More from Rabbani on Fateh

My esteemed colleague Mouin Rabbani was kind enough to send me a speedy and thoughtful response to the comments I wrote here, a couple of days ago, about the short article he wrote on Fateh in the latest issue of the “Arab Reform Bulletin”. Here it is, with his permission but under a headline composed by myself. ~HC

More notes on Fateh
By Mouin Rabbani
1. Fragmentation: I entirley agree with you. The point I sought to make is not that fragmentation into multiple, competing power centres is a new phenomenon, but that it has ‘progressed’ markedly in recent years relative to earlier periods – particularly since 2000 and especially so after Arafat’s death. Poor choice of words on my part.
As for your point that such an organisational structure may have been only way for Fatah to proceed in earlier eras I’m not sure I agree. While it doubtless served the agenda of being everything to everyone and thus played a role in Fatah’s ability to establish and maintain supremacy of the national movement, more disciplined and coherent forms of organisation are not so difficult to envisage. More importantly, I don’t think you can separate the relatively functional ‘controlled decentralisation’ – if you will – of the 1970s and 1908s from the endemic and accelerating fragmentation of more recent years.
2. Spinal cord analogy: I chose this because I believe that Fatah in its multiple forms collectively still represents the center of gravity of the Palestinian movement, and that the quadraplegic current status of the national movement is the result of the desultory state of this spinal cord.
3. Nature of challenges of 6th General Conference: I entirely agree it is not “merely a logistical, organisational problem”. I was pointing out that this is one, important aspect regarding the convening of the GC, not that it is either the more important one or even the most important dimension of Fatah’s broader crisis. So no disagreement between us here.
4. Return of exile leaders: Personally I fully concur with the decision of some key leaders to refuse to return to a partially self-governing occupied territory masquerading as a state in formation because in their view this would confer legitimacy on Oslo. As you point out in some cases such decisions were voluntary, in others leaders and cadres were prepared to return but blocked by Israel and/or sabotaged by members of the Palestinian Oslo elite inciting Israel against erstwhile comrades. Qaddumi like Hawatmeh falls somewhere in between – an initial refusenik, he later expressed an interest in returning and deals to this effect were ultimately vetoed by Israel (Netanyahu if I recall correctly).
Finally, yes, as you surmise I sought in this article to focus primarily on issues relating to the convening of the GC rather than Fatah’s broader crisis, though the two are obviously related. I am as it happens currently working on a broader examination of the latter.