Good judgment on Iran: Sick and Parsi

Two of the people in the US who understand the most about Iranian politics and the dangers of its sometimes toxic intersection with US politics are Gary Sick, who was Pres. Jimmy Carter’s adviser on Iranian affairs back at the time of the Iranian revolution, and Trita Parsi, a younger scholar and activist who has done an amazing job building up an organization called the National Iranian American Council. NIAC has been a consistent voice organizing the hundreds of thousands of Iranian-origined Americans into a powerful and anti-war force in US politics.
Today, both these men have published good, strong commentaries– that in important ways reinforce some of the key points I’ve been making here over the past ten days.
Parsi’s main argument is one of support for the nuanced but basically restrained, and non-interventionist, position that Obama has maintained throughout Iran’s current turmoil.
However, I imagine that Parsi may be under some non-trivial pressure from his own constituency (that is, in his case, a constituency that he has done a lot to organize and create.) Many Iranian Americans are strong supporters of the Mousavi (Rafsanjani) movement in Iran. So Parsi adds this to his piece:

    But here is one legitimate criticism , the Iranians are missing two words from Obama: “I condemn.” Protesters and political leaders I’ve spoken to in Iran want the US to speak out forcefully against the government’s human rights abuses and condemn the violence.

Well, I am all for condemning violence. But it should be a universal condemnation, given that the protesters have also used some violence. (Update 10 a.m.: Laura Rozen is reporting that Obama will do some “condemning” at a news event at 12:30 today.)
Sick’s piece, on his blog today, is a magisterial view of what’s really been at stake in Iran.
Some highlights from what he argues there:

    1. “Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time… This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.”
    2. “There may not be a clear winner or loser.”
    3. Gary’s clear assessment that what is happening is not primaily between Ahmedinejad and Musavi but between Khamene’i and Rafsanjani. (I made that point here on June 15— though at that point I thought it was already over and Khamene’i had won.) In Gary’s post today, he adds the significant point that “President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.”
    4. He emphasizes the size of the stakes and the extreme uncertainty surrounding the outcome.
    5. He gives even stronger suport than Parsi does to Obama’s stance of non-intervention:

      Wouldn’t it feel good to give full throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so — but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran, and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.
      The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders.

The point Gary makes regarding the size of the stakes, for Iran’s Islamist political order and its people, is a crucial one. Regarding Khamene’i and Rafsanjani he writes:

    The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic Republic that they created with such grandiose expectations, is lost on no one. The important sub text, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar [leader, i.e. Khamene’i] and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.
    Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the thirty year history of the Islamic Republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.

The only thing I’d disagree with there is his description of the Islamic Republic as an “expiring corpse.” I think that’s ill-considered language that actually undermines the important argument that he makes later on there: “If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out… ”
Numerous well-meaning people in this country who are supporters of the pro-Mousavi movement in Iran have taken to calling that movement an “intifada.” (Interesting that this Palestinian-origined term is now one seen as having overwhelmingly good vibes within our discourse here in the US.) But the etymological root to “intifada” has to do with “shaking off.” And it occurs to me that one of the big questions about the pro-Mousavi movement has been that it’s never been clear what exactly they were seeking to “shake off”– that is, how deep of a revolt/revolution/counter-revolution they were agitating for.
Some, it seems, were seeking “only” a correction of a claimed error in the operation of the Islamic republic’s own rules– that is, to restore integrity to the existing system.
Others seemed more intent on effecting either deep change within the system, or its complete overthrow. (Seeing Baby Shah leaping into action in Washington DC yesterday as certainly a blast from the past.)
The Mousavists did what they could to dress their actions up in the symbolism of the Islamic revolution, including by their appropriation/expropriation of the “green” color-theme and the use of “Allahu Akbar” as a rallying cry.
Frankly, I was struck by a bit of cognitive dissonance thinking about all these Iranian glamor-puss young women with their streaked hair, nose jobs, tight jeans, etc, out there shouting “Allahu Akbar” to express their feelings. But the more important question is “What do all these people who have rallied around Mousavi’s electoral claims actually want?”
Gary Sick is right (in everything but the “expiring corpse” thing.) This is a big-stake confrontation within the heart of the Islamic Republic. Sort of Stalin vs.Trotsky if you will. (But hard to distribute these roles appropriately among today’s main antagonists. Regarding continuing to expand or consolidating the revolution, Khamene’i is more Trotskyist than Rafsanjani. Regarding the dictatorialness of his rule, he seems more Stalinist– but this judgment is based on the notion than Trotsky, if he’d won, would have been less dictatorial than Stalin, which obviously is quite unknowable.)
My judgment is that the Mousavi/Rafsanjani camp has done quite a lot to provoke the most recent confrontation. Mousavi (who’s the front man) has been just as confrontational in his way as Khamene’i in his. What pushed the M/R camp to take this stand? Did they get spooked by the prospect that a re-elected Ahmedinejad would start to take some significant actions against the extremely profitable Rafsanjani-led economic enterprises, and therefore they decided to plan a big pre-emptive push against allowing that to happen?
There is certainly a large-scale, intra-regime back-story to everything that’s going on in the Tehran streets these days… I imagine we won’t learn about that part of the story for a long time yet, if ever.
Meanwhile, for us Americans, non-intervention has to continue to be the watchword.
(By the way, am I the only person to think that all this business in Tehran may well also be connected in important ways to the fact that the US forces are about to leave the cities of Iraq?)

