US intel chiefs change view of Iran nuclear program

Excellent news today: the US government’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence made public a key “National Intelligence Estimate” report stating on p.6 of that PDF file that:

We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program…
* We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.

This is of course, excellent news. Both in itself, and because the release (and the meticulous-looking quality) of this report indicate that the important intelligence organs in this country have lost the cowed, excessively politicized character they had in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The ODNI was working on finalizing the text of this report even as President Bush and Vice-Prez Cheney continued to voice escalatory accusations against the Iranians, claiming they were still continuing with a well-established nuclear-weapons program.
As I’ve written here several times before, ever since I first came to the US in 1982, I have heard US and Israeli officials and semi-official sources claiming that Iran is “just two to five years” or thereabout away from having a nuclear weapon. I note that 1982 is now 25 years into the past and it hasn’t happened yet. Hence, my level of skepticism about all these very drumbeating and fear-inducing allegations is very high.
Regarding timeframe estimates, today’s NIE seemed to be all over the shop (i.e., the analysts were really not being willing to commit themselves to any firm estimate, which seems to me appropriate.) Here’s what they said:

* We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. [Note that technical capability is a different issue from having and pursuing an intention to produce nuclear weapons. ~HC] (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems. INR is the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which in 2002 was the intel-analysis agency that, as it turned out, got it the most right on Iraq’s WMDs ~ HC) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

Bottom line: there’s still time for engaged diplomacy to work.
The NIE says as much, too:

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

I’ve been trying to figure out what the development was that gave the ODNI the level of “high confidence” the NIE describes, regarding the fall 2003 halt in Iran’s NW program. The best guess I can make is some of the information contained in the report that IAEA Director General Mohamed elBaradei submitted to his board on November 15. The info in that report also, apparently, gave Russia the confidence it felt it needed to start shipping nuclear fuel rods– under IAEA supervision– to Iran’s Bushehr power plant.
ODNI’s public release of its report should considerably brake the rush that some portions of the Bush administration (especially people in Cheney’s office) have apparently been making, to ramp up the pressure on Iran and try to launch an attack against it before Bush leaves office. It is very good news indeed that the DNI himself, Adm. Mike McConnell, seems to have done his job in a highly professional, objective way– as opposed to George Tenet, who as Director of Central Intelligence in 2002 acted much more like a courtier, cherry-picking the intel at the whim of his political superiors.
Having McConnell in place now instead of Tenet, and Bob Gates instead of the criminally reckless Donald Rumsfeld, means the Bush administration is much, much less likely to launch a completely unjustified war against Iran in the months ahead than it would have been if those former high officials were still in place.
Great news.