I wanted to wait till I’d read Reidar Visser’s book on the pursuit and failure of a project for south-Iraqi separatism in the early 1920s, before I posted a short review here of it.
But here I am, stuck in Philadelphia airport in a rainstorm, forced to wait for a flight home tomorrow, work schedule unavoidably postponed… So I thought I’d post the links to the book for y’all here, at least. And then later, after I get reunited with the copy of the book that he sent me, and that’s sitting at my home back in Virginia, and get back into reading it– then, I can write something substantive here about it.
What’s most interesting about the book, from a current-affairs perspective, is that what Reidar’s writing about is an earlier attempt to form a separate, Shiite-dominated, south-Iraqi state– and about its failure.
I am eager to get to the point in his narrative where he describes the denouement there: Why did the attempt fail? But sadly, here I am, stuck in a rainbound airport and separated from the book.
So anyway, go buy your own copy! Here, depending where you live, is how:
— American Amazon
— British Amazon
— German publisher (English-language text)
33 thoughts on “Reidar Visser’s book on failed south-Iraqi separatism”
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I disagree with Reidar Visser’s analysis of Iraq. As he observes, the Iraq he is referring to in Ottoman documents is the predominately Shia South. It is nothing like the post British nation state of today. More importantly, there is documentary evidence of the distinctive ethnic character of the South:
Toynbee notes the differentiating ethnic characteristics of the Shia and the Sunni Moslems as the basis of conflict: “The Shi’ah identified itself with the reaction of the non-Arab subjects of the Caliphate against the Arab ascendancy. The most important of these non-Arab communities were the Iranians…Accordingly, from the latter part of the eighth century we find Shi’ism perpetually seeking to propagate itself into Iran from its original stronghold in Lower Iraq, which was a meeting-place of the [Eurasian] Iranian and Arabic cultures.” (“Study of History” v.1 p. 354)
Coming down to the 20 th century, the Persian character of Iraqi Shi’ites is recorded in the Britannica 13 th edition (1926): “Ethnographically [Southern] Irak is subject to a double influence. On the one hand Arabia. Even stronger than the influence of Arabia is that of Persia [a.k.a. Iran]. In general the inhabitants of [Southern] Irak are Shi’ites not Sunnites, and their religious connection and allegiance is therefore toward Persia. Persian customs are in fashion, Persian coinage is used, and in Baghdad, there is an important Persian quarter, while Kerbela and Meshed ‘Ali to the west of the Euphrates are really Persian enclaves.” Current media descriptions of Southern Iraq report essentially the same.
In sum, it is reasonable to ask if today’s Sunni/Shia conflict is in fact about respective interpretations of Islam. Given the historic pattern of ethnic conflict, there is reason to believe that the developing Iraqi civil war has more to do with ethnicity than religiosity.
Usually, “failed state project” is just an euphemism for the foiled separatist rebellion. Suppression of such activities is considered as big victory for the local nationalists. It is interesting how Vissers treats these issues in his book.
Tom, many thanks for the feedback. I think you might be interested in reading Yitzhak Nakash’s excellent The Shi’is of Iraq (1994, now available in a second edition from 2003), which deals at length with some of the problems concerning the alleged “Persian” links of the Shiites in Iraq.
Tom, another point I try to make in my book is that in discussing “southern Iraq” it may be useful to distinguish between the Shiite-dominated areas close to the shrine cities (which is really “central” Iraq, its historical regional name being the “Central Euphrates”) and the far south around Basra, which historically has had a much more complex ethno-religious make-up, with Shiite Arabs of different denominations (Akhbaris and Shaykhis alongside the orthodox Usuli Shiites), Sunni Arabs (many from Najd), Persians, Jews, Christians, Indian traders etc.
Reidar,
Thank you for your reference to Yitzhak Nakash. I certainly will look for his book. However, I am familiar with his 2003 “Foreign Affairs” article in which he argues for the ‘there is ethnic or national identity differences between Sunni and Shia’. Foreign Affairs articles, while often written by scholars, are not very scholarly in that they do not contain many (if any) authoritative references to substantiate expressed opinions. Accordingly, I have no reason to embrace the Nakash thesis in as much as it contradicts Arab and Persian history scholars such as those Toynbee documents in his book, and many contemporary antidotes such as expressed concerns about the Shia made by Arab heads of state in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Also, how does one explain the profound hatred expressed in the brutal killings by Shia and Sunni if the only thing that separates them is the successor of Mohammad. Clearly, there is a substantial difference between these two groups of people. The scholarly evidence that I have read indicates Eurasian vs. Arab ethnicity. These people have been fighting one another in the Tigris Euphrates valley for thousands of years. This is not opinion it is documented fact. Why should we believe that the same ethnic source is not at play today?
typo in the above note:
should read: he argues for the “there is NO ethnic or national identity differences between Sunni and Shia.”
Also, thank you Helena for making this dialogue possible.