44 thoughts on “Good judgment on Iran: Sick and Parsi”

  1. “…But here is one legitimate criticism , the Iranians are missing two words from Obama: “I condemn.” Protesters and political leaders I’ve spoken to in Iran want the US to speak out forcefully against the government’s human rights abuses and condemn the violence…”
    Could be Dangerous.
    What could fly back into his face: Why doesn’t Obama condemn Israel’s violence? He would be seen to single out Islam — Muslims? What about the Saudis crackdown on their people?

  2. Adding: Obama realizes he’s gonna have to negotiate with these thugs. Plus, he realizes he’s going to be compete with the likes of China and Russia.
    Unfortunately, it’s not like we haven’t had to deal with thugs before. Talking with thugs vs. bombing them [with civilians thrown in] — I’d rather talk to them.

  4. The republic can’t be considered as a material thing that two people wrestle for.
    The republic, the res publica, the public thing or polity is only democracy and nothing but democracy. This is why an accusation that the democracy is fraudulent is a dagger at the heart of the republic.
    (And that in turn is why the challenger demands an unconditional re-run with the same electoral mechanism. He is compelled to restore the appearance of democracy and hand back the mystique that he has dashed to the ground, because it is the source of legitimacy, inseparable from the republic.)
    This is a transitional situation. Development has occurred. Iran now produces jets, rockets, satellites, and a lot more. The base has changed and the superstructure must correspondingly change.
    Then again, in Iran as in South Africa, the electorate is not completely sovereign. In South Africa’s case, the elected Parliament is not sovereign. The Ayatollahs of the Constitutional Court are supposed to be sovereign, as guardians of the sovereign constitution.
    In Iran’s case there is the Supreme Guide, the Guardian Council, and the Experts’ Council. Like the SA Con Court, these institutions are there to slow things down, and dilute or blunt what would otherwise be the semi-direct power of the mass electorate.
    But when there is struggle right inside these superior institution, then the gearing effect of is reversed. An apparently small contradiction there, is magnified. Forces that were bound are loosed and shaken.
    What are “the extremely profitable Rafsanjani-led economic enterprises”? How big is the private sector? Is there a bourse? Can anybody trade there? What is still in the public sector? How well is the working class organised?

  8. In his blog entry Sick says; “Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another…” I don’t particularly remember Khomenei doing much balancing between different “sides.” Which “side” opposed him that he did not steamroll? For example, he was the one that most strongly articulated (and implemented) velayat-i-faqih, how likely would he have been to not choose to crush any faction wanting to change or vitiate that?

