Washington: Concealing SOFA plans since November 2003

The National Security Archive at George Washington University has succeeded in winning declassification of some intriguing– though heavily “redacted”– documents dating back to Nobember 2003 that detail the Pentagon’s longstanding efforts to win a very permissive (from their point of view) long-term security agreement from Iraq.
The page linked to there has a good analysis of the documents and ends with links to PDF versions of the docs themselves.
The NSA analyst, Joyce Battle, starts with a reference to Patrick Cockburn’s excellent recent reporting on the details of the SOFA-plus agreement that the Bushists presented to the Iraqi side at the beginning of this month. Under the heading “Looks like San Remo all over again”– a reference to the 1920 conference at which Britain and France got generously handed their League of Nations “Mandates” over the governance of five majority-Arab countries (take that, Woodrow Wilson!)– Battle notes:

Recently declassified documents show that the U.S. military has long sought an agreement with Baghdad that gives American forces virtually unfettered freedom of action in – and possibly around – Iraq. This new information appears to run counter to Bush administration claims that U.S. intentions have been more limited in scope.

The first of the declassified “documents” she presents is a PDF/PPT slideshow, heavily redacted, that she believes was created by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was dated November 27, 2003. That was just five weeks after the day on which the UN Security Council– meeting in New York, not San Remo– adopted Resolution 1511 which handed the US a qualified and highly time-limited mandate to rule over Iraq.
We might remember that the three most important clauses of res. 1511 were that, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council:

1. Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, and UNDERSCORES, in that context, the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority (Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations under applicable international law recognized and set forth in resolution 1483 (2003), which will cease when an internationally recognized, representative government established by the people of Iraq Is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority, inter alia through steps envisaged in paragraphs four through seven and ten below; …
13. Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and program as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;
… and
25. Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months.

So according to Battle, the requirements that the Pentagon sought in Iraq at the time included items in the following areas:

* Use of Iraqi facilities
* Pre-positioning of supplies
* Contracting
* Respect for Law
* Entry and Exit of forces
* Vehicle licensing and registration
* Bearing of Arms
* Taxation
* Import and Export
* Claims
* Movement of Aircraft and Vehicles
* Use of land and facilities
* Security requirements and support

The collection of documents presented through that NSA web-page comprises eight internal documents dated between the last week of November and the end of December 2003. In one of them, document 5, Paul Bremer laid out in a cable to the State Department and the National Security Council a lengthy list of items that the “coalition” forces would have to insist on still controlling and/or having access to, even after the restoration of Iraq’s supposed “sovereignty.”
Battle wrote this about the Bremer cable:

Text concerning one issue, “use of facilities” is redacted in its entirety. A section on “military/security operations,” though partially redacted, includes several points, e.g.:
* “U.S. must be authorized to detain, intern, and interrogate anti-coalition and security risk personnel”
* “U.S. must be authorized to retain custody of current POWs/detainees/internees…”
* “U.S. must be authorized to seize and retain intelligence-related documents”
* “Coalition forces must have unlimited authority to conduct military operations they deem necessary and proper under the circumstances.”
On the “bearing of arms, uniforms, flags & markings,” the cable says:
* “U.S. forces must be authorized to bear arms and wear uniforms”
* “Designated U.S. contractor personnel must be authorized to bear arms.”
On “utilities and communications”:
* “U.S. forces must have access to utilities and enjoy priority in use” (Note 2)
* “U.S. forces must be authorized to use all necessary radio spectrums without charge.”
Information in the cable on “postal and recreational facilities” was redacted in its entirety.
As to “privileges and immunities,” according to Bremer’s cable,
* “U.S. personnel must be accorded status equivalent to that accorded to administrative and technical (A&T) personnel (full criminal immunity and immunity from civil process for official acts)”
* “Contractors and Iraqis employed by the coalition must be immune from legal process for acts performed in official capacity”
* “U.S. personnel and contractor employees must not be surrendered to international tribunals or any other states or entities without approval of U.S. government.”
On “entry and exit” into and from Iraq:
* “U.S. personnel must be allowed to enter Iraq with ID cards and orders”
* “Iraq must not use visa issuance as a way of imposing limits on contractor personnel.”
Regarding “movement of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft”:
* “U.S. vehicles, vessels, and aircraft must be able to freely enter, exit, and transit Iraq”
* “U.S. vehicles, vessels, and aircraft must not be subject to taxes, fees, tolls, charges, regulation, registration, inspection, etc.”
* “Iraq must accept U.S. driving licenses and permits as valid.”
On “importation and exportation”:
* “U.S. must be able to import and export equipment, supplies, and materials without inspection, restrictions, taxes, customs, duties, etc.”
In regard to “contracting”, CPA headquarters wrote:
* “U.S. must be free to contract for goods, services, and construction without restriction”
* “U.S. must be able to contract using its own rules”
On taxation:
* “U.S. forces must be exempt from all Iraqi taxes”
* “Iraq may not tax income of U.S. personnel and certain contractors received from U.S. government or sources outside Iraq.”
All discussion of “claims” was withheld from disclosure…

On p.1 of this short (but PDF) 29 December memo, a Bremer assistant, who was transmitting to the boss a draft for his upcoming meeting with Iraqi-puppet Governing Council, suggested that “you may want to raise the issue of the Security Agreement.” But Bremer did not want to. As Battle notes, in late January 2004, GC president Adnan Pachachi said he was “still waiting for a draft.”
… And so it has gone on. Secrecy and legerdemain have been used at every turn to conceal the true contents of these momentous agreements from the legislators and publics in both Iraq and the US.
For four and a half years, now.
How does the old saying go? Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice shame on me?
How about if someone is trying to fool all of continuously, for four and a half years? Then what?