Discussing the ‘surge’ with Reidar Visser

Reidar Visser recently sent me a copy of  an article he has written,
titled A Timetabled, Conditional Surge, which he would like to see
more widely read and discussed.  Because of the great esteem in which
I hold Reidar’s careful, well-informed work on modern Iraq, I am very
pleased to be able to make the whole text available through JWN, with his
permission.

However, as Reidar and I have discussed a little already via email, I do
disagree with some of his argument there (though I don’t, for a moment
question the good intentions with which he thought through and articulated
it.)  So in addition to making the full text available via a download,
above, I do also want to engage with it, which I shall do here:

A Timetabled, Conditional Surge
By Reidar Visser, December 27, 2006 		Response by HC
A. As President George W. Bush contemplates policy alternatives
for Iraq, input from experts in Washington is polarized. Opponents of
the Iraq War consider any increase in troop numbers a non-starter and prefer
to focus on the modalities for withdrawal.(1) Supporters
of the Bush administration seem incapable of framing their latest idea –
that of a temporary surge of US troops – as anything other than a repeat
of the same old policy, if perhaps with some added manpower and resources
.(2) 		(1) Correct.  That is exactly my own preference.
But I should add that I see the discussion of a possible “surge”
in troop strength as not only a distraction from thinking about modalities
for the sorely needed withdrawal but also as having the potential– if there
is any surge– of further complicating the task of withdrawal to a considerable
degree.  (More troops and materiel to extract, and more logistical complexity to doing first one thing and then very soon after that its reverse .)

(2)  This is generally a true observation.  However, they do add
some little twists and innovations like articulating the goal (yet again!)
of “securing Baghdad.”

B. Either approach has its problems. A withdrawal of
US military forces from Iraq within one or two years seems a natural goal,
but right now may be the worst time since 2003 for this kind of operation.
The simple reason is that Iraqi politics has deteriorated dramatically: Today,
sectarian militia activity has been maximized to levels never seen before
in Iraqi history. At the moment, Iraq does need help from the outside, because
its elected politicians are incapable of transcending their own narrow party
interests in a bid for national unity.(1) And whereas the
Iraq Study Group may have offered some sound advice about enhanced regional
diplomacy, on the whole their report seems more like a containment strategy
than a plan that pro-actively can induce rapid political realignment inside
Iraq.(2) 		(1) I agree that most of Iraq’s elected politicians
look incapable of transcending narrow party/sectarian interests, though I
am not convinced that this is true of all of them.

“Iraq needs help
from outside”, though?  H’mmm.  Possibly.  If it does, however,
I am deeply unconvinced that this US administration is a body that has either
(a) the capability, (b) the desire, or (c) the requisite political legitimacy
and credibility within Iraq, to be able to do anything helpful for the development
of Iraqi politics except to state quite clearly and categorically its intention
to withdraw the troops and its short timetable for doing so.  

Doing that might well do a lot to concentrate the minds of that vast majority
of Iraqis who are Iraqi nationalists, and impel them to find a way to deal
constructively with each other…

(2) This is an interesting characterization of the main thrust of the ISG
report.  I, too, see the report as urging something of a containment
strategy– but with this difference: I read its recommendations as seeking
to “contain” the desire and ability of Iraq’s neighbors to maintain or escalate
their interventions inside Iraq, as much as seeking to “contain” the ripples
of political destuctivity that might spread outward  from Iraq if the
present deterioration there continues.

Anyway, that is perhaps a minor point.  More to the point in the present
context is that, as I noted in B (1) above,  I don’t see the US as having
the credibility or the capacity of being able to “induce rapid political
alignment inside Iraq.”  Or, indeed, the requisite political standing
to do so, since it is itself, as occupying power, a major and intrinsic
part of the country’s political-security problem.

C. A troop increase could be equally problematic.
(1) Even if more US firepower should succeed in temporarily stemming
the violence, there is nothing in the prevalent neo-conservative expositions
of the “surge plan” to address the fundamental problem of national reconciliation
in Iraq. There simply is no new substance compared with what was being said
back in 2003 and 2004; neo-conservatives still seem convinced that as soon
as there is calm on the streets of Baghdad, a Mesopotamian zest for democracy
will miraculously rise from the ashes. Inside the Bush administration, the
only vision about a parallel process at the political level is that of a
“new coalition government” – involving a few cosmetic changes to the line-up
of Iraqi elite politicians currently engaged in a game of musical chairs
inside the Green Zone, and carrying considerable risk of marginalizing
those few parliamentary factions that do enjoy a certain degree of popular
support, like the Sadrists.(2) 		(1)Much, much more problematic, Reidar, not “equally”
so!  (See A (1) above.)

