Contribution from Carl Conetta of the Project for Defense
Alternatives to the discussion on the ‘Necessary Steps’ report on how to
withdraw from Iraq,
sent June 28, 2008 in response to the comments
made on the report by Helena Cobban, June 25
Published here by
permission of Carl Conetta and under JWN’s usual Creative Commons
license (main principles: always give attribution; don’t use for
profit-making endeavors without negotiating specific permission.)
On Saturday Carl Conetta, who
was a member of the “experts’ group” for the recent “Necessary Steps”
report, sent me this thoughtful response to my JWN comments of June 25.
Most of what he wrote
he keyed directly to the rows in the table in that
post. So as soon as I have time, I shall make a new
column for the table and insert his comments into it. It’s a
good discussion. ~HC
Here’s what Carl wrote:
I found
your review of the report thoughtful and
helpful. Probably the most thorough and thoughtful review that the
report will
receive. So thank you. Important additions and amplifications as
well.
Carl
Conetta
Regarding
some of the points of difference you
mention, my comments:
1.
Handoff to UN. I tend toward your view, but
there were differences among participants about UN capacities, Iraqi
acceptance
of UN authority, and whether leaning heavily on the UN would really
answer
congressional concerns about post-withdrawal stability. Personally, I
think the
first two of these concerns are resolvable. But whatever the nature of
the UN
mandate after US withdrawal, it would have to be sell-able to an Iraqi
populace
that is pretty sick of occupation by foreigners.
2.
Arab-Israeli conflict. I agree that much of
the instability that troubles the Muslim world gains impetus from this
conflict.
But I don’t think resolution of it is essential in order to
reduce the risks of
post-withdrawal bloodshed and chaos in and around Iraq. And the latter
objective
was the aim of the report. Baker-Hamilton linked the two
theaters with a
bigger vision and agenda in mind. If, indeed, reducing the risks I
mention are
contingent on progress in the A-I conflict, then we’ll be in
Iraq a long time.
Conversely, some of the international mechanisms that would be
established as
part of the Task Force agenda might contribute indirectly to progress
in the A-I
conflict (mostly by building cooperation with Syria and
Iran). Of course,
progress in A-I disputes would be helpful to stability in
Iraq. And the
issue, IMHO, is as important.
3.
Elections and constitution. I think the
balance of opinion on the TF was that this would follow on the new
“national
reconciliation” process and/or be a necessary part of it. There was
some
concern, I think, that specifying too many requirements here would
impede
withdrawal or undercut withdrawal sentiment. Also, some debate and
tension about
what constitutes ongoing meddling. So we had to balance different
concerns.
Anyway, I agree that Iraq’s long-term stability requires a
constitutional
rewrite. I think that the present election system is also flawed.
Moreover, this
needs to be overseen by the United Nations.
4.
You’re right that not enough was said about
repatriation and assistance to IDPs. But I don’t think anyone
intended to
exclude or impede these options. The point was that
repatriation will be a
long task and perhaps not preferred by the displaced Iraqis. The
principal
concern here was not to subtly compel repatriation when many may just
want to
get the hell out and stay out for a while. Still, most will want to
return, if
not right away then soon or eventually. I think we all support that
fully.
And the report should have said more about how we could facilitate
that.
RE:
YOUR COMMENTS IN TABLE
Row
A.
*
You’re right that sequencing is ambiguous,
reflecting the fact that you’d probably get different answers
from different TF
members and advisors. My own opinion (and of some others, I think) is
that the
Iraqi government needs to know where we’re headed (ie. out)
very soon and that
key players (especially UN) need to know and be brought into the
process quickly
(ie. before “official” announcement of withdrawal). Publicly, something
like
what you suggest would seem to occur (perhaps a few months into the
behind-the-scenes process): public withdrawal announcement, request to
UN, quick
convening of various support elements. Realistically, though, the USA
would have
to commit considerable political capital and resources to grease the
wheels
beforehand. My opinion: All the players would need to be prepared to
step
forward very fast once withdrawal is officially announced. Anything
less would
invite instability.
*
Functions of the “International Support
Group” are outlined on Page 12. Besides the functions outlined there,
it could
offer a “pool of capabilities” to provide and coordinate various types
of
material support to Iraq under UN supervision. What types of support?
TF members
and advisors differed on this. Certainly humanitarian, reconstruction,
and
development. I would add a “Security Support” component that, beyond
blue
helmets, would assist in the further development of Iraqi Security
Forces.
