I imagine they were not able to inform Hizballah’s high command of their position (who I imagine have little contact with their ‘artillery’ units anyway), I think that explains why there’s been no international condemnation of that incident.

14. NJ from NYC,
    I don’t think that the severity of the wounds is the central issue here. Neither is the level of communications among Hizballah “fighters” (which, incidentally, I understand is quite good).
    I doubt that the Hizballah rounds were actually directed at the UNIFIL encampment. I think that fecklessness is probably a better explanation. But I also don’t think that the IDF targeted UNIFIL. There is quite ample evidence of Hizballah “fighters” setting up positions in extremely close proximity to UN positions (indeed, one of the casualities at al-Khiyam even addressed this in a highly publicized email sent a couple of days before the fatal incident). Not only would firing on the UN positions be contrary to IDF policy, I cannot think of a single rational reason that would explain why the IDF would carry out or sanction such an act.

15. NJ from NYC,
    I don’t think that the severity of the wounds is the central issue here. Neither is the level of communications among Hizballah “fighters” (which, incidentally, I understand is quite good).
    Personally, I doubt that the Hizballah rounds were actually directed at the UNIFIL encampment. I think that fecklessness is probably a better explanation. But I also don’t think that the IDF targeted UNIFIL. There is quite ample evidence of Hizballah “fighters” setting up positions in extremely close proximity to UN positions (indeed, one of the casualities at al-Khiyam even addressed this in a highly publicized email sent a couple of days before the fatal incident). Not only would firing on the UN positions be contrary to IDF policy, I cannot think of a single rational reason that would explain why the IDF would carry out or sanction such an act.

16. JES,
    Thanks for the link. I think it quite likely Hizbuallah did in fact commit the act on Israeli soil. Regarding the Lebanese army and a perception of lack of ability to deal with Hizbuallah-I wonder if it may be more of a lack of motivation ? It’s my understanding that Shia in Lebanon are generally poorer than Christians and Sunni, and may therefore make up a large percentage of the armed forces.
    I would not characterize Hizbuallah as either illegal or terrorist. They have become a political party. Their good works may or may not be done out of genuine charity, I have no way of knowing this but the fact remains they do have strong support. It would also appear to me that they overwhelmingly fight military targets rather than attacking civilians.

17. “It would also appear to me that they overwhelmingly fight military targets rather than attacking civilians.”
    Compared to the Israelis they are quite exemplary in this regard. Just look at the relatively low number of military versus civilian casualties they have caused and compare that to the Israelis’ rate of approximately 9 civilians to 1 combatant, not to mention the fact that Israel is clearly systematically destroying civilian infrastructure (including things like paper box factories, grain silos, milk factories – oh yes, and at least one orphanage)and not to mention the 30-50% rate of children killed by Israel.
    I know a few Israelis who served in Lebanon during the occupation, and not one of them considers Hizballah a terrorist group. Some of them are quite adamant about it, too. They insist that Hizballah was and is a legitimate guerilla resistance group, and that they focused almost entirely on military targets inside of Lebanon. According to these Israelis Hizballah only fired inside Israel to retaliate for Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. In addition, according to current reports I have heard and read, even now the attacks inside Israel appear to be focused mainly on military-related targets based on the locations where most of the rockets are falling. (Therefore, it appears that the Israeli civilian victims of Hizballah attacks constitute collateral damage – oh gosh, we DO have to call it something else, don’t we, when the Ayrabs do it to us?! Collateral damage is something that only happens when the “good guys” – i.e. “we” – make “mistakes”.).

18. “I think it quite likely Hizbuallah did in fact commit the act on Israeli soil.”
    And that justifies what Israel is doing exactly how?
    Oh yes, and shall we talk about Israel’s regular violations on Lebanese “soil” in the years since it supposedly vacated Lebanon – not to mention, of course, its almost daily violations of Lebanese airspace? But I suppose those do not count at all because everything Israel does is right and proper and justified.
    “It would also appear to me that they overwhelmingly fight military targets rather than attacking civilians.”
    Compared to the Israelis they are quite exemplary in this regard. Just look at the relatively low number of military versus civilian casualties they have caused and compare that to the Israelis’ rate of approximately 9 civilians to 1 combatant, not to mention the fact that Israel is clearly systematically destroying civilian infrastructure (including things like paper box factories, grain silos, milk factories, – oh yes, and at least one orphanage)and not to mention the 70% rate of women and children, and 35% rate of children under 14 among those killed by Israel.
    I know a few Israelis who served in Lebanon during the occupation, and not one of them considers Hizballah a terrorist group. Some of them are quite adamant about it, too. They insist that Hizballah was and is a legitimate guerilla resistance group, and that during the occupation they focused almost entirely on military targets inside of Lebanon. According to these Israelis Hizballah only fired inside Israel to retaliate for Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. In addition, according to current reports I have heard and read, even now the attacks inside Israel appear to be focused mainly on military-related targets, based on the locations where most of the rockets are falling. (Therefore, it appears that the Israeli civilian victims of Hizballah attacks constitute collateral damage – oh gosh, we DO have to call it something else, don’t we, when the Ayrabs do it to us?! Collateral damage is something that only happens to brown people when the “good guys” – i.e. “we” white folks – make “mistakes”.).

