- I sent the piece on Fateh that I posted here yesterday to Nathan Brown, a longtime Palestinian-affairs analyst who teaches at George Washington University here in DC, and he was kind enough to send me the following reaction, for publication.
You should read this in conjunction with the contribution that Mouin Rabbani sent in to the discussion yesterday. It is all, really, one continuing forum so I’m sorry in a way that I’ve broken it up this way, though I wanted to give Nathan’s views due prominence and attention. ~HC.
By Nathan Brown.
I couldn’t agree with you more on the shape that Fatah is in. And you’re absolutely right that I had little to say on the subject in my recent commentary. But that’s not because I don’t see the problem of Fatah decay as important; it’s just because I got tired of saying it. (See “Vain Hope Number 3” in this paper, published in January by the Carnegie Endowment.) )
There are two places where my thinking may be slightly different from yours. First, I think there is—or at least there was—a potentially strong international contribution to Fatah reform. I actually think that the US could have made a difference in 2006 had it delivered the message to Abu Mazin that Fatah revival was a priority. That pressure, plus the shock of losing the election, might have made a difference. I got the impression then that there were middle level cadres in Fatah who were looking for that kind of effort. But it didn’t take place, with the US focusing instead on undermining Hamas right away and then in 2007 on Fayyad and security reform. The result was that Fatah came to resemble—I wrote somewhere else—a group of passengers squabbling over seats at the Captain’s table on the Titanic. I worry that now it might be too late to undertake such an effort.
Second, regarding your idea of an international conference with well-reputed non-partisan Palestinians—this is a promising idea I don’t think I’ve heard recently. But I am not sure I would see it as an alternative to Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. I wonder if such leaders would have the political space to operate unless supported (or at least tacitly accepted) by some kind of national consensus. Without that, there is a strong danger that any progress they made diplomatically would get them sucked in to the same discrediting process that happened with the first Fayyad government. So I am not sure it would work if Fatah and Hamas both set out to undermine it. But it’s an idea that is worth discussing.
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Okay, now my response to that:
First, I think it’s incredibly hard to imagine that the US could ever have made a constructive contribution to internal reform inside Fateh, or any other Palestinian movement. At any time at all, given the US’s highly anomalous position as the main backer of Israel in the region and in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. But more especially so during the era of ideological arrogance and know-nothingism known as the Bush presidency. (I.e, including 2006.)
And I’m not sure at all that it would be possible even today, under Obama.
Secondly, you’re right that people of good faith need to do some more brainstorming about the proposal I suggested, that we might, for brevity, call “the Dr. Haidar move.” Its success and relevance would depend on there being evident forward movement in the push for a final peace agreement. And certainly it could not be done in the absence of some form of effective support for it from Hamas and most of the other factions including whatever remains of Fateh.
So it would run in parallel, if you like, with ongoing efforts to resolve the Palestinians’ internal political problems rather than replacing them. (And it could add urgency and a sense of realism to those efforts, if the peacemaking really is moving forward.)
But at least doing the Dr. Haidar move means people don’t all need to get hung up on getting a solid intra-Palestinian reconciliation prior to, and as a precondition for, the peacemaking…
I’ll restate an earlier point. I’m not convinced that Israel/US want a legitimate negotiating partner. They want one who will allow a cosmetic solution and will enforce it. They had it within their grasp with Dahlan but blew it. Now they need to build up another strong man who can take over security, so that the Israelis don’t have to be seen as the thugs they are.
Quisling is the word, I believe.
John, I guess my real hope is that there is a growing split between the Netanyahu govt and the US govt on this issue (as on other issues.)
I must say that I agree with Mouin’s earlier doubts that new negotiations fronted by independent Palestinian notables would offer a way out of the current morass.
The “independent” delegation in 1991-93 was on a very tight Fateh/PLO leash from Tunis, in terms of what it did or did not offer at the negotiating table. How would that work now? How could they possibly engage in any serious negotiations at all, not knowing if either Fateh or Hamas would back their positions (or, conversely, what would be the effect if their positions were favoured by one and not the other). How would they even be chosen?
I think Mouin is also right about Abbas’ inability to resurrect Fateh, but then the question becomes–who else? The choices boil down to another one of the old guard (with no better prospects of remaking the organization), or Marwan Barghouti (and its not clear why the Netanyahu government would release him absent major pressure from the US). I’m very far from an unalloyed Barghouti fan—I think he was intimately involved in both the clientalism that weakened Fateh and the outbidding that spurred the disastrous second intifada—but its hard to see who else could both rally popular support and cadre support in a way that might lead to real changes.