(2)  Actually, I don’t see the Bushists as aiming to “marginalize” the
Sadrists, but rather to crush and/or otherwise suppress their movement completely.
 This makes the Bushists’ plans much more potentially destabilizing
for Iraq than they would be if they sought only to “marginalize” them.

I think it’s also important to note that the Sadrist movement has been one
of the Iraqi movements the most intent on building cross-sect coalitions–
though as we have seen, the movement’s record of maintaining this political
line in its practice has been extremely spotty (to say the least.)

D. What is required in Iraq today is not cosmetic change,
but heavy lifting. The colossal irony of the current situation is that
a large majority of Iraqis actually agree with the declared aims of the Bush
administration – national reconciliation followed by a withdrawal of US troops
– but their “representatives” in the Iraqi parliament (many of them newly
returned exiles with limited insights into the situation of the ordinary
people) are locked in petty shouting matches instead of working for national
unity.(1) It is the open-ended US military commitment that enables
them to go on with this:(2) Certain Shiite politicians infuriate
Sunni politicians with newly concocted demands for federalism; Sunni leaders,
in turn, hesitate in condemning even the most grotesque atrocities committed
by al-Qaida-linked terrorists. Forgotten in all of this are the ordinary
Iraqis. The Shiite masses have so far expressed only limited interest in
“Shiite federalism”, and the average Sunni is quite prepared to denounce
al-Qaida as long as a minimum of security can be guaranteed. 		(1) I think I disagree with you here.  Firstly,
the Bushists have never committed themselves to the goal of a
complete withdrawal– a fact that, in itself, maintains the fears of Iraqis
re Washington’s “real” goals inside their country at a very high pitch.

Secondly, while it may (just possibly) be true that what the Bushists aim
at is something close to a total withdrawal, still, they want to delay this
until after a version of “national reconciliation” has been established in
Iraq while it still under their suzerainty, and thus the resulting political
order would be to their liking.

According to everything I know and understand about Iraq, however, nearly
all Arab Iraqis simply want the US troops to leave as quickly as possible And they certainly don’t want that withdrawal to be held captive to the completion of some
form of US-controlled “national reconciliation” process.

So while it might be true at some very general, hypothetical level to say that “both the Iraqis and the Bushists seek
the same two goals of a US troop withdrawal and intra-Iraqi reconciliation,”
the actual ways these desires play out in the field of everyday politics
are very different, indeed.

(2) I agree with you about the extremely petty and indeed destructively counter-productive
nature of the political “work” being done by most of the elected Iraqi politicians.
 I disagree over the reason for this.  I think it is far more the
fact that the elected Iraqi politicians have almost zero actual, functioning
levers of national administration through which to govern that has reduced
them to shouting ineptitude (and also, to their reportedly high level of
personal venality) than the open-endedness of the US military commitment.

Don’t get me wrong.  I do think the open-endedness of the US military
presence brings enormous problems in its wake.  But if there were, parallel
to the US military presence, a functioning national-level government system,
then at least the politicians would have something useful to do and be more
hopeful about achieving something good for their country.  As it is,
given that that must look impossible for them– from inside the Green Zone
or outside it– then I imagine a lot of even of the best-intentioned of them
throw up their hands and say, “To hell with it!  At least I can sock
away some money for the family and myself, in Europe.”

Of course, one can also certainly argue that both the presence of the US
military in Iraq and the content of the policies pursued by the US administrators
there has contributed hugely to the breakdown of the country’s national administrative
system.  That is without a doubt true.  But the chain of causality
in all this is a little longer and more complex than the way you portray
it.

E. A troop surge offers a unique opportunity for resolving
this paradoxical situation. If executed innovatively, it could enable the
United States to circumvent the bellicose Iraqi elite politicians and appeal
directly to Iraqi nationalism.(1) But success would require
that the troop surge be offered as a package, with obligations for both sides.
The United States should commit forces and economic aid to create the necessary
momentum for a dramatic security improvement, but at the same time should
realign itself with Iraqi nationalism by presenting a timetable for a withdrawal
after the surge. Iraqi politicians, for their part, should undertake to make
immediate constitutional revisions that could bring the Sunnis back in and
achieve national reconciliation.(2) Washington should not seek
to micro-manage this, but ought to make it perfectly clear that the forces
that have so far dominated the constitutional process in Iraq (the two biggest
Kurdish parties as well as SCIRI, one of the Shiite groups) will need to
make general concessions in the areas of federalism and de-Baathification
before any troop surge is offered. 		(1) This, it seems to me, is the central axis of your
argument.  Namely, that the troop surge could enable the US to appeal
to Iraqis “over the heads of” their deeply problematic politicians…  I
see a large number of problems in this argument! Particularly, these two:

(a)  As described a little further down, the US would use this troop
surge to effect a “dramatic security improvement.”  But it would require
a truly enormous troop surge to be able to do this: perhaps doubling the
number of troops deployed in Iraq?.  Out of the question.  The
US simply doesn’t have enough troops to do this.  And secondly, if the
existing troop commitment has, as you argue, allowed Iraqi pols to avoid
making hard choices, wouldn’t any kind of a troop surge allow them to think
they could do so even more?