19. “I think it quite likely Hizbuallah did in fact commit the act on Israeli soil.”
    And that justifies what Israel is doing exactly how?
    Oh yes, and shall we talk about Israel’s regular violations on Lebanese “soil” in the years since it supposedly vacated Lebanon – not to mention, of course, its almost daily violations of Lebanese airspace? But I suppose those do not count at all because everything Israel does is right and proper and justified.
    “It would also appear to me that they overwhelmingly fight military targets rather than attacking civilians.”
    Compared to the Israelis they are quite exemplary in this regard. Just look at the relatively low number of military versus civilian casualties they have caused and compare that to the Israelis’ rate of approximately 9 civilians to 1 combatant, not to mention the fact that Israel is clearly systematically destroying civilian infrastructure (including things like paper box factories, grain silos, milk factories, – oh yes, and at least one orphanage)and not to mention the 70% rate of women and children, and 35% rate of children under 14 among those killed by Israel.
    I know a few Israelis who served in Lebanon during the occupation, and not one of them considers Hizballah a terrorist group. Some of them are quite adamant about it, too. They insist that Hizballah was and is a legitimate guerilla resistance group, and that during the occupation they focused almost entirely on military targets inside of Lebanon. According to these Israelis Hizballah only fired inside Israel to retaliate for Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. In addition, according to current reports I have heard and read, even now the attacks inside Israel appear to be focused mainly on military-related targets, based on the locations where most of the rockets are falling. (Therefore, it appears that the Israeli civilian victims of Hizballah attacks constitute collateral damage – oh gosh, we DO have to call it something else, don’t we, when the Ayrabs do it to us?! Collateral damage is something that only happens to brown people when the “good guys” – i.e. “we” white folks – make “mistakes”.).

20. “You are more than welcome to bring your family and take up residence in Kiryat Shmona or Nahariya for a week. We can talk about it then.”
    Jeremy, thanks for the invitation. I assume you mean that if I lived there, I’d be so shaken up that I too would want the IDF to invade and destroy Lebanon. Maybe you’re right, I don’t know. But that seems to be a matter of emotions, not strategy. I understand the emotional part. What I want to know is, what’s your strategy? If you have one, and it makes sense, then you ought to be able to explain it.
    So far, you’ve turned Nasrallah into a rock star and dramatically increased popular support for Hezbollah. Is this part of your plan?
    Which costs more, a tank or an anti-tank missile? What are the implications of that?
    Since you’ve destroyed the Lebanese economy, created a million homeless people and probably more than that jobless, what do you suppose they will find to do with their new freedoms? (“just another word for nothing left to lose”)
    How will a foreign occupation force prevent local Shiites from maintaining a militia? Have you noticed how well this is working in Iraq? If you have a good plan for how to do this, Don Rumsfeld would like to hear from you.
    My impression is that your government initially made a tactical mistake, which they have since compounded into a strategic mistake, through the classic gambler’s error of doubling down. If I’m wrong, I invite you to explain why.
    How about you JES, any thoughts?

