Odom: “Victory is Not an Option”

Preface (note – this is Scott writing).
Lest any jwn readers think my satire of CNN’s 3 General Stooges incorrectly reflects a general hostility towards all things military, I note only that my father once dreamed of a military career, and my son is now living that dream (my nightmare) as an officer in the “Virginia” Guard.
Like Helena, I too have closely followed strategic writings of this and that military think tank, sometimes even with great admiration. General William Odom is a case in point. Odom was an upperclassman at West Point when my late father was a plebe there. I think Dad would have admired General Odom’s steely nerve, his Eisenhower-like capacity to speak truth when his colleagues and allies were koolaid-drunk, and best of all, his track record of being right on target, especially when it wasn’t popular with the prevailing winds.
In Sunday’s Post, Odom again is out with an iconoclastic blast that says what many in Washington think, but don’t yet have the courage to say. Helena has already made reference to the essay via the “Delicious” sidebar, so here’s my quick highlighting – for the record!
For Odom, “victory is not an option.”

The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq starkly delineates the gulf that separates President Bush’s illusions from the realities of the war. Victory, as the president sees it, requires a stable liberal democracy in Iraq that is pro-American. The NIE describes a war that has no chance of producing that result. In this critical respect, the NIE, the consensus judgment of all the U.S. intelligence agencies, is a declaration of defeat.

Of course, the Administration lately has been trying to re-define, without admitting, what “victory” means. But Odom is holding up the original standard and pointing out what should have been obvious even before going in — that democracy can’t be imposed at the barrel of a gun, and even it magically does take root, a democratic Iraq will not be predisposed to be pro-American or pro-Israel. These are the two “truths” that American’s need to face:

There never has been any right way to invade and transform Iraq. Most Americans need no further convincing, but two truths ought to put the matter beyond question:
First, the assumption that the United States could create a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq defies just about everything known by professional students of the topic. Of the more than 40 democracies created since World War II, fewer than 10 can be considered truly “constitutional” — meaning that their domestic order is protected by a broadly accepted rule of law, and has survived for at least a generation. None is a country with Arabic and Muslim political cultures. None has deep sectarian and ethnic fissures like those in Iraq.

Strangely, American political scientists whose business it is to know these things have been irresponsibly quiet. In the lead-up to the March 2003 invasion, neoconservative agitators shouted insults at anyone who dared to mention the many findings of academic research on how democracies evolve. They also ignored our own struggles over two centuries to create the democracy Americans enjoy today. Somehow Iraqis are now expected to create a constitutional order in a country with no conditions favoring it….

I beg to quibble with the general on the point about American political scientists being “irresponsibly quiet.” I rather think the problem was with the power of those neoconservative agitators – who pressured producers and opinion page editors (even at the once venerable CSMonitor or the PBS NewsHour) to avoid the contributions of major, non-beltway, think-tank academics. It’s happening again in the madness to the rush to pick a war with Iran!

Second, to expect any Iraqi leader who can hold his country together to be pro-American, or to share American goals, is to abandon common sense. It took the United States more than a century to get over its hostility toward British occupation. (In 1914, a majority of the public favored supporting Germany against Britain.) Every month of the U.S. occupation, polls have recorded Iraqis’ rising animosity toward the United States.

Odom notes that these realities are becoming more widely recognized, even as Congress thus far hasn’t had the courage to act on them for fear of four “pernicious” myths – in need of the dismantling Odom memorably provides:

1) We must continue the war to prevent the terrible aftermath that will occur if our forces are withdrawn soon. Reflect on the double-think of this formulation. We are now fighting to prevent what our invasion made inevitable! Undoubtedly we will leave a mess — the mess we created, which has become worse each year we have remained. Lawmakers gravely proclaim their opposition to the war, but in the next breath express fear that quitting it will leave a blood bath, a civil war, a terrorist haven, a “failed state,” or some other horror. But this “aftermath” is already upon us; a prolonged U.S. occupation cannot prevent what already exists.
2) We must continue the war to prevent Iran’s influence from growing in Iraq. This is another absurd notion. One of the president’s initial war aims, the creation of a democracy in Iraq, ensured increased Iranian influence, both in Iraq and the region. Electoral democracy, predictably, would put Shiite groups in power — groups supported by Iran since Saddam Hussein repressed them in 1991. Why are so many members of Congress swallowing the claim that prolonging the war is now supposed to prevent precisely what starting the war inexorably and predictably caused? Fear that Congress will confront this contradiction helps explain the administration and neocon drumbeat we now hear for expanding the war to Iran.
Here we see shades of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy in Vietnam: widen the war into Cambodia and Laos. Only this time, the adverse consequences would be far greater. Iran’s ability to hurt U.S. forces in Iraq are not trivial. And the anti-American backlash in the region would be larger, and have more lasting consequences.
3) We must prevent the emergence of a new haven for al-Qaeda in Iraq. But it was the U.S. invasion that opened Iraq’s doors to al-Qaeda. The longer U.S. forces have remained there, the stronger al-Qaeda has become. Yet its strength within the Kurdish and Shiite areas is trivial. After a U.S. withdrawal, it will probably play a continuing role in helping the Sunni groups against the Shiites and the Kurds. Whether such foreign elements could remain or thrive in Iraq after the resolution of civil war is open to question. Meanwhile, continuing the war will not push al-Qaeda outside Iraq. On the contrary, the American presence is the glue that holds al-Qaeda there now.
4) We must continue to fight in order to “support the troops.” This argument effectively paralyzes almost all members of Congress. Lawmakers proclaim in grave tones a litany of problems in Iraq sufficient to justify a rapid pullout. Then they reject that logical conclusion, insisting we cannot do so because we must support the troops. Has anybody asked the troops?

Speaking selfishly, I’d rather they bring all our sons home from this fool’s errand, sooner rather than later.
Odom, like Helena, has a program for getting out of Iraq:

The first and most critical step is to recognize that fighting on now simply prolongs our losses and blocks the way to a new strategy. Getting out of Iraq is the pre-condition for creating new strategic options. Withdrawal will take away the conditions that allow our enemies in the region to enjoy our pain. It will awaken those European states reluctant to collaborate with us in Iraq and the region.
Second, we must recognize that the United States alone cannot stabilize the Middle East.
Third, we must acknowledge that most of our policies are actually destabilizing the region. Spreading democracy, using sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening “regime change,” using the hysterical rhetoric of the “global war on terrorism” — all undermine the stability we so desperately need in the Middle East.
Fourth, we must redefine our purpose. It must be a stable region, not primarily a democratic Iraq. We must redirect our military operations so they enhance rather than undermine stability. We can write off the war as a “tactical draw” and make “regional stability” our measure of “victory.” That single step would dramatically realign the opposing forces in the region, where most states want stability. Even many in the angry mobs of young Arabs shouting profanities against the United States want predictable order, albeit on better social and economic terms than they now have.

I pause over Odom’s emphasis of “order” over “democracy.” I do agree with one critique of the previous half century of US policy towards the Persian Gulf region – the counterproductive nature of “order” and “power balancing” strategies. Such narrow thinking got us into trouble too, repeatedly: the Baghdad Pact reaped tumult in Iraq after Suez; blank checks to our “regional policeman” the Shah reaped a revolution in Iran; balancing Saddam against Iran got us an even more aggressive Iraq; Indyk’s “dual containment” required the US to devote even more forces to the Gulf – the Saudis by themselves aren’t going to “balance” anybody.
Odom’s counsel most sharply contradicts the current Bush/neocon line on Iran – which they shrilly blame for Iraq’s internal collapse. To the contrary, Odom neatly argues that withdrawal greatly improves our prospects for a constructive result:

Realigning our diplomacy and military capabilities to achieve order will hugely reduce the numbers of our enemies and gain us new and important allies. This cannot happen, however, until our forces are moving out of Iraq. Why should Iran negotiate to relieve our pain as long as we are increasing its influence in Iraq and beyond? Withdrawal will awaken most leaders in the region to their own need for U.S.-led diplomacy to stabilize their neighborhood.

Odom curiously closes with his own leap of faith – and warning.:

If Bush truly wanted to rescue something of his historical legacy, he would seize the initiative to implement this kind of strategy. He would eventually be held up as a leader capable of reversing direction by turning an imminent, tragic defeat into strategic recovery.

Fat chance. This is Bush II, not I.

If he stays on his present course, he will leave Congress the opportunity to earn the credit for such a turnaround. It is already too late to wait for some presidential candidate for 2008 to retrieve the situation. If Congress cannot act, it, too, will live in infamy.