Thanks all for interesting info 🙂
[in discussing “southern Iraq” it may be useful to distinguish between the Shiite-dominated areas close to the shrine cities (which is really “central” Iraq, its historical regional name being the “Central Euphrates”) and the far south around Basra, which historically has had a much more complex ethno-religious make-up, with Shiite Arabs of different denominations (Akhbaris and Shaykhis alongside the orthodox Usuli Shiites), Sunni Arabs (many from Najd), Persians, Jews, Christians, Indian traders etc.]
It looks perfectly reasonable that situation of Shiites who live in relatively ethically homogeneous Southern provinces is essentially different from those who live in the central areas with mixed population. In fact, this can explain Sadr’s radicalism – he lives in a mixed area.
So, it would be interesting to know what provinces / parts of Iraq are considered, what does it mean “South Iraq”. IMO, this would answer Tom’s concern.
Sorry for typos!!! Unfortuntately, this blog does not allow post edit/removal.
— In my April 23, 2006 08:53 AM post it should be a euphemism.
— In my April 23, 2006 09:54 PM post it should be ethnically homogeneous.
Tom and Henry, thanks for your responses and sorry for the delay! I suppose we may be writing from different time zones. With regard to the Shiites of Iraq and their relations with Iran: the war between the two countries in the 1980s – and the absence of large-scale defections of Iraqi Shiite soldiers to Iran – prompted many historians to rethink the established idea that Iraqi Shiites had strong loyalties to Iran. Nakash’s book quoted above expresses this revisionist trend and I think it is generally considered the definitive refutation of the older “Persian” paradigm. (Tom: rest assured that you will find ample documentation and footnotes in Nakash’s book; I assume that it is the house style of Foreign Affairs that has been a restraining factor in the case of the article you quote.) It would be impossible to do justice to the book here, I strongly recommend you read it for yourself. Also I’m no medievalist so with regard to Toynbee I can only suggest yet another reference, Hugh Kennedy’s The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates (1986), which shows how the genesis of Shiism as a faith was very complex in terms of the ethnicities involved, and that before the 1500s it flourished in Arab rather than in Persian areas. With regard to the quotes you give from the Enc. Britannica: please note that one of the arguments is really circular (i.e. [they are] Shiites, and [therefore] their religious connection and allegiance is toward Persia”. And also the very fact that the article enumerates the Persian quarters and enclaves strongly suggests that these were precisely enclaves that stood out from their surroundings, and that those surroundings – Shiite Arabs – were indeed distinguishable from their Persian co-religionists. (You will certainly find the Toynbee position repeated by British officials of the mandate period, especially Gertrude Bell, but note that the Shiite clergy formed one of the elements in Iraq that she never really managed to get close to at all, and I suspect that this may have had an effect on her perception of them).
In general, I think it can be useful to take note of the complexities that exist at different levels. Thus, the sense of both Arabness and Iraqiness among the Shiites between Basra and Baghdad has historically been underestimated, but has since the 1990s received increased attention. At the same time, there are important subdivisions within the Shiite areas of Iraq. In Basra and the far south, as I mention above, there has been greater ethnic complexity in the past, with Sunnis in an important role. Also, it is important not to go to the other extreme and artificially exclude all signs of Persian influence. In particular in the border areas along the Tigris there have been considerable cultural links in the past; some of this heritage has no doubt been suppressed in the late twentieth century when many Shiite writers sought to surpass and outperform the Arab nationalists by stressing their own Arab origins. And as Henry points out, in the areas immediately to the south of Baghdad there is again greater ethnic complexity, with considerable Sunni elements. In my book I try to explain how today’s realities to some extent correlate with this intricate historical atlas: instead of joining together in a unison cry for a sectarian “Shiite” federal unit, many Shiites remain sceptical to federalism as such, whereas in the far south around Basra some are inclined to carve out a regional entity for themselves – quite separate from the Shiite heartland closer to Najaf and Karbala. This latter project, which is overlooked by many analysts but has generated lots of activity at the local level, is known as the “Region of the South”; by way of contrast, the SCIRI leadership speak of “The Region of the Centre and the South” when they refer to their (competing) scheme for a single Shiite sectarian canton.
Reidar,
Thank you for your comments. This is a complicated anthropological issue and should not be oversimplified. I will certainly be reading much more on the subject. However, the one thing that I do not find in my reading to date is a plausible hypothesis that explains the obviously profound (as measured by violence) differences between the Shia and Sunni either in today’s Iraq or historically. I just do not see how this violence can be explained by differences about Mohammad’s successor – as we so often hear.
Also, one point that you made I find very interesting. You refer to the lack of desertions from the Iraqi army during the war with Iran as a measure of Shia loyalty to the nation-state of Iraq. Nakash makes the same point in his Foreign Affairs article. This suggests that there were “significant” numbers of Shia in the army. Yet, the army under Saddam has generally been depicted as the means of Sunni repression of the Shia. Is this not a contradiction – an army with large numbers of Shia repressing the Shia population?
