Iraqi insurgents signaling pre-negotiation readiness?

Robert Fisk had an article in Friday’s Independent in which he presented the contents of what could be a very significant statement that was “passed to” him, that could represent the terms on which a significant portion of the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq is willing to make peace. (Hat-tip to commenter Diana.)
Fisk indicates that the statement was issued in the name of “Abu Salih Al-Jeelani, one of the military leaders of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Resistance Movement.” He wrote that Al-Jeelani’s group, “also calls itself the ’20th Revolution Brigades’, [and] is the military wing of the original insurgent organisation that began its fierce attacks on US forces shortly after the invasion of 2003.”
I believe Fisk’s reference there should be to the “Brigades of the 1920 Revolution”, but would welcome clarification on this from commenters. I do know there is an organization of that name, referring back to an earlier heroic anti-occupation insurgency in Iraqi history.
I am also not sure whether, as Fisk implies on one occasion (but not another), this organization or this statement could be said to represent a position supported by all the Sunni insurgents. I strongly suspect not, but again would welcome clarifications and further info from readers.
I wish Fisk had just given us the text in full, with a commentary alongside. Instead, portions of the text are included in a straight new report there. Here’s what Fisk writes about it:

    “Discussions and negotiations are a principle we believe in to overcome the situation in which Iraqi bloodletting continues,” al-Jeelani said in a statement that was passed to The Independent. “Should the Americans wish to negotiate their withdrawal from our country and leave our people to live in peace, then we will negotiate subject to specific conditions and circumstances.”
    Al-Jeelani suggests the United Nations, the Arab League or the Islamic Conference might lead such negotiations and would have to guarantee the security of the participants.
    Then come the conditions:
    * The release of 5,000 detainees held in Iraqi prisons as “proof of goodwill”.
    * Recognition “of the legitimacy of the resistance and the legitimacy of its role in representing the will of the Iraqi people”.
    * An internationally guaranteed timetable for all agreements.
    * The negotiations to take place in public.
    * The resistance “must be represented by a committee comprising the representatives of all the jihadist brigades”.
    * The US to be represented by its ambassador in Iraq and the most senior commander.
    …[T]he insurgent leader specifically calls for the “dissolution of the present government and the revoking of the spurious elections and the constitution…”
    He also insists that all agreements previously entered into by Iraqi authorities or US forces should be declared null and void.
    But there are other points which show that considerable discussion must have gone on within the insurgency movement – possibly involving the group’s rival, the Iraqi Islamic Army.
    They call, for example, for the disbandment of militias and the outlawing of militia organisations – something the US government has been urging the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, to do for months.
    The terms also include the legalisation of the old Iraqi army, an “Anglo-American commitment to rebuild Iraq and reconstruct all war damage” – something the occupying powers claim they have been trying to do for a long time – and integrating “resistance fighters” into the recomposed army.
    Al-Jeelani described President George Bush’s new plans for countering the insurgents as “political chicanery” and added that “on the field of battle, we do not believe that the Americans are able to diminish the capability of the resistance fighters to continue the struggle to liberate Iraq from occupation …
    “The resistance groups are not committing crimes to be granted a pardon by America, we are not looking for pretexts to cease our jihad… we fight for a divine aim and one of our rights is the liberation and independence of our land of Iraq.”
    There will, the group says, be no negotiations with Mr Maliki’s government because they consider it “complicit in the slaughter of Iraqis by militias, the security apparatus and death squads”. But they do call for the unity of Iraq and say they “do not recognise the divisions among the Iraqi people”.

