Gilbert Achcar’s letter

Iraq developments — Oct. 8, 2005

by Gilbert Achcar

1) How US and British Forces help Iraqis recover
their sovereignty

For any person believing in good faith that occupation troops in Iraq are
helping the Iraqis build independent institutions in order to recover their
sovereignty, recent events in Basra—the way British troops stormed police
headquarters in that city—and their aftermath ought to be enough to prove
the contrary.

Yesterday, Reuters (
British troops seize 12 in Basra raids
) and other agencies reported
how British troops arrested 12 persons, including police officers, in Basra.
The account by Reuters correspondent is interesting
(my emphasis):

“Sources in Sadr’s office in Basra said those
detained included several lieutenants in Basra’s interior affairs department,
which is part of the Interior Ministry, and an official with the local electricity
authority.

‘They are mostly Sadr people,’ one of the sources
said.

He said some of the suspects were seized from the police building which was
attacked by British forces last month to free two undercover soldiers who
had been detained by Iraqi police.
The British military said only that the raids took place in the
Hadem district of Basra.

Another source said all 12 men were seized from one house.

The arrests run the risk of increasing tensions between the 8,500 British
troops serving in Iraq and the local population.

After the detention of the two British soldiers last month, angry crowds
of young men attacked British military vehicles with petrol bombs and rocks,
forcing units to pull back.

took place late on Thursday, shortly after the men had broken fast on the
second day of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, in what could be seen as a
slight and provoke more anger.”

Karbala—after
Najaf, the second major Shiite holy city in Iraq—was supposed to have
come under full Iraqi sovereignty. In his Radio Address of October 1, Bush
boasted that “this week coalition forces were able to turn over security
responsibility for one of
Iraq
’s largest cities,
Karbala
, to Iraqi soldiers.”

Today, Voice of Iraq broadcast the following report, posted by
nahrainnet (my translation from Arabic) revealing what US forces have
done in Karbala at the same time that their British
counterparts in Basra:

KARBALA’S GOVERNORATE CONDEMNS
THE MILITARY OPERATION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CITY AND CONSIDER IT A VIOLATION
OF THE TURNING OVER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

The information office in the Governorate of Holy Karbala
, contacted by the Voice of Iraq correspondent, condemned the military operation
executed by special units of US forces Thursday evening in Holy
Karbala, in the district of Eastern Abbasiya
in the middle of the town.

The representative of the information office of the Governorate said: This
military operation constitutes a violation of the agreement concluded between
the multinational forces and the Iraqi side, represented by the officials
of the Governorate of Karbala, by which security
responsibility has been turned over to the Iraqi side two weeks ago.

The representative of the Governorate’s information
office added that a communiqué was issued in this regard, and we are waiting
for an official reply from the
US
side on this matter.

The governorate of Karbala had seen, on Thursday
evening, US forces supported by helicopters operate an airborne raid in the
district of Eastern Abbasiya in the middle of
the Governorate, during which, according to eyewitnesses, they targeted three
houses in the district. The airborne raid led to the arrest of ten suspected
persons, seven of whom were released and the others taken to an unknown destination.

The correspondent of Voice of Iraq visited the district targeted by the airborne
raid, one of Karbala’s old popular districts.
He saw houses with fallen awnings, shattered window glasses and fallen parts
of their roofs, as a result of the sound grenades used before troops landed.
One of those arrested and later released said: The raid was rapid and
sudden, helicopters filled the sky over the district and made an intensive
use of sound grenades, frightening hundreds of families in the district.
The Americans did not reveal the causes and motivations of this military
raid in which Karbala residents saw a strong
indication that the turning over of security responsibility was only a propaganda
operation. It proved clearly to them that the Americans dominate entirely
the security situation in Karbala and take their
decisions without consulting any of the official authorities of the Governorate.

No further comment needed.

