I’ve been reading the
post
Juan Cole had up Friday, in which he criticized an argument
Michael Schwartz made
as to why the
forces should get out of
as soon as possible, and proposed his own “strategic plan” for what the
military should do in
.
I disagree with most of the arguments Juan makes there. As someone who has
worked in strategic studies on and off for twenty years now, I can tell you
that many of the supposedly “strategic” arguments he offers make little sense
in operational terms.
Moreover, as you will discover if you read further down in this post, there
is also some intriguing political news out of
Iraq
of a strengthening of a key Sunni-Shiite coalition there that could
cut the ground from under the feet of those who argue that the US (or British)
forces have some kind of a “moral duty” to stay in the country to forestall
all-out civil war there
For a corporate recruiter I can tell you that Helena’s self recommendation would do more harm than good in her resume:
“As someone who has worked in strategic studies on and off for twenty years now…”
We look for what people have actualy DONE. Having “worked on” won’t get me very far, specially it was on and off, and it was studies rather than tangible deliverables.
It is perfectly fine to critique Juan’s proposals, but the critique better stand on its merit, not in self amplified credentials. And of course I prefer Juan’s approach, but then again I admit I have zero credentials in this area.
David
“If Americans remembered their own history, they would not be surprised. Writing about another insurgency, the American Revolution, the English statesman Edmund Burke commented in 1775 that “The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.”
William R. Polk notes that the ersatz Iraq constitution that the British imposed in 1922 “was almost exactly copied by the ‘constitution’ American authorities worked out with their Iraqi appointees in 2004.” He describes how the British built up the Iraqi army as the “arbiter of political life” in Iraq during the 1930s, and he recounts how British repression in Iraq forced Iraqi nationalism
Please take a look, give your support let us end this HUMMAN MADE DISATER
Hey, David, what’s with the ill-informed, rudely expressed, and ad-feminam negativity there, anyway? Actually, I was under-selling my credentials including my “tangible delivrables” (!) in terms of books, articles, contributions to study-groups etc., dealing with issues of strategy. (Which were, indeed, tangibly delivered: that’s even better, don’t you think?)
You could find out about some of my contributions to the field fairly easily if you wanted to. But no, you chose– as so often here– your sniping, negativity instead. Maybe you could switch to actually engaging with the topic of the post?
Juan Cole a historian of the first class?
I don’t think so. Not yet, at least. He is a one-eyed historian.
Compare him with Eric Hobsbawm.
No, Cole is a bloke who reads a lot, and writes a lot on the Internet. He is actually a new kind of character. He is driven. He is a blogger. Maybe he is the quintessential blogger. Blogging made him. The fact that he is a working academic professor doesn’t have a lot to do with it.
I used to think he had a peculiar and lonely world-view all of his own, but as we can see as time goes on it reveals itself as a very common-or-garden variety of banal liberal imperialism.
Personally, I preferred Cole as a religious speculator and writer of sectarian tracts. He was exciting in those days.
guys, give it a rest already. the back-and-forth sniping distracts from the bigger picture. both juan & helen made good points in their respective posts. we can debate the shortcomings, but let’s dispose of the personal attack garbage. it’s a waste of everyone’s time.
I don’t claim to have any specific experience or knowledge on Middle East issues, so my comments are just opinions.
I believe that the US presence in Iraq does more harm than good. With close to 150,000 troops and with over 2 years of significant military and counter-insurgency operations the US has been unable to pacify Iraq let alone bring back coherent administration or essential public services to Saddam-era levels. The US by necessity will take sides in the political power struggles between Iraqi factions. The success of the insurgents has been due to their support in their respective communities and tribes. They have better intelligence and seem to slink away before the US troops can corner them. I think it is very plausible that the support within the populace for the insurgent tactics of mayhem will decline substantially if the US presence is removed. It will force the Iraqi factions to compromise towards a power sharing arrangement. Yes, extremists on all sides may feel they have better chance at advantage through violence but it seems none of the major actors – the Kurdish peshmerga, the SCIRI Badr militia, Sadr’s Mahdi miltia or the Sunni militias have the overwhelming superiority to militarily overpower the others. They will recognize before long that it is stalemate if they don’t earlier. The Sunni insurgents are destablizing today primarily because they are completely left out of any power sharing arrangement and the US is aligned against them. US withdrawal should bring about relative parity in military terms. This will allow for more political dialog and arrangements as well as the strengthening of political leaders which is what is ultimately required. The one catch is Iran who has been substantially strengthened and already have their tentacles in Iraq through their proxies and quite possibly directly. They may view this as a golden opportunity to carve out a buffer state in southern Iraq and expand their quasi-control over those oil resources. The question is are the Saudis, Jordanians and Syrians strong enough and motivated enough to counter the Iranians through their own proxies in Iraq. I doubt. So, the scenario that I find most plausible after a US withdrawal, would be a political arrangement of autonomous regions, with oil revenue sharing at the federal level. The Shiites would have some of the key leadership positions in the federal govt due to their population and obviously hold sway over the south but the Sunnis although in the minority will have a reasonable stake. Iran will also have a powerful influence in Iraq. And the new Iraq will be more of a theocracy than a secular state like it was in the past. The new Iraq will not be a strategic ally of the US and the UK although it will provide opportunities for western oil companies to assist in the exploitation of their resources.
The Bush-Blair misadventure in Iraq was an exercise of hubris. They believed their own hype of strength and felt they could deal with any situation through the use of military force. Their arrogance in shredding all previous international norms and legal procedures as well as their incompetence has lead to the collapse of US credibility as a honest broker in world affairs. Further it has weakened the US military that has been used in an ill-defined military campaign without adequate resources and clear end goals. Tyrants and trans-national extremists will note that the worlds only super-power in alliance with another powerful western military could not defeat a motivated third world insurgency. Additionally, democrats in repressive countries will not hope for a magical US rescue from oppression having seen the failed experiment of US Iraqi reconstruction. History will not treat George Bush and Tony Blair kindly!
Will the lesson for western voters be to treat their leader’s entreaties and the amplification provided by their media with more scepticism or will it become just another irritant on some distant shore to be long forgotten?
Ms. Cobban,
With due respect, Juan Cole’s assertions about the utility of American airpower are merited. In conjunction with Iraqi ground forces, US airpower could easily deny any Sunni insurgent forces the operational depth they would need to mount anything beyond the platoon and company-sized actions they are capable of at the moment. As it is, US control of the air forces the insurgents to operate in small-sized elements, and use classic ambush tactics, because larger groupings, or those that loiter on the battlefield, become easy targets for American firepower.
In order for the insurgents to mount a conventional-style attack on Baghdad, they would certainly need to mass forces in battalion and perhaps brigade-sized groupings (although it is not at all clear they could assert command and control over elements that large). Groupings of these size would be practically impossible to build up or move without attracting the attention of US forces. And once they manifested themselves on the battlefield, they would make very easy targets.
You assert there are no examples of such a strategy succeeding. Juan Cole mentioned Kosovo on his blog. I would offer another: US airpower in conjunction with South Vietnamese troops defeated the attempted North Vietnamese conventional invasion in 1972. It should be noted that without US air support in 1975, the South Vietnamese were overwhelmed by the North Vietnamese.
Terra, hi–
In both those case, Kosovo and Vietnam– wasn’t it massive airpower PLUS having/getting large numbers of boots onto the ground that secured the sought-after goal?
In the case of Iraq, you say, “In conjunction with Iraqi ground forces” US airpower could achieve the sought goal. That is the problem, though, isn’t it? There are terrible problems of unit and command cohesion in the Iraqi military, and every time their forces are thrown into battle those get exacerbated.
For example, most recently, they used Kurdish pesh mergas (hastily re-branded as “Iraqi ground forces”) against ethnic Arab and Turkmen communities/resisters in Tel Afar… They could do a bit more of that here or there and continue to “win” individual battles in terms of temporarily seizing the desired patch of ground. (But usually not holding it for long at all, as we’ve seen.) Meantime each such encounter further aggravates the political tensions in the country and further degrades its already battered infrastructure, meaning that dissatisfied Iraqis feel they have even less to lose by joining or continuing the insurgency.
I guess my basic point right now (as in the lead-up to the January elections) is that the political process needs to be given a real chance to work. Most especially if there is a real chance of sufficiently folding the major indigenous Sunni organizations into it that they repudiate the Zarqawists.