(b) The US as such has absolutely zero credibility in any political overture
that might involve “appeal[ing] directly to Iraqi nationalism.”  After
everything the Iraqis have seen the US do in their country in the past 3.5
years, what on earth could persuade them to give any credence to arguments
that Washington might make along these lines?

(2)  Once again, you’re arguing here that the Iraqis need to achieve national
reconciliation prior to the US troop withdrawal.  See my points in D
(1) above.

F. By making the surge conditional, Washington would
for the first time create pressure on Iraqi politicians, via their own electorates.
If presented with a credible plan for national reconciliation and the eventual
withdrawal of US troops, Iraqi politicians would find it hard to persist
in their current squabbling. This would enable the United States to tap into
a most remarkable factor in Iraqi politics: the seemingly unshakeable belief
in the concept of “national unity” among ordinary Iraqis, even in today’s
violent climate. 		I agree with you that there is still– among Arab
Iraqis, at least, a strong desire for national unity in Iraq.  I just
still cannot see how this US administration can possibly, after everything
that has happened in Iraq since 2003, position itself to “tap into” this
desire in any constructive way.

I am certainly not convinced that the Bushists yet have any desire whatsoever
to do this.

However, I do believe that the day will not be too long coming when they
realize they will need to find a “graceful, fast exit” from Iraq…
At that point, but no sooner, we might find ourselves nearing the position
described in point D (1) above, where they share with the vast majority of Iraqis
the desires for (a) a rapid and complete US troop withdrawal,
and (b) Iraqi national reconciliation, which can help facilitate the withdrawal.

That will be the point at which real diplomacy can start. The issues then will
be those of phasing these two operations, of finetuning all the modalities
for the withdrawal, “holding the ring” against internal intervention, etc…

But still, I don’t think that this US administration– which will still itself
be a major part of the problem in Iraq, rather than of the solution– can
negotiate these matters directly with any combination of Iraqis. Rather,
Washington will require the good offices of a trusted and neutral outsider
to help these negotiations. The UN will also be in a position to provide
much of the political “cover” required for particularly delicate parts of
the negotiation…  Hence the focus I’ve been putting on  seeking
to replicate the kind of role the UN played in
Namibia.

The UN, as a body, is potentially in a position to be able to help to mobilize
an Iraqi consensus around a call to Iraqi nationalism.  But the US?
 I just don’t see that as a possibility.

51 thoughts on “Discussing the ‘surge’ with Reidar Visser”

  1. “A troop surge offers a unique opportunity for resolving this paradoxical situation. If executed innovatively, it could enable the United States to circumvent the bellicose Iraqi elite politicians and appeal directly to Iraqi nationalism.”
    My eyes popped out of my head when I read this. The US occupation lacks any legitimacy in Iraq, and a surge in troops will certainly not help us “appeal to Iraqi nationalism”. All it will do is further provoke tension and resentment, among both Sunni and Shia, the latter especially if we go ahead with the policy of trying to wipe out Shia militias.
    Further, one of the main reasons that the ruling Shiites and Kurds are not prepared to make concessions to Sunnis, as you yourself admit, is that the US is there propping them up and providing full support for whatever policies they pursue. Without this net of comfort for the ruling Shia and Kurd politicians, and a real threat of danger from Sunni Arabs, then they will be ready to make the concessions that they have to and set up a real Iraqi nationalist government.
    I believe E) is the major flaw in Visser’s argument, and am frankly surprised and disappointed that this expert whose work I highly respect would advocate escalation.

  3. Bushists aim at is something close to a total withdrawal, still, they want to delay this until after a version of “national reconciliation”
    Helena, I think Bushies will delaying the withdrew of US troops from Iraq till next US election in 2008 , either they announce it before some times of the election to get support or he will leave it to next elected president as a gift from his administration
    Helena did you read what Blair said today? Read this, this one year extation already in the way the troops will stay in Iraq……

    Prime Minister Tony Blair said Tuesday British troops must remain in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007 – in his 10th and likely final, New Year’s message as prime minister.