Fisk’s main commentary on the proposal is to note that its terms would be quite unacceptable to the Americans. He writes,

    It is not difficult to see why the Americans would object to those terms. They will not want to talk to men they have been describing as “terrorists” for the past four years. And if they were ever to concede that the “resistance” represented “the will of the Iraqi people” then their support for the elected Iraqi government would have been worthless…

But in a real sense, that is not the point. No-one would expect the insurgents to come up with a political program that the US occupiers would immediately be able to agree to. But seeing the emergence of a leadership among the Sunni insurgent groups that is prepared to allow the US a negotiated withdrawal, and to start to spell out the terms for that negotiation, is already a good step forward.
And of course Fisk is right to note that many of the leaders of Shiite political parties– not to mention the Iranians with whom many of them have close links– will find these terms unacceptable. Indeed, figuring out the “shape” of the negotiation, i.e., which Iraqi groups should be represented, and how, is one of the first challenges for anyone trying to think through or plan the modalities of a negotiated US withdrawal. I am convinced the US is in no position to design the shape of this negotiation, even if its leaders wanted to (which they still certainly don’t.) That’s why I welcome the mention in the Jeelani statement of the possibility that “the United Nations, the Arab League or the Islamic Conference might lead such negotiations”.
As for this business, also mentioned by Fisk, that the Bushists will not be happy to negotiate with people they have been describing as “terrorists” for the past four years– well, history is absolutely replete with occupying powers and colonial powers that have done exactly that! From the British and French colonial powers in their waning years, through the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1990, through the Rabin government in Israel in 1993… Governments can do this, and survive and prosper (though of course, sadly, Rabin personally did not.)
Could somebody ask Bob Fisk to put the plain text of the Jeelani statement up on the web so we can read it cleanly? Also, further clarification/information on the points I signaled above would be great. Thanks!

12 thoughts on “Iraqi insurgents signaling pre-negotiation readiness?”

  1. There is a point to underline in this Jeelani proposal : he is ready to negotiate with the Americans (the ambassador and the troops commander), but not with the actual government. Does it mean that they don’t want to negotiate with Shiites and/or Kurds in anyway ? Do they feel that given the recent US attack on Iran they have an aperture ? It would be interesting to know whether they would be ready to negotiate with some Shiites and/or Kurdish authorities, or if they want to bypass all the actual Iraqi authorities, even those who are not participating directly in the actual government ?

  2. there doesn’t seem to be much evidence in Fisk’s report that “Abu Salih Al-Jeelani” or the “20th Revolution Brigades” is empowered to negotiate on behalf of Iraq’s fractured insurgencies, or capable of enforcing any “peace agreement” negotiated with US or Iraqi officials. Filtering references to this article, I can’t find any earlier mention of this figure at all on any website. Nexis is also drawing a blank.
    Compounding the dilemma, Fisk’s mystery man requests the “disbandment and the outlawing of militia organisations” including one presumes the Mahdi Army. Is this even within the power of the US military?

  3. Seems to me that they are proposing to negotiate with the Americans if the Americans make it clear they will surrender unconditionally, providing the Americans first dissolve the Maliki government, revoke the elections, revoke the constitution, revoke all agreements they or the Maliki government have made, legalise the old Baath army, disband the militia’s (like the Badr Brigade and other militia’s connected to the Maliki government), and commit themselves to rebuild Iraq and reconstruct all war damage.
    Far be it from me to defend the Americans, but it wouldn’t surprise me if they reject this proposal.

  4. not to mention the embalming of Saddam’s body and burying of it in a stone open tomb in the Hall of Condolences, just off the main square in Baghdad.

  5. Of course neither I nor indeed the B1920R themselves expect the Americans immediately, on the basis of this, to say, “Gee, yes, now we have a basis on which to negotiate!” That’s probably part of the explanation why the B1920R suggest having some other “third” party sponsor the negotiations: precisely to be able to mediate enough between the two– ro more– sides that they can finally bring them all to the same table together.
    Nonetheless, the issuing of this statement does represent the first “opening position” for serious, conflict-terminating negotiations that I have seen relayed by the B1920R, which as far as I understand it is a coalition of Iraqi (as opposed to foreign-jihadist) resistance/insurgent groups; and it represents a willingness on behalf of B1920R to work politically and not solely thru the barrel of a gun. Those developments should certainly be welcomed.
    If the Mahdists get too fed up with Maliki and the present order they might even agree to sign on to a program such as this. (I note that all these parties– actually, all the armed parties in Iraq– claim that “their” own armed wings do NOT constitute militias… In this regard, in Iraq and elsewhere, “militia” is just a term for “an armed formation of which I disapprove.”)