Also, I note that despite winning many battles in Vietnam, the US didn’t win the war there; and despite “winning” the war in Kosovo the US/NATO forces haven’t been able to win a secure and stable peace there. Military hegemony just ain’t what it used to be…
Terra Incognito,
Your analysis as well as Juan Cole’s has a basis in that its all about defeating the Sunni. And that the Sunni insurgents would metamorphosize into a traditional army with command and control and manuever capability.
You may come to different conclusions if you consider that Sunnis may be part of the solution and that the insurgents may be unable to mount serious military campaigns because they are not an army and they may lose popular support that an insurgency requires if they continue their current terror campaign. If the Sunnis can be part of a larger political settlement their people would want it. Today they can get away with it because they can claim they want to destabilize an illegitimate government and kill collaborators of the occupation.
Another point you may want to consider is would those that opposed the occupation gain larger political credence in the future compared to those that supported it. Sooner or later Iraq will become sovereign and nationalism of some form will re-emerge.
Bigfoot; the Sunni insurgency (read Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraqi Army, and the rest of the 1bn Sunnis around the world) are fighting the US occupiers that are facilitating a shia takeover.
ad-feminam
Love it!
Helena,
We can all imagine numerous possible Iraqi futures. And no matter which one actually comes about, I think we can safely predict that a lot of death and violence will be involved in getting from here to there. The question uppermost in my mind is what the US can do to help move Iraq toward some tolerably stable situation, and to minimize the carnage on the path to that situation. I am completely open to argument here. Where the cause of stability and peace is best enhanced by getting out of the way, we should get out of the way. Where it is enhanced by staying involved, we should stay involved.
But I am a bit puzzled about the nature of your opposition to Professor Cole’s argument, and precisely where you do or do not disagree with him. I’m also not sure what scenario you envision as the most likely result of a total and immediate US withdrawl.
The recent political developments you cite do seem interesting, but they don’t at all give me much confidence that the Iraqis are on the verge of finding their own “political way” out of the current situation – if by a political way you mean some way that does not involve open warfare, ethnic cleansing and other forms of violence.
It does appear to me that Sunni Arab leaders have already begun to look beyond the US occupation, and are starting to recognize the need for political organization. They are far behind the Kurds and Shiites in that regard. The young, radical jihadists firebrands, whether foreign born or homegrown, are a nuissance that must eventually be brought to heel or disposed of by the more established and traditional Sunni tribal leaders – whether those leaders are Baathists, conservative Islamists or just old-time authoritarian chiefs. The tribal heads were happy that the jihadists were there to make trouble for the US occupation, but with the end of that occupation in sight, the established figures will soon have to spit the jihadists out.
These leaders are beginning to realize they have been outmaneuvered by the better-organized Kurds and Shiites. The latter have cooperated more with the occupation, while Sunni Arabs followed a completely rejectionist path. By doing so the Kurds and Shiites have produced a constitution and political process that have intensified and legitimized the breakup of Iraq into autonomius regions, and further eroded Sunni Arab power. The current trends threaten to leave Sunni Arabs isolated and impoverished in a war-torn and resource-poor central Iraqi region. Unsurprisingly, Sunnis do not like this development, and are increasingly determined to defeat that constitution – and this time they apparently hope to do so electorally.
In this, the Sunni Arabs appear to have found temporary common cause with the Shiites in Sadr’s organization, because Sadr and his people in Sadr City fear abandonment by the Shiites of the south, and thus oppose the “federalism” of the new constitution. The ratification of that constitution promises to accelerate the movement toward regional autonomy. The Sadrists must worry that the Shiites in Najaf and in Basra will be content to go their own way in a new autonomous Shiite region in southern Iraq, and leave the Sadrists to the mercies of the eventual Sunni rulers of Baghdad. Sadr himself no doubt also fears he will lose control over his scattered followers in the Shiite south. But surely this meeting of the minds between Sunni Arabs and Sadrists reflects no more than a temporary consilience of interests! It is precisely because Sadr and his followers do not want to be part of a Sunni-dominated region that they are opposed to the direction the constitution is taking Iraq.
You seem bitterly critical of Professor Cole for suggesting that the best achievable option at this point is one in which Iraq breaks into separate autonomous pieces. But I don’t understand what your own alternative is. So far as I can tell, the fragmentation of Iraq is well underway, constitution or no constitution, and is going to happen one way of another. I don’t see how anyone at this point can doubt that.
The Kurdish north is already a de facto autonomous region. The Kurds sought to legitimize this reality with the framework of a nominal Iraqi state, by supporting a constitution that establishes a radically decentralized form of government, and will allow them to move toward even greater independence over time. (The current political setup also gives their militia access to US support, supplies and funding, under the nominal control of the “Iraqi military”.) But if the current framework for Kurdish autonomy fails – the one based on the Iraqi constitution – then I suspect the Kurds will simply wash their hands of the entire “Iraqi” political process. They will say that they gave it their best shot, but Iraq’s intransigent Sunni Arabs seems to want nothing less than a restoration of the old power arrangement. The Kurds will drop the remaining pretenses and just go it alone.
Suppose the Sunni Arabs do manage to pacify and organize their communities long enough to participate in large numbers in a referendum that ends up rejecting the constitution. Do you think that the various Iraqi communities will say “OK that first constitution didn’t work; let’s try again and fo for a more centralized framework?” This seems extremely far-fetched to me. If the current constitutional process fails, that is not going to lead to a new movement in the direction of national unity. The idea of a truly united Iraq is dead. The Iraqi constitution is a phoney, artificial, inauthentic document hammered out under intense US pressure and meddling tutelege. There is no reason at all to think that it’s failure will usher in a new era of more peaceful and constructive Iraqi politics, or a movement toward national unity. There is no longer any way of holding Iraq together as a unified country that does not involve the imposition of force. And the fact that the Sunnis might successfully organize and vote does not suggest to me that they are about to embark on a new democratic era.
There is already a civil war of some form occuring, and that war is likely to heat up in the near future. I believe the US needs to disengage from daily involvement with this conflict, an involvement which may very well be worsening it. The resolution of conflict in Iraq is bound to be a bloody business one way or another. But the death and destruction can be minimized to some degree to the extent that the contending parties are unable to mount anything that looks like a conventional military operation. Professor Cole’s suggestion in that regard strikes me as having merit. Air power cannot stop the civil war from occurring. But it can influence its intensity. It could be used to disperse large-scale mobilizations, and deter them from happening in the first place.
Perhaps an even more important role for a reduced, but residual US presence in the region is to deter military intervention by neighboring states. What is going on in Iraq is terrible. But the nightmare scenario is that nervous or opportunistic neighboring states might intervene, and come into conflict with each other. Preventing the Iraqi conflict from escalating into a regional war should be our chief concern now.
Excuse me for being crude, but the Bush administration has dropped a huge shit-bomb on Iraq, and Iraq is not going to magically clean itself up simply because the US gets out. Or to change to a prettier metaphor, Pandora’s box has been opened and furies have been unleashed. It truly sucks that we now have to think hard now about how to minimize the mess Bush has made, and choose the least bad of a bunch of rotten options. I hate having to do so, and I hate Bush for making us have to do so. But we do.
Frankly, I think much of the “just withdraw now” camp is in deep denial about the extent of the problem Bush and his minions have created. I receive a barrage of email every day from progressive groups and news organizations, and much of just seems to repeat the same mindless slogans, or add some remaining tidbits to the same old well-known histories of events from 2002 and 2003 – to the accounts of lies and distortions about WMDs, to the scheming of the neocons, etc. I know all that stuff. But it doesn’t help me at all think about what should be done now. A simple and total withdrawl from Iraq will, I fear, produce a result that will have us back there in no time, and in greater numbers than before.
In both those case, Kosovo and Vietnam– wasn’t it massive airpower PLUS having/getting large numbers of boots onto the ground that secured the sought-after goal?
If the sought-after goal in Iraq is ending the civil conflcit, then I agree 100% that air power won’t do it. But I think Cole’s point is just that air power can be useful in lessening the damage caused by that conflict, not ending it entirely.
I guess my basic point right now (as in the lead-up to the January elections) is that the political process needs to be given a real chance to work. Most especially if there is a real chance of sufficiently folding the major indigenous Sunni organizations into it that they repudiate the Zarqawists.
