Democracy in Israel

HaAretz is now saying that the vote count there, with 99.5% of votes counted, gives this result for the 120-seat Knesset:

    Kadima– 28 seats
    Labor– 20
    Shas– 13
    Yisrael Beitenu (Lieberman)– 12
    Likud– 11
    National Union/National Religious Party– 9
    Pensioner’s Party (Rafi Eitan)– 7
    United Torah Judaism– 6
    Meretz– 4
    [All Arab parties]– 10

Congratulations to my friends in Meretz for having retained their four seats! (At one point, they were forecast to lose two of them.)
The rise of the “Pensioners’ Party”, headed by longtime spy boss Rafi Eitan, was the big surprise. He was the man responsible for (1) capturing Adolph Eichmann and (2) running the very damaging spy Jonathan Pollard deep in the bosom of the US national-security apparatus in the 1980s…
(Hat-tip to Imshin for tha tlast link. She wrote today, “You wouldn’t believe how many youngsters I know who voted for the pensioners’ party, not to mention non-Russian’s who voted for Avigdor Lieberman…”
Now coalition formation will get seriously underway…

21 thoughts on “Democracy in Israel”

  1. I think pressure should be focused on preventing Olmert from annexing the Jordan Valley region. That’s a large and significant part of the West Bank. A future State of Palestine needs its border with Jordan for its economy. Perhaps people in the Labor party can force any coalition to scrap the Valley plan. The Hamas government could also focus its rhetoric particularly on that issue.

  2. Between the need to keep an unexpectedly strong Labor Party happy and the need to obtain international support for the evacuation, retaining the Jordan Valley should be out of the question. All the signs point to a withdrawal from everything east of the wall.

  3. Perhaps so, Jonathan. But you should not imagine that a withdrawal such as that would win any significant international recognition for the line thereby delineated…

  4. Not de jure recognition, certainly, but possibly de facto support as an interim measure pending resumed negotiations. I think this is the kind of support Olmert will go for, but he won’t get even this unless the Palestinian state he leaves behind is a viable one. A cantonized, bantustan-like territory without the Jordan Valley won’t cut it, so even if Olmert wants to retain the valley, he won’t be able to do so as a practical matter. I’m expecting something more like a unilateral implementation of the Clinton plan.
    Although maybe I’m underestimating both Olmert and Hamas. In last night’s speech, he called on Abbas to negotiate, and Haniyeh said he won’t oppose talks between Israel and the PLO (although he’s still not ready to talk directly). Olmert was known to favor resuming negotiations before the PA election; maybe there’s a real possibility of this?

  5. Notice that the quotes about the Jordan Valley in that article come from the reporter, not from Olmert or anyone connected with him. Olmert has in fact stated that Israel needs to secure its eastern border, but has been very non-specific about what the eastern border will be, and hasn’t made any promises to keep the Jordan Valley. As a practical matter he won’t be able to keep it, and he’s smart enough to realize this.

  6. As a practical matter he won’t be able to keep it, and he’s smart enough to realize this.
    “As a practical matter he will keep it, and he’s smart enough to realize this.”
    The Palestinians will just have to live within the 420 miles of tall fences that mark out Israel’s new borders, in a pseudo-state surrounded and almost cut in half by Israeli settlements.
    http://www.onegoodmove.org/1gm/

  7. If you look at the numbers, you’ll see that Olmert doesn’t have to keep Labor happy. He has a range of coalition options open to him – even Lieberman said today that he’s willing to compromise on the “convergence” plan, and it’s looking increasingly likely that Netanyahu will be dumped soon, leaving room for a more flexible Likud leadership. That said, I think that Olmert will be closer to Labor because that’s what he wants to do, i.e. that is the substance of his plan, and he wants the broadest possible legitimization that he can possibly achieve to avoid having to go to a referendum.
    Regarding the Jordan Valley, it’s important to keep in mind that, unlike the rest of the West Bank (“Judea and Samaria”) the purpose of establishing settlements there was almost purely security, not ideology, based. The fact that on June 5, 1967 the Iraqi army was sitting on the border had a major impact on the thinking of the Labor government that set up these settlements in the first place. In addition, the narrow waist of the country in the Sharon was seen as being difficult to defend at the time. Both the political environment and military technologies have changed since then. Today, the Ariel salient will be a better solution for protecting Israel from being cut in two, negating the need for tight control of the border with Jordan.
    But the key here, I think, is that Olmert and Kadima have left open the possibility of negotiations. The Palestinians would do well to do what they need to do in order to participate in these negotiations – and their future. It’s great that Haniya is saying nice things, but I believe that he is simply “not the man”. If I understand correctly, the Prime Minister does not have the authority to negotiate or come to a deal under the Palestinian constitution. Arafat ensured that those powers remained with the President. Therefore, it is up to Abu Mazen to see to it that he is in a position to talk, and to deal with Israel during the time remaining.

  8. Appears that there’s a good chance that Meretz won a fifth seat.
    Kadima also won another seat. Both Lieberman and Shas are down a seat each, while Likud is up a seat, so the three have 12 mandates each.

  9. JES, yet more thanks for your informative contributions here.
    Re negotiations, you’re right that Abu Mazen could take some initiatives. But don’t look for him to get far out front of his public– now, any more than ever. Also, don’t expect any Palestinians at all to be interested in any negotiations over Olmert’s ‘final status’ line that would not, centrally, give them something very tangible in Jerusalem. The Jordan Valley, which has a low Palestinian population, is really a sideshow compared with that.
    Actually, for Palestinians around the world, nearly everything is a sideshow compared with Jerusalem.

