The ‘Necessary Steps’ recommendations, annotated

I’ve now taken the chance to examine the Executive Summary of the “Necessary Steps” report issued yesterday by the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq. From a quick scan through the report’s other 28 or so pages, I think the Executive Summary looks easier to deal with. The rest looks a little amorphous and unclear.

My main reactions to reading it are these:

    1. They did indeed use many of the ideas I have been working on and advocating for throughout the whole of the past three years. Points of what I would call our “distinctive” convergence include our shared emphasis on the need for the UN to have a key role in helping organize some of the key political aspects of the departure; and our shared emphasis on the need for the US to be “generous” to the Iraqis as we depart their country, in partial compensation for the sheer harm and misery inflicted on them.

    2. There are many other points of convergence that i would not necessarily judge to be so “distinctive”, since they are points that are also articulated by many others in the peace and justice community. These include, crucially, the need for the withdrawal to be total, which was indeed right there.

    3. Altogether, therefore, there are very many points of convergence between their plan and what I have been articulating, refining, and advocating throughout these past three years. So bravo to them.

    4. In four key respects, however, their plan differs significantly from what I have been advocating. These are:

      (a) They do not envisage nearly so definitive a handoff of decisionmaking and “convening” power regarding Iraq, from Washington to the UN Secretary General, as I do.

      (b) They make no mention at all of the need for focused attention also to be paid to reaching a final resolution of the remaining strands of the Israeli-Arab conflict, as I have consistently done since before the publication of the Baker-Hamilton report– of which that was also, we can recall, a key feature. Baker Hamilton rightly recognized the close linkage between the two theaters. At a political level, I don’t see how the US can expect to involve the UN in any meaningful way in handling complex diplomatic tasks regarding Iraq if at the same time Washington is keeping the UN and the international legitimacy it represents at arm’s length in the Arab-Israeli theater.

      (c) They make no mention of the need for new national elections in Iraq or, crucially, the need to craft a new, post-occupation Constitution, or at the very least, submit the existing one to very thorough review.

      (d) They call for a plan to fund “refugee resettlement in third countries” but make no mention of supporting the return and repatriation of the two million refugees and the two million IDPs to their home communities; whereas I see that, rather than resettlement in other countries, as the prime need.

In general, therefore, I think it would have been excellent if I could have discussed these differences with the people who wrote the Necessary Steps report, before they published it. I think those discussions would have been excellent. We would probably all have learned a lot from them. And the result would have been a significantly richer and more helpful report all round. But, ahem, as I noted yesterday, they didn’t bother to consult me before they went about ripping off my work without attribution and publishing this report.

In addition to the four broad points of difference I’ve identified above, I have some other, more detailed comments on some of the points they make in their Executive Summary. And I’ve made a table in which I’ve put those comments alongside the relevant portions of their text. So read on, dear readers…


The “Necessary
Steps” report
from the Task Force for a Responsible
Withdrawal from Iraq, June 2008, as annotated by Helena Cobban for Just World News,
June 26, 2008. 

Creative
Commons license
on this as on all my web-published work.
(Yes, plagiarizers, you know who you are.)
Their text My
comments
Intro: The Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal
from iraq was formed to answer this charge:1

The President has announced that
a complete military withdrawal from Iraq will take place over the next
12-18 months. What concrete policy steps can the US government take,
immediately and during the withdrawal, to encourage peace and stability
in Iraq?

We do not underestimate the challenges posed by this charge. Iraq is a
traumatized and politically fragmented country. Neighboring states may
be tempted to intervene in Iraq’s internal conflicts to
protect their own interests.
2 The
credibility of the United States is badly eroded by a war that most of
the world opposed.

The United
States and the international community bear a responsibility
3
to contribute to the alleviation of suffering and the advancement of
stability and peace in Iraq. It was the consensus of our expert
Advisory Group that there is little the United States can do to achieve
those goals as long as it maintains an open-ended military presence in
Iraq. In the context of withdrawal, however, there are many measures
the United States and international community can take to maximize the
chances for progress. In this report, we propose a set of initiatives
that, taken in the proper sequence, can help to create the conditions
for ending Iraq’s long national nightmare.

1. So I guess the “charge” mentioned in the first line
there is one formulated by Rep. McGovern. It is a good one. It defines
a timeline for a complete
US  military withdrawal from Iraq
, albeit one
that is on a timescale longer than would be strictly necessary from a
purely logistical point of view.

