I just want to add to all my previous posts here on the Gaza Palestinians’ bust-out of earlier today that the political ground for this intriguing new move was sown in good part by President Bush’s amazingly maladroit trip around the Middle East over the past two weeks.
During the trip, Bush underlined again and again his intense concern for Israelis, their security, and their every last little whim. But he turned a notably deaf ear to the pleas he heard from all his most ardent Arab friends that he do something to demonstrate some concern for the hardships being suffered by the Palestinians and some real resolve to stop, for example, Israel’s continued illegal encroachments on Palestinian land and the harsh– and also illegal– collective punishments it has been imposing on the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank for many years now.
Bush even attempted to publicly “joke” about of the hundreds of much-hated checkpoints/chokepoints that have been choking any semblance of ordinary life in the West Bank for many years, and jovially urged the Palestinians to just “forget about” the whole string of UN resolutions that underline what their rights to their own lands and to a decent life thereon really are.
During Bush’s visit to the region, Israel escalated its military attacks against the Gaza Palestinians. Much of the media in Syria and Lebanon, where I was until yesterday, was full of commentary to the effect that Bush gave Israel a “green light” to do that and also to tighten the screws of the siege it has maintained on Gaza for many years now.
Is it in any wonder that in these circumstances Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak evidently feels he can do nothing to intervene to re-close the wall between Gaza and Egypt, and no other Arab leaders are prepared to step forward to help to stem the tide of Hamas’s growing power?
8 thoughts on “As Bush sows, so Hamas reaps?”
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Helen, well written, and too true, but there is one typo, second paragraph, ‘please’, should be pleas, as in the plural of plea.
Thanks for alerting me to the typo, now corrected.
Yes.
I often wonder if Hamas could maintain its power without the Israeli right wing doing their cruelty. Likewise, can the Israeli right wing maintain its power without Mamas shooting off rockets, etc.
So, if Gaza becomes some sort of loosely associated part of Egypt and things get better for the people, what will the right wing or Hamas do to preserve their power. Hopefully, the will of the people will prevail.
Power to the People!
Bob Spencer
Helena, I wonder if the bust-out and associated developments represent a revival, or possibly a culmination, of the “parallel unilateralism” strategy that you postulated for Hamas after the January 2006 election. During the spring and summer of 2006, some of the Hamas ministers were talking about ending Gaza’s economic dependence on Israel and realigning the economy with the Arab world, which at least for the time being means Egypt in practical terms. Hamas has now taken a rather forceful step toward doing just that.
This might also lead, to some extent, to a revival of Israeli unilateralism. After the initial shock, some senior Israeli officials began spinning the bust-out as an opportunity for Israel to disengage from Gaza economically, and I don’t think that’s entirely spin. There’s some interesting analysis along those lines in today’s Yediot.
As for Bob Spencer’s speculation that Gaza might “become some sort of loosely associated part of Egypt,” I wonder if it might end up more the other way. I did some speculating of my own about the Gaza-Sinai relationship in late 2005, at the time the Rafah crossing reopened and before the rocket-closure-raid cycle started developing its own logic. The key points were that Gaza has six times the population of North Sinai governorate, that there was more money in Gaza than in that part of Egypt, that Egyptian security control in that region was tenuous and that the ports of al-Arish and Port Said had the potential to become a key Palestinian import-export route. All these, except possibly the second, remain true, and given that it will be a political impossibility for Mubarak to re-close the border (although he has built walls against his own Bedouin citizens), Sinai al-Shamaliyya might end up becoming a de facto Palestinian economic appendage. Interesting times.
I’ll close by questioning received wisdom, noting a legal paradigm shift, and indulging in some wild speculation.
Questioning received wisdom: I think we’ve been wrong all along in describing the siege of Gaza as an Israeli siege. In fact, ever since Israel left the Philadelphi route, it’s been an Israeli-Egyptian siege, and Egypt has maintained its end for its own reasons. Hamas correctly perceived Egypt as the military and political weak link, and chose to break the siege at the Egyptian border. I’ve actually wondered why it took so long; there have been partial breaches of the wall before, and I remember thinking at the time that Hamas would gain an advantage by widening them. Maybe it wasn’t yet ready, but I think it’s now very clear that they and Israel were never the only players.