Tom, I think the explanation for the perception of discrimination is this: the rank and file of the old Iraqi army were mainly Shiites. The officers, on the other hand, were mostly Sunnis. Those in key positions were often from carefully selected tribes and clans near Tikrit and other areas of north-western Iraq.
As for religious rivalry, I don’t think we should underestimate the potential for grave conflicts rooted in sectarian differences, as we have seen in Europe in the past. Sects can certainly become “ethnic” or ethno-religious groups; what I object to is not the focus on Shiite distinctiveness in Iraq, but the idea that this distinctiveness should automatically produce loyalty to Iran (or that it should necessarily make the Shiites unable to coexist peacefully with the Sunnis).
Juan Cole writes today regarding Bin Laden’s comments about Sudan: “There is no petroleum to my knowledge in Darfur.”
He should read Power and Interest News Report (www.pinr.com 6/2/05)
“Control over oil reserves is at the top of China’s wishes — and Sudanese diffidence for the U.S. seems to be a good set-up for Chinese penetration as a powerbroker. In 2003, China’s National Petroleum Corp. planned to invest one billion dollars to create Sudan’s largest oil refinery. Moreover, as recent declarations from Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed Al-Jazz confirmed, a newly-discovered oil field expected to produce 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil is located in the Darfur region. This latter is also the way to Chad, a country well-known for its natural gas reserves.”
Tom,
Reidar has repeatedly appeared to me to have a strong scholarly knowledge of Iraq, particularly the Shi’a areas that he writes so much about.
As someone who has been to Iraq recently and interviewed Iraqis on the street, I hope I can offer some insight that perhaps others writing here cannot.
(Reidar, to my knowledge you have not travelled recently to Iraq, correct?)
I have been trying to explain the “civil war” thesis by raising analogies to previous historical “sectarian/ethnic killing.”
How many would have said in the 1920s or even early 30s that German citizens would soon be putting their fellow citizens of Jewish origins into ovens and gas showers?
How many analysts of the situation in Rwanda in the late 80s and early 90s would have believed Hutus and Tutsis would soon be slaughtering each other with machetes? Indeed, many have proclaimed an inability to distinguish between the two “ethnic groups.”
My point goes something like this, if Shi’as are first and foremost committed to a Shi’a faith that leads them to hate Sunnis, then why was the Iraqi Communist Party, possessing a solidly secular analysis, primarily made up of Shi’as?
When the United States arrived in Iraq, they had an analysis that was either woefully simplistic and ignorant, or intentionally malicious.
They broke the country into three major factions, promoting the idea that the “60% Shi’a” population all had the same wants and desires, and so 60% of the Governing Council should be Shi’a.
Unfortunately, men like the US’ loyal ally Iyad Allawi, a “secular Shi’a”(and also formerly connected with the Ba’ath Party before defection) decry the idea that all Shi’as are in agreement about governance.
You need to understand the important nuances of the Iran-Iraq War, which I myself am only recently becoming acquainted with.
Iran finance “terrorist groups” to destabilize the Ba’ath regiime, and those groups are now in power in Iraq.
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq was founded at a conference in 1982 to “export the islamic revolution to iraq.”
Prior to this, the Da’awa Party was outlawed in Iraq when its militants attempted assassinations of several Iraqi government officials, and prior to this, one of Iran’s ministers proclaimed the stated goal of the post-revolution Iranian government was regime change in Iraq and to destroy the Ba’ath Party.
Most of the men running the government in Iraq, (including the Kurds!) appear to have little bakcing from their “grassroots constituency,” and so by feeding the flames of ethnic and sectarian identity, they ensure a constituency for themselves.
It really appears to be kind of a textbook case of the use of nationalism, religion, and ethnic identity to preserve political and social power by the elite.
For sure it is more complex than this, but it is an important element to describe the breakdown of the diversity of Iraqi society.
Jasim Abdulghani has an interesting read about the Iran Iraq War which is also excessively documented:
Iran and Iraq in the Years of Crisis, I believe is the title.
Another element to consider is the role of State-sponsored terrorism and militias in Iraq, which is certainly not well enough examined.
Reidar, thanks a lot for inavliable info 🙂 I am in EST(GMT-5) time zone.
Tom,
One simple explanation of Shiite allegiance to Iran is that Hussein did quite a lot to brutally suppress radical Shiite Islamists. Also, Hussein certainly wanted to unite all Iraqis against Iran in the joined Iraq-Iranian war effort – something that he actually achieved.
But now Hussein is removed, radical Shiite clergy flourishes – so we have strengthening ties between Iraqi Shites and Iran – starting from the S.Iraq.
2006-04-24 On Bin Laden’s tape
Permit me to salute the contributors to this thread for an unusually high level of scholarship and discourse.
Reidar
Very interesting subject, as I am Iraqi and I am from Babylon (Hilla), correct me if I am wrong, I found most you writing and comments dig deep in the differences between Shiites community (Iraqi, Iran) and Sunni.
I don’t exactly what your goal in the end, but I feel to find the differences and gig deep ti winding these differences and promoting the “Shiites federalism”.