  11. I think the best outcome would both deny Mousavi in his quest to become Iran’s Sakashvilli, while also waking up the government in Iran to the need to get rid of the Basiji (Thug Corps), while making Iran’s goverment more secular, open and democratic.
    In other words, I’d like to see the Color Coup fail, but I’d like to see the freedom movement succeed.

  12. I think the best outcome would both deny Mousavi in his quest to become Iran’s Sakashvilli, while also waking up the government in Iran to the need to get rid of the Basiji (Thug Corps), while making Iran’s goverment more secular, open and democratic.
    In other words, I’d like to see the Color Coup fail, but I’d like to see the freedom movement succeed.

  13. How is Mousavi Iran’s Sakaashvili? What policies does he espouse resemble Sakaashvili’s enough to make this analogy? Has he campaigned for confrontation with Russia? There are no breakaway regions of Iran that Mousavi wants to subjugate.

  14. Domza, equating the Council of Guardians and Supreme Leader to the South African Constitutional Court is laughable.
    The Constitutional Court must give reasons for its rulings, its jurisdiction has constitutional limits which it has scrupulously followed, and if its decisions are sufficiently offensive to the public, the constitution may be amended through the procedures specified in article 74, which are within the control of popularly elected bodies.
    The Council of Guardians is not required to give reasons for its rulings, and vetoed a bill which would have compelled it to do so. Its jurisdiction extends not only to interpreting the constitution but to disqualifying candidates for office, which it may do (and routinely does) arbitrarily. Moreover, the power to revise the constitution in Iran (specified by article 177) is not within the competence of any elected body: all amendments must be initiated by the Supreme Leader and drafted by a council which includes the Guardians. In practice, this means that the Guardians’ powers cannot be reduced, nor its decisions reviewed, without its own consent.
    As for the Supreme Leader, he is elected for life unless impeached and has his own, extra-constitutional army. Yes, one might say that these institutions exist to “dilute or blunt what would otherwise be the semi-direct power of the mass electorate;” but one can also say, more accurately, that they exist to preserve the privileges of the ruling class and to keep certain matters entirely outside the electorate’s competence.
    Please, Domza, do yourself a favor and read the Iranian constitution (preferably in conjunction with a book or two on modern Iranian politics) before making comparisons like that.

  15. “Frankly, I was struck by a bit of cognitive dissonance thinking about all these Iranian glamor-puss young women with their streaked hair, nose jobs, tight jeans, etc, out there shouting “Allahu Akbar” to express their feelings”
    Probably what Gary Sick means by “expiring corpse” of Islami Republic, as personified by that video.

  16. Azazel, how kind of you to give this your attention, and me the opportunity of making a reply.
    Allow me to pass on your invitation to go into the detail and specificity of the Iranian constitution, because I am presently trying to reach for something more general. Let me explain, as briefly as I can.
    In a Westphalian world, the papist globalisation is in the past. All states meet as equals, without any higher authority. The diplomats of all countries form a cadre that underpins the Westphalian arrangements. This diplomatic corps resembles nothing so much as an Internet, complete with occasional great “bloggers”, like Talleyrand.
    Although the heuristic Westphalian world can encompass monarchies, yet the logic of the external sovereign face of each nation is such that its guiding authors are within, and the democratic republic is the fitting and stable form that gives expression to this source of authority. Progress is generally in the direction of the democratic republic.
    From this Internet-like world of adults, with no secular authority in Rome, or any alternative to Rome, a trend towards “World Government” is a regression. So 20th-century globalism is retrogressive. It is global infantilism.
    Internally, and with a particular reservation that I will come to, each Westphalian nation should move towards an optimum situation where “the free development of each [person] is the condition for the free development of all”. The nadir would be an idealised form of the Paris Commune, where the entire polity is constituted as authority, in real time. This is of course the very opposite of horizontal “separation of powers”, or vertically layered authority whether religious or secular.
    My reservation is the one you mention, Azazel, namely class conflict. So long as society is divided into antagonistic classes, their contradiction will interfere with the beautiful Westphalian scheme, and all the more so if it is less than complete. In Iran, this is happening. In South Africa, too, the class-blind constitution and its incarnate court cannot cope with actual class struggles. It awaits a role that it is never asked to play, and in the meantime fiddles with the margins, and bickers.
    In Iran, like South Africa, “power to the people” is the way forward. Which side sincerely wants such an outcome? Not Mousavi/Rafsanjani side, I think.

