Here are the comments Mouin Rabbani made on what I posted here today:
- On the whole I agree with you – particularly your debunking of the five myths.
Some additional points:
– I think a sixth “myth” you could have added is that Abbas is Fatah and Fatah is Abbas. I think people have a tendency to overlook the extent of the separation between Abbas and his entourage on the one hand and Fatah (however defined) on the other. It is all but complete. If previously people could vote for Hamas in PA elections to protest the failures of Fatah, it wouldn’t be much of an exaggeration to say that today a vote for Fatah is a vote against the PA. The top echelons of the PA, the security forces, even to an extent the PLO have been massively de-Fatahised since 2005. I’ve always believed that upon assuming office Abbas saw his main obstacle as not Hamas, but Fatah, and has worked assiduously since to incapacitate (what is left of) it. While there were various compelling reasons for him to seek the political integration of Hamas into the Palestinian political system in 2005-2006, I remain convinced that using it to cut Fatah down to size was one of his primary calculations (this backfired disastrously, of course, but then again has he done anything that hasn’t?).
– I disagree with you that inviting independents is a viable option. Who selects them? In 1991 they were appointed by the PLO. Today there is no legitimate Palestinian leadership that could fulfill a similar role. I therefore remain convinced that for Palestinians achieving consensus on a new leadership and joint political program remains an absolute priority. This is, I hope, shorthand for the rejuvenation of the PLO. For what it’s worth I am also convinced that reconciliation (particularly between Fatah and Hamas) cannot be achieved so long as Abbas remains in a position of power, and that his removal from office is a precondition for this to succeed.
Thanks for the contribution there. And definitely thanks for adding ‘Myth #6’, a significant addition to the list.
On how a negotiating “team” of political independents might be constituted in the current circumstances, I certainly agree that Dr. Haidar and Co., back in 1991, were named from PLO-Tunis. (Though Arafat never did wholly trust or empower them– or anyone else. Hence, in their case, his interest in the whole Oslo gambit, as devised by… Mahmoud Abbas.) I guess this time around, if one could find honest and smart Palestinian independents who could get enough of a popular mandate just by virtue of who they are and considerable prior coordination with Hamas and all the factions, then to a large degree it would be up to them to continue to build their own mandate from there on…
In several of the decolonization processes the Brits participated in in the 1950s and 1960s this was the approach used… I guess we’d need to think through the issues a bunch more.
But anyway, Mouin, thanks for adding your wisdom in here. And since I trust your judgment so much I feel really good that you apparently agreed with my basic thesis that the crisis inside Fateh is a real problem for everyone involved in the peacemaking venture– including, at this point, Hamas.