The well-informed southern Iraq scholar Reidar Visser has an important new piece of analysis here, titled Basra Crude: The Great Game of Iraq’s “Southern” Oil.
He adds some very important clarifications to the whole current discussion of the linked questions of oil regulations and federalism in Iraq.
Some very important information he injects into this discussion:
- Accounting for one of the world’s greatest concentrations of petroleum wealth, almost all of Iraq’s supergiant oil fields can be found near Basra or in one of its two neighbouring governorates. The other six Shiite-majority governorates of Iraq have little or no oil, and even the most optimistic estimates of new discoveries in Kurdistan pale in comparison with the reserves of Basra and the far south.
This problem is particularly pronounced with regard to the areas south of Baghdad, where the conflation in the international media of the terms “Shiite”, “Southern Iraq” and “oil” masks an intense battle for control currently underway between competing political currents within Iraq’s Shiite community. Basra is unusual in that the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) – the Shiite party that has accomplished the remarkable feat of becoming the favourite Iraqi partner of both Washington and Tehran – is completely on the sidelines in local government. Instead, other local factions and especially the Fadila party have dominated since 2005. In the same period, the idea that Basra could become a small-scale federal entity of its own, separated from the rest of the Shiite territories, has gained some ground, while traditional Iraqi nationalism also seems to remain surprisingly strong among the population at large. The implication is that SCIRI’s competing project of a single Shiite super-region south of Baghdad will suffer from a glaring defect unless something changes dramatically in Basra: it will have almost no oil resources.
Visser also notes that if the currently proposed suggestions for revisions in the country’s oil-regulation laws are confirmed by the Iraqi parliament, then “the incentives for seeking federal status for existing governorates – such as Basra – will become greater.”
Anyway, go read his whole piece of analysis there. Then you can come back and discuss it– including, most likely, with Reidar himself– on the comments board attached to this post.
Yah, the next step disintegrated these regions and Iraq State gone forever, according to the plan (“We will Stay Till the Job Done!”, “Now or Never!”, Tony Blair), time will tell next Kirkuk drama.
Prof. Visser: Should I believe you or my lying eyes?
It is truly a great irony that Prof. Visser, one of the foremost proponents of the THEROY that the geographic boundaries of post Ottoman/British Iraq constitutes a national entry such that the people living within those boundaries identify with a common national ideology (virtually mocking those who see a tripartite division) contradicts his own theory by providing evidence of even further divisions than envisioned by the tripartitest. He now describes how one facet of the tripartite, Southern ‘Shialand’, is fragmented even further into VERY non-national ideological entities.
Meanwhile, what Prof. Visser and all those who “see” a common shared national ideology do not feel a need to explain is the magnitude of the violence that these people with the “same commonly embraced national ideology” are inflicting on each other.
Prof. Visser et al, may I suggest an experiment in social scientific logic? Randomly select a day in the “Today in Iraq” archives and then explain consistent with the logic of scientific explanation how your nationalist THEORY explains the FACTS, i.e. Iraqi-on-Iraqi torture, murder and mayhem described in Iraq on that day.
I won’t even suggest the greater and necessary social scientific challenge of explaining the totality of Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence that these so-called ‘nationalist’ are inflicting on one another, or the ‘ancient history’ of the subjection and persecution of the Shia by (what I guess you would call ‘common nationalist’) Sunnis that was the prevailing theory before the American invasion, and still argued by those such as J. Cole.
X, if you take a closer look at my various writings, I’m sure you will find that my basic argument is that there are three trends in Iraq south of Baghdad: Iraqi nationalism, Basra/south regionalism and, finally, a project of Shiite territorial consolidation. Historically, they rank in that order in terms of significance. I have earlier written on the only instance of separatism in southern Iraq – a secessionist movement in the port city of Basra in the early twentieth century – precisely with the objective of showing its relative strength versus sectarianism and its relative weakness versus Iraqi nationalism. This paper deals with a parallel struggle that goes on today.
Much of the current violence in Iraq is directed by a tiny group of professional terrorists and criminals, many of them with ties to outside Iraq. Of course, the problem cannot be reduced to an elite problem. But the outside world would help the Iraqis overcome their difficulties if policy-makers, international media and commentators had taken a more critical view of the extremist minority, instead of uncritically accepting their agenda.
Reidar,
While I think your analyses of Basra’s history and present situation are first-rate, I have a great worry that
a) the Basra Oil Workers Association can be dismantled as easily as the army and Iraqi state have been and
b) as you rightly point out, the uni-provincial line of Fadila may not be able stand up to the superior firepower of Iran/SCIRI or US/SCIRI.