  17. What puzzles me is why so much of the material used by the protestors is in English and designed to appeal to a western audience? For example, some of the video clips of the live Neda would, I imagine, not work in the West if she were wearing a hijab and probably don’t work among more conservative Iranians.What are the protestors expecting from the West? American intervention?
    It seems that there are three sides to these protests, the Mousavists, the conservatives (Khamene’i/Ahmedinejad) and for want of a better term, some nihilists who want nothing to do with either of the other two groups and want to end the Iranian Relovution. Perhaps they know they can only succeed by appealing to the West as they are too few to do anything else but hope to appear more numerous by hanging on Mousavi’s coattails.

  18. Domza, I appreciate what you’re saying. I would nevertheless draw a distinction between the Con. Court and the Guardians on the following basis: Whether or not the Con. Court can cope with class struggle, its jurisdiction and rulings do not prevent such struggles from taking place in other arenas. If the South African electorate chooses, it can enact class struggle through national and local legislatures, trade unions and other civil society groups, or if necessary the constitutional revision process. In other words, ZA contains mechanisms by which the people might move the governming process closer to their will, with the Con. Court able to moderate but ultimately dependent upon the people’s acquiescence.
    The Council of Guardians, in contrast, does not allow organic political processes to take place independently of its power. In fact, its primary role for at least the past half-decade has been thwarting any political activity outside selected factions of the ruling class. Moreover, unlike ZA, there is no constitutional “work around,” even a difficult or time-consuming one, by which the people can overcome the Guardians’ opposition. Thus, if Iranians want to wage class struggle, they are denied the political process and must do so underground, as the bus drivers’ union and other independent workers’ organizations have learned.
    Which leads me to answer your ultimate question: no, the Mousavi/Rafsanjani faction isn’t very interested in power to the people, but neither is the Khamenei/Ahmedinejad faction. It is the latter faction that has made extensive use of unelected bodies, extra-constitutional military forces and economic control to achieve its ends. Moreover, as sometimes happens in pre-revolutionary situations, Mousavi and Rafsanjani are by now as much led as leading, and are thus more likely to end up increasing popular power (whether they would or no) than the faction currently entrenched in government.
    On the larger subject of Westphalianism, I have to think about it a bit more, although I’d argue that the difference between a global democratic republic and democratic republican states is mainly a matter of scale. But I’ll leave that for another day because I really do need to get back to work.

  19. Protests aren’t enough to topple the Islamic Republic. The Shi’ite theocracy will fall only if servicemen in the Revolutionary Guard switch sides. The end will come only over Khamenei’s dead body. The question is whether the regime is better at putting out fires than demonstrators are at starting them.

  21. Expat Iranian socialist Reza Fiyouzat, in Counterpunch:
    “The most class-conscious, the most politically active of the Iranian working classes, are by far the most anti-government. How do we know this? We know this because they invariably end up in jail.”

  22. Counterpunch is another site like JWN where opinions are unashamedly divided. You takes your choice.

  23. ah comrades, letz give it up for Russian TV:
    from the NYT Lede blog:
    http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/latest-updates-on-irans-disputed-election-4/#t14h24m
    Update | 4:41 p.m. Russia Today, the Russian government’s English-language satellite news channel, aired this video report on Tuesday looking into the Iranian government’s claims that the whole opposition movement in Iran is a plot fostered by Western governments and George Soros. Perhaps because it is financed by the Kremlin, which quickly congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on being named the winner of the Iran’s presidential election, Russia Today’s way of investigating this conspiracy theory was to talk to just two guests, from the far-right and far-left of the American press, who both endorsed the idea that it is all a plot.
    Craig Roberts, a former member of the Reagan administration, said that the C.I.A. was behind the whole thing. Wayne Madsen, an investigative journalist, agreed with the Russia Today anchor that Mir Hussein Moussavi’s green movement had “all the hallmarks” of an American-orchestrated “color revolution.” Mr. Madsen added that, given the heavy coverage of what is happening in Iran by American news organizations, “it seems like there is a coordinated and concerted effort to try to stir things up using the Western media.”