There is no “Iraqi political process” right now to speak of, other than the one that is itself a by-product of the occupation, and is associated with the miserably weak and phoney government that is a US creation. When the US disappears, so does that process. Maybe that’s a good thing. But I doubt it would be replaced by a home-grown, nationwide democratic process. Instead the gloves will all come off.
The only sense in which Sunni Arabs can be thought of as participating in the current political process is that they might succeed in mobilizing politically to defeat it, by defeating the constitution that representatives. But when they defeat it, they are not going to come forward with some nifty new political ideas for a united Iraq.
As far as I can tell, the vast majority of Iraqis simply do not want an Iraq that is unified in any conventional sense. There are dozens of groups, with dozens of incompatible agendas, and they are all thinking about how to achieve them. Most of thoise ways involve violence.
Pretty good post nanook!
Juan Cole’s position assumes several things that, in my opinion, can’t be logically supported. He assumes we will support the ‘good’ guys and make consistant decisions. This administration has not shown that they are capable of this. To me it seems this administration (and the military, which are really just administration proxies) prefers autocratic ‘easy to buy’ types who are certainly NOT ‘good’ guys. The military has already been used by local groups to settle personal conflicts. What makes Cole think such manipulation won’t continue?
The ‘bad’ guys in Iraq are the terrorists who blow up Iraqi civilians. These types are unlikely to raise and field the types of large scale armies that Cole believes American forces can be used against. If any group in Iraq CAN raise a large standing army to fight the type of battle Cole fears I cannot see why America should be the arbiter of which side has the ‘correct’ position. Any such ‘army’ would also have a certain amount of civilian support. Would we also be willing to fire on them?
Another problem is the bases needed to give ‘air support’. Cole seems to believe NO base is ‘permanent’. Frankly, this is just silly. He seems to believe FOREVER is ‘permanent’. I am sure the Iraq’s would consider 20 years ‘permanent’. Once we get used to using air support in that region we will not soon give it up. Once we spend billions to build bases, we will not soon give them up. The fact is, the longer we are there the harder it will be for us to leave. The more we spend, the harder it will be for it to seem ‘wasted’. Ten years may not be ‘permanent’ to Cole, but I bet it seems pretty ‘permanent’ to those innocents who get shot at!
He also makes a common mistake (one he has accused others of making). He believes the ‘solution’ (assumes an Iraqi ‘problem’) is up to America to solve. It’s not. It’s a problem to the Iraq’s, and up to them to solve. We helped cause their problem, but it is doubtful we can solve it. Our presence just makes a bad situation worse. His attitude has a ‘colonialism’ feel to it. I find that surprising from a person who has spent so much time there. Believing Americans can help by killing more Iraqi’s is shocking. We have killed plenty of Iraqi’s, yet we are still hated.
I find Cole’s position to be not much different than the administrations. Both assume a straightforward situation that can be simply resolved with…well, with resolve, ‘staying the course’. It’s gone too far for that. Iraq is no longer (if it ever was) a ‘problem’ that can be solved with American bullets. Or American supported governments, for that matter.
I sure wish I was more articulate and could explain better. Sorry.
.
I, too, don’t think all that much of Cole’s arguments for a continued US involvement. He speaks of an “Iraqi army” of 3000. Is he serious? And which faction gives orders to this “army”, since the present “government” is merely one of the various factions now reaching for power in Iraq? What Cole seems to propose is that the US back ONE of the various factions in Iraq and pretend that this represents the general interests of Iraqis. This is nonsense from what I know. Iraq is already fragmented, and US support for one or more of the fragments will hardly preserve order or increase it. I would says he suffers, perhaps unconsciously, from the Kissinger syndrome that we saw in Vietnam. Id est: Stay on because it will be humiliating if we don’t. So the war has now come down to the US image and nothing more. Really!
Back to the idea if US troops should withdraw immediately or not, Howard Zinn’s interview with Tom Engelhardt a couple of weeks ago makes this point: (to paraphrase) it is a certainty that US troops continuing in Iraq creates chaos, but it is NOT a certainty that their withdrawal will continue the chaos. We have to take a chance.
Hi!
I believe this civil war talk and the sectarian violence is actually encouraged by the US.
There is no way that they could conquer Iraq without dividing it first. Yuh know, the old divide and conquer routine.
It seems that every move the US has made since the invasion was calculated with “division” by means of a civil war.
This government by “Federation” is exactly what the US knew would never fly. How could any country remain as a federation when the Kurds are given the right to separate, or at least given separation in everything but fact?
From the very beginning of this conflict the US has used the Kurds and trained the Kurds to stand up as an Iraqi army. It’s a joke. It only caused resentment amongst the Sunni and Shiite populations.
The US is never gonna leave Iraq. I think they intend to be “invited” into the Kurdish held areas up North prior the 2006 US elections. The hatred and mistrust towards the Kurds for assisting the US in attacks against both Shiite and Sunni folks will be at it’s height by that time. The US will use the excuse that the Kurds need to be “protected” from the rest of Iraqi people.
Obviously, in doing this move into Northern Iraq, the US will not need more troop strength and it will satisfy the US voter. It will appear as progress! Plus the US-Kurds get Kirkut and the large airbase up north.
Prior the move …. it is necessary for the US to destroy all the infrastructure within the South of Iraq and then ensure that Sanctions are imposed upon Iran. Thus, the Shiite will be on their knees for an eternity because of not having the parts for repairs to the oil infrastructure.
When the US moves into Northern Iraq, Turkey will remain quiet if they are promised acceptance into the E.U. .
The referendum taking place by December will fortify the US position because the Constitution will be legal tender at the United Nations. The passage of the constitution and the trial (death) of Saddam must take place prior the US move into Northern Iraq.
Calm
Helena,
Who is Shaikh Abdul-Latif Himayem? Do you have any sources that could give you some background on him and connections, if any, he may have to Shia leaders?
Colonizers have always argued that they must stay to prevent a bloodbath, etc., they who have created the very situation.
Helena,
the Kosovo comparison is indeed nonsense: not only did the airpower not stop the Serbian military from doing as it pleased, it probably provoked the worst of the ethnic cleansing that took place. What “stopped” the conflict (and you are of course right to point out that the current state of affairs there is far from rosy, hence the quotes around stopped) was the political capitulation of the Yugoslav government, and the resulting unopposed influx of UN peacekeeping troops, at a time when the population was harldy unwilling to fight on. This point is curiously lost on those who think Kosovo represented interventionism done right. Of course the terrain in Iraq is very different from Kosovo’s mountains, but then one might ask why the comparison is made in the first place…
PS This notion of groups of 3000 soldiers going at it in set piece battles ignores the fact that the resistance is fighting a highly decentralised war, in which small groups of fighters operate with near autonomy, often for such a rudimentary thing as a paycheck (see the analyses on globalguerillas, for example). Going to a conventional model of warfare is therefore not merely a strategic change of policy;it would represent a profound structural change in the nature of the fighting groups. For this reason, I find the scenario Prof. Cole describes somewhat cartoonish and implausible…
Frankly, any military vacuum left by a US military withdrawal will probably be filled first of all by Iran and perhaps other neighboring states. Iran isn’t going to let any new Shiite entity, be it an autonomous region or independent country, be attacked and subdued by a makeshift army of Sunnis. There may be no formal intervention by the regular Iranian armed forces, but there’s nothing to keep “volunteers” from crossing the border to assist. In fact such folks are probably there in small numbers now.
The Kurds will have their own problems keeping Turkey out of the fray. On the econonomic side, even if they are able to control the oilfields around Kirkuk, where the hell are they going to sell it? The only export outlet from the region runs through Turkey. The only other apparent possibly is to or through Iran. Iranian muscle might come into play there also.
Who needs US air power?
I read all comments I felt very sad and sick of some suggestions, opinions and thoughts about a country was a sovereign had 5000 years of history gave you the first ever Code of Law and you learned from their nation how to speak and write.
Some of the commentators hadn
Why do so many American’s fear Iran ‘interference’ in Iraq? The ‘threat’ of Iran is used like a weapon by people who advocate the continuing presence of American troops. Yet is is AMERICA that started the interference!
In other words it is ‘OK’ for America to interfere in other countries if it is in our ‘National Interest’ but not ‘OK’ if other countries do it. Even if the ‘other country’ is a neighbor that has been INVADED in the past, or has allies to protect.
