So Hamas has now signed on to a ceasefire/truce plan with Israel that covers in the first instance only the Israel-Gaza front, but with a proposal that this be extended to the West Bank according to a fixed (but at this stage undisclosed) timetable.
This is in line with the expectations I reported on here on Tuesday.
In the Reuters report that’s linked to above, Jonathan Wright writes that,
- Israel said it was ready for “quiet” at the Gaza border, but that it would require a complete halt to attacks by Hamas on Israelis, a stop to cross-border rocket fire from all Palestinian groups and an end to weapon smuggling into Gaza.
“We can’t have a period of quiet that will just be the quiet before the storm,” said Mark Regev, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
[An un-named Palestinian official close to the talks] said Hamas made any truce conditional on Israel opening all of Gaza’s border crossings and halting military action in the territory.
The Islamist group had backing from other Palestinian militant factions in the enclave, he added.
With this agreement, both sides would seem to win a significant portion of what they sought. Israel wins the cessation of attacks on its people from Gaza. Hamas wins Israel’s agreement that this ceasefire be reciprocal (no small feat), and also the lifting of the siege of Gaza.
But each side has things it wants to win that it still has not. Primarily, for the Israelis, the release of Gilad Shalit (which will be part of a prisoner exchange); and for the Palestinians, the extension of the tahdi’eh to the West Bank (in their locution, this would constitute a “comprehensive” ceasefire.”)
Egypt’s intel chief Omar Suleiman has been the main intermediary in these negotiations. Al-Masry al-Yawm‘s Fathiyya Dakhakhni reported today that Suleiman is due to travel to Israel pretty soon to resume negotiations on these remaining issues.
No word yet on whether Hamas has specified the length of the timetable within which they want to win the extension of the ceasefire to the West Bank, far less what that length might be.
Wright attributes to Egypt’s official MENA news agency a quote from an un-named senior Egyptian official to the effect that this truce “would contribute to talks between Israel and the rival Fatah movement of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, as well as to reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.” That I doubt. In fact, coming just as Abu Mazen is about to meet Bush here in Washington, it considerably undercuts Abu Mazen’s position by showing the whole world that Israel considers it more important to negotiate a tough deal with Hamas rather than to make nice with him in the US-sponsored formal peace talks.
At this point, I imagine that many Israeli officials are concerned first and foremost about securing a degree of calm in their country as they prepare for their 60th anniversary celebrations. Hamas and its allies are the ones with the ability to deliver– or withhold– that calm. Abu Mazen is not.
One main issue ahead will be that of responsibility for verifying the ceasefire. This is crucial to its robustness. I hope Omar Suleiman has made provision for that. Because without verification, any small (or large) mischief-maker on either side of the line could easily torpedo it. Maybe if, under the terms of the siege being lifted, the EU regains a (possibly slightly differently configured) monitoring presence at Rafah, then an expanded EU mission could also provide ceasefire verification?
Let’s wait and see.
On a related topic, do you think there’s anything to this?
I seriously worry that all this news about an alleged Syrian nuclear facility is some attempt to sabotage a Golan peace.
Hi. Yes, the news Jonathan refers to about what Olmert may have asked Erdogan to pass on to Asad are certainly intriguing, and for now I find them pretty hard to evaluate. Especially since there is simultaneously the publicizing– though largely, I think, from the US side– of the videos that allege bad things about the site that was bombed in Syria.
Personally, I still haven’t been able to figure out all this latest Israel-Syria stuff. The Israel-Hamas stuff, by contrast, is something I’ve been watching like a hawk over recent weeks– and it’s an area in which real things (as opposed to possible dances of the seven veils) are actually happening.
Re the VOA piece, how depressing that they used Zal Shoval as a major source/commentator. What terrible, skewed “judgment”.
The BBC ran this story at the top. I wonder how come the NY Times doesn’t think that this is news fit to print.
Bob Spencer
Jonathan,
This has been in the press here since the beginning of the week. They Syrians pretty much timed the release to coincide with the end of Carter’s visit to Damascus.
It has caused some noise locally, but I would say this is considerably less than the “political storm” described by the VOA reporter.
Personally, I don’t see why this should be so intriguing. This essentially the same deal offered, in turn, by pretty much every prime minister since Yitzhak Rabin. The sticking point has always been with the 400 meter disparity between the 1920’s international border and the 1949 armistice line. But Rabin offered the same thing, as did Netanyahu (through a letter carried to Syria by Ron Lauder), as well as Barak.
For their part, the Syrians have always insisted on returning to the negotiations from exactly the point where they left off under Rabin. I guess that they don’t realize that it’s not as easy in a democracy for a prime minister to counter a programme on which he was elected as it is in the type of political system that Syria currently enjoys.
What is interesting is what the Arab, and particularly Syrian, press have been saying. They are trying to present this as a victory. How? They are asserting that Olmert has backed of previous Israeli demands that the deal include a commitment for Syria to (1) stop supporting Hizballah, (2) kick the Palestinian leadership – primarily Hamas leadership – out of Damascus, and (3) stop supporting Iran.
I find it interesting because it parallels what the Hamas leadership has been trying to do by portraying the “Gaza-first” tahdiyya as as staged “calming” rather than as a major retreat on previous firm stands that they have taken, and a clear indication of how weak they have become.
Helena is very optimistic about the prospects of a Hamas/Israel ceasefire.
But what happened after the last one, in 2006? This ended the Israeli onslaught on Gaza after Hamas had torpedoed the PA unity government negotiations by attacking into Israel, killing two soldiers on Israeli soil and kidnapping Shalit?
Israel eventually withdrew following a ceasefire with Hamas.
What happened then?
Within a few months Hamas consolidated its arming and military prepations, had taken over Gaza by force and kicked the PA out?
Since then Hamas has been heavily arming, as Helena has noted here, both against Israel and preparatory to its future prospects for take over of the west bank.
So what would an Israeli agreement to a new ceasefire with Hamas imply? Acceptance of Hamas as the rightful government of Gaza? Rejection of the PA government in the west bank with whom it it supposedly negotiating final status arrangements?
It’s not hard to see why a ceasefire would suit Hamas, but can someone explain to me why the Israeli government would see it in its interests to switch sides, abandon Abbas and empower Hamas even further?
Israel has powerful friends in Washington (but Palestinians have rockets).
WASHINGTON, April 26 – Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said Friday that he failed to achieve any progress in Middle East peace talks with U.S. President George W. Bush and he is returning home from Washington with little to show for his visit.
“We demanded the Americans implement the first phase of the road map that talks about the cessation of settlement expansion,” Abbas said, expressing disappointment the U.S. has not exerted more pressure on Israel to stop. “This is the biggest blight that stands as a big rock in the path of negotiations.”
Israel is pushing forward with controversial building projects on disputed land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and has so far refused to evacuate illegal settlement outposts, release Palestinian prisoners, halt military incursions, and dismantle roadblocks that severely disrupt daily life.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/978049.html
So much for Annapolis.