  10. I think that before the elections here, Abu Mazen was calling for secret, back-channel talks. Taking things out of the public eye would probably be best for both parties right now.
    Actually, for Palestinians around the world, nearly everything is a sideshow compared with Jerusalem.
    I think that the same can be said for Jews.

  11. unlike the rest of the West Bank (“Judea and Samaria”) the purpose of establishing settlements there was almost purely security, not ideology, based.
    No at all, look to your (“Judea and Samaria”) what’s this mean? Isn’t the ideology, based names?
    You try to convince us, first let yourself believe in Jordan Valley name and the fact its occupied Arab land before you give us your statement.

  12. Salah,
    Please read again what I wrote. The unlike was meant to contrast the Jordan Valley with the rest of the West Bank. The quotations marks around “Judea and Samaria” was meant to indicate that I don’t agree with this terminology.

  13. I can understand keeping the Jordan Valley as part of a unilateral withdrawal, but I can’t imagine Israel keeping it when they negotiate a final agreement.
    The Jordan Valley is less of a security concern now, given peace with Jordan and, less significant, the removal of Saddam Hussein. Iran is not going to send ground forces all that way anyway.
    Still, so long as a conflict existed, Israel has a concern as to who’s entering the territories from any side.
    When it comes to a final peace agreement, the Jordan Valley would be the first thing the Israelis drop in their demands. There can of course be short term or even long term security arrangements: early warning stations, joint border monitoring, etc.
    But I would seriously hope that Olmert is smart enough to recognize that any Palestinian state would not be able to have Israel on it’s eastern border. So it makes sense for Olmert to say he will keep it now, even if he’s willing to give it away as part of an agreement.

  14. Joshua, I think you and I have different understandings of Olmert’s plan (and on reflection I still think mine is the ‘correct’ one.) My understanding is that he’s talking about unilaterally delineating a line he describes as Israel’s ‘final’ border before 2010. He says he’s prepared to discuss this with the US and EU, perhaps… but certainly NOT with the Palestinians. That means he is not actually envisaging any actual “negotiations” over this line with the other party to this dispute.
    Yes, it seems he is enivisaging a preliminary withdrawal of settlers (but no mention of withdrawal of troops) from some WB areas prior to 2010. Again, no ‘negotiations.’

  15. He says he’s prepared to discuss this with the US and EU, perhaps… but certainly NOT with the Palestinians. That means he is not actually envisaging any actual “negotiations” over this line with the other party to this dispute.
    I think that you have not understood Olmert’s plan. He, and others in Kadima, have clearly stated that there remains a period during which they will be willing to negotiate with the Palestinians. This, of course, is predicated on the PA committing to those negotiations and making an honest effort to rein in the “militants”. Sure, there is an apparent problem with Hamas now, but, in any event, Abu Mazen is the one who has to negotiate – not Haniya. If the Palestinians don’t agree to honest negotiations within this timeframe, then Olmert intends to act unilaterally. Haim Ramon indicated the day after the elections that that time limit was one year.
    There is nothing new about Olmert’s plan. This is exactly the plan articulated quite clearly by Amram Mitzna in the 2003 elections!

  16. Helena, I don’t think we have different understandings. I know Olmert is saying “these will be the final borders.” But what’s he going to be able to do? The Palestinians clearly wont accept having Israel control the Jordan Valley and the dispute will still continue, regardless of what imprimatur the UN does or does not give a “final” withdrawal.
    Olmert can withdrawal and say “these are the borders.” But he or his successor would eventually have to do something to reach a final
    resolution. Because so long as those borders are not accepted by the Palestinians, then they can’t really be final.
    Put it this way. Israel has formally annexed the Golan Heights and claimed that Jerusalem is its unified capital. Technically these are now
    established borders, according to Israel. But everyone knows that Israel’s presence in these areas will have to be negotiated, because no one accepts it based only on Israel’s say so.
    The question is, do the parties negotiate a final deal now, or does Olmert withdrawal, further consolidate Israel’s position, and negotiate later.
    That is why I have supported “disengagement,” “convergence”, or whatever you want to call it. Yes, a negotiated agreement is preferable, but in the absence of that I don’t mind Israel pulling out of settlements. Because it will eventually have to pull out of more when it looks toward a final agreement.
    Some people object to this formulation because it supposedly allows Israel to get away with giving up some settlements for the sake of securing
    others. But if Israel doesn’t withdrawal, then they would simply build more settlements AND keep the existing ones.
    I just don’t see the downside. We are talking about settlements that Israel would eventually have to give up in a negotiated agreement anyway.
    Might as well pull out of them now.

  17. JES
    Correct me if I’m wrong…but wasn’t the plan for the Jordan Valley put forward in the Allon Plan in 1967? (Allon being the Minister of Defense at the time)
    The idea as I recall was to militarily control this mostly unoccupied, desert land along the Jordan River which would remain as the eastern boundary of Israel to prevent foreign armies (like Iraq) to cross into the West Bank and pose a threat to split the narrow waisted Israel in two.
    Of course, this would complicate a two-state solution by limiting the Palestinian entity, which would become a series of enclaves and have no access to Jordan. Jericho is close to the Jordanian border and would be presumably be accessed only from the west (Ramallah).

  18. WmPeele,
    Yes, basically this was part of the Allon Plan, which called for Israel to retain territory in the West Bank not densely populated by Arabs. (Although Yigal Allon was Labor Ministor and Deputy Prime Minister at the time). And, yes, the primary rationale was defense, so Allon was concerned with a foothold in the highground, strategic depth behind (or in front of) the Sharon and control over the Jordan Valley, where the Iraqi tanks had been staged to cut the country in two.
    I do think that there’s a strong argument to make that, today, the military and security concerns that were at the heart of the Allon Plan are radically different.

Comments are closed.