2. In the second graf there, it would have been more accurate and
useful to write “Neighboring states may be tempted to continue intervening
in Iraq’s internal conflicts, with a variety of motivations including
the protection of their own interests.”

3. I’m wondering whether it’s accurate or helpful to imply
that  the “international community” has a
responsibility equivalent to that of the US for the alleviation of
suffering and the advancement of stability in Iraq. Under
international  law, the US as occupying power and as
UN-mandated power has the responsibility. If we in the US seek to
engage the UN in the peacebuilding efforts, as we would do under this
plan, then we should be quite clear that we are asking the rest of the
“international community”, however construed, to do the US an enormous
favor.

A To make
its intentions clear prior to withdrawal, the United States
can and should:

  1. Seek a short-term renewal of the UN mandate instead
    of a
    bilateral US-Iraqi security agreement.
  2. Announce support for a new UN
    mandate to take effect in 2009 that will legitimate and define
    international participation in Iraqi reconciliation, reconstruction,
    and humanitarian aid.
  3. Signal that all of Iraq’s neighbors,
    including Syria and Iran, will henceforth be treated as partners in
    promoting stability.
  4. Support the establishment of an International Support
    Group for Iraq.
  5. Inform the Maliki government that the United States
    will soon announce a timetable for withdrawal and will shift
    toward a stance that emphasizes neutrality and non-interference in
    Iraqi politics.
The ‘plan’ doesn’t say anything about when or how
the announcement of the timetable for total withdrawal gets made. The
“charge” above supposes that the President has already
made the announcement, whereas point 5 here supposes that that step–
as also possibly the four that precede it– is taken before the
announcement. This lack of clarity is troubling, because the wording of
the Announcement and the modalities of its issuing (including when and how it gets made) are both extremely important.

In what I’ve been writing and saying recently, I stress that the
announcement of the timetable for the total withdrawal should be
accompanied by a request
to the UN Secretary-General to convene the negotiating forums necessary
to allow the withdrawal to be accomplished in a timely and orderly
manner. This formulation conveys the strength of the aspect of “handing
over responsibility” for the Iraq project to the UN; and the term
“request” conveys an appropriately supplicatory and low-key US attitude
toward the UN as it makes this request (see note 3 in the above
section.)

Points 1 and 2 in this section are  pretty helpful in
substance. However, framing them only in the terms that the US should
“Seek a short-term renewal… ” and “Announce support for a new UN
mandate… ” doesn’t convey the sense of a definitive hand-off
of responsibilities to the UNSG that I think is needed. Then, points 3,
4, and 5 here all strongly convey a sense of Washington as continuing
to be the key actor.

On point 4, I’m still not sure what the role of the International
Support Group is supposed to be.

On point 5, it is very clear to me that one of the key things the UN
will need to do is organize
new national elections, preferably under a constituency-based system,
to generate a new, post-occupation national leadership

capable of both governing the country and  crafting a new,
genuinely nationalist-Iraqi Constitution.

Why is there no mention of that anywhere in this plan?

B Subsequent
to the announcement of a timetable for withdrawal, to promote
reconciliation in Iraq the United States can and should:

  1. Take vigorous diplomatic steps to stem the flow of
    arms and foreign fighters feeding the civil war and communal
    violence.
  2. Assist Iraqi actors and the UN in convening a
    pan-Iraqi conference on reconciliation, backed by an expanded writ for
    a UN mission in Iraq. Among other things, that conference should seek
    an immediate ceasefire and redress of the losses of refugees and
    internally displaced persons.
Okay, so re the timing of the timetable announcement,
that seems to have just mysteriously happened somewhere between point
A-5 and the beginning of point B.

#1 here is banal. The US as such is already trying to do this.
Actually, the majority of the “arms and foreign fighters” that are
feeding the communal violence are coming from the US (who are, after
all, foreign fighters) and their allies. So as the momentum shifts
towards withdrawal then the “arms and foreign fighters” problem will
correspondingly decrease.

Yes, I know there will continue to be a strong motivation for the
Saudis, Iran, and maybe Syria and other powers to continue sending arms
and military trainers into Iraq. But after the timetable announcement,
as I envision it– accompanied by the request to the UNSG–
then it will be up to him, not the US, to take over the diplomacy with
Iraq’s neighbors, not the US.

(Important note: Under my plan, the UNSG needs as much prep time as
possible to get his show on the road prior to the Announcement being
made.)


Point 2 here is generally excellent.