21. Well John, I would say that the strategic objective was to ensure that a Lebanese militia would not be able again to threaten Israel with large-scale rocket attacks. Has this strategy succeeded? I don’t know. Perhaps the politicians and the military did make mistakes. Time will tell, but I do think that there’s a good chance that the level of damage inflicted on Hizballah will, in the long run, outweigh the increase in prestige to Hassan Nasrallah. Of course, much of this depends on how the political solution of the war plays out and on how serious the Lebanese government is in achieving real sovereignty over its territory.
    As to your questions about the Lebanese people, I suppose they will be doing the same thing that the citizens of northern Israel will be doing – rebuilding their homes and economies. Sure, I know that the damage has been much more severe in Lebanon, and believe me I don’t feel good about this. But then let’s not forget that hundreds of Israeli homes have been destroyed, thousands heavily damaged, hundreds of businesses are or will be on the verge of bankruptcy, not to mention the tens of thousands of dunams of forest and fields that have been destroyed.
    What I don’t see you asking is what was Nasrallah’s strategic objective, and what right did he have to recklessly engage a foe that could inflict such damage. You’re not asking that because you’re not sitting in the rubble. I suspect, however, that a lot of Lebanese are asking precisely that question right about now.
    You ask: “Which costs more, a tank or an anti-tank missile? What are the implications of that?” Well, I remember very well the Yom Kippur War. There were two weapons issues that had a similar impact then. One was the latest Russian SAMs that gave the Syrians the ability to down a significant number of IAF planes – a force that was seen as invincible in 1967. The second was the introduction of the Soviet Sagger anti-tank missile that enabled pretty much any Egyptian or Syrian infantryman to efficiently take out an Israeli tank. This latter was so effective, that fresh crews were literally sent out in quickly repaired tanks that still contained remains of the former crews because the tanks were being taken out so effectively.
    Implications? During the war itself, the IDF was able to compensate for the new weapons rather quickly by adopting new tactics. Immediately after the war, they began developing new systems that countered these threats until, apparently, now with the introduction of the Kornet. So, I don’t think that, militarily, the long-range implications of low-cost Russian anti-tank weapons are that serious.
    What is more interesting are the longer term political implications. I believe that in the case of the Yom Kippur War, these were a peace treaty with Egypt.

22. “You are more than welcome to bring your family and take up residence in Kiryat Shmona or Nahariya for a week.”
    Fantastic suggestion! In fact, let’s do an exchange. I will bring my family and take up residence in Kiryat Shmona or Nahariya, and you bring your family and take up residence in southern Lebanon. No, wait, let’s make it a BIT more even-handed. You can take up residence with your family anywhere you like in Lebanon – you choose the place. Anywhere at all, northern, southern, central, eastern, western. Let’s see how long you last with the “most moral military in the world”.

23. JES, thanks for your comments. I appreciate your perspective on these issues, even though we usually disagree. Of course I don’t know what Nasrallah was thinking, any more than I know what Olmert was thinking. Usually, these tragedies are the result of mistakes and misperceptions on both sides. My guess would be that Nasrallah intended to provoke a limited Israeli ground incursion which his forces were prepared to rebuff, in the hopes of gaining domestic political advantage. I doubt he anticipated an all-out air assault on the entire country. If that’s right, then Nasrallah’s conduct was certainly despicable and probably foolish.
    Whichever side is ultimately deemed the victor, the people of both nations will be the losers, as you point out. However, the Lebanese economy was far more fragile than Israel’s before the war started, and is now in shambles. The far larger numbers of homeless and jobless people in Lebanon will have a much harder time rebuilding any kind of normal life. The vast majority of them will blame Israel more than Hezbollah. The latter will have more new recruits than it can handle. This is not like the Yom Kippur war. By overplaying its hand in this asymmetrical conflict, Israel has nearly destroyed the nation-state entity it needs to make peace with, and will leave behind the kind of chaotic environment in which violent extremists thrive. You know you can’t hold the territory. It will be an endless war of attrition, just like last time.
    Your big expensive weapon systems only work as a deterrent to traditional nation-states. When used like this, they leave chaos in their wake, and groups like Hezbollah step in to fill the void. You can’t preserve order by creating more chaos. Everybody should know this after watching the Iraq fiasco for the last 3 years.
    I hope the reports are true that your government rejected the lunatic advice of American neocons to expand the conflict to Syria (and beyond?). I’m telling you, these people are not your friends. Israel needs to shift away from reliance on American political cover and the mythically invincible IDF to the difficult work of making peace with its enemies. I wish you luck in this.

24. Here we go again JES:
    http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749293.html
    Do these people from the Washington D.C. office of Baker & Hostetler LLP sound like real friends of the Israeli people? Do your friends normally threaten to disown you when you look like you might not be “winning?” They’re pretty worried about Joe Lieberman’s defeat, aren’t they? Could it be their own political hides they are frantically trying to protect?

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