* I
agree that part of the UN mission would be
supporting the renovation of Iraqi governance structures and would
include
election oversight. TF members and advisors differed on this. As for
the
specific type of democratic structure. The group didn’t
broach this, either. Too
interventionary, for some. Of course, as you point out, this (and the
constitution) is essential to Iraq’s long-term stability. [
Personally, I favor
tying assembly seats to sub-provincial administrative units according
to some
population-related rule and then filling those seats according to
proportional
representation. This should result de facto in a flexible
constituency-based
outcome. ]
>>>
It is important to note a
persistent tension in the TF and advisor group between three objectives
(1)
developing initiatives to “reduce the risks of post-withdrawal chaos
and
bloodshed”, (2) achieving relatively rapid withdrawal, and (3) letting
Iraqis
completely assume the reigns of government as quickly as possible. How
to
balance these? TF members and advisors differed.
Row
B.
* On
stemming the flow of arms. As you note:
once we leave, other powers may try to continue or to ramp-up flows of
arms and
assistance to various groups. Indeed, there could be a surge in
anticipation of
our leaving. I agree, responsibility to stop it falls to the UN after
we leave.
But we need to develop better multi-national mechanisms before and
during
transition. The transition needs to be seamless, not punctuated by a
gap. My own
view is that this is solved principally by political means via the
International
Support Group, which must include all of Iraq’s neighbors.
But there’s a role
for technical means, too, as well as better and joint border control.
Row
C.
*
Well, as I said above, I disagree on the
necessity of linkage between resolving the A-I dispute and the goals of
withdrawing from Iraq while reducing risks of post-withdrawal chaos. If
I’m
wrong about this, then we’re stuck in Iraq for a very long
time. Don’t get me
wrong, I think resolving the A-I dispute is as important to regional
stability
as Iraq withdrawal – or even more so. I just don’t
see them linked in the way
you and Baker-Hamilton do.
* On
US vs UN as driver of international
efforts. I agree it should be UN in the lead ASAP. I would have liked
to see the
report put more emphasis on the UN generally. But TF members and
advisors differ
on this. At any rate: practically speaking, the US must put tremendous
weight
behind this for it to really work. And that means, initially, being
ahead of the
UN, getting people into the process and underwriting the process.
Another reason
this section of the report put emphasis on specifying the things the US
must do
and push was to convey to congress that just dumping the mess in the
UN’s lap
was not sufficient.
Row
D.
* It
may be the case that in 10 or 12 or 15
months Iraq will not require any outside security forces. I think it
will.
Either way, the report makes such arrangements provisional. Still, the
international community must be ready for it.
* I
don’t think US forces should be a part of
this – except perhaps in small numbers providing service
support. Some provision
for US rapid reaction support (delivered from outside Iraq) might be
good as
well (and will exist, at any rate).
Row
E. I already mentioned some things about
the repatriation issues. Regarding “third countries”: this does include
the
United States.
Row
F. In this context, “America must lead” was
meant to imply “first to pony up” and “most generous”, not that we
should grab
and hold onto leadership. I do agree, though, that how we
express and seek
leadership is an issue worth watching. I wrote on this a
while back:
Also
indicative of the “hegemonic
presumption” is our fixation on “American global leadership”
– as a
pre-eminent and necessary end. We’re obessed with extoling,
asserting,
justifying, and defending it. That we intend to lead in every dimension
seems
often to overshadow what we intend to do. AND ALSO:
The
United States should seek to win leadership, rather than simply
claim or assert it. American efforts at engagement will be most
reliably
productive if we build consensus through dialogue, not inducement. We
should
aim to convene, facilitate, and provision cooperative action. This
implies
“leading” from within the team as a co-equal
member.
When A Map
Is Worth a Thousand Words
The only involvement the United States should have in Iraq after it withdraws completely is the payment of reparations mandated and administered by a third party not allied or beholden to the United States. Other than that, the United States has no right to any kind of involvement, not military, not political, and not economic. Individual Americans and NGO’s who wish to come to Iraq to assist in the recovery and reconstruction of the country and its people UNDER IRAQI DIRECTION are another story. They should be be welcomed.
And by the way, “small numbers [of U.S. forces] providing service support” is not complete withdrawal, and “US rapid reaction support (delivered from outside Iraq)” is absolutely not acceptable as it will certainly be used in the furtherance of American and not Iraqi interests. Nor is any kind of “aid” money acceptable because that is ALWAYS tied to conditions favorable to the United States, and would be used later if not sooner to coerce the government.