C On the
international level, the United States can and should:

  1. Immediately re-engage Syria and Iran in non-coercive
    “give-and-take” diplomacy addressing
    bilateral issues.
  2. Engage with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey seeking
    their support for peace and economic recovery efforts in Iraq.
  3. Work within the International Support Group to
    encourage Iraq’s six neighbors to promote peace and
    stability in Iraq and the region. 
  4. Strengthen the provisions of the International
    Compact with Iraq for reparations and debt relief.
Point 1 here is excellent. But it’s definitely worth
spelling out that Washington’s diplomatic re-engagement with both Syria
and Iran should cover the
whole range
of the issues of contention that the US has
with each of those powers.

I am also very disappointed indeed that this Executive Summary says nothing
about the need for a new policy towards Iraq to be accompanied by a
strong focus on reaching
final peace agreements on all the remaining tracks of the Israeli-Arab
conflict.
Even the Baker-Hamilton report made a
poinjt of stressing the close linkage between the Israeli-Arab and Iraqi
theaters and the need to address the Israeli-Arab peacemaking as part
of the move toward mending Iraq. This report should certainly echo and amplify that point.

Also, under my scheme of the UN taking the lead in convening all the
negotiation forums needed to end the US occupation of Iraq, the tasks
listed in points 2, 3, and 4 here would be performed primarily by the
UN, with US help; they should not be thought of as tasks for the US to
lead.

D With
regard to security, the United States can and should:

  1. Identify likely flashpoints and,   when
    requested by Iraqis, factor them into the planning for
    transitional US military activities during the period of 
    withdrawal.
  2. In anticipation that a blue-helmeted peacekeeping
    force will be needed and requested by Iraq when the US
    withdraws, support the UN in organizing and funding it.
  3. Assist the UN and donor states in creating
    disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs.
I don’t think that an entirely new and separate UN
peacekeeping force will necessarily be needed. Some of the US forces
now present in the country should be reconceived and reconfigured as an
effective, temporary national gendarmerie and act as such under UN
command.

The UN should meantime also offer to the Iraqis to take over the job of
finishing the training and equipping of their national police and
military forces.

DDR is, as always, a really good idea.

E With
regard to economic and humanitarian issues, the United States can and
should:

  1. Cease pressure on Iraq to open up its oil sector and
    other parts of its economy. 
  2. Support the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in
    better addressing the plight of Iraqi refugees and internally
    displaced persons. 
  3. Give aid to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon earmarked for
    the care of Iraqi refugees.
  4. Support a plan to fund refugee resettlement in third
    countries.
  5. Donate to an Iraq Development Fund that bankrolls a
    labor-intensive public works program and helps to fix the broken food
    rationing
    system.
  6. Help to strengthen Iraqi NGOs, with special attention
    to women’s groups.
Points 1, 2, and 3 here are fairly banal (but
definitely necessary.)

I have a real problem with point 4, since I strongly believe that the
primary stress when looking at the issues of the refugees and the IDPs
(why no mention of the latter?) should be on repatriating
them and giving them significant support to
rebuild flourishing home communities on or near the home
properties from which they fled.

That is, quite rightly, the prime focus of the work UNHCR does in all
refugee situations around the world; and it is surely the right option
for Iraq’s refugees (and IDPs).

Also, which “third countries” should be prevailed on to take two
million Iraqi refugees? And for goodness sake, why only “third”
countries, and why no mention of the responsibilities the US itself to
resettle that small proportion of Iraqis who may still have good reason
to fear persecution in their country even after some real democratic
and institutional reform?

Note the slightly mysterious mention of “women’s groups”, but no other
kinds of civil society groups there… This from the notably
female-excluding group that produced the report!

F In sum, the United States can and should: quickly carry out a
full military withdrawal from Iraq, carefully pursue
diplomatic remedies for the Iraq crisis, and generously give to
help rebuild Iraq in the long run. The responsibilities are not
America’s alone, but America must lead.
I agree with the first and third of the clauses here.
But as indicated above, I believe the “who” question of who leads the
conduct of this diplomacy is mis-answered here. Also, where did this
“America must lead” business come from??

30 thoughts on “The ‘Necessary Steps’ recommendations, annotated”

  1. Haven’t read anything yet, but had a look at the list of names…
    The exclusion of women – particularly older, highly experienced and deeply knowledgeable ones from whom it appears they plagiarized – is not the only problem I see with this group. It seems out of all the people they involved they saw fit to include only two Iraqis, Nadje `Ali and Ra’ed Jarrarin their “workshop”, and no Iraqis as principles. I respect and largely agree with both of them, but I have to wonder just exactly how much actual input and influence the only two Iraqis they consulted had on the final product.
    Disappointing, but not really surprising.