2) Muqtada al-Sadr’s
official position on the Constitution: Refer (again) to Higher Clerics

Excerpted from today’s Al-Sharq al-
Awsat (my translation from Arabic):

Al-Nafaf, AFP: Young
Shiite Cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr confirmed yesterday that his followers are free to take part
in the referendum on the constitution that will take place on October 15.
Mustafa al-Ya’qubi, one of al-
Sadr’s major aides, said in a communiqué distributed to journalists
in the holy Shiite city of Najaf (160 km south
of Baghdad):

‘Sayyid Muqtada al-
Sadr has replied to the question: How to vote on the constitution?
by saying: The question of the constitution
needs ijtihad and fatwa [
Muqtada al-Sadr means: theological expertise
for which he is not qualified], and therefore each one should refer to his
model (muqallad) and reference (
marjaa). Al-Sadr added: We ask God,
in general, that He deigns granting us a just State, as comes in the prayer
… God, we implore you to grant us a noble State dignifying Islam and its
people.’

On the Sadrist official site, there is this single
sentence:

“In his reply to a consultation on the issue of the constitution—
Sayyid Muqtada al-
Sadr: Each one refers to his model regarding the constitution, for
it is a question requiring ijtihad—Be up to the
responsibility, please.”

---

Addendum on Muqtada from Gilbert:

Below are excerpts from letters I wrote at the end of August on the issue
of Muqtada al-Sadr
. They shed some light on his recent position:

In his press conference in Najaf on August 25, al-
Sadr said the following about the constitution: “There is no problem
with federalism as such, it is an Islamic idea, but its timing now is not
good.”

Also: “I have heard that they will remove the purging of
Baath (de-Baathification) from the constitution.
We refuse that categorically.”

This last statement, not surprising from al-Sadr
, shows the distance between him and those Sunni opponents of federalism
who are pro-Baathists.

On the issue of the constitution, Muqtada al-
Sadr has made quite ambiguous or even contradictory statements. One
of them is the interview that he gave to the BBC on July 18, where he said
(from the report posted on the BBC website):

“I personally shall not interfere. I say that our constitution is the Koran
and the Sunnah and I refuse any political role
while the occupation is present.” he said, although adding that he would
not stop any others participating.”

He vowed in the same way not to take part in the political process as long
as the occupation remains, while his followers actually took part in the
January 30 elections and are represented not only
in the Parliament, but even in the government itself. The pro-
Sadr ministers announced, after the August 25 clashes between al-
Sadr and SCIRI followers in
Najaf, that they suspended their
activities in solidarity with al-Sadr, but he
called on them in a communiqué to resume them:

“My brothers in the Iraqi government who have suspended their ministerial
activities must resume their activities at the service of the people. The
interest of Islam and the interest of Iraq are more important and more venerable.”

…

Al-Sadr is opposed, of course, to the federal
scheme because he fears it could marginalize him. His main constituency is
in Baghdad
, a mixed city, and he has built up his image as a hero to hard-line Sunnis
by converging with them, so he believes he could build a mixed
Shia-Sunni constituency, thus getting an important leverage over his
Shia rivals. Actually, this is exactly
the same game that Allawi plays, the difference
being that Allawi cozies up to “moderate”
Baathists whereas al-Sadr cozies up to
Sunni fundamentalists (the AMS, etc.).

However, al-Sadr is cautious and quite opportunist,
capable of combining contradictory attitudes and statements—talking like
a firebrand and participating in the government at the same time, even calling
on his ministerial supporters to resume their activities in the government
after they had suspended them. [Emphasis inserted by HC] Al-
Sadr knows that federalism has become very popular among Shiites because
of the sectarian polarization in recent weeks, plus the genuine longing of
the Shiites, and especially the Southern population—after such a long historical
record of oppression—for some kind of autonomy. This longing is sharply increased
by the fact that the Sunnis appear more and more as nostalgic of Saddam Hussein. That’s
why al-Sadr has made conciliatory statements
on federalism.