I found this really ironic thoughts from some one use his academics to promotes separations and to be used to break down a state lived for hundreds of years in this mosaic harmony.
Just to clarify some points to you and to other friends here the Shiites faith start from Iraq not Iran, Iran was as Sunni form start and there king/Roller enforce the shaiist faith for his personal benefits this very well known story, that’s done when he invited many shaiiest religious clears to Iran to listen to them and answer his needs, the Imam Al-Hilly he is the one who make him believed to convert to Shaitsim.
Back to Shiites clerics, if you read and dig deep for major and most of the shait clears in Najaf/Karblah (Centre/South Iraq) you will find for tens of years those Persian clerics are dominated on the roll there in those two cities, this is very obvious to Shiites Iraqi and they very concern about it. This not just I Iraq but also in other places like south Lebanon and Bahrain and other gulf countries.
Even for some of those clerics who born in Iraq and they got the Iraqi citizenship in reality they are Iran loyalest not Iraq loyalest because they are Persian, not Iraqis.
Thas why you make you wrongly stated “Should automatically produce loyalty to Iran (or that it should necessarily make the Shiites unable to coexist peacefully with the Sunnis).
Moreover, as an Iraqi and interested early days to track the influence of Persian on the Shiites Iraq, I found the black dress that most of the south Iraq Wemen dressed are promoted and enforced by those Persian “Shiites” if we compare the dress inside Iran we see its different they never enforced it there, also the acts and stories of commemoration of Ashora’a “The killing of Imam Al Hessian Bin Ali” all those hornbill acts and stupid things are promoted and supported by those Persian clerics which is most Iraqi Shiites hates those acts but they may be felt fear inside due to those Persian cilier influences by covering those acts as religious borders of Shiites, which in fact not. Same you find this in Lebanon and Pakistan but not in Iran!!
Last point I would like to mention here those Parisians they don’t looking to take the political power in Iraq or other countries, they hied their in those Religious schools and places but they are state under state this obvious in Iraq and Lebanon.
Brian
Your comment had some facts about what’s in Iraq and I agree with “Iran finance “terrorist groups” to destabilize the Ba’ath regime, and those groups are now in power in Iraq. which is most of the west do not or did not like to hear or to say.
I am some times come to my mind to say if you live beside an neighbour like Iran for thousands of years you will find why Iraq have most of his problem with Iran?
What wee see of “terrorist groups” which mostly in the western median colour the fighters against the invaders in facts its very accurately you put represented the Iranian whom we seeing and hearing daily killing of Iraqis and distractions of there symbols of their country, this not far reading the history of the distraction of Babylon Hanging Gardens and Babylon Tower when the Parison King under his wife Alistair ordered him to go to destroyed Babylonian’s kingdom which really reflect some acts what they doing now.
Henry James
I think your conclusion not quite right, Hussein’s brutally includes every one oppose his regime and his rolling from Iraqis whatever he is from North, South, Muslim, Christians, but those “Shiite allegiance to Iran” as I said promoting Khomeini Ideology inside Iraq that make Hussein’s includes them but not because they are Shiites, but Hussein’s brutally includes in some degree Iraqi Shiites by association..
Some recent whats happing to Iraqi women in Iraq now under influence of Persian on the Shiites Iraq,
The New Fashion Brought to Iraq
The art of compromise in Iraq
[Hussein’s brutally includes in some degree Iraqi Shiites by association…]
Baathist PR justified all kinds of repressions by unloyalty to Baathist cause and personally Saddam Hussein. But now we see very clearly that actually they fought against separatism and religious radicals.
So, the question is, how and on what ideological grounds opposition to the central rule will be put down after Baath? Since nobody can envision an answer for this question, all that remains is civil war.
Henry James,
So, the question is, how and on what ideological grounds opposition to the central rule will be put down after Baath? Since nobody can envision an answer for this question, all that remains is civil war.
Henry, Iraq now not normal society neither normal state to give us the answer or we can find answer.
You and other friends knows that there are now inside Iraq many fingers playing their games, there is one Iraqi official he stated that 23 groups “not Iraqi” inside in additions to the criminals and other elements from Iraqi society.
You know very well the disappearance of state and lawlessness will make these things brings the civil war.
Take any country any state in the world without any force and under lawlessness condition will be as same as Iraq if its not worse, just go back to Katrina storm and what happened there in few days of lawlessness, compare that with Iraq now after 4 yeras what’s will the place there now.
Brian, on your historical analogies: if I understand your purpose, the one with Germany is better, Germany having been if anything less anti-Semitic than other European nations beforehand, but with Rwanda, knowledge of recent history in Rwanda and Burundi surely made the events of the 90s less surprising to some analysts.
Henry,
With all due respect, Hussein hijacked the Baathist PR.
I don’t know what your knowledge about Iraq from 1968 till invasion, but might some Iraqis will explain it to you.