  2. They call for a plan to fund “refugee resettlement in third countries” but make no mention of supporting the return and repatriation of the two million refugees and the two million IDPs to their home communities;
    This is outrageous as far as I am concerned. These people need to go back to their homes and communities, and Iraq does not need to be robbed of millions of its greatest resources. Furthermore, it is not up to a bunch of Americans to decide these things. What on earth are they thinking, and why?! Funding permanent exile for millions of Iraqis? Horrible! And why do they even think it is something they have a right to decide on behalf of any Iraqis? I am really, REALLY disappointed.
    As for the only two Iraqis they saw fit to include at all, unless Ra’ed has drastically changed his point of view, he would not agree with this AT ALL. It is one of many things on which we are strongly in accord. I don’t know what Nadje `Ali’s position is on repatriation vs resettlement, but based on her other views, I would be surprised if she agreed with this report. At the very VERY least funding should be designed to give the choice to the Iraqis who will receive the funding whether they want to return home or resettle elsewhere.
    Helena, you are right and they are dead wrong on this.

  3. Helena:
    “or, crucially, the need to craft a new, post-occupation Constitution, or at the very least, submit the existing one to very thorough review.”
    Helena, is it your view that a new, or substantially amended, Iraqi constitution would only have force if it were put to a general referendum to the Iraqi people and carried, as the existing constitution was by nearly 80% of the voters in a free, UN supervised referendum in Oct 2005?
    Or do you feel that, if necessary, some outside force like the UN should decide the constitution of Oct 2005 is null and void and impose an amended one without a vote of the Iraqis themselves?
    Shirin:
    “It seems out of all the people they involved they saw fit to include only two Iraqis, Nadje `Ali and Ra’ed Jarrarin their “workshop”, and no Iraqis as principles. I respect and largely agree with both of them, but I have to wonder just exactly how much actual input and influence the only two Iraqis they consulted had on the final product.”
    Are you saying that Iraqis with differing opinions from you should have been equally heard by this committee?
    Just out of interest, are Nadje `Ali and Ra’ed Jarrarin, Sunnis? Or do they represent Sunni and Shi equally?

  4. Helena:
    “or, crucially, the need to craft a new, post-occupation Constitution, or at the very least, submit the existing one to very thorough review.”
    Helena, is it your view that a new, or substantially amended, Iraqi constitution would only have force if it were put to a general referendum to the Iraqi people and carried, as the existing constitution was by nearly 80% of the voters in a free, UN supervised referendum in Oct 2005?
    Or do you feel that, if necessary, some outside force like the UN should decide the constitution of Oct 2005 is null and void and impose an amended one without a vote of the Iraqis themselves?
    Shirin:
    “It seems out of all the people they involved they saw fit to include only two Iraqis, Nadje `Ali and Ra’ed Jarrarin their “workshop”, and no Iraqis as principles. I respect and largely agree with both of them, but I have to wonder just exactly how much actual input and influence the only two Iraqis they consulted had on the final product.”
    Are you saying that Iraqis with differing opinions from you should have been equally heard by this committee?
    Just out of interest, are Nadje `Ali and Ra’ed Jarrarin, Sunnis? Or do they represent Sunni and Shi equally?

  5. BB, I am saying the fact that they included only two Iraqis in the entire project and no Iraqis among the principles is very unfortunate and disappointing.
    Ra’ed and Nadje are both non-sectarian, and outsiders should get over their sectarian ideas about Iraq.

  6. The emphasis on passing authority to the UN Secretary-General assumes that he would be an independent arbitrator who would perform, not in the interests of the US, but those of Iraq. There is evidence that this is not the case.
    Ban Ki-Moon has a reputation as a bland, humble administrative type who has a strong leaning to the US. He has a Master’s from Harvard, served two terms as ambassador to the US and his son attends UCLA.
    Ban Ki-Moon has been remarkably silent on the tragedies taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his speech to the CFR on May 31, 2006 when he was politicking to be UN SecGen, he named five “pressing measures to undertake.”–terrorism, Peacebuilding Commission, humanitarian principles, MDG and Human Rights Council. Ban made NO mention of Iraq and Afghanistan. NONE! Tens of thousands dead and millions of refugees and there was no mention of them!! Then or since!!
    http://www.cfr.org/publication/10833/restoring_the_vitality_of_the_united_nations_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html
    More recently Ban has displayed his fealty to the US and its ally Israel in the Iran matter.
    Ban Ki-moon has repeatedly condemned Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric against Israel, expressing “shock and dismay”, but he has remained ominously and inexcusably silent about the blatant Israeli and US threats of military attacks on Iran, thus undermining the world’s confidence in his ability to steer the global community clear of yet another major war in the Middle East caldron. He has also been MIA on Palestine.
    Ban is supposed to have some interest in violations of the UN Charter “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” but apparently he doesn’t, when the US and Israel are involved.
    Ban Ki-Moon is a US lackey. Don’t expect much from him.