Moreover, I understand that the leadership of the Basra trade union association is generally Communist and not as young as it used to be, and that it is holding the line against junior members who do not subscribe completely to a nationalist line.
Finally, unlike you, I am not inclined to think that the “one province” idea is well thought out. It may be just a slogan to bring coherence to the Basra regionalists’ political program in defiance of the central state and SCIRI/Mahdi Army but beyond that, how exactly is the Regionalist movement going to keep control of Basra’s oil? Set up another state?
Best,
Hala
Visser writes:
“Much of the current violence in Iraq is directed by a tiny group of professional terrorists and criminals, many of them with ties to outside Iraq.”
What possible evidence could he possibly bring to bear that would support this proposition?
How can a “tiny group” conduction operations on such a large scale across virtually the whole country that the generals of the worlds mightiest military power are expressing concern about the long term damaging being done to their armies, and the inability to defeat this “tiny group.”
Does Visser work for the State Department? Seriously, that is precisely what the Bush administration contends – a few trouble-makes from the outside.
The hubris of academics like Visser and Cole never ceases to amaze me. They feel that they can write anything that suits them without evidence and not be questioned because of their pedigrees.
Well, x and tj, since you are so critical of Reidar Visser, and Juan Cole, two people who are recognized for their expertise, and seem to think you know a good deal more than they do, I must ask you the source of your great knowledge of the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular. X, you do mention Today in Iraq, which is certainly a good daily source for what is being published in the media, and in the blogosphere, but tj, you do not indicate any source at all, though you do seem to imply that the United States State Department is where the real information is to be found. Is that what you believe?
الأميركيون يستعجلون إقراره مشروع قانون النفط ينتظر مصادقة البرلمان
/ وكالات
كشف النائب الكردي محمود عثمان ان “الاميركيين والبريطانيين، الذين كانوا متعجلين لاقرار مشروع قانون النفط والغاز، كان لهم دور كبير في اقناع الأكراد بقبوله”، فيما جددت “جبهة التوافق” السنية معارضتها اقرار المشروع في ظل الأوضاع الأمنية المتردية، فيما هنأت الولايات المتحدة مجلس الوزراء العراقي على اقرار المشروع الذي ينص على اعادة توزيع العائدات النفطية على كل المناطق وفقاً للنسب السكانية.وكشف عثمان بعض التفاصيل التي رافقت عملية اقرار مشروع قانون النفط والغاز في مجلس الوزراء بعد اشهر طويلة من الخلاف بين الحكومة المركزية وحكومة اقليم كردستان، وقال ان “الاميركيين والبريطانيين، الذين كانوا راغبين بشدة بالاسراع في حسم مشروع قانون النفط والغاز، كان لهم دور كبير في اقناع الاطراف الكردية بالقبول به بعد محادثات مكثفة بين الحكومة العراقية والحكومة الكردية انتهت بمساومات بين الطرفين حول استثمار النفط وكيفية ادارة العقود والتوزيع”.واضاف عثمان ان “الزيارة الاخيرة للسفير الاميركي زلماي خليل زاد الى دوكان ركزت على اقناع الاكراد بقبول قانون النفط بعد ان تعهد لهم بأن القانون الجديد يضمن تحقيق مصالح اقليم كردستان”. ولفت الى ان “الحكومة الكردية كانت تريد ان تتمتع بصلاحية بيع عقود النفط واستخراجه ومنح تراخيص الى الشركات بصفة ذاتية على ان يكون هناك ممثل عن الحكومة المركزية، في وقت كانت الحكومة في بغداد تطالب بالاشراف على العقود الموقعة مع وجود ممثل عن الاكراد”، مضيفاً انه “تم حسم ذلك بعد الاتفاق على ان تكون نصف العقود الموقعة تحت تصرف حكومة اقليم كردستان”.
من جانبه شدد الناطق باسم “جبهة التوافق” السنية سليم عبدالله على ان “الظرف الحالي غير مناسب لاقرار مشروع النفط والغاز” وقال: “ننظر الى القانون الجديد بشك وتخوف في ظل الوضع الامني الذي لا يساعد على طرح مثل هكذا قانون، خصوصاً انه يتناول الاستثمار النفطي الذي يعد اهم عنصر للدخل القومي العراقي.
