On August 31, Al-Sharq al-Awsat published a leaked version of the nearly completed text US-Iraqi security (SOFA) agreement. That text was dated August 4. Raed Jarrar of the American Friends Service Committee worked over the weekend providing a full translation into English, which you can read on AFSC’s website, here.
Great work, Raed!
Yesterday, Raed also blogged a translation of an important interview with Iraqi parliament Speaker Dr. Mahmoud al-Mashhadani explaining that the Iraqi parliament must ratify any such agreement– but why, in fact, it is quite unable to do that at this time.
So there is a sort of unreal aspect to all the discussion of clauses and sub-clauses in the draft “text” of the treaty. (As I have been arguing here for a long time now. Most recently, here.)
Indeed, the Iraqis side has had the “upper hand” in the negotiations for at least the past 2-3 months. All the talk in the US political elite about the US being able to ram the US’s “conditions” down the throats of the Iraqis is just that– talk. It has zero basis in reality.
Still, there are a number of mildly interesting points in the August 6 negotiating draft. Most of them come toward the end. And most are the points where lack of agreement is still indicated, rather than agreement.
For example, this:
- Article Twenty Seven
Contract Validity
1- This agreement is valid for (…) years unless it is terminated earlier based on a request from either sides or extended with the approval of both sides.
Oops. Is that the John McCain “100 year” agreement– or maybe just a three-month agreement? They haven’t figured that one out yet!
Or this:
- Article Twenty Six
Targeted times to handover complete security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces, and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq
Iraqi Suggestion: the Iraqi delegation has suggested the following title to this article:
Transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi authorities, and the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq
U.S. Suggestion: the U.S. delegation has suggested combining paragraphs 1 and 2 as follows:
1- Both sides have agreed on the following time targets to handover complete security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces and the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq:
A- U.S. combat troops will withdraw from Iraq completely at the latest on (…)
B- U.S. forces will withdraw from all cities, towns, and villages at latest by June 30, 2009 unless the Iraqi authorities request otherwise.
Note: the head of the U.S. delegation offered to accept the new title only if their combined paragraph is accepted, and he linked the two as one deal
Plenty of work for the lawyers there, eh? But then, later in Article 26 comes this:
- 6- U.S. forces may withdraw from Iraq before the dates indicated in this article if either of the two sides should so request. Both sides recognize the Iraqi government’s sovereign right to request a withdrawal of U.S. forces at anytime.
Article 23 is interesting:
- Article Twenty three
Extending this agreement to other countries
1- Iraq may reach an agreement with any other country participating in the Multi-National forces to ask for their help in achieving security and stability in Iraq.
2- Iraq is permitted to reach an agreement that includes any of the articles mentioned in this agreement with any country or international organization to ask for help in achieving security and stability in Iraq.
I wonder, in the second clause there, if the agreement would allow Iraq to reach a similar kind of agreement with its friendly large neighbor Iran?
… Well, as I note above, there is an unreal air to this whole exercise. I quite agree with Raed when he writes in his blog:
- Politically, the majority of Iraq’s MPs are against signing any agreements with the US as long as the US is occupying Iraq. It’s impossible for the Maliki government to get the approval of a simple majority of MPs, let alone 2/3 majority.
I think the US government should consider a different type of agreement with Iraq: an agreement for a complete withdrawal that leaves no troops, no mercenaries, and no permanent bases (and no 5,000 employees embassy either.)
Quite right. And just what I’ve been arguing consistently for, for many years now… And devising semi-detailed plans for, too.
One final point. Most Iraqi parliamentarians have been quite forthright in pursuing their rights, as an elected legislative body, to have rights of ratification before any international agreement of such great impact for the country goes into effect. Back in October 2002, the members of the US legislature faced imminent legislative elections and in those circumstances proved themselves easily cowed by a bellicose and overbearing administration… And they simply rolled over and gave the president the widest possible authorization to conduct any kind of operations against Iraq up to and including a full-blown war of invasion and occupation.
Which is how we got to where we are in Iraq, in the first place.
This fall, in the lead-up to yet another momentous round of US elections, let’s hope the members of the US Congress keep their heads and don’t allow themselves to be cowed into giving the president any permissions for either war-making or occupation-prolongation, such as would later turn out to be dangerous traps for our country.
Your comments deal primarily with the time factor of the US military occupation of Iraq and not with the legal status of US forces, which are also probably included in this agreement.
As has been pointed out before, this agreement is primarily a treaty, and not a SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) which is usually considered to be a military command prerogative. It deals with the time limitations on the US military occupation, which is of great import to all parties concerned, and not merely with the legal status of visiting military forces which have traditionally been considered to be administrative in nature and not at the treaty level. That’s why Bush is calling this a SOFA and not a treaty — it is a clear subterfuge to avoid Senate debate.
