More on NATO, etc.

The statement issued by the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting yesterday was considerably more sensible than the belligerent, jingoistic rantings that make up much (though thankfully, a decreasing amount) of the commentary in the US MSM. At several points it goes to lengths not to express any strongly anti-Russian judgments. For example, “We deplore all loss of life, civilian casualties, and damage to civilian infrastructure that has resulted from the conflict.” It notably does not make any promise of either immediate or more delayed military aid to Georgia, saying only that NATO has agreed to measures “intended to assist Georgia, a valued and long-standing Partner of NATO, to assess the damage caused by the military action and to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and economic activity.”
And finally, it seems to go quite a long way toward respecting the leadership in negotiating the political tasks that lie ahead regarding the Georgia crisis to… none other than “the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Alexander Stubb.”
This strikes me as extremely realistic, sensible, and helpful. The more they do that, the better. (You can read more on OSCE here.)
The NATO people well understand that the US- and Israeli-trained Georgian armed forces got trounced in the recent fighting. (The US had been training the Georgians mainly to do checkpoint duty in Iraq… And one of the Israeli private companies training the Georgians was headed by Gen. Gal Hirsh, drummed out of the IDF after the troops he’d trained showed in 2006 that they couldn’t do anything effective other than checkpoint duty in the West Bank. H’mmm.)
AP’s Matti Friedman had this account of some interviews he did with US trainers in Tbilisi, who were fairly disparaging about the skills of their trainees. Interestingly, Friedman interviewed these trainers last weekend while they were “on standby at the Sheraton Hotel, unarmed and in civilian clothes.”
From the beginning of the Georgia-Russia conflict, the US military took great pains to keep its own troops far away from any situation in which they might be seen as being involved in the fighting. I also saw a report that, though the US flew the 2,000 Georgians who had been in Iraq back to their country, they disarmed them before they did so, so as not to be accused by the Russians of pumping any more arms into the country during the war.
Despite its sometimes accusatory rhetoric, the actual actions on the ground taken by the Bush administration have been prudent and wise, and I am happy to give them credit for this.
It strikes me there is a huge contrast between the prudence displayed in those actions and the belligerence expressed so many times by McCain.
Journalists and others should ask McCain: “What, actually, would you have done differently? Would you have put US troops into this fight? How would you have supported them there?”
It strikes me that McCain’s rhetoric– including his repeated expressions of strong and completely uncritical support for Pres. Saakashvili– have been irresponsible and incendiary.
Why is Barack Obama not calling him on this?
Why is Obama not putting forward a strong and compelling alternative to the belligerent and dangerous approach espoused by McCain? Surely he can see that the US public doesn’t want another war? (Especially one that it has zero hope of winning.)
I just want to come back, for a moment, to the question of what it is that NATO used to do, back when it still it had a rationale. What it did was deter the Russians from sending their massive ground troops into the industrial heartlands of Western Europe.
NATO succeeded precisely because it succeeded at deterring. It didn’t succeed at fighting, because thanks to the success of the deterrence it never had to fight.
Georgia is not an industrial heartland of Europe. On August 8, Georgia was not a member of NATO. If it had been, NATO’s crisis would have been even sharper and more immediate– because even if it had been a “member” of NATO, very few NATO members would have come to its aid.
But member of NATO or not, the war in Georgia has shown that the old western doctrine of “deterrence” failed on that occasion.
One caveat, though: This was deterrence still at the strictly sub-nuclear level. (And that in itself is also significant. What utility at all do nuclear weapons have today?)
Deterrence, it strikes me, is closely linked to a desire (or, a readiness) to achieve significant strategic goals through “shock and awe.” Yet the whole world has now seen that even “shock and awe” didn’t bring Bush a strategic victory in Iraq, just as it didn’t bring Olmert one in Lebanon.
Military power just ain’t as useful in “foreign” encounters as it used to be. (To be discussed later, not now: the extent to which Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia are actually “foreign” for Russia. Military power did prove “useful” for Russia there; and lack of a working, indigenous national-defense strategy proved disastrous for Saakashvili…)
As of now, Georgia’s military forces have been just about stripped of all their capabilities. I’m sure the Russians have been fascinated to look at all the computers, drone-control systems, naval electronics, and other military hardware and software they’ve been carting home from all the Georgian military bases they’ve over-run in the past ten days.
A question: How many sensitive US or NATO systems have been compromised as a result?
Another, more important question: What will be the outcome of the negotiations that will doubtless occur over the Georgians’ ability to rebuild their military, given that it would be starting, as of now, from somewhere around ground zero?
… Okay, I realize this is a slightly rambly post, but I’m too tired to divide it up better or do any other form of high-level editing on it. I just want to note here, finally, that The National Interest, the uber-Realist mag published by the Nixon Center, has a couple of very good pieces on Georgia/Russia on its website today.
This one is a very well-informed ‘Realist’ take on the whole Russia question, by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett.
They write:

    in reality, today’s Russia is not a resurgent imperial power. In the post-Cold War period, it was Washington, not Moscow, which started the game of acting outside the United Nations Security Council to pursue coercive regime change in problem states and redraw the borders of nominally sovereign countries. In Russian eyes, America’s invasion and occupation of Iraq, including arresting and presiding over the execution of its deposed President, undermined Washington’s standing to criticize others for taking military action in response to perceived threats. And American unilateralism in the Balkans, along with planned deployments of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe and support for “color revolutions” in former Soviet republics, trampled clearly stated Russian redlines.

And this article is an interview with Shalva Natelashvili, the founder and chairman of the Georgian Labor Party, and a veteran leader of the Georgian opposition.
Two key excerpts from that:

    Q: Why did President Saakashvili order Tskhinvali to be taken by force?
    A: He probably had hopes of receiving some kind of external support. Someone must have lied to him to give him these false hopes—whether it was from the West, South, or North is uncertain. Someone was deceiving him.
    Also, Saakashvili had real delusions of grandeur, and saw himself as the Napoleon of Asia, which is a psychological disorder for an individual and a tragedy for Georgia.
    Third, he wanted to speed up the entry of Georgia into NATO, but this is a mistake: the issue of the Abkhazia region would still remain unresolved.
    Fourth, he’s committed crimes against democracy—he established a one-party dictatorship in Georgia in all the elections held in Georgia during his reign (local, presidential, parliamentary), closed the free flow of information, seized TV companies and dozens of innocents died.

And this:

    Q: How can Georgia and Russia overcome these tensions and live peacefully?
    A: Russia and Georgia are fated to live peacefully together. Russia should recognize Georgian territorial integrity, and Georgia shouldn’t conduct a strident anti-Russia policy.
    Georgia is a very small country located at the very center of Eurasia. Its geographical location is supposed to make it the unifying point of the Western and Eastern, Northern and Southern civilizations. That is the function of Georgia—it can solve its problems and those of the rest of the world as well.

That sounds realistic and hopeful. I hope we can all hear a lot more from this guy.

14 thoughts on “More on NATO, etc.”

  1. Why is Barack Obama not calling him on this?
    Because Obama wanted earlier NATO military involvement in Georgia–
    Jake Tapper, ABC, August 17, 2008
    On “This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” this morning, Obama campaign co-chair, former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D., said that Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., “called early on for a military action plan for NATO working with Georgia, trying to deal with the issues preemptively, so we didn’t have to face the reality we’re facing today. If we could have preemptively worked with Russia, with Georgia, making sure NATO had the ability and presence and engagement, we could have, perhaps, avoided this; we don’t know, because the Bush-McCain approach is: focus exclusively on Iraq the last five years. A lot of issues have gone without the attention they deserve.”[Note: Obama is the chair of the Senate European Foreign Relations Subcommittee, which has held no meetings.]
    http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2008/08/daschle-pushes.html
    Helena, I’m afraid that Obama is not the peacemonger you think he is. He wants continued occupation in Iraq, war on Iran if they don’t stop their nuclear program, extending the Afghan War into Pakistan, and now this on Georgia. He wants a larger army and Marine Corps — why?? He has been AWOL in the Senate on important European issues — why?? McCain and Obama agree on one thing, that the new president will be the new decider in the new American autocracy, with force as a primary option, and you and I be damned.

  2. Georgia is not an industrial heartland of Europe
    Georgia is a set of pipelines surrounded by a country. It was judged to be the least unstable route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey.
    Mary Kaldor and Yahia Said discuss the Nagorno Karabkh situation in their book Oil Wars.
    http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/pressAndInformationOffice/newsAndEvents/archives/2007/OilWars.htm
    This frozen conflict has the potential to be an order of magnitude worse than the Georgian mess, and the alliance between Armenia (no traditional friend of Turkey) and Russia still exisists
    The prize in the Endgame is Baku and Azerbaijan and their oil and gas companies.
    The US raprochment with Iran may have something to do with a realisation that bringing Casian Gas and oil out to Turkey through Iran may now be the logical way to go.
    The recent Chatham House paper on the lack of investment in new oil infrastructure and the resulting prodcution capacity shortfall illustrates the consequences for the European Economy within the next ten years.
    Saakashvili’s stunt jumped the gun by about five or ten years and as a result has bound the Iranians more closely to the Russians, and probably brought the return of Azerbaijan to the Russian sphere of influence a bit closer.
    A US Presidential Candidate who is reported as singing about bombing the Iranians is a suspect quantity.