Iran has a VITAL interest in a stable Iraq. Not only that, if shiites start being killed in large numbers Iran SHOULD interfere to prevent genocide. Who else WILL protect shiites? Saudi’s? Pakistani’s? Considering they consider shiites to be infidels who deserve death, I doubt it.
At least TRY for consistancy. If WE reserve the right to go after ‘National Interests’ then so do other countries. If WE reserve the right to nuclear weapons, then so do other countries. If we reserve the right to occupy other countries, then so can others. Setting up a world wide double standard makes us look like fools, and sets us up to be ignored in the future.
It’s called ‘moral ascendency’ folks. And America has lost it. And we will NOT get it back by shooting people from airplanes while occupying their country.
.
Great article. I too was struck about the request to leave. Why would Sunnis want the Zarqawis blowing up Shi’a and then hiding among the Sunnis. They need more Iraqis trying to kill them in revenge? Also their only real hope for a good future is a united Iraq. Z-ists are a threat to that, whatever their utility, and a threat to the Sunni establishment’s power.
Another thing: I’ve seen only you highlight, since the Attack this determining realty on the ground: there are 3, maybe 4, roads into and through Iraq (not counting those from Turkey and Iran). If the Shi’a want, they close those off tomorrow. Goodbye re-supply! A week later you find positions being overrun when a hungry and munition-less base succumbs. Like I say, I’m just an arm-chair BSer, so if you know, please tell me why we are not one fatwa away from military castrophe?
You can maybe air-supply units or bases, but that is hugely expensive. How long before they dig up their old anti-air weapons, or invent and buy new ones, making the airways as dangerous as the roads?
The real argument to my mind is get out of Iraq now, or be kicked out later at much greater expense and damage. To think there’s really any choice here is of a piece with the “being greeted with flowers” delusion.
Jim P
I’m not qualified to guess what would happen if the US left Iraq ASAP. But I do know that it is necessary for the preservation of my country (the USA) that we stop waging imperial wars. There is such a thing as blowback. Those of us who watched the US equip and train mercenary torturers in Central America in the 80s wondered when the same practices would happen here. Now they’ve moved to Guantanamo and the President claims the right to jail citizens indefinitely by executive fiat.
Getting the US out of Iraq is about perserving whatever shreds of democracy and decency we can in this country. We broke it, but Iraqis are going to have to put it together again, however they can. We can’t help, only hurt further, and shoot ourselves along the way.
“it is a certainty that US troops continuing in Iraq creates chaos, but it is NOT a certainty that their withdrawal will continue the chaos. We have to take a chance.”
Exactly. What we know beyond any question is that the chaos began with the forced entrance of the U.S. into Iraq and virtually every move the U.S. has made there has exacerbated the situation. What we also know is that the greatest amount and magnitude of violence is committed by the U.S., and therefore that the departure of the U.S. will bring about the end of most of the violence, death and destruction. The end of the occupation will also bring about the end of the violence that is directed at the occupation. All the doomsday scenarios about civil war and Iran and who knows what other predictions are nothing more than speculation.
Chaps
Can i draw your attention to this morning’s Observer.
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903,1577937,00.html
It describes the UK withdrawal strategy and timescale.
Unfortunately the leak is to the wrong newspaper (if it was in the Telegraph I would believe it more) and might be designed to head off critcicizm at this weeks Labour Party conference.
The getout clause to change the plan if circumstances change is interesting.
Scott Ritter seems to be on the money so far with his Al Jazeera article
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1A678E7E-2612-4B21-8D21-04E6D5FC5D54.htm
Josh Landis seems to be pointing to something unpleasant planned on the other frontier.
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/
Dan Kervick wrote:
“Frankly, I think much of the “just withdraw now” camp is in deep denial about the extent of the problem Bush and his minions have created.”
An army of occupation, starting an illegal war, destroying whatever was left of the country they invaded, killing tens of thousands of people, using its troops and airplanes to flatten cities and make living in those cities unbearable, must stay to magically become the solution for the problems it’s own presence causes?
For God’s sake, who’s in denial?
Cole’s most recent entry on his blog suggests that he has done an about face re withdrawl and now supports leaving NOW. I applaud him for this. Intelligent people are able to change their minds after argument. And apparently the arguments for withdrawl have convinced him that it is necessary. In short, the situation in Iraq has deteriorated too far for the US to remedy (as if the bozos in the administration even care about “remedies”)with a continued presence there. As Albright said, there are “no good options” now. The USA will have to confess its utter failure, its utter stupidity, its utter wickedness, turn tail and get out of the mess it has made, leaving it to the victims to pick up the pieces as best they can.
When I was younger and more na
Today, Juan is calling for the US to “get all the ground troops out now.”
He does so in a fairly dremagogic way, as though he’s trying to link this (not very radical) call to the wave of energy produced by yesterday’s big march in DC.
The logic he applies to the call also seems to me twisted, chauvinistic, and self-pitying in the extreme:
The first reason to get the ground troops out now is that they are being fatally brutalized by their own treatment of Iraqi prisoners….
No, Juan. The first reason to get them out now is that they are killing and maiming Iraqis in their thousands while destroying the infrastructure of their country, Iraq.
Juan’s argument reminds me of the equally chauvinistic, self-pitying, and self-serving stance of Gilda Meir and other Israeli leaders who have said that “the worst thing the Palestinians do is they make us kill them”… and all that line about having to “shoot while crying.”
I’m disappointed. I expected better from you, Juan.
chaps
utter confusion here
Sunday Telegraph reports
“It can also be revealed that thousands of soldiers will remain in Iraq for at least two more years, despite claims by the Government that it has an “exit strategy” and will begin reducing troop levels by next year.
This newspaper has learnt that the Ministry of Defence is still planning to deploy large numbers of troops as part of phase 10 of Operation Telic – the code name for the continuing military operations in Iraq – until at least -January 2008.”
Yes, Juan Cole is being disingenuous or worse. Withdrawal to stop the US troops being corrupted is nonsense. It does seem that he is being demagogic. He seems to be trying to rush to the head of a movement that is about to leave him behind, but only to say that “ground troops” must be withdrawn. We know that he (illogically) wants the US to keep air bases in Iraq, but he is keeping quiet about that this time around.
Juna Cole seems to be squandering his credibility recklessly. I wonder why?
Brian’s proposition is pointless. Everyone in Arab Iraq now so distrusts the United States, that trust cannot be regained. The only possibility now is a more or less unilateral exit, and that is certainly what will happen sooner or later, when support for the war in the US has dropped so low that the policy cannot be maintained.
Brian says ‘Resisters are OK; terrorists are not.’ This is incomprehensible. They are the same people, apart from the small percentage of foreigners.
I don’t myself worry about “civil war” in the wake of a US departure. It certainly won’t be worse than what is happening right now. The idea of “civil war” is one put up by the US in order to divide the country. I think the clearest policy of the cabal in Washington with regard to Iraq, is that they want to split the country up, the three zones (or more). obviously to weaken potential opposition to Israel. We have been hearing for a long time now, how Iraq is an artificial country, which was created by the British, etc. All this is a propaganda ploy destined to justify the break-up of the country. I am sorry to say that there are many among the anti-war people who believe and propagate this falsehood, and continue to help the Bushies in this way.
Of course, there are not many of the commenters here (or for example on the Today in Iraq blog) who have actually been to Iraq. I was sad to discover that Juan Cole, in spite of all his academic studies on Iraq, has never been to the country. Iraq is not necessarily like other Arab countries. That is why it is wise to listen to the Iraqis who write here, like Shirin or Salah.
Shirin does not hesitate to confirm what I myself saw in Iraq, and that it is largely a unified country (except for the Kurds), with less differences between Mosul and Basra, than between London and Edinburgh. I repeat again that in earlier history up to the Ottoman period (another foreign occupation), everybody knew what Iraq was, even if it didn’t necessarily have precisely the same boundaries as today (Britain and France, for example, don’t have the same frontiers as in medieval times).
So the idea of “civil war”, and the necessity to break up the country is just a ploy coming out of Washington. It is certainly true that there is now quite a lot of internal inter-community conflict, but are you surprised, given the absolutely terrible conditions existing in Iraq at present? But inter-community conflict is still relatively superficial, and could be resolved, once the main problem – the US and British occupation forces – is removed.
