Palestinian choice on dealing with a hostile status quo

My good friends Hussein Agha and Rob Malley have a thoughtful and generally intelligent article on the current (sad) state of the formal Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” in the latest New York Review of Books. They do a good job of describing the Bush administration’s bizarre strategy of trying to get Olmert and Abbas to reach what is called a “shelf agreement” by the end of this year– that is, a full final-status Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement that will be signed, ratified through referenda held in both national constituencies– and then, quite simply, be set on a dusty shelf someplace “until circumstances permit” its implementation.
If this is a recipe for anything, it is most surely a recipe for kicking all the many political problems any US president faces in doing Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy along into the next presidency. That is, even if supposing the whole project doesn’t crash long before that…
As I say, Agha and Malley do a good job of describing that. But it’s where they voice their own proposals for what might be done to improve the strategy that they look a bit as though they’re trying to re-arrange a few last deckchairs on the Titanic. They make the generally laudable suggestions that a way has to be found to include Hamas and if possible also Syria into the negotiating process, and make some excellent arguments as to why these steps would be good. Where they are considerably less sound, though, is on limning out what incentive those two important actors might have for joining the process as it is currently structured (and therefore, what changes might be necessary in the process if indeed they are to be persuaded to join.)
Hussein and Rob also keep their general diplomatic/political horizons incredibly tightly focused within the purview of a US-dominated global and regional environment. For example, at one point they argue that the peacemaking approach has “always” been one of choosing whether the Syrian track or the Palestinian track should go first, and the assumption they can’t both be pursued together. But that has really only been the case since 1992 or so. At the Madrid conference of 1991, remember, both parties were well-represented (even if the Palestinian delegates there were still only acting within the fig-leaf of a “joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.”) But the idea that only one lucky contestant– either the Palestinians, or the Syrians– is allowed through the diplomatic gate at any one time is certainly a creation of the post-Cold War, “unipolar” era. Prior to that, there had always been strong pushback, including from the Soviets and other international actors including most Europeans, to that noticeably divide-and-rule approach… And such pushback may well return again.
Personally, I have always argued for a “comprehensive” approach to this peace diplomacy, in which all the complex intertwining tradeoffs can be explicated and resolved together and the state of hostility between Israeli and all of its neighbors be ended once and for all. In the present circumstances, it may even be necessary to aim for this comprehensive peace within the even broader regional context of concluding a comprehensive Mesopotamian and Gulf peace, as well.
Which brings me to the failure of the NYRB duo to even consider that the global/regional environment within which Arab-Israeli peacemaking efforts are pursued is already changing, and can certainly be expected to change even more rapidly over the 3-5 years ahead.
I get a little tired of all the deckchair-arrangers who don’t even look at the important broader questions of

    (1) Whether the US can indeed continue to “lead”– that is, as this “leadership” has been exercised until now, exercise complete unilateral veto power over– all the remaining Israeli-Arab peacemaking tasks?
    (2) Whether the US should continue to play that role; i.e. on what grounds do the peoples of the region and the world allot this important task to this distant country, and why should US presidents continue to set themselves up for all the hassle and hostility involved in this, anyway? And finally–
    (3) Whether a more legitimately constituted, UN-led and explicitly UN-anchored diplomatic intervention that embodies global values and is not tied into the partisan, often exclusionary diplomatic agenda of a single, distant power would not, indeed, bring much, speedier, more reliable, and more sustainable benefits to all the parties concerned? (And yes, that includes the citizenries of both Israel and the US as well as the Palestinians and the other Arab parties.)

Right now, we are still in the era of the US’s unipolar near-hegemony over the Middle East, though I don’t this will be the case for very much longer. I have heard any number of Palestinians who, like Hussein Agha, are close to the Fateh leadership, talk very patronizingly about their compatriots from Hamas. (In fact, I seem to recall that was a big theme in the long conversation I had with Hussein in London’s Holland Park a year ago.) These pro-Fateh people say things, “Oh, those Hamas people just really don’t understand how the world works. But maybe one day they’ll learn, and then they’ll be more like us.” My response to that is generally to say that in my experience, the Hamas people certainly do understand the present balance of power in the region– but rather than adapting themselves simply to work within in it, as most Fateh people decided to do many years ago, they are seeking to transform it. A very different mindset, indeed.