  3. Good cop/bad cop–
    MOSCOW (Reuters) – Cooperation with NATO is crucial and Russia will behave in a pragmatic manner following the alliance’s decision to freeze regular contact with Moscow, Russia’s envoy to NATO told Reuters on Wednesday.
    “We will carefully analyze this situation. There won’t be any aggressive action from anyone on our side. We will behave in a pragmatic manner… There will definitely not be a cold war,” Dmitry Rogozin said in a telephone interview.
    “I am planning, over the next few days, to give certain signals concerning military cooperation. I think the signals will be received positively by my (NATO) colleagues.”
    “Without Russia’s support in Afghanistan, NATO would face a new Vietnam, and this is clear to everyone. Militarily, NATO and Russia have a very good and trusting relationship,” Rogozin said from his Brussels office.
    http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSLK24574520080820
    Note: “Russia’s support in Afghanistan” — sounds like a threat — just think about how some shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles could change the equation, a la Charlie Wilson’s War.

  4. Helena / Don
    It is noticeable that the subject of Georgia or Nato does not seem to appear in the comment or opinion pieces of New York Times or Washington Post this morning.
    The only item of any note is in Washington Post about cruise missiles targetted on Iran on submarines in the Indian Ocean.
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/community/groups/index.html?plckForumPage=ForumDiscussion&plckDiscussionId=Cat%3aa70e3396-6663-4a8d-ba19-e44939d3c44fForum%3aa725552c-bd4a-4a5f-a5b9-a0c96cfae382Discussion%3a72f707af-ab9a-49d7-80f2-eced43d28f0b
    BBC news has a bleat from Mr Saakashvili about Russians not leaving as its next to last item.

  6. Don, just to clarify: I don’t at this point think that Obama represents the eirenic side of things. What I’m saying is that I wish he would both because (a) it’s the only sane way forward, and because (b) far from being the potential vote-loser he apparently thinks it is in this heated election season, I think there are strong, smart ways to describe a Realistically de-escalatory approach that could actually win him respect and support at the polls.
    Instead of which, there he is, trying to out-McCain McCain. Not a winning strategy…
    I’m also trying to call him back to his better self, the one who made that great statement about trying to get us not just of Iraq but out of the mindset that got us into Iraq…
    It would help, of course, if he’d read my blog!

  7. Does anyone else get the sense that the US and NATO really don’t have a clue as to their goals and ambitions in Georgia? It appears that policymakers have taken to believing their noble rhetorical narrative and have lost sight of the strategic goal: BTC.
    So, the US and NATO loaded Gerogia up with lots of high tech military goodies, some “training”, and gave Saakishvili a few “atta boys” and some nominal guidance.
    No wonder he became a loose cannon!
    It’s shocking that Saakishvili wasn’t told clearly from the start that his job was to guard the BTC pipeline. from terrorists. Period. Don’t even think of doing anything else.
    That meant providing not only armed guards, but also social programs to keep residents happy and engaging in active outreach to defuse tensions that could otherwise motivate people to blow the pipeline up. And, above all, he was to placate his difficult neighbor to the north, who was not pleased with the pipeline’s bypassing Russia.
    Apart from the armed guards, it does not look like Saakishvili understood his mission. Of course, his sponsors in Washington don’t understand much about the need for implementing social programs or defusing tensions, either.
    If this is how the American government goes about protecting the pipelines that serve as the capillaries for the industrial economy, we’re all in real trouble (although it would definitely be good for the climate.)

  8. today’s Russia is not a resurgent imperial power. In the post-Cold War period, it was Washington, not Moscow, which started the game of acting outside the United Nations Security Council to pursue coercive regime change in problem states and redraw the borders of nominally sovereign countries. […] And American unilateralism in the Balkans, along with planned deployments of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe and support for “color revolutions” in former Soviet republics, trampled clearly stated Russian redlines.
    Oh, for pete’s sake. If it’s imperialism when the United States draws “red lines” in the sand of sovereign states outside its borders, then it’s also imperialism when Russia does it. “The other guy started it” really doesn’t work as an excuse. None of us would accept that justification if offered by the United States or one of its allies, would we?