Another reason, I think, why the Bushies want to break up the country, is that it would leave the US with much more of a chance to keep permanent bases in the country. If the country remains united, I can’t see any future Iraqi government agreeing to permanent US bases. Not after what has happened. On the other hand, if it were a question of negotiating with three separate governments, it should be possible to find some sort of agreement for staying there, perhaps with the Kurds.
I take it as axiomatic that the US government does desire to stay in the country in the long term; it is necessary (from their point of view), in order to prevent attacks on Israel. On the other hand, at the moment, things don’t look too bright. No Iraqi Arab will be willing to tolerate the US military in the long term; they can only stay by force. Long-term occupation of bases only by force, is not possible. A treaty with a puppet government is not going to solve the problem.
So break-up must be the policy being pursued by Washington.
Er, when I said “So break-up must be the policy being pursued by Washington.” I didn’t mean they ought to follow this policy, I meant that I think it is the Bushie policy, their only hope of achieving their aims. At the moment, they seem to me to be making progress, I regret to say, by stimulating inter-community conflict.
Check out what the excellent Billmon is saying here. We have to get out of Iraq, despite the immorality of both staying and going, in order to preserve a shred of possiblity for democracy and decency in the US.
Its hard to keep up with all the arguments, but the thrust of Billmon’s resonates with me. Unfortunately, it is so subversive of the administration tale of a few bad apples vs the noble cause of our military that it will likely never achieve mass awareness in this country. Too dissonant. But, maybe I’m wrong. The idea of a nation losing its soul is a powerful one.
Exactly. What we know beyond any question is that the chaos began with the forced entrance of the U.S. into Iraq and virtually every move the U.S. has made there has exacerbated the situation. What we also know is that the greatest amount and magnitude of violence is committed by the U.S., and therefore that the departure of the U.S. will bring about the end of most of the violence, death and destruction. The end of the occupation will also bring about the end of the violence that is directed at the occupation. All the doomsday scenarios about civil war and Iran and who knows what other predictions are nothing more than speculation.
At least some of these predictions are informed speculation based on an analysis of what is actually occuring in Iraq right now. Obviously we can not be certain about the outcome of any action before it is taken. But that doesn’t mean we can avoid the responsibility of doing the best we can to estimate the likely consequences of our actions, and to act on the basis of those estimates.
Of the many casualties that occur in Iraq every week, only a relatively small number are those taken by US forces. Many of the casualties are those that the US forces themselves inflict – both on insurgent forces and innocent civilians. These will be diminished by withdrawing some troops from the country entirely and redeploying others away from the main areas of civil conflict.
But it seems to me that the majority of the casualties right are those caused by insurgent attacks against non-US targets. Some are attacks on Iraqi government forces and agencies. Others are a result of the increasingly intense sectarian and ethnic violence. There is already a simmering war on for the future of Iraq, being fought among Iraqis themselves. Since the US is not the focus of these attacks, there is simply no reason at all to think that this sort of violence will subside once the US is gone.
At this point, the civil conflict consists mainly of guerilla tactics such as suicide bombing, sabotage, abduction and assasination, and local hit and run attacks, because that’s the only sort of fighting that can thrive with US troops in the area. Larger-scale fighting attracts the attention of US forces and draws a US military response. But it seems entirely likely to me that without the presence of US troops – or some capable foreign troops – this activity will develop into more organized militia activity, and full-scale urban fighting.
Now to some extent this may be a good thing. Militias have achieved control in many areas of the north and south where the fighting is in fact less intense and where the US and the British have in effect ceded control to those militias. And perhaps we should allow the same process to occur in central Iraq. But there are certain highly contested areas – Baghdad for one, Kirkuk and Tal Afar for others, which are likely to be locations of intense fighting among Shiite and Sunni militias, and a nearby US presence could be useful in helping to supress that fighting.
It also seems likely to me that the contending parties will acquire foreign sponsors, because that’s generally what happens in a civil war. The various states in the region have too great a stake in the outcome of the Iraqi conflict. There is already some foreign intervention in Iraqi affairs, but it is quiet and covert. If a residual US force can play some role in deterring open intervention, it is worth considering.
The reasons for preventing more active foreign intervention have nothing to do with who has a “right” to intervene, or with reserving some prerogative for the US that is denied to others. And the issues go way beyond matters of US “national interest”. It is a question of world peace. Iraq is in the heart of a region that is vital to international development and security, and a focus of global competition. A major war in that region involving some of the region’s major states – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Syria – would almost inevitably drag other major powers into the fighting. There is too much at stake. And it would obviously cause much bloodshed in the region, even if it remained localized. This is what scares the shit out of me, and what we must work to prevent.
I would much prefer that this job of preventing foreign intervention were performed by some multinational, UN peacekeeping force. But that seems very unlikely – the attitide right now among UN member states is “You Americans caused this mess – you fix it!” Unfortunately, the problems we have caused are now beyond the stage where they can be easily fixed. But they can be minimized.
I absolutely agree that it is the US that unleashed the chaos with its stupid and criminal invasion. George Bush should be impeached, and dragged before some international court for what he has done. But the chaos has been unleashed, and it now has a life of its own that go well beyond the response to the provocative presence of US troops.
I really don’t see how someone doing an honest appraisal of the events that are transpiring in Iraq right now could conclude that a total and immediate US withdrawl would stumulate a new era of politics and pacification. The US presence is certainly one of the causes of conflict in Iraq right now. US forces prevent some kinds of violence, and both cause and provoke other kinds. But they are decreasingly the focus of the violence. The battle has moved to other arenas.
I would not be too harsh on Juan. Being a very public person and having to do an about face is doubtless painful and it is very human to try to cushion the blow to oneself with perhaps some specious arguments. He deserves credit for having changed his mind. And I HOPE it was not due to wanting to be “left behind” by the “out now” movement. The important thing is that an influential blogger has come around. I think we should welcome him into the fold. And no, his argument is NOT as disgusting as were those of Golda Meir and her ilk.
I would not be too harsh on Juan. Being a very public person and having to do an about face is doubtless painful and it is very human to try to cushion the blow to oneself with perhaps some specious arguments. He deserves credit for having changed his mind. And I HOPE it was not due to not wanting to be “left behind” by the “out now” movement. The important thing is that an influential blogger has come around. I think we should welcome him into the fold. And no, his argument is NOT as disgusting as were those of Golda Meir and her ilk.
You don’t get it hal. Juan Cole hasn’t changed his mind at all. He still wants a dominant US air force in Iraq. Many years ago I saw a tableau in an RAF museum in North London of an enormous 1930s RAF base in Iraq. It made a huge impression. I got the following in a few seconds from Googling “Bomber Harris”. Just to show there is no excuse for Cole at all. Note that the Brutish did not succeed in Iraq.
‘After the war (WW1) the country (Iraq) was occupied by the British Army. In 1920 the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate to control the area. Britain provided Iraq with a constitution and arranged for Faisal ibn Ali, the son of Sharif Husain of Mecca, to become king of Iraq.
‘Winston Churchill, Minister of War and Air, estimated that around 25,000 British and 80,000 Indian troops would be needed to control Iraq. However, he argued that if Britain relied on air power, you could cut these numbers to 4,000 (British) and 10,000 (Indian). The government was convinced by this argument and it was decided to send the recently formed Royal Air Force to Iraq.
‘An uprising of more than 100,000 armed tribesmen took place in 1920. Over the next few months the RAF dropped 97 tons of bombs killing 9,000 Iraqis. This failed to end the resistance and Arab and Kurdish uprisings continued to pose a threat to British rule. Churchill suggested that chemical weapons should be used “against recalcitrant Arabs as an experiment.” He added “I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes to spread a lively terror” in Iraq.
‘In 1923 Squadron Leader Arthur Harris took command of 45 Squadron. He decided to use gas attacks and delayed action bombs on the Iraqi tribes. One RAF officer, Air Commodore Lional Charlton, resigned in 1924 after visiting a hospital that contained civilian victims of these air raids. However, Harris disagreed and remarked “the only thing the Arab understands is the heavy hand.”‘
And it goes on.
Helena on criticizing Juan’s “The first reason to get the ground troops out now is that they are being fatally brutalized by their own treatment of Iraqi prisoners….”
Remember, even the entire Democratic Leadership doesn’t have a plan for leaving Iraq. Rove was right when he said “nobody in Washington will join the anti-war forces.” That was just proved in Saturday’s march.