  7. BB, I find it fascinating that your first impulse was not to recognize that it is not for Americans to make decisions on behalf of Iraqis with minimal token Iraqi participation. Instead, you turned immediately to the question of sectarian representation among the token Iraqis included. It is this very attitude on the part of the American occupiers that has contributed most to the division of Iraq politically, geographically, and socially that has taken place since the Americans and their “coalition of the bribed and coerced” blasted their way into the country.
    Very few Iraqis ever used to be so focused on each others’ religious and ethnic background. No one really cared about such things.

  8. Don, I share some of your concerns about Ban. However, at the end of the day the SG is the servant of the Security Council and in the first instance of its permanent members. So what is required is a new agreement (resolution) among the P-5 powers under which they explicitly, as the UNSC, take responsibility for the long-overdue transition of Iraq out of US bondage and into self-governance.
    Thus far, the other P-5 powers have not been clamoring to get this responsibility, and understandably so. (For Russia and China, seeing US military power continue to be attrited day after day after day in Iraq must be a singular satisfaction.) So the US needs to BEG them to have the UNSC/SG take on the task.
    I know, too, that many Iraqis don’t see the UN as any kind of a neutral, benevolent body. After what the US persuaded the UN to do to Iraq during the 1990s (mass starvation etc), who can blame them?
    However, there is literally no power other than tyhe UN that can help the US do what it needs to do, which is get out of Iraq; and no power other than the UN that can help Iraq stay together . It has to do with that amorphous quality that I keep referring to: “international political legitimacy.”
    As I said in one of my many speaking engagements this week, the UN is like what Churchill said about democracy: It’s the worst system imaginable except for all of the alternatives. Thank God we have it, as an organization and as an idea…

  9. PS BB, as for “Iraqis who do not agree with me”, you would be very hard pressed to find an Iraqi outside of those who are profiting from the occupation, or depending on it to keep their positions in the make-believe government, who do not want an end to the occupation and a complete American withdrawal, and the sooner the better. The latest polls show that this is the desire of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis, and the number is growing day by day.
    What Americans (or Brits, or Australians, or anyone else) think ought to happen should not matter in the face of what Iraqis think ought to happen. It is just not your business, and in any case, haven’t you done enough already?

  10. HC: “there is literally no power other than the UN that can help the US do what it needs to do . .and that can help Iraq stay together”
    The last time I checked, Iraq was a sovereign country with an elected leadership. Its leaders have their faults, but they seem okay to me. But now the US needs the UN to help it do what it needs to do? What the US needs to do, is to leave Iraq to the Iraqis. Can the UN help the Iraqis? That’s for them to decide.
    Someone whom I admire greatly has written about human security. “True security is people-centered rather than state-centered, she wrote (on page 103). And: Wouldn’t a diplomacy based on the “Golden Rule” of treating the peoples of other countries with the same fairness, respect and generosity that we hope to enjoy from them do more to build the real security of U.S. citizens than one that seeks to grab unilateral advantage for American corporations wherever it can? Why does our country’s approach to the other people and governments of the world need to be marked so deeply by fearfulness and mistrust, rather than by hope and a sense of responsibility . . .(p. 104)
    Is that worthy process congruent with “So what is required is a new agreement (resolution) among the P-5 powers under which they explicitly, as the UNSC, take responsibility for the long-overdue transition of Iraq out of US bondage and into self-governance.” Oh, Iraqis, your fate is in the hands of the P-5 powers. They know what’s best for you. They will be responsible, trust them.
    Do we want the UN to come into the U.S. and solve our problems too — voting discrepancies, disaster relief, loss of civil rights, poor medical care, etc. or do we think that we know better how to solve these problems than some UN bureaucrat from Thailand, or a weak SecGen from Korea? Do you intend to go to the UN to set up the new International University or do you intend to allow Iraqis to do it? Golden Rule.
    It is a fact that Iraqis justifiably hate the UN and the US because of the deadly sanctions. It is also a fact that the UN has been silent about all the US aggression in violation of the uN Charter. It is also a fact that the UN has been manipulated by the US repeatedly to sanction a country (Iran) which has done nothing wrong, while not sanctioning the naked aggression and rape of Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia, to name a few, by the US (and Israel in Lebanon). All of this is true because the UN is a tool of the US, which is why you wrote “can help the US do what it needs to do” rather than “help Iraqis do what they need to do.”
    Shirin: What Americans (or Brits, or Australians, or anyone else) think ought to happen should not matter in the face of what Iraqis think ought to happen. It is just not your business, and in any case, haven’t you done enough already?
    I couldn’t have said it better myself, or even as well.