10 thoughts on “Palestinian choice on dealing with a hostile status quo”

  1. Ms. Cobban,
    Thank you for writing. I am so thankful for your investigative journalism, historical knowledge, and perspective.
    I appreciate your criticism of “Into the Lion’s Den”. I am writing to say that it was hard to finish reading after this passage:
    “The fate of the negotiations will remain, to a large extent, bound up in Hamas’s decisions. By continuing its path of ‘resistance’ (their quotes) and escalating its rocket attacks against Israeli targets, it can disrupt the talks, as it has already demonstrated in recent weeks. … Large-scale Israeli retaliation, with its inevitable civilian casualties, will increasingly make Abbas’s position untenable and expose him to vehement criticism.”
    Those words so clearly reveal the authors’ biases that I have difficulty trusting anything they write. I have never felt sufficiently informed on the specifics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is why I rely on you, nybooks and others. So it makes me angry and resentful to see such a statement from a publication which I have come to appreciate. And it makes me sad that you didn’t call them out up front.
    I hope you reply.
    Matt

  2. Yes, they seem to be the same old, same old suggestions. Six decades around the same circle! Very interesting post but.
    Agree with Helena, it’s only ever going to be solved by a comprehensive agreement tieng everybody in.
    Northern Ireland could/should have been a model? But that resolution only came to pass when Ireland itself pushed the process, which only occurred after economic prosperity started to spread through that country. In the Middle East there are what, 7 or 8 regional players who have to come to the party?
    Anyway, here’s my proposed 15 point plan:
    Everything to be agreed at the same time or nothing to be agreed:
    1. All Palestinian groups, all regional countries recognise Israel’s right to exist as a jewish state on the 1967 boundaries (Jerusalem excepted).
    2. All Israeli settlers in the west bank be given the option of becoming full citizens of the Palestinian state, or vamoosing back to Israel with compensation paid by the west and Israel.
    3.All Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries be offered nationality and full citizenship by those countries.
    4. Palestinian refugees not taking up (3) are entitled to live in the new state of Palestine, with compensation. They are only entitled to return to Israel unless the government of Israel agrees.
    5. All Palestinian political groups sign up to the democratic state of Palestine and most particularly to observing agreements entered into by past Palestinian governments.
    6. The Golan Heights are returned to Syria on the 1967 boundaries.
    7. The boundaries are recognised between Israel and Lebanon, between Syria and Lebanon and between Syria and Israel.
    8. Syria recognises the state of Lebanon.
    9. Israel has sovereignity over West Jersualem and the area under the al asqa mosque containing the jewish holy sites. Palestine has sovereignity over East Jerusalem, the al asqa mosque and the muslim holy sites. (Basically the Clinton proposal)
    10. Palestine and Israel commit to the protection of all the other’s holy sites in their states.
    11 ALL countries sign up to freedom of religion and freedom of worship in their states. This includes Saudi Arabia! And Iran! And Israel!
    12. Borders are open between Egypt and Gaza/Palestine and between Jordan and the new state of Palestine.
    13. Economic federation between Egypt, Jordan and Palestine.
    14. All parties agree no further territorial demands will be made on Israel or by Israel. (Again the Clinton proposals)
    15 All the above to be put to referenda not only in Palestine and Israel, but in all the regional countries too.
    !!!!! Sounds so easy, doesn’t it?!

  3. Does anyone doubt that if the US, the preeminent world power, with great influence in the Middle East, ‘snapped its fingers’ there would be a solution in Israel/Palestine? Obviously the US does not want a solution, and never has. Turmoil and conflict suit US foreign policy.

  4. Your proposals seem to fall into three categories: those which are reasonable, those which are unacceptable and those which are inexplicable.
    These last, such as the insistence that Saudi Arabia permit freedom of worship (presumably as defined in the US), are by far the larhest group and seem to reflect the American mania for interefering in other people’s affairs.
    Why, for example, should these questions be put to referenda in the neighbouring countries? Nothing else ever has been. The suggestion implies the “democratic revolution” (undefined but ominous) so often mention by the neocons.
    And why should there be a free trade area between Jordan Egypt and Palestine? Why not allow these states to be sovereign and make their own trade policies?
    And what state of Lebanon should Syria recognise? The current one in which the constitution excludes the largest part of the population from political power?
    As tto the boundaries between Israel, Lebanon and Syria what about the shebaa farms?
    Then there are unacceptable points. The first of these is the refusal of the right of return. This is an example of terrorism rewarded: cut it any way that you like but the 1948 refugees have claims which must be met. The offer of citizenship in any of the neighbouring lands is one which has existed since time immemorial: Palestinians lived in their country in 1948 because they chose to do so. They are not living there today because they or their ancestors were expelled.
    All in all, your proposals indicate a biass against Palestinians combined with the pseudo realism of believing that they are in no position to bargain.
    Militarily they are not, and any agreement they might reach will be, in current circumstances, under duress. That is not how peace is made.
    The first step must be the re-examination, openly and honestly of the events of 1948. The major obstacle to peace now is the dominance of an infamous alliance beween obscurantists, fascists and crooks which dominates Israeli politics thanks to the unfailing support it receives from the US government and its vassals. Once that claque has been brought to order the reasoned debate will begin, and not just in the middle east.