  24. Since the election I have felt unease about Mousavi not being the “liberal” alternative he is made out to be. There is surprisingly little information about his background readily at hand. We all know he is an artist and an architect and that as prime minister he helped Iran through the troubled times of the Iran-Iraq war but there is little discussion of his actions in the years after the revolution.
    No mention of the fact that he was editor of the Islamic Republican Party newspaper which preached a hardline position, opposing release of the American hostages for example. Or that he was instrumental in the founding of Hezbollah and efforts to export the Revolution.
    Nor do we hear much about his human rights record as Prime Minister.
    I just read a sobering article by expat Iranian filmaker Lila Ghobady who now lives in Canada (as I do) where there is a large Iranian community. She has few illusions about Mousavi’s liberalism.
    http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/06/19-11

  25. There’s actually quite a bit available on Musavi, for those who don’t mind digging for ole fashioned books. Like so many of Iran’s leading reformists, yes, he has long been close to the inner circle — indeed, most of the former lead hostage holders of the US diplomats became key reformists and pragmatists.
    And ye he gave a few “memorable” speeches during his brief stint as foreign minister and then as prime minister…
    One excellent book with sections on how Musavi became one of the key reformists in the late 80’s is by the late Mehdi Moslem, Factional politics in post-Khomeini Iran, (Syracuse UP, 2002) — has much on the early rise of the reform movement. (from within) and Musavi’s leadership.
    Too bad its not on the net and that Mehdi not still with us. (cancer took him far too young)

  26. Good bit available on Musavi, for those who don’t mind digging through ole fashioned books. Like so many of Iran’s leading reformists, yes, he has long been close to the inner circle — indeed, most of the former lead hostage holders of the US diplomats became key reformists and pragmatists.
    And yes, he gave a few “memorable” speeches during his brief stint as foreign minister and then as prime minister…
    One excellent book with sections on how Musavi became one of the key reformists in the late 80’s is by the late Mehdi Moslem, Factional politics in post-Khomeini Iran, (Syracuse UP, 2002) — has much on the early rise of the reform movement. (from within) and Musavi’s role — which the media and expats largely don’t seem to know.
    Too bad its not on the net and that Mehdi not still with us. (cancer took him far too young)

  27. Rafsanjani’s daughter edits a magazine called “women”. Mousavi is an artist. He campaigned holding hands with his wife.
    When Iraq adopted a modern demoracy, it voted for women to be guaranteed 25% of the seats in the parliament.
    Within months of Iraq’s ground breaking (for ME) decision, ultra conservative Kuwait allowed women to vote for the first time (2006). Earlier this year Kuwait elected 4 women in their own right to their parliament. (Something that when unremarked on here, I gather?)
    Women – and female sensibilities – are the hidden key to what’s happening in Iran. But no doubt the cia have has been buying them off.
    Probably Condi Rice setting this up in her four years as SoS.
    I suspect that the clash at the top end of the regime is aout who is going to lead Iran into the American Obama New World.

  28. Thanks for that Scott. There is actually an extensive excerpt from “Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran” at Google Books. Unfortunately the first two chapters are not included and it seems those would be the ones discussing Musavi.
    Still, there is a great deal of information in the available chapters. Chapter three begins by noting that the left didn’t expect much from Khamenehi on account of his support for the conservatives and his “anti-Musavi actions”.
    Interestingly Moslem explains how Rafsanjani supported Khamenehi with his poor religious credentials because he believed this would make it unlikely that the leader would oppose his policies.