Juan is merely providing a meme that is national self interest based for leaving Iraq, one that will fly with the establishment. You’ve got to give him credit for changing his view after argument, and weak as this argument is–we should just get out because murder is murder and that’s what we’re there for–it IS one that you will soon see mainstream politicians using.
Context.
Helena on criticizing Juan’s “The first reason to get the ground troops out now is that they are being fatally brutalized by their own treatment of Iraqi prisoners….”
Remember, even the entire Democratic Leadership doesn’t have a plan for leaving Iraq. Rove was right when he said “nobody in Washington will join the anti-war forces.” That was just proved in Saturday’s march.
Juan is merely providing a meme that is national self interest based for leaving Iraq, one that will fly with the establishment. You’ve got to give him credit for changing his view after argument, and weak as the ‘we’re degraded’ point is–we should just get out because murder is murder and that’s what we’re there for–it IS one that you will soon see mainstream politicians using.
Context.
I would dispute the statement that Cole “has not changed his mind at all” since he obviously has. He may not have made as complete a U-turn as you would like, and still needs to revise his view on the air bases, but overall he has changed. I would not attack so relentlessly a blogger who has done a great service in informing the general public about events in the Middle East, simply because he is not in COMPLETE agreement with you. He, unlike some others, evidently can change his mind and one can hope he will change even more in the future.
I also think that trying to smear Cole and make him an advocate of gassing and mass murder by conflating him with Winston Churchill and Harris is definitely below the belt. Very shoddy, in my opinion.
I don’t think I’m smearing Juan Cole, except to say he ought to know better, because it only takes seconds to get the record up on any screen. The point is that Iraq was the very place where this proposition of controlling a country from the air was first tried. It was not just a stick-and string affair as it appears in the film of “Lawrence of Arabia”. Iraq was exactly the place where high-tech colonialism was conceived of and tried out on the scale of a whole nation over many years. It failed, of course.
One has to mention Harris and Churchill to avoid the implication that this was some obscure backwater. No, it was right in the mainstream of history and of the history of warfare in particular. This is stuff everybody should know, let alone professors who blog.
Incidentally, Harris went to Rhodesia at age 17 and spent five years or so as a pioneer colonialist before enlisting in WW1. After WW2, finding he was not very well thought of for his “area bombing” of Germany, he left England again for South Africa. He died in 1984.
Harris disagreed and remarked “the only thing the Arab understands is the heavy hand.”‘
Leave them it
I think one needs to post the list of Congressmen (and women) who voted AGAINST going to war in Iraq. These are the only members of Congress without blood on their hands. A list of honor.
Akaka (D-HI)
Bingaman (D-NM)
Boxer (D-CA)
Byrd (D-WV)
Chafee (R-RI)
Conrad (D-ND)
Corzine (D-NJ)
Dayton (D-MN)
Durbin (D-IL)
Feingold (D-WI)
Graham (D-FL)
Inouye (D-HI)
Jeffords (I-VT)
Kennedy (D-MA)
Leahy (D-VT)
Levin (D-MI)
Mikulski (D-MD)
Murray (D-WA)
Reed (D-RI)
Sarbanes (D-MD)
Stabenow (D-MI)
Wellstone (D-MN)
Wyden (D-OR)
Helena wrote:
Today, Juan is calling for the US to “get all the ground troops out now.”
He does so in a fairly demagogic way, as though he’s trying to link this (not very radical) call to the wave of energy produced by yesterday’s big march in DC.
The logic he applies to the call also seems to me twisted, chauvinistic, and self-pitying in the extreme:
“The first reason to get the ground troops out now is that they are being fatally brutalized by their own treatment of Iraqi prisoners….”
No, Juan. The first reason to get them out now is that they are killing and maiming Iraqis in their thousands while destroying the infrastructure of their country, Iraq.
Juan’s argument reminds me of the equally chauvinistic, self-pitying, and self-serving stance of Gilda Meir and other Israeli leaders who have said that “the worst thing the Palestinians do is they make us kill them”… and all that line about having to “shoot while crying.”
Helena, your comments on Cole’s argument for getting US ground forces out of Iraq present a very unfair and distorted picture of his argument. The first reason for getting out that Cole gives – the brutalizing effect of the war on US troops themselves – is not at all the centerpiece of his argument. Yet for some reason this is the only part of the argument you see fit to mention. Cole devotes only a single paragraph to defending that first reason. The bulk of the post is given over to the defense of this second reason:
The second reason is that the ground troops are not accomplishing the mission given them, and are making things worse rather than better.
Cole then goes on for eighteen paragraphs in elaborating and defending this claim. It clearly forms the the heart of this post, so I don’t know how you missed it. And if you didn’t miss it, I don’t know why you ignored it. Since it is clearly his main argument, and focuses far more on the harm that is being done to Iraq Iraqis than on the harm done to the US or US troops, your criticism of his position as chauvinistic, self-pitying and self-serving is a grossly unwarranted cheap shot.
I don’t think I’m smearing Juan Cole, except to say he ought to know better, because it only takes seconds to get the record up on any screen. The point is that Iraq was the very place where this proposition of controlling a country from the air was first tried.
This would be relevant to Cole’s argument, Dominic, if he was proposing the grandiose aim of “controlling Iraq from the air.” But all he argued was that US air power could be effective in scattering large organized forces, and in preventing the limited and unconventional civil war currently underway in Iraq from growing into a larger, conventional civil war. I haven’t seen any good arguments yet for the conclusion that he is wrong about that.
I wouldn’t say Cole has done an about face. His position has hardly changed at all. In the exchange with Gilbert Achcar, he underlined that he favored:
withdrawal on a short timetable of almost all US and Coalition ground troops from Iraq.
In today’s post, “almost all” has been strengthened to “all” and “on a short timetable” has been strengthened to “now”. The latter change makes little practical difference, since the logistics of redeployment will require that any decision to get troops out “now” means that they come home on a short timetable. And Cole still wishes to maintain an air presence in Iraq, which was the main point of contention. This is hardly an about face.
This exchange seems to be more about Juan Cole’s integrity and competence as a commentator than discussing concrete alternatives to stablizing Iraq. It sounds more like a faculty meeting at some university.
I don’t think anyone can deny that it is in the interest of all Iraq’s neighbors and the oil-consuming world at large that a modus viviendi must be found that the greater majority of all factions can buy into. Without such a deal, the establishemt of security and the reconstruction of necessary infrastructure cannot be accomplished. Those two things are necessary to pacify the hearts and minds that can still be won over. Those people have to have a better offer than the promises of the insurgents and other murderous groups before they will assist in destroying or driving the thugs out of the country.
So what obstacles stand in the way of live and let live? 1) The presence of US troops is obviously one. The official purpose is to train an Iraqi army, supposedly loyal to an elected central government, that will defeat internal enemies and protect the country from invasion by foreign states. The key here is where does the allegiance of those units truly lie. Are the peshmerga at Tall Afar, for example, going fight to prevent the secession of Kurdistan? I agree with an earlier post that, faced with shifting alliances, at some point our military probably won’t know the difference between the white hats and the black hats. Without a reliable national Iraqi military force, the only choice is to pack it in.
2)Family loyalties and their offshoot, blood feuds, could be two big boulders in the road. There’s a lot of stuff in the media about tribesmen joining one side or another to avenge relatives. How big a factor is this in preventing reconciliation? I’m not an Iraqi. You natives and other experts out there tell me.
3)The proposed constitution is indisputably a source of discord. Why? One has to wonder why the Kurds and Shiites are uncompromisingly insistent on provisions for “autonomous” regions within which lie the main sources of the country’s wealth, i.e., if they are truly interested in a unified and economically integrated Iraqi state. The Sunni’s who benefitted for so long from Saddam’s largesse, understandably, don’t want to put their economic future in the hands of those at whose expense they benefitted. Ergo,they oppose the constitution. If there is a realistic prospect that Iraqis in predominantly Sunni areas will be mostly disenfranchised dirt farmers and goat herders, they have little choice but to fight for their share.
So–what are the possible solutions? In light of number 3 above, simply removing American troops from the picture won’t bring peace and reason. A joint occupation by neighboring countries might be a possibility with the backing of the full UN. That’s if they can all play nice. Or, someone must convince the Kurds and religious Shiites to give up there dreams of autonomy and independence for the good of all.