The paradigm shift: now that the Egyptian border is open, Gaza can no longer be regarded as Israeli-occupied territory. Some scholars such as Dugard maintain that the occupation continued after the 2005 withdrawal because Israel continued to control the access points. I’ve argued in the past that international law precedents, such as the ICJ’s judgment in the DRC-Uganda case, don’t support this interpretation and that the occupation ended once Israel gave up effective control on the ground. At this point, however, the argument is moot: as long as the Egyptian border stays open, Gaza can’t seriously be regarded as occupied even under Dugard’s interpretation. This would mean that the law of belligerent occupation no longer applies to Gaza, although the humanitarian law of war, including the provisions relating to siege, still do. Israel is no longer legally responsible (note: legal and moral responsibilities aren’t necessarily the same) for the general welfare of Gaza, or for supplying its people with goods like electricity or fuel.
And now the wild speculation: On the hopeful side, this is a potential chance for Gaza to get its act together. The Palestinians have, to put it bluntly, choked on Gaza several times, and neither the PNA nor Hamas has been able to control the place sufficiently to govern it or to institute an effective cease-fire. Israel has been partly responsible for this state of affairs but so has Palestinian infighting and the prevalence of splinter militias. If Hamas can re-establish an economy in Gaza and use the popularity that it has surely gained from this move to consolidate its authority, then it might be able to work out a mutual cease-fire on the Israeli border, position itself as a responsible diplomatic player, and maybe even reduce the perceived risk of Gaza by enough to attract foreign investment. This would in turn increase the pressure on both Israel and Fatah to move toward ending the occupation in the West Bank, because otherwise Hamas would be able to point to its success in Gaza as the only viable alternative.
Working against this is the fact that Egypt will now take a major security interest in Gaza, given that a linkup between Hamas and the Egyptian ikhwan is Mubarak’s worst nightmare. As noted above, it’s politically impossible at the moment for him to close the border, but he isn’t going to just leave a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political organization alone. I think we can expect to see Egyptian security forces infiltrate Gaza in the near future, primarily in covert roles, and there’s a potential for major disruption if this turns into an undeclared Hamas-Egypt war.
Of course, the reverse might also happen – that Hamas would expand its security interests to include north Sinai. If the route to al-Arish becomes its lifeline, then it will want to protect its access to that route, and might find allies among the local Bedouins who are in effective revolt against the central government. I think Hamas wants to avoid this kind of entanglement, which is why it’s trying so hard now to come to an agreement with Egypt on border control, but I don’t think the possibility of Hamas strongholds or patrols in Sinai can be ruled out. This in turn would raise tensions along the Israel-Egypt border due to the increased possibility of infiltration.
There is now an opportunity for the Gaza crisis to either resolve into a new metastable arrangement, or to expand. I know which one I hope will happen, and I also know that I’m afraid the other will.
I see that about two thirds of the above comment came after I said I was going to “close.” Famous last words.
Anyway, two more observations: First, I wonder if Hamas will open Gaza to the Palestinians living in the Lebanese refugee camps, who are the worst-off of the refugees and have recently been hard hit by the Lebanese security forces. If Hamas wants propaganda victories – which it obviously does – then that could be a big one, and possibly a humanitarian victory as well.
Second, water will continue to be the bottleneck for Gaza even if the border stays open. It can get fuel, food and other supplies either from Egypt or through Port Said and al-Arish (the latter of which has recently been upgraded), but Egypt can’t supply water given its own scarcity, and importing the volume that Gaza needs to develop would be logistically difficult. This may preclude a complete economic disengagement between Gaza and Israel, at least in the immediate term. Do you have any idea how Hamas intends to go about resolving this situation?
On a not-entirely-unrelated topic, this may also be of interest.
Jonathan, a big welcome! It’s so great to have your comments here– especially since we don’t have your wisdom over at Head Heeb these days, alas.
When I have time I might lift your comments here into a main post (with full attribution to your good self, of course.)
Meantime, just know that yesterday I had immediately thought about and posted– here— about the possibility that this was delayed implementation of the “parallel unilateralisms” theory. I really welcome your further elaboration here of some of the big questions involved.
Anyway, read on down further into yesterday’s posts and see what else you find to comment on!
Thanks, Helena (and also for posting my comments on the front page). I’ll come back to this topic later; this could be one of the moments when regional politics undergoes a real shift, and it deserves discussion. I’ve already taken far too much time off work today, though, even if these days I have to reprimand myself for it.
At any rate, on a primal level, I’m glad the bust-out happened. The long-term ramifications could go many different ways, though, and not all of them are good.