  29. how Musavi became one of the key reformists in the late 80’s
    Musavi went underground when Khomini obolished PM position also he made Ali Khamine in one day Ayahtullah part of strengthing his control during early days coupled with assaniation of soem opposition to his regime in 80’s.
    After 20 years now Musavi appear as reformists but not much known what did did in last past 20 years mad him “reformists”!.
    But any canditats who promts for the frontryunere for presdeancy should have passed loyalty teste to Mullah and spaciiaally the aproval of the sprem leader Ali Khaminie, so is Musavi reformists run on his own morals? this the qestion.
    it voted for women to be guaranteed 25% of the seats in the parliament.

  34. Checkov, do you watch RT, or are you just shlepping something from another blog? RT covered Iran a lot. What makes you think that interviewing a couple of US pundits was the whole of it? What question did you think RT was going to ask these US writers? What is wrong with Wayne Madsen, actually? Wayne is a good old-fashioned journalist of great tenacity and integrity, based in Washington for many years, now also a blogger. What is wrong with Paul Craig Roberts (“PCR”), who writes frequently, elegantly and intelligently for Counterpunch?
    What you are retailing here, and inviting us to partake of it, is nothing but rotten ostracism and exclusion, conveyed in the form of supercilious snobbery. You invite an odious comparison of yourself with Wayne Madsen and PCR. They apply their minds to the facts, and bring long experience and sharp discrimination to their work. What do you bring? Nothing but jeers and sneers.

  35. Salah, in relation to those links: the 2nd one, the multi media discussuion, was a timely reminder of the progressive, modernising nature of Baath led Iraq in the 1970s, especially in regard to women. As the discussion recalled this came to an end with the ascension of Saddam in the 1980s, when women were turned into baby-making factories for the state to provide fodder for the war Saddam started with Iran and then in the 90s bore the brunt of the sanctions while Saddam and his Baath cronies prospered.
    The 1st link was the annoucement of Gruber International Women’s Rights Award to an Iraqi woman who, after April 2003 set up the Organisation of Women’s Freedom, and also founded a newspaper for women’s issues called Al Moussawat. She is also planning to start a television station for women’s issues. None of this would have happened had it not been for the invasion ie – if Saddam, his sons, and the Baath were still in power. Or if a “strongman” had been empowered, not a modern democracy.
    The third link relates to 2004, which is a year before the Iraqi’s voted to guarantee women 25% of seats in the parliament. So really, your links rather buttress my point.
    Also re the “glamor puss young women shouting Allahu Akbar” – it is unlikely that the Basijii on the roof would have taken aim at a woman in a burqa. And that Basijii would have had many men to aim at, as an alternative.
    His choice to kill a young woman in jeans certainly symbolises the struggle to modernise the state which is going on there and which so many here seem to want to deny?

  36. Also re the “glamor puss young women shouting Allahu Akbar” – it is unlikely that the Basijii on the roof would have taken aim at a woman in a burqa. And that Basijii would have had many men to aim at, as an alternative.
    This was something that I thought about when I saw the footage of Neda as well. I would say that you are putting it mildly, BB, when you say that “His choice to kill a young woman in jeans certainly symbolises the struggle to modernise the state….” I’ll be more to the point. I think that it symbolizes an innate hatred of women, especially those who don’t know their place in the traditional, well-defined world.
    (I also find it highly surprising that Helena would use such descriptions to describe other women.)

  37. What is wrong with Paul Craig Roberts (“PCR”), who writes frequently, elegantly and intelligently for Counterpunch?
    I rest my case!
    BTW, if you bothered to go to the link that Chekov provided, you’d see at the end this bit:
    As a reader writes to point out, if Russia Today had asked, Mr. Roberts might have explained that he also sees a conspiracy behind what he has called “the 9/11 cover-up.”
    As for Wayne Madsen, well Dominic, I think that you really do have to get out of South Africa more. He’s also a walking conspiracy theory.
    Also, to “shlepp” is Yiddish for to drag, as in “I had to shlepp those bags all the way over here because Dominic was too lazy to do it himself.” It does not mean to “steal”.