Some of you seem to think that branding ideas as speculation automatically discredits them. This is akin to the thinking of the Bushites when they pooh-poohed advice on the possible unintended consequences of their “splendid little war”. Many of those “speculative” possiblities have come to pass. Risk cannot be weighed without exploring all realistic scenarios for the likelihood of both negative and positive outcomes.
What I have laid out is speculative if you will. However, it does fit the facts as I have been able to determine them. I am willing to be corrected if someone can demonstrate that my line of thinking is so flawed as to be useless.
Let me be clear about something else. I believe in a foreign policy based on traditional American moral leadership. Woodrow Wilson did too. In 1919 he arrived in Europe to the cheers of adoring throngs. When he departed for the last time, the streets were empty. For a variety of reasons, Wilson had brought hope to a Europe he didn’t understand. His diplomatic approach was to lead expecting his allies to follow so noble and honorable a course as outlined in the Fourteen Points. They were perfectly willing to humor the president and, in the end, made sure that their interests were served first. To be fair he was not himself during the peace conference due to severe illness. Nonetheless, a willingness to learn and work with limitations imposed by the international dynamic in Europe would have served him better. Realpolitik might have produced a better treaty and prevented at least some of the horrors of the next 25 years. (Speculation)
Morality does not put gas in the tank. It doesn’t provide a standard of living for those who need jobs to pay for things that make jobs for other people. Getting serious about a single-minded effort to drastically reduce our dependence on oil and natural gas is the safest, and most moral way to avoid becoming embroiled in the Gulf region.
that it is largely a unified country (except for the Kurds), with less differences between Mosul and Basra, than between London and Edinburgh. I repeat again that in earlier history up to the Ottoman period (another foreign occupation), everybody knew what Iraq was, even if it didn’t necessarily have precisely the same boundaries as today (Britain and France, for example, don’t have the same frontiers as in medieval times).
Wow! So much to question in one paragraph!
Could you please explain in what way Mosul and Basra are “less different” than Edinburgh and London? (Apart from that small difference, those pesky Kurds, of course.)
I think that stating the obvious – that al-Iraq was a known region for centuries – is not the same as proving that the state created by the Allied powers and the League of nations in the 1920s is somehow historically cohesive. There is a big difference between, say, Iraq (i.e. Baghdad) as the center of an Arab-Muslim Empire and Iraq as a modern nation-state. Kind of like assuming that because the Houran has been known since early Muslim times as a region that a “Houranistan” would some how be a cohesive state.
Sure, Britain and France don’t have the same borders today as they did in Medieval times. But then, for much of Medieval times, Britain was ruled by people who didn’t even speak the same language as the ruled population. And during the intervening centuries, Britain has shown periods of civil strife and extreme “lack of cohesion”, so where’s the comparison here?
Finally, you rightly point out that the region known as Iraq was, under the Ottomans, occupied by foreigners. But it was also occupied by foreigners under the Umayyad dynasty, if you recall. In fact, when exactly wasn’t Iraq effectively under occupation during the past 1300 years?
I think the clearest policy of the cabal in Washington with regard to Iraq, is that they want to split the country up, the three zones (or more). obviously to weaken potential opposition to Israel.
I don’t think that that is clear at all. I don’t really see how splitting up Iraq, and opening the area up to the possibility of coming under the control of a militant Iran or Ba’athist Syria, for example, is in the interest of either the US or Israel (and I don’t think that anybody of any standing in either country has even hinted at such a contingency being in their interest). Frankly, Iraq has not been a conventional threat to Israel since the late 1970s. Objectively, a united, neutral Iraq between Iran and Israel is probably more in Israel’s interest (if you will concede that Israel is entitled to have interests), as well as in the interests of Jordan, Turkey and probably all of the Arabian peninsula.
Of course, members of the neo-isolationist coven may have a different view on this.
Dan you are correct. Cole sent me an email saying he had “not changed his position” so I presume I exaggerated what changes in his position he made. Sorry. He still thinks the US needs to be involved to keep Iraq from “going to hell in a handbasket.” My view is that the time is past for any US involvement to have a positive effect. Certainly using US military power to assist one faction (and I regard the so called ‘government’ as merely one faction among many) to attack another is not going to have a “positive effect.”
Dan Kervick wrote “all he argued was that US air power could be effective in scattering large organized forces”.
I don’t think you are being disingenuous, Dan, but I do think most people will understand that the only reason for having a US air force in Iraq in Juan Cole’s terms would be to keep the lid on, or in normal parlance, to control the country.
Churchill, Rumsfeld, and now Juan Cole have all been looking for a cheap technical fix for the problem of controlling Mesopotamia. It’s a fool’s errand.
“simply removing American troops from the picture won’t bring peace and reason.”
Not removing the American presence (and not just the troops) guarantees that peace and reason will never come.
“A joint occupation by neighboring countries…”
That has the best possible chance of making things even worse.
Dominic,
I simply disagree that the only reason for having US air forces in Iraq is to “control” the country. It is perfectly possible that these forces could be used to exert some limited influence on the direction of events, by suppressing outbreaks of major violence in the form of conventional warfare, and deterring outside intervention, while recognizing that most events are beyond our ability to control, and that the ambition of directing the overall course of history in Iraq is a futile one.
Dan, as far as I know the word “control” is an ancient accounting term deriving from “counter roll”. It refers to the “control account” or summary whereby the principal is able to supervise an enterprise overall without going into the details.
A US air force in Iraq would be intended to have precisely this kind of backstop function. But as I say, it’s a fool’s errand.
So, what options are being compared ?
1. Immediate total withdrawal to prevent further loss of US lives, and let Iraqis take care of themselves (Sheehan;)
1.a. Immediate total withdrawal, and hope that the removal of the provocation of occupying forces tamps down the violence (Schwartz;)
2. Immediate withdrawal of any ground troops not needed for protection of limited airbases, which are retained to prevent civil war (Cole;)
3. Train up sufficient Kurdish and Shiite police and military forces to repress Sunnis, then withdraw to 4 enduring bases and bring most ground forces home so our adversaries cannot claim to have defeated us (Bush/Rice/Rumsfeld;)
4. Enable a few Sunni and Sadrist communities to protect and govern themselves and rebuild their communities, as models for constructive engagement between occupiers and resisters (me, posted above at 25.09.2005 07:23.)
Any others being bandied about ?
Separately, does anyone else hope that some representative of the US Government went to Amman last week and sought out the organizers of the conference of al-Anbar leaders ?
Wouldn’t it be constructive for our side to have someone to talk to, possibly negotiate with, on their side ? Truces, cease-fires, armistices and surrenders require two or more parties coming to an agreement. Who have we, either the coalition or the current (Shia-Kurd) Iraqi government, got to work with on the other side ?
Why is Juan Cole constructing sentences like the following?
“Among the more powerful Iranian arms merchants is Manucher Ghorbanifar, this one with friends in high places in Washington, who is trying to pull the United States into a war against Iran. War is good for arms merchants.”
This is innuendo. The reader is being invited to understand that there are “Iranian arms merchants” who are similar to Gorbanifar. Gorbanifar is Iranian like Zalmay Kalilzad is Iraqi. This whole paragraph is a piece of disinformation.
My theory is that Juan Cole has been captured and somebody else is writing his blog these days.
Dan Kervick wrote:
“But all he argued was that US air power could be effective in scattering large organized forces, and in preventing the limited and unconventional civil war currently underway in Iraq from growing into a larger, conventional civil war.”
But isn’t that “controlling Iraq from the air”? The Americans would keep an eye on whatever is going on in Iraq (from the air, I suppose), and somewhere in the chain of command there would be a guy (a general I suppose) who would make the decision to sent in the cavalry, sorry, the air force to intervene, whatever that may mean, and for whatever reasons.
Menno,
There is a sprinkler system in my building that is designed to go on in response to heat or smoke, and put out fires. Yet nobody would say the sprinkler system controls our building.
Why couldn’t US air forces (and the guy in the chain of command who makes the call about when to deploy them) be given a limited sprinkler system mission, rather than the grand mission of controlling Iraq from the air?
Dan wrote:
“There is a sprinkler system in my building that is designed to go on in response to heat or smoke, and put out fires. Yet nobody would say the sprinkler system controls our building.”
