High command problems in Israel

Aluf Benn and two colleagues writing in Wednesday’s HaAretz tell us that:

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is still debating whether to approve the proposed expansion of the Israel Defense Forces’ ground operation in south Lebanon. The proposal will be brought to the diplomatic-security cabinet Wednesday morning for approval.
Olmert fears that the plan presented by the defense establishment will result in hundreds of casualties, and therefore, wants to subject it to a careful cost-benefit analysis. In Tuesday’s fighting in Lebanon, five soldiers were killed and 23 others wounded, two of them seriously.
According to a government source, Olmert has also asked the army to present him with several different options for a ground operation…

This, on the same day that AP’s Steve Weizman tells us of a significant, mid-war change in the command structure at Israel’s Northern Command:

The commander of the Israeli military on Tuesday appointed his deputy to oversee Israel’s battles in Lebanon, a dramatic mid-offensive shift sidelining the head of the northern command.
The military announced the appointment of Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinksi in a statement on Tuesday. Israeli media linked it to plans to intensify the offensive in Lebanon as well as to mounting public criticism of the army’s handling of the conflict with Hezbollah guerrillas.
Though the military denied it, the appointment looked like a shake-up of the top command on the Lebanon front in the midst of a campaign, a highly unusual move.
Writing in the Haaretz daily, veteran military analyst Zeev Schiff said the new appointment signaled serious command problems.
“Clearly, the change in the command leadership is not good for Adam personally,” he wrote, referring to the head of the northern command, Maj. Gen. Udi Adam. “But it also sends a negative signal to the army and the public at large.”
The last time a similar switch was made was during the 1973 Mideast war, when generals in the army reserves, including former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, were sent to the southern command to effectively take over from the general in charge, Shmuel Gorodish, in the battle against Egypt.
Israel has lost 36 civilians and 65 troops since the fighting with Hezbollah began on July 12. Despite the 28-day offensive, rockets continue to pummel northern Israel. According to the Israeli police, 145 rockets exploded in Israel on Tuesday alone.
Criticism of the conduct of the war has concentrated on the slow progression from the air campaign to a ground offensive and the failure of the military to sweep through Lebanon in a matter of days, as it did in 1982.
However, much of the criticism has been aimed at the political leadership — Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz — because the Security Cabinet they head has failed to approve the military’s plans to push forward more quickly.

Schiff’s whole piece is here.
Two quick comments. First, the facts of the military shake-up and the strategic uncertainty in the political echelon in Israel indicate to me that I was right to estimate, back in mid-July, that the early days of the Israeli assault on Lebanon were not part of some long-hatched plan against the country– but that in those days, as indeed since, Olmert and his equally untested Defense Minister Amir Peretz were deciding things on the run, in haste, and with great emotionality, rather than playing from a smoothly prepared strategic script. Weizman’s reference to the earlier comparable command shake-up, back in 1973, underscores this. That too was a war that was not one of choice– and comprehensive pre-preparation– by the Israeli high command… Unlike, say the wars of 1956 or 1982, which were chosen and extensively pre-planned by the high command long before they were launched.
A second related point: It is not necessarily good news for those of us hoping for a speedy ceasefire and a far-reaching, sustainable peace to learn of the edginess and indecision at the top of the Israeli command structure. If this whole assault up until now was driven mainly by Olmert’s emotional over-reaction to the capture of the two soldiers on July 12, then who knows what further risky decisions his cabinet might take over the weeks ahead?
(The more charitable explanation for Olmert’s actions has been that he was determined to “re-establish the credibility of Israel’s strategic deterrence”, which according to many Israeli strategic analysts on the right had been severely dented by the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon back in 2000. But the effectiveness of a strategic deterrent depends crucially on the psychology of those being deterred. So long as Israeli troops are on Lebanese soil and Lebanon’s people remain targeted by Israeli stand-off weapons on a continuing basis, then the Hizbullahis are unlikely to be “deterred” from continuing their military activities… But anyway, as noted above, I believe Olmert’s decisions have been far more emotional and less rational than this… )