This missive offers up ongoing research to colleagues and jwn readers for comment. sh
Lately, I’ve been paying closer attention to various Iranian think-tanks, particularly those that are part of a complex behind-the-headlines foreign policy decision-making process — one rarely written about in the west, much less understood. Even the need to study such a process would be “foreign” to those imbibing the shallow propaganda about the Islamic Republic being a “totalitarian theocracy.”
Yet even serious Western analysts and journalists take fuzzy short-cuts. They commonly start with factional tendencies on various domestic issues and then assume, quite erroneously, that these “divides” translate neatly into similar takes on international affairs. When contrary evidence inevitably arises, analysts revise and (I suspect) often invent, all manner of elaborate sub-factional group labels, which then get reformulated from one book to the next, often by the same author.
No wonder former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice once lamented that “I don’t understand Iran.” Many here in the west saw that as a mark of humility, of her “having learned” after eight years in government. I call it something else.
For a recent rather chaotic rendition of Iranian sub-factions and how they are supposed to matter, see Ray Takeyh’s widely praised newest book: Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs And then consider that Takeyh has been hired by Dennis Ross, to help advise Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Perhaps it’s not a coincidence then that Secretary Clinton — and now even President Obama — say that they do not know if the diplomatic outreach to Iran will work.
In my view, Iran’s foreign policy decision-making process has far less to do with factional struggles, and more to do with fluidity and discussion, study and sharp debate, within broad guidelines from on high, among a wide variety of formal and informal institutions, councils, and yes, think-tanks. The process is quite open to considering new possibilities, for gradual consensus building on new paths. Such decision-making is anything but rash or “dictated” from on high, nor is it simply the fruit of a strategic tendency to delay or stall for time. Rather, Iran’s foreign policy decision process inherently takes time.
I’m reminded of venerable assessments of the tea leaves in Saudi decision-making, and how “consensus formation” there among various parts with “the ruling family” can also seem quite ponderous. In Iran, the “family” might be thought of as those laboring — and debating — within “the system.”
Various Iranian think-tanks, even those not readily seen as connected directly to executive processes, play important roles in foreign policy analysis, discussion and consensus building. While one think-tank may have senior personalities or scholars known for this or that tendency or alliance, knowing such ties can be misleading. Reports produced within such research centers often test ideas, consider different interpretations of events and of Iran’s interests. Compelling reports then get wide circulation, discussion, and refinement via other research centers.
Many of Iran’s leading think tanks even post their reports on-line — sometimes in multiple languages. Curiously, recently released released American-Iranian journalist Roxana Saberi admitted to having had unauthorized possession of a report on Iraq prepared by Iran’s Center for Strategic Research (CSR). One of the best known think-tanks, CSR functions underneath Iran’s “Expediency Discernment Council” (yet another complicated conflict resolution and advisory body needing careful study). CSR is headed by former top nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani — who among many hats, doubles as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
Leader Khamenei nominally does sit at the top of the Islamic Republic’s decision-making process, yet like his predecessor, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, his “leadership” is more “from the rear” — to first encourage careful, intense, yet rational and detailed debate. Khamenei may then get involved at the level of key decisions or declaring “red line” markers on hot issues. This is not to suggest that the Leader is not informed or aloof; quite the contrary, his long speeches often suggest sophisticated and nuanced awareness of external developments.
I think that Hooman Majd’s description of “ta’arouf” in his recent book, The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, told me most of what I need to know about how inscrutable Persian culture is to Americans of all stripes.
Drew,
Do you care to share what you learned so we don’t have to read it ourselves. Life is too short to spend it reading about people who haven’t produced much beyond friction.
scott:
Yet even serious Western analysts and journalists take fuzzy short-cuts. They commonly start with factional tendencies on various domestic issues and then assume, quite erroneously, that these “divides” translate neatly into similar takes on international affairs. … then get reformulated from one book to the next, often by the same author…………………think-tank may have senior personalities or scholars known for this or that tendency or alliance,
This is not the first time the writer argue this matter, he did in 2002 when he said:
Now with above statement wonder what makes you or what credentials that made you different from the rest of “serious Western analysts and journalists” when in comes to Iran?
‘I’m reminded of venerable assessments of the tea leaves in Saudi decision-making, and how “consensus formation” there among various parts with “the ruling family” can also seem quite ponderous. In Iran, the “family” might be thought of as those laboring — and debating — within “the system.”
Thomas Lippman, veteran journalist,
former Middle East bureau chief with the Washington Post, and author of Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia
So for Iran very similar but not “royal family” structured is more that religion hierarchy were promote personalities in a hierarchy structures build on respect and fears of the above whom are interested to rull, money power more that Islam and religion guidlines.
recently released released American-Iranian journalist Roxana Saberi admitted to having had unauthorized possession of a report on Iraq
Although Roxana Saberi played well politically by Iranians, but Roxana Saberi case mayu be very similer if comparing it with Sandra Mackey a journalist who worked secretly inside Saudi Arabia during the Oil Boom of the 1970’s and 1980’s. She lived in Saudi Arabia for four years, and as far as the authorities knew, she was simply the wife of an American doctor. But she saw things and traveled to places rarely viewed by any outsider, let alone a Western woman, and she succeeded in smuggling out a series of crucial articles on Saudi culture and politics.
That made The New York Times in 1987 called her “A SPY IN THE HOUSE OF SAUD”
Robert Baer’s ‘The Devil We Know’
good grief Salah, your research is, well… all over the place. You fixate on my side-reference to Saudi decision-making — and then you went off on an unrelated tangent.
Of course, IRI and SA are quite different entities — yet I submit that within both societies, the ideal of “consultation” and discussion (of dowrehs, diwaniyahs & such) is deemed quite “Islamic.” (even as adapted differently)
As for Sandra Mackey and casting about for my “credentials,” you might want to look at the Amazon reference to the book, “The Iranians.”
I’ve been focused on Iran matters since early 1984, since sitting in on a seminar with R.K. Ramazani, widely recognized “dean” of Iran foreign policy studies here in the west. (and still very active — as long time jwn readers know)
The reference to Khomeini “leading from the rear” is in one of his works, maybe several — forget which one at the moment.
That said, where I foul it up here, that’s all my doing. :-}
As for Baer, he’s now writing for the best-seller market — and sure, has many sensational wonders in his book. (though a lot on 20 year old events in Beirut — that’s the “devil” he knew)
For careful insight into Iran, look elsewhere. (like the book my ole classmate Drew suggested in response #1)
As Patrick Clawson (from WINEP/AIPA) once wrote, if you want to learn anything real about Iran, ignore anything that sells well. (here in the US)
He understands exactly the dynamic at work.
By the way, nice to hear from you Drew. Delighted you know of Majd’s work. (His blog entries at Huffington Post are often quite “different” and incisive — he’s quite a survivor/player too — valued and trusted for his translation skills, and yet able to criticize even those top officials for whom he translates)
If you happen back Drew, fill us in on if “you beg to differ” too…. with my forming “thoughts” on Iranian thought-tanks. :-} No Ta’roff needed.
recently released released American-Iranian journalist Roxana Saberi
Karim Sadjadpour New York Times, May 11, 2009
By the way, nice to hear from you Drew. Delighted you know of Majd’s work.
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