Hussein was a small guy appeared behind Ahmad Hassan Al-Baker in the first statement broadcasts on Iraqi TV in 1968, he holds first all the intelligence and security power, he started to kill assassinated his follows of the most senior Baathist PR thinkers and older higher in the party than him like Tawfiq Al-Samarrai, also killed any one he think cause any thread to his future.
Then he became as vice president, he used all his power to gain the hearts and minds of Iraqis, he behaved exactly like Hitler in Germany.
Then in 1980 with 8 years Iraq/Iran war he builds his pyramid of power he is suppressed Baathist PR by promoted loyalty to Saddam Hussein.
The fact is most Iraqis enrolled in Baathist PR for many reasons most of the members enrolled to lives their normal life under Hussein’s brutally, I can say there is no Baathist PR from the day Hussein came to the power.
Moreover most of his forces some estimated 25,000.00 Republicans and special forces all of them they loyalty to Saddam Hussein this done by the way of selection and enrolments process these forces by chosen them from much close tribes and areas North Iraq around Tikrit.
Most of Iraqis who are from Tikrit in Particulars are not Baathist PR members they regards themselves over the rest of Iraqis this the attitude they had for 35 years, those Hussein relatives and tribes who are in Iraqi military Forces either as a commanders or intelligences military officers which cause a lot of graveness and confusion to those who graduated from The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and other military schools, those who are far more confidant and experienced personal than those who know only loyalty to Saddam Hussein.
I think you will agree with me why most of Iraqi military forces withdraw from the war battel during the invasion and went home because they had enough humiliations from the regime.
Saddam used any one to achieved his goals we saw there were many Shiite who done criminal acts against innocent Iraqis and also many Saddam’s Loyalest who killed many Iraqis, I pick your attention also I don’t if Reidar take it in account about the reasons of many Shiite solders and military feels to Iran during Iraq/Iran war, this because there were orders from Saddam at a time to shoot nay solder or Military personal with draws from the was battel, this very Cleary demonstrated in the battel for the Al-Muhamarh battel when Sabah Mirza who was serving Saddam ate that time lead a group of special forces and stood on the costal of Shat Al-Arab “Al-Arab River” in Basra Iraqi side and shoots many who flee the ware zone due to heavy battel there make some of troops and gropes to withdraw the field s due to heavy Iranians fire, so for many of them preferred to surrender to the Iranians troops than withdraw and consequently killed by shooting them by “Saddam Death Squads”.
Also I would like to mentioned that most of the POW who flee the war or caught by Iranians were treated very badly by Iranians even they are Shiites this rise the question here what’s make them do that if the Iranians believe in shaiit faith also? I don’t know if Reidar take this in account also in his study also.
As fare as I know there were a very secret document mentioned that the Iranians chose or selected some Iraqis from POW or those flee Iraq, to do the torturing and humiliations of Iraqi POW in Iran to distance themselves from any future criminal actes by any international agencies like Human Rights and others and make the case as between Iraqis and the Iranians regime did nothing wrong to Iraqi POW.
The irony we do not see any of those who is loyal to Hussein and did many brutal actions against Iraqis brought to justices, court or caught and questions and charged all we know I believe they are free their and doing same thing with loyalty under other power.
Salah, you wrote, “I don’t exactly what your goal in the end, but I feel to find the differences and gig deep ti winding these differences and promoting the ‘Shiites federalism’. I found this really ironic thoughts from some one use his academics to promotes separations and to be used to break down a state lived for hundreds of years in this mosaic harmony.”
Lest there be any doubt about this: I’m NOT trying to promote a sectarian brand of federalism for Iraq. Quite the contrary, I hope to draw attention to the multitude of different views on federalism that exists among the Shiites of Iraq – a complexity that often drowns in Western news coverage. I have been interested in the issue of territorial decentralisation in central and southern Iraq since the mid-1990s, and the general trend right up until the summer of 2005 was that many Shiites were not particularly interested in federalism at all, except for some in the far south around Basra, who in 2004 began talking about federal status for a small region of three governorates only. That’s why I’m quite astounded at the rapidity with which the Western media since August 2005 have rather uncritically concluded that “all the Shiites” agree with the more recent idea of a single sectarian canton as promoted by one of the Shiite factions. I feel more attention should be paid to two competing trends among the Shiites, the Iraqi nationalist one, as well as the regionalist one in the far south.
The mere fact that I have written a book about separatism in southern Iraq does not mean that I embrace the separatist idea or seek to sow discord. If anything, I am an enthusiastic admirer of the mosaic qualities of Iraqi society that you refer to – qualities that I believe can be expressed both at a regional and a national level. But I feel strongly that regardless of political preferences, it can be useful to discuss projects like the failed attempt to establish a separate state in Basra. Iraqi nationalist historians have systematically shied away from the subject and Western historians have disregarded it. But the Basra project is interesting. To some extent it was mere opportunism on the part of a wealthy mercantile elite, but it also had more positive qualities: it tried to build a local coalition of Shiites, Sunnis, Jews and Christians, and it later came to highlight non-sectarian regionalism as a possible alternative to what its proponents feared would develop into an extreme form of centralism. These are ideas that can be of relevance for today’s debate about democracy in Iraq.