Will the US Senate go along with this deception? Will they rubber-stamp anything Bush does? Of course they will, based on their recent (non)performance. They want to be sure the president retains executive privilege for when they have their guy in office.
from the DOD Dictionary:
****
status-of-forces agreement
(DOD) An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. Also called SOFA. See also civil affairs agreement.
****
So we should refer to it as a “SOFA,” no?
On August 31, Al-Sharq al-Awsat published a leaked version
A hah It’s a leaked Version?
If US and Iraqi honest about this saga why they did not put it in public domain, why we or you maunderings after “Leaked” version a which no doubt set for serving US more that Iraqi and in Al-Sharq al-Awsat which another mouth of neocon Arabic version not more not less.
This just wasting of time and illusion that talking about this thing here, Iraq no more that occupied land by invader you like this fact or not whatever manoeuvring here and their just cosmetics to put-on ugly face of occupiers.
Helena I really interested to hear from you Quaker friend in RED ZONE what Iraqi on the streets in Red Zone telling and speaking about long term US occupation or forgive me log term agreement
Don, what makes you think that the US will treat this agreement as a “treaty” subject to Senate ratification and not just a SOFA? Do you know something the rest of us don’t. Not that I disagree with your bottom line that it makes a lot of difference with the present Senate anyway. I don’t know why we bother with this third branch of government stuff anymore anyway.
jonerik,
I think I made it clear that calling this a SOFA and not a treaty is a subterfuge to which the US Senate subscribes, for the reason that I stated.
The draft agreement provides that neither the Iraq parliament nor the US Senate need to participate if both executives waive their constitutions.
“This agreement goes into effect on the day that diplomatic memos confirming all constitutional procedures have been met in both countries are
exchanged.”
Bush won’t have any problem trashing that part of the US Constitution that requires that he obtain the advice and consent of the Senate on this treaty.
I don’t think there’s any evidence that this version of the SOFA is going to be signed anyway. Or any version.
The idea that Maliki is at some point going to give way, and sign to a particular set of conditions, is wrong. He would have done it already, if he was going to do it. (The conditions available here are not that different to what came out in June).
Maliki is politically unable to sign. I don’t know that I understand all the factors. The humiliation evident in the June conditions is a central issue; the reaction in Iraq was powerful. Consequent orders from Najaf also big. At least one anon commenter has also pointed to a wider network of factors, but I don’t remember what they are or whether I agreed (I wasn’t that impressed).
However the narrative of Maliki’s “over-ambition”, getting out of his baby-walker too early, is mainly sourced in American officialdom, though publicly expressed through supposedly independent analysts and academics.
What has been striking is the almost total lack of political analysis of why it is that Maliki is not signing. Personally I think the absence of discussion was under instruction from the US embassy to the Green Zone, but a hypothesis of incompetence is equally tenable. However the think-tank analysts and professional academics have really discredited themselves by their failure to address this basic issue (apart, of course, from Visser, whom I always support).
In response to the criticism, the narrative of “over-ambition” has been developed. As usual, it is personal, and demeaning to the Iraqis. In fact, it is Orientalism with a capital O at work. The oriental potentate who makes decisions for capricious whims. It is a typical reaction, when you don’t understand what is going on, or don’t want to.
I should think Maliki knows quite well that he is on dangerous ground. So there’s a reason.
So, is the US going to use force, if the agreement is not signed? Assassination? Deposition? Resort to the UN? Nevertheless, it is clear that we are going to be discussing these possibilities in the coming months.
@Helena:
Regardless of the likelihood of this draft document being signed in its current form by either the Iraqi or U.S. executive branch, I join Don in urging you not to refer to it as a SOFA.
I made this point in comments here when an earlier version was circulating. It still holds, and is not a trivial point. This document has the characteristics of a treaty, not a traditional Status of Forces Agreement. The AFSC, which has performed a useful service in making the translation available, correctly does not refer to it as a SOFA.
Why use language that supports the Bush administration’s position that it can legally commit the U.S. to these provisions without ratification from the Senate?
What is AFSC?
I doubt that the language has importance (SOFA vs treaty), as the agreement is not going to be signed anyway, according to all the signs. It would have been signed, if it was going to be, when Condoleeza Rice was in Baghdad, but it was not.
Alex AFCE is the American Friends Service Committee – a truly excellent organization. They have a strong program for Iraqi refugees, among many others. Ra’ed Jarrar is their Iraq consultant. Google it and check it out.
Nell, I agree with you 100% on the term SOFA. We should not be adopting the Bushite lying language.
And by the same token I object to the use of the term insurgency to describe any and all non-American-perpetrated violence in Iraq, particularly that directed at the occupation and its agents. The 1991 uprising in Iraq was an insurgency. Nothing that is going on in Iraq right now can accurately be called an insurgency.