نصب 12 عداد لقياس كميات النفط المصدرة على ميناء البصرة
-البصرة /اصوات/
انجزت الملاكات الفنية والهندسية في شركة نفط الجنوب بمساندة احدى الشركات الاميركية عمليات نصب/24/ عدادا متطوراً لقياس كميات النفط العراقية المصدرة عبر ميناء البصرة من اصل/24/ عدادا.
وقال مصدر مسؤول في وزارة النفط “ان الملاكات الفنية تمكنت من نصب هذه العدادات في ميناء البصرة العميق وفق احدث التقنيات العالمية ومن المؤمل انجازنصب بقية العدادات بحلول شهر نيسان المقبل “.
واضاف المصدر “ان انجاز هذا المشروع سيسهم في ضبط كميات النفط الخام العراقي المصدر بشكل دقيق ووفق المعايير العالمية “.
New Oil 12 meters installed!! From 24 meters in Iraqi oil port in Basra!!
After four years of full control for all oil sites around Iraq from day one when US troops moved in 2003 secured those oil filed and infrastructures 12 Meters now installed! Wonder those 80Billions or more that reserved for Iraq constructions, so how much and what’s oil taken by US/UK from Basra oil Fileds?
May be Visser have some knowledge about that?
Troubles for the Iraq Oil Deal
Hala, many thanks for your insights. The information about a battle between generations within the trade union movement seems highly relevant to future developments. Another possible indications of new winds within the trade union is that many of their recent public statements have been bismillah-ed (but then again most things in Iraq these days are…)
I also think you are absolutely right in pointing to ideological flaws and deficiencies in the regionalist alternative. Back in 2005, I was fascinated by this project, chiefly because it was non-sectarian, but also because it seemed to attract secularists and Islamists alike. The secularists have been less in evidence lately, and it is possible that SCIRI is hoping for some kind of rapprochement with one of their leading figures, Wail Abd al-Latif (hitherto a uni-governorate federalist). At least, their newspaper, al-Adala keeps quoting him every now and then. Unless Fadila can re-establish some kind of alliance with the secularists (and, more generally, connect to Basra’s rich cosmopolitan heritage) I think they will continue to face severe problems.
TJ, sources on the survival of nationalist sentiment among large segments of ordinary Iraqis are provided in the paper. You may possibly be interested in the article mentioned in footnote 57 for instance. Both of the UIA parliamentarians quoted are from Basra and belong to the huge segment of Iraqi Shiites who are not particularly enthusiastic about any form of federalism. But perhaps the most important indication of the survival of nationalist sentiment in Iraq is that Sunnis and Shiites continue to refer to “Iraq” as the framework they are fighting for. This marks an important contrast to the conflict on the Balkans in the 1990s, on which so much Democratic Party commentary on the Iraq situation is based. It is a pity that in their search for points on which to criticize the Bush administration, some Democrats seem to have lost all sense of judgment in their analyses of Iraq. There were many good arguments against the war, and there are many good arguments for a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. But he fallacious assumption that Iraqis are incapable of living together just isn’t one of them.
Prof. Visser ignores the principle criticisms posited in this comment series:
1 The validity of his inductive generalizations from anecdotal quotations of Iraqis (e.g. two parliamentarians or the seven people interviewed in one of his articles, or opinion polls in another article for which there is no discussion of validity) to the whole (or very large majority) of the Iraqi population. Anecdotes do not prove generalizations.
2 His discussion of the fragmented Shia South provides anecdotes that contradict his generalization about national identity. Seemingly, there is not even a homogeneous southern identity.
3 Perhaps most importantly, he has not provided any evidence that supports his contention that: “Much of the current violence in Iraq is directed by a tiny group of professional terrorists and criminals, many of them with ties to outside Iraq.”
Regarding his contention that: “…perhaps the most important indication of the survival of nationalist sentiment in Iraq is that Sunnis and Shiites continue to refer to “Iraq” as the framework they are fighting for.” He ignores the Kurds who have clearly indicated a desire for independence. Of course the Sunnis are not about to give up the southern oil riches and ports for a desert-state in the north. And, what the oil rich southerners will demand when it is politically timely is yet to be seen.
Finally, no one in this comment section has argued that there is not a general nationalist identity. Rather, that scant evidence has been provided to support the proposition and there is a large amount of evidence in the form of the civil war that tends to disprove the proposition.
The issue here is the logic of historic explanation which involves much more that a list of anecdotes, footnotes and pedigrees. Unless, of course, one thinks Socrates a fool.