Oh yes, and the Regional Imperial Command and Control Center must be dismantled and the land returned to Iraqis. After a legitimate Iraqi government can be elected in a legitimate election if that government wants to establish real diplomatic relations with the United States, let the United States set up a real embassy for diplomatic purposes, not a citadel from which to run its imperial acquisition.
It’s time to Re-Engage:
“True security is people-centered rather than state-centered, she wrote (page 103, R-E). And: Wouldn’t a diplomacy based on the “Golden Rule” of treating the peoples of other countries with the same fairness, respect and generosity that we hope to enjoy from them do more to build the real security of U.S. citizens than one that seeks to grab unilateral advantage for American corporations wherever it can? Why does our country’s approach to the other people and governments of the world need to be marked so deeply by fearfulness and mistrust, rather than by hope and a sense of responsibility . . .(p. 104, R-E)
Do we follow the old American Exceptionalist way of ordering what we want, perhaps using the UN as a foil, or do we sit down as equals with liberated Iraqis and acknowledge that they have the power?
An international worker I admire, not the one quoted above, was instrumental in setting up a girls secondary school in an impoverished city of Brazil (Salvador) where females have few rights. She gave money she had raised, and advice, but she ceded all control to a local Brazilian woman. She believed that to get power, and results, you have to give up power, and she demonstrated her belief by action. Some of ‘her girls’ are now in college.
The only involvement the United States should have in Iraq after it withdraws completely
Shirin, I think there is far important point from what you said.
While the democratic world concerning on issues around the world in regards to dictatorship’s crisis or rough regimes like what we seeing in Sudan, or Mozambique Robert Mogabi doing and others.
Should be the same democratic world bring those who lied and run to war in Iraq on false claims to justices? This is important point not just the money it will be a historical moment and event in US democracy and the world to see people who lied and planed to ruined member of UN state for five years and they keep saying we do for the best of humanity and Iraqis while their acts not justified at all and regarded no more than crimes and human catastrophe with people have nothing to do with US and with war on terror which designed by those war criminals think-Tank to lead our world.
Those who sit in Think Tank are criminals should be fronting them and brought to justice sooner not later.
Mean while you keep feeding you up with these photos and pictures from Iraq with your heros hardworks!! as if Iraq living in 17th century they forgot their claims that Iraq was developed and had the 3rd strong military power Iraqi developed WMD and scientists that Saddam relay on them.
This the pictures all over in the media in the news and most importantly on US site
Operation Iraqi freedom, dose any western car if he looks to that photos which first bring to mind that these people living in mud hoses control vast oil reserve 2nd or 3rd let push to withdrawal our tropes from their, hill now, who cares then
Salah, I agree with you completely that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and the other criminals who are responsible for the catastrophe in Iraq should be brought to justice. I don’t have much hope, though, that this will ever happen.
I don’t have much hope, though, that this will ever happen.
Same for you call of “the payment of reparations ” this may be the opposite, it might I am sure will be Iraqi will bay for those 4113 US marines killed and also tens of thousands who disabled by the war on the claims that we went for you help!
Just reading found that one Senator talking about high oil prices saying let get that damn oil form there where our Sons, Brothers and Sister fighting!! Ok it’s a US Promises Land isn’t?
Five years after the U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, Iraq is throwing open its oil sector to foreign oil firms in a way Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others in the region are reluctant to. Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani “(Iraian Guy do care about Iraqis!!)” says no company will have any special privilege.
Wonder how the truth manipulated and how people talking about Iraq from illegal invasion to “sovereign” government and fake political setup. many regarded as if this is a new Iraq where people of Iraq have seeing the horrible live to push them out of their land and country, slaughter them, make their life hill in many ways form Shock & Awe to death squad to sectarian cleaning and assassinations and most importantly horribly daily life for those who still live. Finally to make them to obey the master and obliged for his demand even their Allah gifted resources just to get their minim life back.
Just talking to some family members and friends still in Iraq recently, Imagine Shirin the garbs from household for FIVE years no one collected although there were some times was collection but imagine the life of Iraqi in the middle of piles of garbage and rubbish any one who speak here and comment have his mind in his head knew what such life Iraqi have under your administration liberation and progress they making in Iraq?