    Rebecca said: “I shook his hand. I wish to God I hadn’t. It’s a disgrace. He’s lying about what’s going on out there.
    “I can’t believe he’s sunning it up at that Bee Gees’ home in Miami. It makes me sick. And it was Graham who set the camp up for him – the podium he was standing on.”
    Rebecca, from Fair-burn, West Yorks, last saw Graham on Boxing Day. She said: “I just can’t believe he’s gone. He was everything to me.
    “I just wish he’d taken me with him. I’ve nothing to live for any more.”
    I wounder what those thunders of thousands Iraq what they can say who lost fathers husbands and babies or brothers and sisters or Mums….

  5. Helena,
    Your troop doing well! Read the below. Why not let increase them and see the Good things the doing will be too Good, isn’t?
    “But the journalists in Iraq have a responsibility to the American people to report the macro-story. The 12-year-old boy had been caught in the crossfire as troops struggled to maintain order during another spasm of sectarian violence. The (depressed) infantryman who told me about the sewage system had lost friends while working out of a small combat operating base in town. The JAG officer confided that he believes we made a mistake invading Iraq in the first place, but that if we left now, the violence in the already chaotic country would explode.
    The truth of the matter is that the Bush administration has made enormous and tragic mistakes at every stage of this debacle. It overplayed the threat from Iraq and undersold the price, in lives and resources, of a war. It failed to plan for a post-invasion Iraq, ignored the threat of an insurgency and allowed a shoddy reconstruction rife with fraud, abuse and sheer amateurism to sabotage our efforts to put the pieces back together. Worst of all, it has failed to admit to its mistakes or adjust to emerging realities along the way, leaving us in what now seems to be a no-win situation.”
    http://www.startribune.com/562/story/905313.html

  6. “My eyes popped out of my head when I read this.”
    I am with Mike on this one!
    “Looks like Reidar Visser is headed down the same primrose path as Juan Cole.”
    Did Juan Cole say anything positive about the “surge” (aka escalation) proposal? If so, I am disappointed because lately he seemed to have understood things better than before in that regard.

  7. Moreover, the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan are plainly not about those countries’ liberation from U.S. occupation. The extremists’ goal is to prevent those countries from becoming democracies — not “Western-style” democracies but any sort of democracy. It is the extremists, not us, who are slaughtering the innocent and doing it deliberately. They are the only reason for the continuing presence of our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    A Battle for Global Values
    Tony Blair

  9. Many thanks Helena for your detailed analysis and criticisms. In the light of some of the comments above, I think I should restate once and for all that this is by no means a condonation of the kind of surge that is currently on the table. That sort of surge would only be a sorry continuation of the current policy. I advocate a surge that is tied to a full, timetabled withdrawal and at the same time is made conditional upon constitutional changes to effect national reconciliation prior to the surge. It is my view that this should be presented as a deal to the Iraqi people. The United States would then have a chance to clarify its intentions in Iraq through a timetable for a full withdrawal. Importantly, Iraqi politicians would come under pressure from below, because it would become abundantly clear that the fastest route to a US withdrawal would be to negotiate a national reconciliation package as part of the deal, to be followed by a security sweep in Baghdad and then a gradual drawdown of forces. The problem today is that Iraqi politicians claim to be working for national unity but in practice do the opposite thing. If the US supplies more troops without any preconditions as regards national reconciliation, they will only be fuelling sectarianism. Conversely, if Washington announces a troop withdrawal tomorrow, my fear is that the armed factions in Iraqi society would intensify their planning for civil war. To those who advocate immediate withdrawal, I would like to ask exactly what kind of actions on part of groups like SCIRI, Badr, the Sadrists, al-Qaida and the native insurgent groups you anticipate in the immediate wake of a withdrawal. What are the exact steps that will lead to national reconciliation under this scenario?

  10. //Did Juan Cole say anything positive about the “surge” (aka escalation) proposal?//
    You caught me out, Shirin. The truth is that I have not read Juan Cole for ages. I went straight from reading everything on his blog each day to not reading it at all.
    I suppose I was referring to some of his proposals at the time I was still reading him. I’m glad if he has come back to a more consistent pro-peace position, if that is the case. But I am not about to go back to that site.
    For Peace, Against Imperialism. I do think that is the minimum platform. Once people start getting iffy about this minimum, you can’t rely on them as sources any more. They must go back to the ranks.
    I get the feeling that people get “nobbled” in the USA. The regime wears them down. Or maybe they are not the real thing in the first place. They are “left ringers”, who prove to be more like Judas-goats. I’m afraid there are plenty of those. Helena is not one. Helena rings true like a peace-bell.

  11. Reidar, I’m afraid you are a liberal, and your good “pottery barn” intentions are taking you on a road to hell.
    Face facts. You can’t fix it, and you can’t afford to buy it. The way out is the way out, or you will never get out.
    Your bogey-men have multiplied, have they not? You now count “groups like SCIRI, Badr, the Sadrists, al-Qaida and the native insurgent groups”, where once there was only Saddam Hussein. This is neurotic.
    You remind me of the story “The Fruit at the Bottom of the Bowl”, where a criminal goes mad while trying to wipe his fingerprints off everything.