Reidar,
Many thanks for replaying to me and clarifying things.
Reider I read Robert Ford words who serviced in Iraq as a head of the American Embassy’s Political Affairs Office in Iraq and he worked nearly 2 years in Baghdad plus three months in the Shia holy city of Najaf., his words perfectly and really reflects the attitude hold by the majority of Iraqis from far North to down South.
Its might interesting to you the Arabs in Al-Ahwaz or it called also Arabstan; this land went to Iranians as part of deals by Britt’s after WWI.
Those who lived in Al-Ahawaz are Shiites Arab and they still not feeling Loyalest to Iranians/Parisians, it also wealthy region comparing with Basra
Reider,
“it can be useful to discuss projects like the failed attempt to establish a separate state in Basra.”
Sorry Rieder
Can you explain more a bout this statement,
Why establishing a separate state in Basra?
For what will be benefits Iraq as a state and Iraqis as one nation?
Salah, again, I’m not at all suggesting that such a state should be established, I merely refer to the fact that earlier in Iraqi history there was at one point such an attempt. It sparked off many ideas, some probably rather parochial and overly localist – but also some interesting ones about inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cooperation within a small-scale regional entity. I think the problem is that much of the debate about whether Iraq is on the verge of disintegration or not is polarised and ill informed. On the one hand, there are those who say that Iraq is artificial and that the Shiites are about to separate – but who say so without having ever investigated the actual historical precedents for such separatism, and who therefore tend to exaggerate the centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, there are those who subscribe to the Iraqi nationalist paradigm and say that the Iraqis have been united for centuries and tend to systematically overlook every competing trend. I am trying to find some sort of middle ground here; why not take a look at history and study what actually happened the one time in Iraqi history when there actually was a southern separatist movement? That is the subject of my book. I focus on the separation forces in the south but also on their very obvious limitations.
Below is “note” that I have posted at a history and theory site. It’s about 500 words long. I hope that not too much. But, it goes to this on going discussion.
Ethnic theories of religious wars – Iraq and the Reformation
With no more information about the developing Iraqi civil war than the combatant’s respective Sunni and Shia Islamic sects, it is reasonable to conclude that the war is fought for theological reasons. Similarly, post-Reformation wars between Catholic and Protestant Christians appear prima facie to be theological. However, if the ethnic characteristics of the respective groups are considered, then theological explanations become questionable.
For example, Frenand Braudel notes that the Protestant Reformation essentially represented a breaking away of the ethnic Nordic people from Latins. He writes: “The old frontier of the Roman [Latin] Empire along the Rhine and Danube essentially divides the Protestant and Catholic countries. Of course, the Reformation had its purely religious aspects: it was one outcome of the rising tide of religion [reform] that was evident throughout Europe. But [Latin Europeans] maintained the connection with Rome, while the [Nordics] broke completely away.” He wonders skeptically: “Is this coincidental?” (“A History of Civilization” p 349-356) Also, the Britannica 9 th edition (1898) article on the Reformation makes reference to its “Teutonic” nature.
The Tigris/Euphrates valley plays a role analogues to the Rhine and Danube; an ethnic divide. Throughout recorded history, in this valley, Eurasian migrants/invaders met and conflicted with their counterparts from the Arabian steppes. For example, in the 8 th century, “The focus of the nascent Arabic culture was Baghdad…a short distance above Ctesiphon, the former capital of the [displaced Eurasian] Sasanian Persian Empire…” (Toynbee: “Mankind and Mother Earth” p 390) Also, a millennium before the current Shiite/Sunni conflict, in 945 AD, the [Eurasian] Shiite Buwayhids, from the southern Caspian Sea shore, conquered Sunni Arab Baghdad.
Toynbee notes the differentiating ethnic characteristics of the Shia and the Sunni Moslems as the basis of conflict: “The Shi’ah identified itself with the reaction of the non-Arab subjects of the Caliphate against the Arab ascendancy. The most important of these non-Arab communities were the Iranians…Accordingly, from the latter part of the eighth century we find Shi’ism perpetually seeking to propagate itself into Iran from its original stronghold in Lower Iraq, which was a meeting-place of the [Eurasian] Iranian and Arabic cultures.” (“Study of History” v.1 p. 354)
Coming down to the 20 th century, the Persian character of Iraqi Shi’ites is recorded in the Britannica 13 th edition (1926): “Ethnographically [Southern] Irak is subject to a double influence. On the one hand Arabia. Even stronger than the influence of Arabia is that of Persia [a.k.a. Iran]. In general the inhabitants of [Southern] Irak are Shi’ites not Sunnites, and their religious connection and allegiance is therefore toward Persia. Persian customs are in fashion, Persian coinage is used, and in Baghdad, there is an important Persian quarter, while Kerbela and Meshed ‘Ali to the west of the Euphrates are really Persian enclaves.” Current media descriptions of Southern Iraq report essentially the same.
