Iraqi politics– 17 weeks on

I see from the handy “Democracy denied in Iraqi” counter here that 118 days have now passed since the much-vaunted Iraqi parliamentary election of December 15.
It has become clearer and clearer to me over recent weeks that the major cause of the political impasse that has brought so much uncertainty and violence to the country since then has been the anti-democratic meddling of the machinators of the US occupation force and some of their close political allies within the Iraqi political system. (See e.g., here, here, and here… )
Today, there is news that the acting Speaker of the Parliament, the very venerable Adnan Pachachi, has said he, “will convene the legislature next week to push the formation of a new government that is stalled over who will be prime minister.” Pachachi added, according to that AP report, that “Shiite politicians told him they hope to have the deadlock over the nomination of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari resolved before the session”.
I certainly wish Pachachi well in his efforts. But we need to understand that the big, multi-party Shiite electoral list, the UIA, has thus far stuck firm with its original decision to nominate the current interim PM, Ibrahim Jaafari, to form the new government. That despite huge efforts by President Bush and others to try to scuttle his nomination
Regular JWN readers will know that I’ve been following intra-UIA political developments here for some time– and in a way markedly different from that pursued by most people in the MSM.
Recently, Reidar Visser wrote to me to add some of his own, impressively detailed analysis to what I’d written earlier. He wrote:

In one of your recent posts as well as the Global Policy Forum piece you focus on the combined strength of the Sadrists, i.e. Fadila + Muqtada supporters. This is a highly relevant point, because there are many ideological similarities between the two. But it is worth keeping in mind in this context that in the struggle over the PM nomination, it is the Muqtada faction plus the two Daawa factions that have kept the most unified position. Some leading Fadila members in fact signalled their support for Abd al-Mahdi, although others may also have “defected” (from those “leaders”) during the vote…
It is now rumoured that the Fadila Party have been quite prominent in the wheeling and dealing over government posts (and that they have even toyed with the idea of presenting their own leader, Nadim al-Jabiri, as a compromise PM candidate). If they are this thirsty for office they may well be particularly susceptible to the sort of arm twisting that no doubt is taking place these days. Thus, the Fadila element is probably not an overwhelming anti-Abd al-Mahdi force at the moment, and might conceivably at one point even follow Qasim Dawud’s example. (On the other hand, I have not yet seen any credible reports of the Muqtada supporters and the two Daawa factions reneging on their support for Jaafari. Also I should think that the spiritual leader of Fadila, Muhammad al-Yaqubi, the favourite of Muqtada’s late father, will dislike an ideological sell-out for the sake of positions of power.)

I really appreciate this clarification. Thanks, friend!