  5. bb – your “proposal” has that familiar ring of “reasonableness” based solely on “facts on the ground” and overwhelming military superiority. The problem is that the status quo is based on criminal acts, illegalities and violations of international law and human rights. Morality, legality and basic human rights should at least be recognized in any proposal. “Facts on the ground” simply give quasi legal sanction to the anachronistic ( I hope ) notion that relations between peoples should be based solely on brute force. Hopefully, humanity has moved beyond that, despite the efforts of the Bush administration to reverse historical, moral progress.

  6. Malley is on the advisory board of J Street, the new PAC positioning itself as an alternative to AIPAC. (The emergence of such an organization is about ten years too late.)
    Because it’s a crucial election year, and there’s the prospect of a Democratic administrations coming to power, those taking the lead in the new organization are being extremely, excessively cautious.
    People who will have real influence in a Democratic administration are fooling themselves that somehow the clock can be turned back, that Fatah will just pick up where they left off with the last Democratic administration. So, sadly, are leaders in Fatah.

  7. “Why, for example, should these questions be put to referenda in the neighbouring countries?”
    Because the Northern Ireland settlement could not have taken place without the question being put to a “yes” vote in Ireland. In the case of Israel/Palestine there are several countries who have a vested interest similar to that which Ireland had in relation to Northern Ireland.
    “And why should there be a free trade area between Jordan Egypt and Palestine? Why not allow these states to be sovereign and make their own trade policies?”
    Palestine would otherwise be forced back into dependancy on the Israeli economy.
    “And what state of Lebanon should Syria recognise?”
    The sovereign state of Lebanon which is a member of the UN.
    “The current one in which the constitution excludes the largest part of the population from political power? ”
    What business is it of Syria’s what the Lebanese political system is, any more than Syria’s political system should be the business of Lebanon?
    “As to the boundaries between Israel, Lebanon and Syria what about the shebaa farms?”
    The sovereignity issue re Shebaa is contested between Lebanon and Syria. This would be resolved when the borders are recognised by those two countries.
    “The first of these is the refusal of the right of return.”
    The right of return can only be imposed on Israel (or any other sovereign state) by consent or by military defeat.
    “The offer of citizenship in any of the neighbouring lands is one which has existed since time immemorial”
    The only state that has given Palestinians citizenship, as far as am aware, is Jordan? I am not aware that any other Arab state has offered citizenship to Palestinian refugees.

  8. bb, other states have given some displaced Palestinians citizenship at various times. A colleague of mine’s father was a Christian from Ramallah who left in 1948. He was given citizenship in Lebanon. Lebanon at the time wanted to keep their “demographic balance” and gave the Christian refugees citizenship. He told me it was only the Christians, and only what he called the “48s” who received this offer.

  9. seem to reflect the American mania for interefering in other people’s affairs.
    nothing more revealing than coarse national slurs. Bevin, you I think are maybe not an american, nor are many of the posters on this blog. Yet you regularly exhibit a mania for interfering in Israeli affairs. why then should bb not be concerned with Iranian affairs? Why aren’t you? Is religious freedom not as much right for Iranians and Saudis as sovereign rights for Palestinians?
    based solely on “facts on the ground” and overwhelming military superiority.
    Actually I think bb proposed a referenda on all these proposals. I know that you and bevin think you know what’s best for Palestinians, but I hope you’d admit that Palestinians themselves know more.

  10. Matt — you list of conditions will never fly. It will die on the very first condition, requiring that the Palestinians recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State. To the Palestinians this is a non-starter because they see it as recognizing that what Israel did to them both in 1948 and since than in the name of creating an maintaining a Jewish State.
    The creation of Israel as a Jewish State (a state with a Jewish Majority) required the removal of the indigenous Palestinian Majority in order for it to come about. Despite popular myths of the time Palestine was not a land without people, nor did the Palestinians just up and leave of their own free will without any force or fear. It has been documented and proven even by Israeli historians that a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Palestinians did indeed occur, and that in the 60 years since that the Palestinians have been denied the ability to return to their homes and property.
    For the Palestinians recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a jewish state is to recognize that the ethnic cleansing that was done to them was right. In many ways it would be like asking the Jews to recognize that Hitler was right in what he did. Since no one would ever dream asking the Jews to recognize that what the Nazi’s did to them was right how can anyone expect the Palestinians to do that in regards to Israel.
    To further add to this recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a jewish state is also perceived as giving a blank slate to future acts that Israel might conduct in the name of protecting the Jewish character and Jewish majority of the state. If the birth rate of non-jewish Israeli citizens begins to threaten the Jewish majority what than, would Israel be justified in expelling or sterilizing these people in the name of defending its jewish majority.
    The Palestinians might be willing to recognize Israel’s right to live in peace and even recognize that currently it has a jewish majority but they will never recognize Israel’s right to exist as a jewish state, its a non-starter and will only keep a peace process from coming to light.

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