In sum, it is reasonable to ask if today’s Sunni/Shia conflict is in fact about respective interpretations of Islam. Given the historic pattern of ethnic conflict, there is reason to believe that the developing Iraqi civil war has more to do with ethnicity than religiosity.
John R, thanks for that insight.
I do however feel there is one element of the Rwanda conflict which is especially pointed and important to consider, that being the role of an outisde colonial force, providing favor and propping up one group for years, only to cede its support to the other upon its exiting the country. It’s not a direct analogue to Iraq, but certainly the US’ tacit (and at times direct!) support of Saddam Hussein followed by a bizarre perspective switch in favor of “shi’a” Iraqis rings with discomforting similarity.
I hope my fellow “commentators” or “analysts” here will start to consider the role that political and personal interest is playing in the conflict. Despite your feelings Tom, in my opinion, and perhaps Salah who has not only visited Iraq but apparently is Iraqi, will second this, the Iraqis I met, Sunni and Shi’a alike still are looking for a unified Iraq. Reidar’s assertions that the south are most likely to continue pushing for secession also rings true with me.
At the end of the day, however, the politicians of Iraq appear to be a large part of the problem. Due to their long exiles many politicians are seen as outsiders by those forced to remain under Saddam’s Iraq. I would argue that only by dividing Iraq’s public from each other and beating the drums of ethno-sectarian nationalism will many of these politicians remain in power.
If there is a civil war, it is directly the result of United States policies. Policies which I feel are increasingly intentional. Check out my recent post about the roots of the civil war, and the apparent foreknowledge of the United States that militias would inevitably be a problem:
Rumsfeld Ignored Saddam’s Militias, Generals “Ignored” Shi’a Militias
Tom, Wrote
In Baghdad, there is an important Persian quarter,
This quarter is it’s built during Kisra the king of Persian, this before Islam, then the Persian kingdom fall to Islam during Omar Bin Khatab time.
Correct me if I am wrong here, so this quarter its part of the that era of history of Iraq.
There is nothing at that time what you say” Even stronger than the influence of Arabia is that of Persia [a.k.a. Iran]. In general the inhabitants of [Southern] Irak are Shi’ites not Sunnites, and their religious connection and allegiance is therefore toward Persia.”
In other words the history told us that Omer Bin Al-Khatab call Iraq as the “Black Land” why? Because most of Southern part of Iraq was green in my view its not “inhabitants” therefore there were people but in any way there is no Shi’ites not Sunnites yet at that time!!!.
Also Basra its recorded as a town in our history before Islam and then during Islam time, Basra played very well as part of one of the destination for the schoolers to study and live.
Tom, Wrote
In Baghdad, there is an important Persian quarter,
This quarter is it’s built during Kisra the king of Persian, this before Islam, then the Persian kingdom fall to Islam during Omar Bin Khatab time.
Correct me if I am wrong here, so this quarter its part of the that era of history of Iraq.
There is nothing at that time what you say” Even stronger than the influence of Arabia is that of Persia [a.k.a. Iran]. In general the inhabitants of [Southern] Irak are Shi’ites not Sunnites, and their religious connection and allegiance is therefore toward Persia.”
In other words the history told us that Omer Bin Al-Khatab call Iraq as the “Black Land” why? Because most of Southern part of Iraq was green in my view its not “inhabitants” therefore there were people but in any way there is no Shi’ites not Sunnites yet at that time!!!.
Also Basra its recorded as a town in our history before Islam and then during Islam time, Basra played very well as part of one of the destination for the schoolers to study and live.
Friend Reidar,
Basra, the Failed Gulf State
Reider its can not be more clearer than this about your attention and your books.
What Britt’s in early 1914 did in Basra they cam back after 100 years to try again their game, to make tiny small canton like Kuwait, Bahrain, or others state and then will be in line with their interest.
I hope you all be lose again….and keep dreaming.
I think you got at home there more problems and differences of ethnics and religious complex than South Iraq…
I agree with Brian that US/UK attention to disintegrated Iraq as one country this attention start clearly with Sheik Paul Bremer III by introducing his paranoia division with Sunni, Shiites and Kurds, he forgot that the Kurds also Muslims some Sunni and some Shiites but for sick stop these ill thought and leave the people live in peace and work for peace not for harm and wars between people lived on their land 5000 years together and love each other but those invaders each time tried to play in the mud..
Sorry, I don’t have time or energy at the moment for a more complete comment. Hopefully I will in the next day or two. In the mean time, briefly:
1. Historically the split between Sunni and Shi`a was not over religion at all but purely over politics. I believe the situation in Iraq today is the same. Not religion, not some idea of ethnicity, but politics.
2. Granted I do not come at this from an academic, but rather from an experiential perspective. I have known many, many, many Iraqi Shi’is who are Arabs, or Kurds, or Turkmens, and they all consider themselves Iraqis first, and not one of them has expressed any notion of being ethnically different from Sunnis. The ethnic differences were based not on sect but on whether they were Arabs, Kurds, or Turkmens. That includes even one Shi’i family I know whose origins are from India, and who experienced some discrimination from Saddam’s regime on that basis. First and foremost they consider themselves Iraqis and Muslims.