The burden of proof in this should be on those who believe Shiite sectarianism has a clear territorial component. I’m not denying that there is sectarianism in Iraq; what I am saying is that this should not be construed as a quest for a separate territorial space in the shape of an exclusive Shiite homeland. This is a motive that many foreign commentators assign to Iraq’s Shiites as a collectivity, without bothering to check whether the Shiites actually have such ambitions. Of course, there is more evidence to this than mere anecdotes, but it would be rather time-consuming to recite the entire corpus of scholarship on Iraqi nationalism and the position of the Shiites since the early twentieth century. Works by Peter Sluglett, Eric Davis and Yitzhak Nakash provide a good introduction. In general, centuries of coexistence and anti-separatism speak for themselves. They form the dominant trend in Iraqi history, and it is on the basis of that record one should ask questions about long-term trends, valid generalisations, parentheses, and the influence of the external environment.
As for the role of professional criminals in fuelling insecurity in Iraq, I would recommend Toby Dodge’s excellent analysis in Survival vol. 49 no. 1 (2007). Or consider the fact that after all, only a fraction of Iraq’s many million inhabitants are actually engaged in perpetrating terrorist violence against their compatriots.
Just for the record: I have never claimed that the Kurds are Iraqi nationalists.
Prof. Visser writes: “Just for the record: I have never claimed that the Kurds are Iraqi nationalists.” Then it would seem that his “Wilson Quarterly” article “One Iraq or Three” is a misnomer. Should it not read “Two Iraqs or Three”?
He now seems to be accepting the idea of a two part partition of Iraq (Kurdistan and Sunni/Shia land), if not a three. This moves him closer to Sen. Biden and other Democratics whom he criticizes for their tri-part partitioning ideas.
He also writes: “In general, centuries of coexistence and anti-separatism speak for themselves. They form the dominant trend in Iraqi history…” He seems to ignore the fact that for approximately five centuries prior to 1920c that “coexistence and anti-separatism” came in the context of the Turkish Ottoman Empire’s military domination. He writes as though “coexistence and anti-separatism” represented the expressed free will of the people rather than the imposed will of the Ottomans expressed with their army.
I have to agree with other commenters that he, like J. Cole, is essential a think-tank type scholar; an ideologue who uses selective facts of history to create the illusion of objective analysis in order to promote a political agenda. This is not to say that he should be ignored or his agenda is wrong. Like Cole he provides much information; however, one has to be careful not to confuse his facts with his opinion’s and value judgments in the guise of fact.
Once again, tv, instead of merely dissing recognized scholars Reidar and Juan Cole would you care to share with us the source of your superior expertise? So far, you have only hinted that the United States State Department and Senator Biden are authorities on Iraq. Is that where you put your reliance?
TV, my article is titled “Other People’s Maps”. The title you quote is the overall headline for the two essays that was chosen by the Wilson Quarterly. At any rate, it is perfectly possible to argue for a pragmatic alliance of Arabs and Kurds within a single state framework, without having any illusions about the depth of Iraqi nationalist sentiment among the Kurds. The crux of the matter, in my opinion, is that if the international community should set about dismantling every state in the Middle East where there is multi-ethnic complexity, then surely the twenty-first century would come to mark a very destructive phase in world history. Frankly, I do not see it as fundamentally problematic at all to present perspectives that allow for a bit of empirical complexity: Iraqi nationalism is strong, yes, but that does not mean that regionalism is non-existent (or even incompatible with Iraqi nationalism). Iraqi nationalism is weak in Kurdistan, yes, but that does not mean that Kurdish leaders are incapable of seeing advantages in a pragmatic alliance with the Arabs within an Iraqi state.
As for the suppression supposedly exercised by the Ottomans I would challenge you to present evidence of iron-fist Ottoman rule in Iraq. In fact, their level of control there was mostly flimsy, to put it mildly, and there must have been some other kind of glue preventing the eruption of the sort of dormant tensions that you seem to posit. Also please don’t forget the largely peaceful period of the monarchy from 1921 to 1958; those thirty-seven years account for 43% of Iraq’s history as a modern state, whereas the year or so that has lapsed since Samarra is the equivalent of 1%.
Reidar,
Major modern history written by western historians, after the modern industrial revolution in the Europe, they were explored for more resources and markets for their mass production of goods.
These written histories have a lot of influence of western personalise views and ideas that not really reflects the truths about Islam and Islamic world and nations in ME.