  11. Shirin,
    I asked you if Iraqis with differing opinions from you should have been equally heard by the committee? That was the point of my question.
    Finally you replied:
    “BB, as for “Iraqis who do not agree with me”, you would be very hard pressed to find an Iraqi OUTSIDE OF THOSE WHO ARE PROFITING FROM THE OCCUPATION, OR DEPENDING ON IT TO KEEP THEIR POSITIONS IN THE MAKE-BELIEVE GOVERNMENT, who do not want an end to the occupation and a complete American withdrawal, and the sooner the better.”
    In other words, Shirin, your answer is “no”, on the grounds that Iraqis who do not share your opinion, ALL OF THEM, are profiting from the occupation and/or depending on the occupation for their positions in a “make-believe” government?
    Therefore, on your say-so, and on your opinions as to their motivations alone, they are to be excluded?
    “BB, I am saying the fact that they included only two Iraqis in the entire project and no Iraqis among the principles is very unfortunate and disappointing.”
    Absolutely agree with you.
    But on the other hand, you are not seeking a representative group of Iraqis, but only those who agree with your own political opinion?
    In which case, the representation may as well have been confined to the two spokespersons you mentioned, as they no doubt more than adequately expressed the opinions you agreed with – and which the committee would also share, would they not?
    A sad outcome, imo. The Iraqis deserve more than outsiders insisting there can be only one opinion.
    However the Iraqis have a fully representative, elected Council of Representatives now, an astonishingly varied free media and unrestricted access to the internet/blogosphere where the full gamut of Iraqi opinion is continually expressed.
    It’s hard to imagine the Iraqis choosing to revert to a system of government where only one opinion is allowed and the free media and internet are banned again?

  12. “On point 5, it is very clear to me that one of the key things the UN will need to do is organize new national elections, preferably under a constituency-based system, to generate a new, post-occupation national leadership capable of both governing the country and crafting a new, genuinely nationalist-Iraqi Constitution.”
    Helena, I ask again:
    Do you propose that the UN should unilaterally declare the 2005 Iraqi constitution approved by 80% of a national vote, SUPERVISED by the UN itself, as null and void?
    If so, what are your reasons?

  13. Bb, you know it’s not for you or me to say anything about the legitimacy or otherwise of the Iraqi constitution that Iraqis adopted while they were still under US occupation. It is for Iraqis to decide whether it still serves their needs as a nation. It is already widely understood in Iraq, and even beyond, that it needs some significant revision. But if the Iraqis, negotiating with each other in an environment free of US political control decide to revise it very radically or do it over completely, that is quite up to them.
    From an international law perspective, the whole project undertaken by the US, which was still a belligerent occupying power, to revise the Iraqi governance system was quite illegal. But as I said, it’s for Iraqis to decide what they want to do, in an environment that is as far as possible free of coercion from the US, and in light of the experience they’ve had living with this constitution which for many, perhaps most, of them has not been a happy one.