  12. reading helena’s comments I get the impression that bush doesn’t want iraq to succeed but wants his own business (what ever it can be) to succeed over there. reidar’s view seems simpler. does surge mean sadr city will be like falluja?

  13. Reidar,
    Your proposal seems to me to be eminently sane. One can agree or disagree with the US decision to go to war in Iraq, but that doesn’t change anything concerning the present situation. The US is engaged in Iraq and can only rectify the situation by taking positive steps, as you have suggested. I agree that announcing a unilateral withdrawal without taking some responsibility for securing national reconciliation would not be such a positive step – either for Iraq or for the US.

  15. Reidar, hi. Nice to encounter you here! Thanks for hanging in with the discussion even though I did criticize you fairly strongly on the main post and several commenters then also piled on. But this discussion is important.
    (I think Dominic made a key point when he referred to the misguiding role that good intentions can play.)
    You say, The problem today is that Iraqi politicians claim to be working for national unity but in practice do the opposite thing. I admit that is a problem, but I absolutely don’t see it as THE problem. I see THE problem as being the continued presence in Iraq of an occupation force that, whether through the intention of its political masters or through their inattention (and this makes v. little difference to the Iraqis), has made things considerably worse for the vast majority of Iraqis than they were four years ago.
    The (smaller) problem of the divisiveness and ineffectiveness of the “Iraqi” politicians who were generated through US-designed and -administered elections is derivative in many ways from the problem of the occupation.
    … Which is therefore, imho, the over-arching issue that needs to be resolved. I.e., the occupation needs to be ended.
    You write, I would like to ask exactly what kind of actions on part of groups like SCIRI, Badr, the Sadrists, al-Qaida and the native insurgent groups you anticipate in the immediate wake of a withdrawal. What are the exact steps that will lead to national reconciliation under this scenario?
    I have tried to address these questions a number of times over the past 18 months, including in the writings linked to in the “How to withdraw from Iraq” portion of the JWN sidebar. See especially items 1 and 2 from the bottom of that list, and my undeservedly little-known “Namibia plan”.
    My basic position is as follows:
    (1) It is really no business of the Americans how the Iraqis might choose to run their own country. (Or of Norwegians?) But inasmuch as some/many of us do have what we judge to be a sincere concern for the wellbeing of Iraqis we should, first of all, listen to their own ideas about how they would plan to proceed. We can then, as fellow-humans, voice our own opinion of that, and I guess it’s up to them to pay heed or not.
    (2) Moreover, we can say with a degree of confidence, based on an argument by induction, that if the US troops stay in Iraq, the 36-month downward course for Iraqis can be expected to continue. If the US troops do not stay in Iraq, we literally do not know what will happen there. The Iraqis may indeed find a way to put together a form of national reconciliation that works for them. (And you have been one of the outsiders who’s made a point of noticing the potential for this, when many others didn’t.) Or they may not.
    At one level, as an American, I say again that what the Iraqis do is their own business. At another, as a concerned citizen of the world, I say that there are ways the US can organize its withdrawal that will make the chances of intra-Iraqi entente higher, and ways that will make it lower; and the US govt shoul definitely choose the former.
    Actually, I’ll go further than this and say that if the US wants to organize a non-catastrophic withdrawal of the troops then it has every interest in seeing the emergence of a stable coalition of Iraqi nationalists who can negotiate the many modalities of this withdrawal with some authority.
    Sort of like SWAPO.
    But the US cannot– for the reasons I enunciated in the main post– expect to control this process of Iraqi coalition formation.
    Exact steps? I would say, there: (1) US announces its intention to pull all US troops out of Iraq by a date certain, perhaps 4-6 months ahead, and its position that it has no lasting ambitions on the land or resources of Iraq. It expresses goodwill to the Iraqi people, and apology for the harms that have (inadvertently) been caused there since March 2003 (or March 1991?) It also invites the UN Sec-Gen to oversee a process of negotiating the modalities of this withdrawal, including the formation of an Iraqi negotiating team of his choice, and a parallel negotiation that involves Iraq, the US, and all Iraq’s neighbors. (2) The timetable now having been announced by Washington and the other policies anounced by Washington, all act together to start transforming the political dynamics within Iraq, the region, and indeed the US as well. The Iraqi parties and movements have a powerful incentive to work with the UN to make this whole process work. They and the UN also start planning for the many tasks of social, economic, and political reconstruction that the country needs iof it is to recover from everything it has been through. (3) On the date certain the last US troops leave and there is a handing-over ceremony.
    Reidar, when I was growing up in England in the late 1950s and the 1960s this kind of thing was happening almost every week as our “empire” got dismantled. It truly ain’t rocket science. Iraq is lucky that it has hundreds of thousands of very well-trained technicians, administrators, and other professionals.
    Heck, this is getting long. Sorry about that. Maybe we need another main post.