  9. If it’s imperialism when the United States draws “red lines” in the sand of sovereign states outside its borders, then it’s also imperialism when Russia does it.
    The problem is not so much that the US draws “red lines” in the sand, but that they draw “red lines” in the future. The future of humanity, that is. The USA and Russia have both the capacity to destroy the world many times over with their nuclear arsenals. Mainly because of USA policy, the world has become one immense nuclear time bomb. If it goes off, the US is to blame. Whether you call the US power politics
    that led to this situation “imperialism”, “insanity”, “criminality”, or anything else, seems quite irrelevant to me.

  10. Russia’s role in Afhanistanhas beencrucial from the first: the “Northern Alliance” is and long has been closely linked with Russia. Its supply lines run through Tajikistan and central Asia.
    Politically, too, the minorities supporting the Alliance are crucial to the important business of projecting the image of popular support for the puppet regime. Never mind Stingers, NATO is perilously close to being marooned in Afghanistan. Currently it depends entirely upon Russian and Pakistani supply lines. And the United States military consumes oil in vast quantities every day it is in no condition to function without constant re-supply.
    re Johnathan E. Do you really mean to argue that US and Russian foreign policies during the past decade (one might say ‘since 1917’) have not been very different? Russia has been in continual retreat and, at every stage, the US has had a contingent ready to move in and redouble its offensive efforts.

  12. Russia has been in continual retreat “since 1917?” You must be kidding. Yes, there was Brest-Litovsk and the Civil War, but by 1921, the USSR ruled everything Imperial Russia had ruled other than Poland and Finland. It picked up Mongolia as a client state in 1922 and pretty much all of eastern Europe other than Yugoslavia after 1949 – or are you one of those who agree with Gerald Ford that there was no Soviet domination of the East bloc?
    The situation since 1989 is different, but it’s still a bit simplistic to describe it as an American advance and a Russian retreat. There are, after all, quite a few newly independent countries with non-Russian populations who were active players in the drama. Part of the reason that so many of them gravitated to the United States is that they’d had long experience with Russian domination and quite understandably wanted protection from Russia, much as Cuba turned to the Soviets for protection against its bullying neighbor. (Or do you regard Soviet support of Castro in the same light as American support of Saakashvili?)
    Personally, I’m a “neither Washington nor Moscow” sort. I don’t think that the antidote to the American empire is a Russian empire – I’m one of those anachronistic fellows who believes that small countries’ right to self-determination ought to be respected. In the current crisis, that means South Ossetia and Abkhazia against Georgia (subject to a fair settlement for the victims of the 1990s-era ethnic cleansing), but also Georgia against Russia. What it doesn’t mean is applauding while Russia arrogates to itself a sphere of influence against the will of its neighbors, even if the United States is taken down a peg in the process.

  13. John E I suppose that it’s a matter of interpretation, pre 1945, which is too complex to get into here. You might want to look at the Baltic states however.
    Re Ford this was one occasion on which he allowed himself to offend the cartoon book conventional narrative by introducing a little subtlety in his analysis. The question is, to what degree you feel that Russian control over Poland contributed to its strength? As much as the Afghanistan advance in the 80s or less?
    What Russia really wanted, in the 1950/60s was a de-militarised eastern Europe, including a disarmed Germany. That was something that the US was determined would never occur. What we are seeing today, in Georgia and elsewhere, is that that determination remains as strong as ever: the duel between Washington and Moscow began before Lenin’s old father was a gleam in his great grandmother’s eye.

  14. question is, to what degree you feel that Russian control over Poland contributed to its strength? As much as the Afghanistan advance in the 80s or less?
    I’m not sure that really signifies. Imperialism is often costly to the imperial power, as the United States is finding out in Iraq. American control in Iraq isn’t contributing to the United States’ strength – quite the reverse in fact – but I doubt you would classify it as non-imperialist on that basis.
    There’s only one measure that matters in determining the character of Soviet domination of Poland: did the Poles want the Russians to rule them? I’d say the answer is pretty clearly, and non-controversially, “no.” I don’t think it’s an accident that the presidents of the Baltic states, Poland and Ukraine have all paid recent solidarity visits to Tbilisi.
    What Russia really wanted, in the 1950/60s was a de-militarised eastern Europe
    Which is why, when Imre Nagy declared neutrality, the Soviets sent in the tanks and hanged him? Your view of Soviet intentions toward the client states seems rose-colored.

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