The Ottoman Empire as it was the focal point for the Dutch, Spanish, Britt’s and France imperialism power at that time it might useful to remind you those imperials called The Ottoman Empire in late days of its life as “ The Sick or ill Man” as they like to call The Ottoman Empire.
So back to the point here about what you said if the international community should set about dismantling every state in the Middle East where there is multi-ethnic complexity, can you tell us if there is a single state or a country in our world have just a single ethnic group?
This is just a naive thought about nations to say, the fact is the west have more ethnics than ME nation and region.
The Western imperialisms use this term for their benefits and interests, they used this many times along the history in regards to the region, as I said, the written history by western historians tells you a lot of ethnics in ME or within Ottoman Empire panting themselves as a defenders and survivors for such ethnics who suffered from Ottoman Empire as Armenians or Saddam as the Kurds so on and so forth repeated every time.
Sykes-Peco agreement was international community should set about dismantling every state in the Middle East where there is multi-ethnic complexity, the first western imperialisms dismantling of ME.
West wars History very proud of in name of Imperialism were they dismantling those Welayats “ولايات “and regions after broken and dismantling Ottoman Empire.
They set up symmetries far in those war battle’s lands for their killed solders, put statues and made sermonise for their “sacrifices” for their lost army men who came to ME to the region killing unknown numbers of native citizens in ME those western historians did not give us the real numbers of the loses of those wars done by the western imperialism.
So the point is who have the right to specks in the way you put it in your words?
Every nation have its own beliefs and structure, what you call “international community should set about dismantling every state is similar to old believe and thoughts of whites superiority it’s not far from what from your history of “Lenin and Hitler, the men who initiated this century’s most appalling political experiments.”
Then you said:
Frankly, I do not see it as fundamentally problematic at all to present perspectives that allow for a bit of empirical complexity: Iraqi nationalism is strong, yes, but that does not mean that regionalism is non-existent (or even incompatible with Iraqi nationalism).
I don’t know what’s bother you or others in the west from” Iraqi nationalism”?
Is it some thing bad? Is it a belief or attitude that danger the world!?
What is if you had same history as Iraqis had how will be your love to your land?
What you call your love to your mainland?
What all the people in the west or in any country have to do if their land invaded or occupied their land by foreigners?
Is it their love for homeland and their country that drives them to fights those foreigners? What you call that? Is it “nationalism”?
Your talking as per today about Iraqi ethnics is selective but you dismissed the facts that the invaders for four years working hard to make this happen, in fact the dismantle of ethnics in Iraq its fare backs decades, lets take Mullah Mustafa Al-Barazani movement when its started early 1960 when CIA supporting him for his idea of separatist North Iraq to establish a Kurdish state in fact his dream its not North Iraq but beyond that include south Turkey , North- West Iran, and east Syria area to make his Kurdish state, this is the mangling of the west of ethnic dismantle of Iraq state. Or take the 13 years inhuman sanction that hurts Iraqi citizenry whatever ethnics they belong to but it was one of the tools that used to weaken Iraqi society and Iraq state.
In regards what you said here:
As for the suppression supposedly exercised by the Ottomans I would challenge you to present evidence of iron-fist Ottoman rule in Iraq. In fact, their level of control there was mostly flimsy, to put it mildly, and there must have been some other kind of glue preventing the eruption of the sort of dormant tensions that you seem to posit.
Regrettably you again missed that Iraq was a demolish region after many wars, ethnics cleansing and distraction from Mongol to Safavid and Bowaiehi periods, after those dark old days there was no major urban area as such most Iraqis are lived as Bedouin style than what was during Abases Empire where were a major cites and more developed urban areas was, when Iraq was called the Black Land (because of Agriculture and vegetation across of the land 30 millions peoples that lived on).
Those people lived in a very poor conditions after those miserable war times what Ottoman got is not a state, while Ottoman start to strength of their new Empire they looked to new wealth and start build their Empire by searching for more revenues and resources for their new Empire, so they went collecting money and wealth from those peoples and regions they occupied or opened at that time one of them Iraq, what they done they use their power and their forces to take “Money” from people living on the areas under their control, some stories heard from my father and mother, some from older Iraqi tells how they hate the Turks and their polices in Iraq, they punished the people to pay money and animals to the Sultan in Istanbul “Ottoman Empire” in conjunction with wide spread corruption among those collectors, beer in mind the Turks took some polices and steps that represent ethnic cleaning, from imposing the Turkish language on Iraqis and other Arabs, made all official documents to be in Turkish language which in reality its far from Islamic behaviour and Islamic ruling as they claimed they ruling under.