  16. “To those who advocate immediate withdrawal, I would like to ask exactly what kind of actions on part of groups like SCIRI, Badr, the Sadrists, al-Qaida and the native insurgent groups you anticipate in the immediate wake of a withdrawal.”
    I expect it to be quite bloody. I expect the longer we wait to do it, the more bloody it will be. I expected this from 2002 onwards.
    “What are the exact steps that will lead to national reconciliation under this scenario?”
    I don’t know but I do know that that is NOT the goal of the Bush administration. They could give a rat’s ass what happens to the Iraqi people.
    And I’ve known that from 2002 onwards too.
    Three ways to fight a counter-insurgency:
    bribery
    civil war
    genocide
    Looks to me like they choose civil war, but I want our troops out of there before they choose genocide.

  17. Helena, I still believe in the ability of the Iraqi people to sort out this for themselves, through their own mechanisms. What I see as a problem though is that some of the most sectarian forces in Iraq have been promoted to extremely powerful positions since 2003, and their desire to hold on to their newfound privileges may probably interfere with what could have been a natural, indigenous reconciliation process if implemented back in 2003. That’s why I think the US today has a responsibility to work for a greater degree of balance in Iraqi politics and above all a move away from sectarianism before it leaves.

  18. Reidar,
    that some of the most sectarian forces in Iraq have been promoted to extremely powerful positions since 2003,
    Reider, by whom “ promoted to extremely powerful positions? And who helped them beside Iran?
    This is a Nation Building as Sheikh L Paul Bremer III and Noah Friedman setup Reider..
    I think the US today has a responsibility to work for a greater degree of balance in Iraqi politics
    You asked the same person who did the damage to fix it? Are you sure that US will do it?
    We ask the criminal to fix his crims!!
    Four years of systematically brought Iraq down in all aspects and now you believe they will fix it?

  19. Salah, I would be interested to know your thoughts as to which Iraqi politicians – I’m asking about names here – would lead the process towards Iraqi national reconciliation in the event of an instant US withdrawal.

  20. “Sectarian violence”
    US allies operate Iraq death squads
    Click here to Watch the Video
    “Note: The original complete video was removed from Google Video on November 28, 2007. We found this shortened version on YouTube.
    Terror: Instrument of empire
    We hear about it on the news every day…
    More dead bodies found in Iraq.
    The cause? Seemingly random sectarian violence.
    But murder on this scale, even in as chaotic a place as Iraq, can’t be random. Plans have to be made, weapons have to be provided, and men have to be recruited and led. So who’s doing the funding and leading?
    Former Vietnam era CIA operative John McCarthy has an idea:
    “As a Case Officer for a top secret CIA program in Vietnam in 1967, one of our missions was to create havoc by the use of Black Terror; arming and dressing ‘operatives’ in North Vietnamese uniforms for acts of ‘terror’ and sabotage against specific targets of those who were ‘uncooperative’ and/or suspected of links to the Viet Cong infrastructure, and during lulls in the ‘action’ to keep the fear and hatred alive.”
    Sound far fetched? Maybe not.
    Remember the two UK special forces troops who were arrested in Basra dressed in Arab garb armed to the teeth, driving around in a car full of explosives? Civil authorities wanted them held for murdering Iraq police officers. The British military sent a tank to break open the jail walls to rescue them. What was that all about?
    Should we really be surprised that those who lie to get us into a operate this way?”
    To learn more , visit John McCarthy’s site site: http://johnmccarthy 90066.tripod. com .

  21. The gist of the objections to this is that Bush doesn’t have any credibility for something like that; and he wouldn’t be interested even if he did have credibility. Fine. But if you are, for example, a Democrat and living under a two-party system, would you not find it natural to advocate for a position that repudiated that of the other party and set out views and options that didn’t necessarily represent more of the same? Is that no longer within people’s capacity?
    My second point is that after many years of hearing nothing but the drumbeat of sectarian interpretations of the events in Iraq (and I have already had my say about Juan Cole and the media’s role in this, so I will say no more about that)there is now a very powerful inertia in American thinking to the effect this is a Sunni-shiite war beyond anyone’s ability to control. The essence of this is its superficiality. It is a cartoon representation. It is part of the Bush legacy. So when Reidar says he still thinks the Iraqis can sort this out on their own, there isn’t any meaningful discussion. Hence the inability to come up with any real opposition-party position.
    The main lesson to be drawn from this proposal, in my opinion, is that it was a well-reasoned non-sectarian op-ed proposal to US papers and no US newspaper would carry it. This has nothing to do with the logic behind it, rather it is an indication that the whole country has drunk the sectarian kool-aid.