But states and armies don’t work that way. They never are neutral, like sprinklers. The Americans cannot operate like a technical device, because they are a party themselves, with their own interests, and they will act accordingly.
Besides, wat is limited? It might be limited on paper, but it all depends on what happens on the ground. If you fail in your mission to prevent “limited and unconventional civil war”, or if things happen you didn’t expect (they always do), will you give up or will you escalate? Or to use the sprinkler metaphor: if that limited sprinkler system can’t prevent a fire from breaking out, wouldn’t you call for a fire hose?
JES says in reply to my point:
(Alastair’s point) “that it is largely a unified country (except for the Kurds), with less differences between Mosul and Basra, than between London and Edinburgh. I repeat again that in earlier history up to the Ottoman period (another foreign occupation), everybody knew what Iraq was, even if it didn’t necessarily have precisely the same boundaries as today (Britain and France, for example, don’t have the same frontiers as in medieval times).”
(JES) “Wow! So much to question in one paragraph!
Could you please explain in what way Mosul and Basra are “less different” than Edinburgh and London? (Apart from that small difference, those pesky Kurds, of course.)
I think that stating the obvious – that al-Iraq was a known region for centuries – is not the same as proving that the state created by the Allied powers and the League of nations in the 1920s is somehow historically cohesive. There is a big difference between, say, Iraq (i.e. Baghdad) as the center of an Arab-Muslim Empire and Iraq as a modern nation-state. Kind of like assuming that because the Houran has been known since early Muslim times as a region that a “Houranistan” would some how be a cohesive state.”
JES doesn’t actually disagree with me; he has read some Islamic history, though he doesn’t seem to have been to Iraq, and thus is in no position to deny what I am saying.
Also he doesn’t read my text. The “pesky Kurds” are excluded from what I said. He fails to note that the “pesky Kurds” are in the middle of setting out grandiose, exaggerated claims for their territory, which are unlikely to be substantiated. It is absurd to accept their claims as a given.
The comparison I was making was with Britain. Why is it legitmate to say that Britain is allowed to be described as a cohesive country, but Iraq is not? Given that very few researchers have actually been in Iraq in recent years (Cole, as we have seen, is one who has not), it is very difficult for them to assess correctly the real state of feeling in the country, and the factor does not come out correctly in recent studies on Iraq. In any case, recent political science studies on Iraq concentrated on Saddam, and subsequently on the 2003 war and its consequences. Nobody paid any attention to what Iraqis actually thought about themselves.
In addition, JES fails to take into account pre-Islamic history. Iraqi identity was formed in pre-Islamic Mesopotamia, a great civilisation. What you see today is the descendant of that (though not I would say in the simplistic way Saddam presented himself as the descendent of Nebuchadnezzar).
Cole now says that he has long wanted the US ground troops out, but not the US airforce. It would remain to keep Iraq from descending into civil war. What puzzles me are these questions:
1. Who controls the US airforce in Iraq? Who will give it orders to bomb this or that? The Pentagon? Does anyone think the Pentagon has Iraq’s best interests at heart?
2. Will US air power first bomb Shia positions if that would “prevent” civil war, and then next Sunni areas to do the same thing? Would it bomb Kurd areas for the “good” of Iraq? Would it be subservient to whoever claims to be the government in Baghdad?
When a nation is in a pre-civil war condition, I don’t see how putting the power of the US airforce at the disposal of one faction or the other is going to pacify things.
I would like Cole supporters to answer my questions.
No, Alastair, I haven’t been to Iraq. I have been to both Edinburgh and London though, but I’m not sure that that qualifies me to make sweeping generalizations about their relative similarity. I also doubt that you have ever attended a meeting of the “cabal in Washington”, so I’m not really certain how you are qualified to comment on what their policy considerations are.
Iraqi identity was formed in pre-Islamic Mesopotamia, a great civilisation. What you see today is the descendant of that….
Yes, that is good. I guess I don’t have to ask for your opinion on the fact that modern Israeli and Jewish identity are based on the ancient kingdom of Israel (although not a “great civilization”, a nation of some merit).
It would be interesting to hear from you what those “grandiose” Kurdish demands are. Do they not qualify as an ethnic/national group with their own language, culture and history? Would it be an issue if there weren’t oil in the north?
Why is it legitmate to say that Britain is allowed to be described as a cohesive country, but Iraq is not?
Possibly because, by and large, the British haven’t been gassing, bombing and shooting each other in large numbers lately. It was exactly my point that Britain, despite having a definition of itself that, ostensibly, goes back to Roman times, has gone through periods when its society was extremely fragmented and not cohesive. To simply point at a region and maintain that, because the region had a name in the past, its population is cohesive and unified is missing the point.
What is, however, most telling in your response is that you still do not substantiate your basic claim: That it is somehow in the joint interest of the United States and Israel that Iraq succumb to fragmentation.
“Yes, that is good. I guess I don
Alastair, I just wanted to say how good it is to see someone here who understands what rubbish is the blather about Iraq being a non-viable state “cobbled together” from eternally warring factions, about its society having no cohesiveness, and it having no national identity. Nothing could be further form the truth, of course. In fact, as you note, Iraq was recognized as a region for a very long time, and its people have had a strong sense of national – or perhaps a better word would be regional – identity long before statehood.
I also would not completely dismiss Iraqi Kurds’ sense of being Iraqi. Iraqis are fiercely and proudly Iraqi, and many of the most fiercely Iraqi people I have known are Kurds, and they are adamant about Iraqi unity, and strongly opposed to any sort of splitting up. Unfortunately, they get out-shouted by the corrupt and brutal warlords and their mafiocracies in Kurdistan.
My advice to those missing the history of Iraq in US goes and sees by yourself
The Art of the First Cities at the Metropolitan Museum in New York City
Just so there’s no mistake, I also do not think it desireable (or justified) for Iraq to be fragmented. I also think that the strong national identity among united multi-ethnic peoples is a key force in resisting those whose aim is to re-establish a Muslim empire and caliphate.
JES, a united population is THE key force in resisting a foreign power that attempts to invade, occupy and dominate a country.
LEAKED CONSTITUTION SETS SCENE FOR
FOREIGN BASES, SECTARIAN TENSIONS
27 September 2005
The draft constitution for Iraq that has been published in
the Western press has been widely reviewed and commented
upon by many individuals. There have been ongoing
revisions to the constitution. The most recent version was
released internally on Sept. 13th. This version has not
been disseminated to either Western or Iraqi press or to
the Iraqi public. CPT Iraq was sent a copy by a contact in
the government. While much of the document is similar and
most changes are more in terms of replacing a word or two
there are some significant differences.
Perhaps the most dramatic change is the omission of a
section of the “Transitional Provisions.”
The published draft reads:
1. “It is forbidden for Iraq to be used as a base or
corridor for foreign troops.”
2. “It is forbidden to have foreign military bases in
Iraq.”
3. “The National Assembly can, when necessary, and with a
majority of two-thirds of its members allow events stated
in #1 and #2 to take place.”
This provision is completely missing from the current
unpublished version.
Perhaps a more subtle change is in the “Fundamental
Principles” section. In the published draft, Article 2
states: “No law can be passed that contradicts the
undisputed rules of Islam.” In the unpublished current
version, the article reads, “No law that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam may be established.” Now
this may be splitting hairs but Iraqis have said that
“undisputed” would imply Islamic law that is recognized by
both Sunni and Shi’a. The word “established” would imply
that law that exists in one branch but not the other would
be considered the basis of national law. This could create
serious tensions if a Sunni or Shi’a were required to obey
a national law that is outside of their particular faith
tradition.
Financial issues play a major role in the constitution and
there is a significant contradiction in two sections of
the unpublished current version. In the “Powers of the
Regions” the second clause of Article 117 states, “Regions
and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of
the national revenues [as a clarification oil revenue is
considered national revenue] sufficient to discharge its
responsibilities and duties.” But there is an addition to
the unpublished current version in reference to oil and
gas revenues that states, “A quota shall be defined for a
specific time for affected regions that were deprived in
an unfair way by the former r
whose aim is to re-establish a Muslim empire and caliphate.
Why you bother?!!!
Is it their right to do what their religious believe what tell them? As you are proud as a Jew and your state established as a Jew State as most of you believed in its God Call for the Jew to be in a Holy Land why not the Muslims established their State of Islam built on Sharia’a? It