All these things the Ottoman have no interest to developed most Arab region as such , but there were some trial by some Waly “والي “ who govern Baghdad like Madhat Basha who try to developed Baghdad (which his ruling place to look more modern) but not Iraq as his area of control.
This bring me to point here that most of western and British specially (some commentators here in this space still believe) Iraq is a state created by Britt’s!!
The fact is Iraq and Iraqi had a deep history 5000 years, no one invented Iraq than the citizenry of that land with deep history.
In regards to what you said here:
don’t forget the largely peaceful period of the monarchy from 1921 to 1958;
those thirty-seven years account for 43% of Iraq’s history as a modern state,
Here again you are selective in your Iraq history, it’s very important here to mention Rashid Ali al-Kaylani movement which spearheaded the opposition to the Anglo – Iraqi treaty of that year. By 1933, however, when the treaty had taken effect, both men acquiesced to the new situation, and Rashid Ali accepted his first premiership, and how Britt’s iron-fist force demolishes that movement. This is far more important than your project in Southern Iraq.
Finally your views and analyses of Iraq during this occupation period with very obvious missing facts when you talking about Oil and its new arrangements ”laws” the fact is all these things are designed and enforced by US/UK and others on Iraqis as citizens it has nothing to do with them or they have no say in them (they are cornered in their homes to the degree some say “We call it; the place you wait until the moment you have to go face the devil.”.
You and others like Helena using this puppet Government and parliament (each member paid US$10,000/Month as a bribe) some sort as a face for a legal foundation to built the case for a new State of Iraq which all the facts telling Iraq now is a falling State “there is no state right now” so what you build on its just falls and not real case you can build on.
In regards to oil or to what Helena tried in her next post about Iraqi government enforcing US to talk with Iran and Syria, it is just make no sense at all from someone who holed this level of knowledge and understanding of politics.
Apologies for lengthy post
Salah
To my mind, there is no need to apologize for the length of your comment. You being forth the fundamental fact of Iraq, and more generally the area that the English named ‘Middle East’ (significantly: ‘Near’, ‘Middle’ & ‘Far’ East denote distances of points in the British Empire from England) – current events cannot be understood without taking into consideration the profound effect that foreign occupation has had on the psychology and behavior of the people who live in that region.
I believe that a good example of that effect can be found in repeated uses of words translated into English as ‘Crusaders,’ ‘Andalusia,’ ‘Persians’ and ‘Safavid’ that appear in statements attributed to Sunni insurgents. Indeed, the very last words attributed to Saddam before he died were an admonition to the Iraqi people to beware of the ‘Persians.’ The sense of the historic foreign occupation cannot be discounted when attempting to understand the current events.
There is a very good blog that I read regularly ‘missing links.’ While I learn much from the analysis of the Arabic documents that the blogger (Badger) provides, I feel often the attempt to glean meaning from contemporary documents without putting them in historic perspective is an exercise in futility. Similarly, ‘Just World News.’ And, sadly, historians like Cole and Visser the same.
Can one really understand the violence in Iraq today out of the context of invasions of the last thousands years? Politicians, journalist, television ‘talking heads’ and nominal historians who want to promote an agenda and ideology say “yes”. Others with a genuine sense of history see the past in everything that happens and is said today. Politicians see ‘terrorist’, Cole sees Sunni exploitation of Shia, Visser sees ‘trouble makers’; all see Iraq thought their ideological presuppositions not the facts of history – all the facts not ‘cherry picked’ selected facts that support their agendas.
Just to highlight to our finds here that modern Iraq history showing Iraq was free from any occupation for 45 years only!
The start of Republic of Iraq in 1958 after thrown the Poppet Monarchy regime and from that time to 2003, if we discount the Iran and 1991 period those time Iraq was hooked to war time and all his resources (money, and humans) forwarded toward the wars, then the only time Iraq had to developed is 24 years only, in these years Iraq achieved to the one of the top of the list of thread country world, in 1980 UN said the literacy in Iraq is 85% of its populations its the highest figure from all the rest of the Arab and neighbouring countries, also Iraq had the biggest Steel factory in ME, and the Biggest Phosphates / Fertiliser Factory in ME, Iraq was the plane to produce 5Millions barrel/Day of oil in 1985, also the plane was also to finish the Underground tunnel highway in same year.
In addition to above Iraq have 2/3 of his population between 15-35 years old.