  22. Reidar,
    Thank you for asking.
    I really I can not say, I am not that close locally to give names as such.

  23. As victim/veteran of the Nixon-Kissinger Fig Leaf Contingent (Vietnam 1970-1972) I think I have a pretty good idea of the precarious situation now facing the Cheney-Bush Buy Time Brigade in Iraq. Namely: How to survive a lengthy deployment in the Foreign Legion (in my case a year-and-a-half) doing the unnecessary and impossible under the direction of the ludicrously incompetent for the benefit of those who care only for themselves and who couldn’t give a shit about us? Or, stated in three of our many sardonic slogans back in the day: “We are the unwilling led by the unqualified to do the unnecessary for the ungrateful;” “We’re here because we’re here because we’re here because we’re here;” and “We lost the day we started; we win the day we stop.” So, as the tipping point turns the corner knocking over the ink-stained, flypaper dominoes near the entrance to the tunnel at the end of the light, I’d like to address yet another tendentious rendition of the time-dishonored dialectical dodge known as “Shifting the Burden of Proof.” Specifically:
    “To those who advocate immediate withdrawal, I would like to ask exactly what kind of actions on part of groups like SCIRI, Badr, the Sadrists, al-Qaida and the native insurgent groups you anticipate in the immediate wake of a withdrawal. What are the exact steps that will lead to national reconciliation under this scenario?”
    First of all, those of us who advocate “immediate” — after almost four years — withdrawal from America’s occupation of Iraq don’t have to justify our position. Absolutely to the contrary: Those who advocate the continuation of an indefinite, undefined, unfunded, notoriously failed occupation have to justify theirs. And since over these same past four years — starting from even before the onset of this predictable disaster — those who advocated the occupation of Iraq have never once succeeded in justifying their position, I can only express my contempt for such sophistry by paraphrasing an old high-school teacher of mine: “If you could have, you would have; but you didn’t, so you can’t.”
    Time’s up. How many years and lives and hundreds-of-billions of dollars do you think the American and Iraqi people have to passively sit by and watch you squander while you seek to avoid formulating any “position” that would convince us to support it? Those of us who have absolutely no interest in tellng the Iraqi people how to run their lives and dispose of their own natural resources have no obligation to let you off your own hook by pretending — as you like to do — that we can predict what various and sundry Iraqi factions will or will not do (as if we had any real understanding of or power over such endlessly-shifting political associations) should we leave their country and stop our bloody Keystone Cops meddling in their affairs. If you knew what to do, you would have done it already. Instead, you can come up with nothing more convincing than some high-school-level debating gambit like trying to get your interlocutors to defend an impossible position that they themselves never advanced?
    You very much need to understand something. This “discussion” doesn’t take place in a vacuum. The iron Law of Diminishing Returns has already begun to terminate the American occupation of Iraq in the same way that it brought about the termination of America’s occupation of Southern Vietnam. Put most briefly: the expenditure of ever increasing resources to achieve ever decreasing (indeed hallucinatory) “returns” (like Ahmed Chalabi’s swell London townhome) will cause either the occupation to end first or America and the occupation both to end later. Ending the occupation of Iraq has become an American question about American survival. Iraq has nothing to do with this question any more than Vietnam did. Trying to avoid solving American domestic political problems by projecting them onto hapless foreigners always blows back in the end to the detriment of not just the hapless foreigners but America, too.
    To slightly paraphrase what James Carroll said about this needless, tragic farce back in November of 2003: “Only a fool defines a problem in such a way that he cannot solve it.” To the American government and its supporters of discretionary Presidential warfare-welfare and makework-militarism: Trying to dodge admitting failure — and forthwith terminating the failed enterprise — by shifting the burden of proof to the uninvolved and indifferent (i.e., the American people) constitutes nothing more than a shabby, transparent dialectical dodge that even shameless sophists should find too embarrassing to employ. America needs to solve America’s problems in America and let the Iraqi people — and their immediate neighbors — solve their own in the way they find most suitable to themselves. If that means “national reconciliation” (itself an intentionally vague Orwellian misnomer), then good. If not: good. The Iraqis and their neighbors will think of something they consider “good.” They always have.
    We Americans have nothing but good options if we quit occupying Iraq; and saying that “we have no good options” means nothing more than “defining a problem in such a way that we cannot solve it” — good business for those like Cheney and Bush who prefer having the the problem until they can slink out of office and hand it — unsolved — to their successors. Too bad for the American and Iraqi people if we Americans allow these self-interested and discredited charlatans to achieve yet even more needless procrastination. We win the day we stop acting so demonstrably stupid; and this day will come when we (1) cut off the money for, (2) revoke the “authorization” of, and (3) punish the perpetrators who instigated America’s illegal, immoral, pointless, wasteful and self-destructive occupation of Iraq. Enough of the sophomoric high-school “debate.” Time’s up.