  38. You did not make a case, JS49er. How can you rest a case that you did not make?
    I know what shlep means, thanks very much. Chekov shlepped a whole slab of text from another blog. Why?
    Are Chekov and you shlepping tales about PCR and Wayne Madsen to any blog you can find? What for?
    Is it the land of the free and the home of the brave? Or is it the land of anonymous character associations? Are we opposing stupid secret denunciations, or only when we feel like it?
    Let people go to Wayne Madsen’s blog, and read PCR on Counterpunch and elsewhere, and judge for themselves.

  39. Let people go to Wayne Madsen’s blog, and read PCR on Counterpunch and elsewhere, and judge for themselves.
    Hey, I’m all for that! Let them judge for themselves.

  40. Let’s see Dominic (and anyone else who wants to take the challenge) if you can make some rhyme or reason out of this Paul Craig Roberts article recently published in your favorite online periodical: Counterpunch
    The article begins thus:
    On October 16, 2004, President George W. Bush signed the Israel Lobby’s bill, the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act. This legislation requires the US Department of State to monitor anti-semitism world wide.
    To monitor anti-semitism, it has to be defined. What is the definition? Basically, as defined by the Israel Lobby and Abe Foxman, it boils down to any criticism of Israel or Jews.
    Rahm Israel Emanuel hasn’t been mopping floors at the White House.
    As soon as he gets the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 passed, it will become a crime for any American to tell the truth about Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and theft of their lands.
    It will be a crime for Christians to acknowledge the New Testament’s account of Jews demanding the crucifixion of Jesus.
    You can find this gem here.
    Now Dominic, take your time. Look up the two Acts mentioned and please answer the following for me:
    1. How on earth do they relate to each other?
    2. How does the “Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009” do anything that its predecessor didn’t do (except, possibly, making it a “hate crime” to attack someone based on their sexual orientation)?
    3. What on earth does Rahm Emmanuel have to do with either of these acts?
    If you can answer any of the above questions, I might just consider that “PCR”, as you call him, has a keen mind that he applies to the facts and and sharp discrimination to his work. Otherwise, I’ll just have to continue considering him as a nut.

  41. I think you miss my main point here.
    Women have more rights before 2003, yes the 25% there but Iraqi women were easy target on the streets in the schools in the university in the street in the prisons at home the.
    As for your climes that tyrant regime saying” when women were turned into baby-making factories for the state to provide fodder for the war I don’t know from where you get this statement and you did not tells how tyrant regime don’t (don’t tell me Google bb? I were living Iraq and I knew what were there).
    But let tell as I was inside Iraq, before the war let 1970’s Iraq have introduced law for the mothers to have ONE years of Full pay if they have baby and they can exited to more one year if they wish but without payment and they can go back to their job after that.
    This well before the war. Therefore, what you said have no evidence we appreciate if you could tell us you source of story. Nevertheless, in anyway war is a killing machine and as some research done after 9/11 in US they find that more babies were born than normal time. Therefore, its human nature here also has some effects to keep balance.
    Do not be mistaken in any way my word is justifying any tyrant behaviours at all.
    I agree the good thing they taken him off as Iraqi have no way can get rid if abrasive bloody tyrant bunch of criminals’ regime.

  42. Women’s Human Rights in Post-invasion Iraq

    Iraqi women cite the lack of personal security as the biggest threat they face since the US invasion. According to the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the US, as an occupying power, was responsible for the human rights and security of Iraqi civilians. But US forces failed to meet this responsibility.

    Rape and abductions of women have risen sharply since the invasion. So have “honor killings,” in which rape survivors and women who violate conservative social mores are murdered by family members to restore the family’s “honor.” Many Iraqi women are fighting simultaneously against the US occupation and the rising tide of Islamism, which seeks to monopolize interpretations of Islam in pursuit of a reactionary social and political agenda.

    Iraqi women say that the gains won by the Iraqi women’s movement in the first half of the 1900s—maintained to a large extent through 1990—are being rolled back.

  43. Hi Brian J. Glad you were able to read much via google books of the Moslem book. Good catches on substance too. Wish we could have more of that here instead of the constant side-tracking of these threads into extreme ideological banter, with certain voices posting 70% of the comments.

  44. If someone didn’t like the voice that looks strange to his ears he should go away from here as his voice also strange here with his “expert” biased views.

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