  14. BB, you have a very interesting way of twisting people’s statements into things they do not mean. Pointing out the demonstrable fact that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want the U.S. out and the sooner the better is not even remotely the same as saying I only want people consulted who agree with me. The two things are, in fact, completely unrelated.
    I meant what I said, bb. The fact that even this group of otherwise enlightened people believe it is appropriate to include only two token Iraqis, and in a peripheral role, is unfortunate and disappointing – to put it nicely. That is exactly what I meant, simply, and it is all I meant no matter how hard you work to make it fit your prejudices.
    you are not seeking a representative group of Iraqis, but only those who agree with your own political opinion?
    I am not seeking anything. I am commenting on the extremely disappointing choice made by Chris Toensing and his colleagues in the project. That is all.
    In which case, the representation may as well have been confined to the two spokespersons you mentioned, as they no doubt more than adequately expressed the opinions you agreed with – and which the committee would also share, would they not?
    No. And please stop making things up, will you?
    The Iraqis deserve more than outsiders insisting there can be only one opinion.
    1. Who says I am an outsider?
    2. I insisted on nothing of the kind. I stated simply that including only two Iraqis and even then in a peripheral role is unfortunatel and disappointing. That is what I said, that is what I meant, and it is all I meant.
    3. In fact, having outsiders deciding for Iraqis about their country and their lives is EXACTLY what Christ Toensing and his colleagues did, and it is precisely what I was objecting to.
    However the Iraqis have a fully representative, elected Council of Representatives now…
    No they don’t, although the Parliament is far better than Maliki and his make-believe government are. Unfortunately, though, the “Council of Representatives” does not have much in the way of real power. They are pretty much hamstrung by Maliki and his American masters.
    It’s hard to imagine the Iraqis choosing to revert to a system of government where only one opinion is allowed and the free media and internet are banned again?
    Where on EARTH did THAT come from? Who has suggested anything remotely like that? Seriously bb, sometimes your mental leaps are impossible to follow.

  15. Don I agree with everything you said – almost. Where I take exception is here:
    The last time I checked, Iraq was a sovereign country…
    You’re kidding, right?
    …with an elected leadership.
    Depends what you mean by elected, I suppose. Maliki is prime minister only because he was acceptable to the Americans, not because he was the choice of Iraqis. As you may recall the first choice was unequivocally declared “unacceptable” by George Bush. A few days later Condi Rice and Jack Straw appeared in Baghdad, and when they left they had their man Maliki – relatively unknown, and far more pliant – in the top job.
    And then there is Mam Jalal Talibani, the warlord who gives new meaning to the word opportunist. Not to mention Hoshiar Zabari, aka the Kitchen Cat, another lifelong opportunist. These people do not have Iraq or Iraqis anywhere on their list of priorities.
    The parliament comes the closest to actually being elected, and are several cuts above Maliki and his crew. However, they have only as much power as Maliki and his American masters are willing to give them. Look, for example, at how they are being completely bypassed, in violation of the Iraqi Constitution, on this so-called “security agreement”. And they are being bypassed precisely because the American agenda depends on this agreement, and there isn’t a chance in hell they would pass it.
    Its leaders have their faults, but they seem okay to me.
    They are neither leaders, nor are they okay, and the vast majority of Iraqis do not think they are OK. In fact, they are not really a government because they do not function as a government in any real way. They are completely beholden to a foreign power, not to the Iraqi people or the Iraqi state.
    They are far from OK. They run sectarian death squads and torture rooms, they hold political prisoners, and have been responsible for much if not most of the “sectarian” violence. They are willing to see homes and neighborhoods destroyed and Iraqi men, women, and children left homeless, and maimed and killed in order to wipe out a powerful political opponent (i.e. Muqtada Sadr) who is deemed likely to outdo them in the provincial elections.
    No, Don, they really are not okay and the poll figures show that most Iraqis living in Iraq do not think they are okay. Iraqis deserve to have a real election, not one designed, run, and manipulated by a self-interested occupying power.

  16. BB, you appear to be unaware of some of the realities around the Iraqi Constitution. For example, you apparently do not know that the largely American-designed constitution was not made available to most Iraqi people to read prior to their voting on it, and that substantive changes were made to it just prior to the vote that Iraqi people were not made aware of at all.
    I believe the American term is “buying a pig in a poke”. Don’t know where that expression comes from, but I DO understand what it means, and Iraqis were sold a pig in a poke.

  17. “It is for Iraqis to decide whether it still serves their needs as a nation. It is already widely understood in Iraq, and even beyond, that it needs some significant revision. But if the Iraqis, negotiating with each other in an environment free of US political control decide to revise it very radically or do it over completely, that is quite up to them.
    From an international law perspective, the whole project undertaken by the US, which was still a belligerent occupying power, to revise the Iraqi governance system was quite illegal. But as I said, it’s for Iraqis to decide what they want to do, in an environment that is as far as possible free of coercion from the US, and in light of the experience they’ve had living with this constitution which for many, perhaps most, of them has not been a happy one.”
    Fair enough then.
    It would be up to the COR to legislate for a constitutional review committee. My reading of the constitution suggests that its recommendations would have to be passed by a two thirds majority and then by a national vote of the Iraqi people. In the event of that vote, the constitutional changes could be vetoed by a two thirds majority of THREE provinces.
    This would suggest that any radical constitutional changes are unlikely, and would only be on the margins. More likely, imo, is that an “upper house” or “Senate” might be established, as this is already provided for in the constitution? But this would be a fair way in the future.
    Despite its teething pains, Iraq has the first and only truly representative democracy in the Arab world and has constitutionally embedded limitations on executive power that can only be dreamt about in other Arab countries.
    It was approved by 80% of the voters in Oct 05.
    Personally I think it would be more useful if you and other likeminded people put your minds to throwing up ideas as to how the current constitution and electoral system could be made to work better rather than advocating a wholesale throwing-out which could only be imposed on Iraq by force?