  6. All that this means is that the US is being offered an avenue to suurender. The only end to this conflict will be defeat. But what does that mean? It is rather complex: one has to understand that to americans the whole war has been marginal. To Iraq it is the central event in the past few hundred years, an astonishing and inexplicable visitation of violence of a sort almost incomprehensible to Arab societies. Something without any apparent reason which came and would not go away. And will not until it is driven outvigorously.
    And so in Iraq the war is important. Not so in america: it is an issue, but only just, a few thousand deaths, not many, an imperceptible sliver of the population and most of them from the margins, rural people or immigrants, the poor, the people who have never counted in America and never will. And so surrender, a complete withdrawal, some generous sounding, but ultimately meaningless, promises of reparation, a government of some kind, vague supervision by the Turks and the Jordanians. Some wise imprimaturial words from the UN. Nobody will look very hard, or parse the detail, everyone will be glad to see the end of it, or something that can be described as being the end.
    The truth is that America doesn’t care very much, it has done this sort of thing before and will do it again until it is stopped. There is nothing new about Empire, there never was a Republic before it. It has been Empire from the beginning, and genocide, ethnic cleansing and batrayal. Iraq simply joins the long list of victims composed of those who trusted America and its goodwill. The most recent to join this procession of the naive were the shia in Iraq who, despite having been sacrificed in 1991, thought they could use the US against the baathists. Who had been the last lot to believe that they could use america against the Iranians. Before them it was the Kurds caught between NATO, the Shah and the Baghdad Pact. What makes the Israelis think that they are different? Or the Britiah for that matter?

  7. All that this means is that the US is being offered an avenue to suurender. The only end to this conflict will be defeat. But what does that mean? It is rather complex: one has to understand that to americans the whole war has been marginal. To Iraq it is the central event in the past few hundred years, an astonishing and inexplicable visitation of violence of a sort almost incomprehensible to Arab societies. Something without any apparent reason which came and would not go away. And will not until it is driven outvigorously.
    And so in Iraq the war is important. Not so in america: it is an issue, but only just, a few thousand deaths, not many, an imperceptible sliver of the population and most of them from the margins, rural people or immigrants, the poor, the people who have never counted in America and never will. And so surrender, a complete withdrawal, some generous sounding, but ultimately meaningless, promises of reparation, a government of some kind, vague supervision by the Turks and the Jordanians. Some wise imprimaturial words from the UN. Nobody will look very hard, or parse the detail, everyone will be glad to see the end of it, or something that can be described as being the end.
    The truth is that America doesn’t care very much, it has done this sort of thing before and will do it again until it is stopped. There is nothing new about Empire, there never was a Republic before it. It has been Empire from the beginning, and genocide, ethnic cleansing and batrayal. Iraq simply joins the long list of victims composed of those who trusted America and its goodwill. The most recent to join this procession of the naive were the shia in Iraq who, despite having been sacrificed in 1991, thought they could use the US against the baathists. Who had been the last lot to believe that they could use america against the Iranians. Before them it was the Kurds caught between NATO, the Shah and the Baghdad Pact. What makes the Israelis think that they are different? Or the Britiah for that matter?

  8. This may not be as distasteful to the US administration as it at first seems. Things are going nowhere with the current govenment. Installing another Sunni strongman, after disolving the Shiite government and constitution, might provide an actual exit strategy – as Helena’s post about Martin Van Creveld’s thoughts on withdrawl pointed out, the alternative, withdrawl under fire, could be very costly.

  9. Hmm, this makes things a bit more amusing:
    Pace says he hasn’t seen evidence of Iranian meddling
    By Jonathan S. Landay
    McClatchy Newspapers
    WASHINGTON – A day after the U.S. military charged Iran’s government with shipping powerful explosive devices to Shiite Muslim fighters in Iraq to use against American troops, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Monday that he hasn’t seen any intelligence to support the claim.
    http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/politics/16683888.htm

  10. On the subject of the origin of the weapons said to be from Iran, MarkfromIreland in comments on Today in Iraq for Sunday Feb 11 shows clearly that they are common products of Pakistani manufacture (http://dailywarnews.blogspot.com/). The stenciling on the cases is the same (and no doubt urdu and farsi writing can be confused).

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