3. In my experience and by my observations conflict between groups in Iraq now concerns not religious or ethnic differences or prejudices, but rather political power. In terms of day to day living and relationships the overwhelming majority of Iraqis have not paid much attention to ethnic or sectarian differences.
Salah, please notice the phrase “the victory of Iraqi nationalism in the south” in the quotation above. In fact, the advance of Iraqi nationalism in the Basra area is a major theme in my book. Again, this is a subject where there unfortunately has been too much polarisation, between those who see Iraqi nationalism as an age-old force, and those who think it is merely something that was imposed on the population by a ruthless regime. I try to show how Iraqi nationalism became remarkably widespread in the south at a early stage, already in the times of the monarchy.
Also, just to make the point that I’m not completely inventing the existence of certain regionalisms in contemporary Iraq (please note that I’m talking about regionalism and not sectarianism in this case), I’d like to draw your attention to the following quote from the very interesting piece by Mahmud al-Amir which you posted the other day – about tensions between Shiites from the holy cities and those of the far south.
ذات يوم، سألت (قيادياً) طريداً من حاشية أحد القادة الكبار عن سبب هجرته إلى لندن، واستقراره هناك، وعزوفه عن العمل مع (الجماعة) فأكد لي بالحرف الواحد، أن السبب (جنوبيته) أي أنه كان جنوبياً يتحدر من واحدة من المدن الجنوبية في العراق، والجماعة الحاشية لا يرغبون أن يتحول (معيدي) مهما كانت أخلاقيته وتدينه وثقافته وكفاءته وحركيته ووعيه السياسي ومقدار الجهد الشخصي الذي يبذله في الخط المذكور، إلى قيادي بارز، إن الأولوية في هذا الخط ـ وأقولها صريحة وواضحة ـ للنجفي أو الكربلائي ـ والبقية لا قيمة لهم مهما فعلوا!!.
If you read my book, I think you’ll find that I have profound respect for what I believe is still the dominant trend among the Iraqis: multi-ethnic coexistence and the rejection of sectarianism. The preface starts with the assertion that if history is anything to go by, then Iraq should have somewhat better prospects than Yugoslavia. At the same time, there clearly are certain tensions in Iraq related to regionalisms. I think it will be better to openly discuss those issues (and their historical precedents) instead of pretending that they don’t exist. If there is no such dialogue, black-and-white logics will reign instead: extreme nationalism with no toleration for differences of opinion, or partitionist ideas and claims that peaceful coexistence in Iraq is impossible.
Frind Reidar, wrote
I think it will be better to openly discuss those issues (and their historical precedents) instead of pretending that they don’t exist.
I am ready to talk and talk, I love to see the other side listen for the best for Iraq first as one country and for Iraqis as one nation.
Its strike me when some from the west come to our nation to our land and promotes things and politics with hidden diesses that will spreads sooner or later that causes chose as we see now in Iraq.
If you or other think US/UK doing good think in Iraq and there are progress in Iraq right now, to the most of Iraqis its not its achoase and its a distraction of their state, except a small groups of those came with Americans.
If you ask same that guy “Mahmud al-Amir” I am sure he will agree also as much as he hated old regime.
Talking about Mahmud al-Amir.,I talk about it and mentioned it in one of my previous poste to Tom, Shiites were become victims in associations under Hussein time ( when he came to power not before),
I give you more, all the stuff of the intelligence services asked openly who is Shiite or Sunni, the Shiites are asked to leave their jobs the Sunni and Tikrites of course they hold the high ranks stayed. But each Shiite left his intelligence service got a better job and role in normal civil sector according to his skills, some of them got a managerial post as they still regime friendly in the eye of regime.
Despite their employment history, their experiences which is less from others which they either Shiites or Sunni and more qualified for those role.
Comparing Shiites position under Hussein’s regime with Sunni today in Iraq from first day by sheikh Pal Bremer III, the case opposite the Sunni now victims! isn’t it?
then Iraq should have somewhat better prospects than Yugoslavia
Is it the case of Yugoslavia done according to what the west like and according to similar “profound respect and books same as what you put?
Is the Yugoslavian’s choices?
Same applicable to South Korea, and North Korea, Or before west Germany and West Germany, its all done to the wish of invader? It’s not your call it’s those people who lived on their land for 5000 years call let them they do it not “you” as occupier.
extreme nationalism with no toleration for differences of opinion, or partitionist ideas and claims that peaceful coexistence in Iraq is impossible.
In my mind there is no wrong with nationalism under what level, but we need to filter those who causing the “no toleration for differences” and live with it’s as a core of the society their not “partitionist ideas” that causes more differences and unpeaceful coexistence.
If you read the history of the ME the choase came with the invaders when they put those un-sited lines as a borders for one nation had one language had one religion and lived for thousands of years on their land most of them from same tribes.