  18. B. Hussein Obama may not be needing the services of that pack of policy-job seekers after all:
    Yet to Come: The Biggest Flip-Flop of Them All
    Obama was a relative moderate on the war during his first year in the Senate. He gave one speech against the war in 2002, but by the time it became clear he would face no serious challenger in his Senate race, he cooled his rhetoric, and even spoke out against timetables for withdraw. When he arrived in Washington, he waited 18 months before making his first floor speech on Iraq. Then Obama began his campaign for the presidency. Playing to the Democrartic party’s antiwar base, Obama pledged to withdraw troops regardless of the facts on the ground. He opposed the surge, and even warned that it would make the violence worse. And as progress became apparent, he stubbornly refused to recognize the gains our troops were making.
    But Obama is a man of change. Just in the last week he dropped his opposition to telecom immunity, his support for handgun bans, his pledge to take public financing and renegotiate NAFTA–all core issues for Obama, or they were supposed to be. So what issue will he shift on next? After looking at the numbers from yesterday’s Quinnipiac battleground polls , we’re betting Iraq. It turns out that Americans as a whole aren’t nearly so eager for surrender as the left-wing of the Democratic party, and Obama isn’t much for staking out unpopular positions.
    The left should brace itself: Obama’s going to be pro-surge, pro-troops, and pro-victory by this time next month.
    ____
    Purple Kool-Aid time, then? God knows best.
    Happy days.

  19. Iraq has the first and only truly representative democracy in the Arab world
    How nice that you have the luxury of entertaining such pretty fantasies, bb. Too bad Iraqis, and not you, are all living the reality.

  20. Sorry, Don, I do not understand your question. What do I suggest in regard to what exactly?

  21. Shirin, since you are at odds with the titular leadership of Iraq, and Iraq’s lack of democracy, what do you propose be done by Iraqis and by outside interests?

  22. Don, I don’t think there is much that Iraqis can do as long as the occupation continues, outside of continuing to oppose and fight the occupation in whatever ways they can. As for outside interests, they best thing they can do is stay out of Iraq’s business, and that goes double for the United States.
    The situation is unacceptable. The government is unacceptable. The constitution is unacceptable. All need to be changed, but certainly not under the auspices of the United States, which would only manipulate the process to its own advantage once again. Just look at how the U.S. and its agents Maliki and his government are using massive military violence to change the results of the upcoming provincial elections. Look at the death and destruction and suffering they have caused to accomplish a political goal. And what would they be willing to do to defeat a strong opponent if there were an election for a new national government?

  23. So, are you saying that the US should simply withdraw from Iraq and allow Iraqis to deal with their own problems? And that no American plan, other than a withdrawal plan, is required?
    I would tend to go that way. Of course (1)Iran is tied tightly to Maliki and Badr and (2) The US will never leave unless it is forced out, which might happen because of (1). And if Sadr aligns with the Sunnis, then Maliki would be seriously weakened.
    I’m afraid Iraq will be like I/P, going on and on.

  24. Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. Just get out, get out completely, and get out quickly and leave Iraq to Iraqis.
    I do not think Iraq would be like I/P at all. The two situations have nothing in common really historically or in any other way. Unlike the Israelis and Palestinians Iraqis have centuries of history of living together without serious, protracted, widespread conflict. I don’t think things will suddenly become wonderful as soon as the Americans are gone, but the situation can never begin to resolve as long as they are there.

  25. PS Don, contrary to the contrafactual nonsense that has become, by incessant repetition, received reality, Iraqi people from all sectors have a very strong sense of identity as Iraqis, and that is something that unifies them. The conflict we have seen since 2003 is an aberration, not the norm.

  26. I’m with you. I have never been to Iraq, but I get the sense that they are a remarkable people. Let them be. I’m sure many Americans feel that way too. Unfortunately, when money is involved, the politicians follow the money and not the people. So we need to support Helena (though we may differ on the details) and other strong voices for peace and common sense (which isn’t so common).

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