  24. Ladies and gentlemen it is all about Oil not democracy. Read the Baker report recommendations for privatisation of oil resources
    Any student of history can demonstrate that the establishment of democracy in Iraq is impossible. No escalation or prelongation of American troop presence in the country will result in religious or political reconciliation, but it will cause more death and destruction.
    Pack up now just as we did in Vietnam and let the people / parties sort it out, perhaps that is as close to democracy as you are going to get

  25. Until now, Osama Ben Ladin is still at large. But who cares? We have found our scapegoats, such as Saddam Hussein, elsewhere. We use despotism as an excuse to bomb, destroy, desecrate, invade and plunder the homes, lives, countries and civilizations of other people while assuming that, in reality, we are the only people who are entitled to claim the right to homes, lives, a country and a so-called civilization. Without a second thought, we pillage other countries not even considering the fact that it is in the very countries we so easily destroy that civilization itself began.

    Even the American people, who are so easily fooled most of the time, came to realize that something is terribly wrong with the whole idea of a war in Iraq. We demonstrated this by voting more for the Democrats than Republicans in a sullen, stupefied but not yet verbal enough protest against what our immensely intelligent Bush is doing in Iraq. I remember that it was not so long ago that anyone who had the notion of criticizing the American invasion of Iraq was considered a traitor and unpatriotic. Have we cost the lives of so many American soldiers and the wellbeing of so many more under the guise of protecting our country? Is it not obvious that we have in fact endangered our country so much more because of our arrogant foolishness?

    http://www.redress.btinternet.co.uk/yaghi2.htm

  26. “That’s why I think the US today has a responsibility to work for a greater degree of balance in Iraqi politics and above all a move away from sectarianism before it leaves.”
    exactly what, pray tell, gives you inspiration for the fantasy that the US authorities will actually start doing so, when for over 4 years they have only promoted sectarian strife in Iraq???
    did you believe in the immaginary WMDs too?
    And why does anyone who says we need to GET OUT NOW have to explain why? If you propose we stay there, please tell us how it is going to improve by the US troops staying there, when all we have seen is evidence to the contrary. So, give us some benchmarks. Start with: “By February 1, 2007 we will see XXXXX and that will indicate that the situation is improving for the IRAQI PEOPLE.”
    (you tell us what XXXXX is) oh, and making Iraqi oil safe for American corporation profits DOES NOT COUNT as an “improvement”

  27. Can people tell how angry this makes me to hear so-called learned ‘experts’ keep proposing that we stay in Iraq and go on killing people WHO NEVER ATTACKED OUR COUNTRY OR THREATENED US????
    I am seriously having trouble with the “courteous” part of the requirememts here.

  28. Hey, I just heard that the coach for the Iraqi basketball team was shot and killed today. He was head of the PARALYMPICS team for basketball, although he did take the regular Olympics team to Altanta in 1996. Well, he heard there waw unrest in his neighborhood, so he grabbed his gun and went outside and got mowed down by the Americans.
    So, too bad for him, NO? that’s just war – can’t make an omlette without breaking a few eggs right? Damn, we have made an omlette the size of Texas, maybe it’s time WE STOP IT.
    I think anyone who feels we should stay in Iraq should go to that man’s funeral and explain to his family and HIS TEAM how we are helping them by bringing them FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY — one damn snuff movie at a time.
    Now get going!! Off to Baghdad for you!!!!

  29. Mr Friedman has a point.
    Now President Bush wants a “surge” of more U.S. troops to Baghdad, in one last attempt to bring order. Whenever I hear this surge idea, I think of a couple who recently got married but the marriage was never very solid. Then one day they say to each other, “Hey, let’s have a baby, that will bring us together.” It never works.
    If the underlying union is not there, adding a baby won’t help. And if the underlying willingness to share power and resources is not present among the major communities in Iraq, adding more U.S. troops won’t help either. Adding more troops makes sense only if it’s to buy more time for positive trends that have already begun to appear on the horizon. I don’t see them.
    As Saddam’s hanging underscored, Iraqis are doing things their way. So maybe it’s time to get out of their way.

  30. Helen is obviously right that realistically, nothing will be accomplished by adding a relatively small number of troops. If there was a local problem, 20 or 30,000 troops might help. Where will you put those troops, and what would they do?? What are their missions?? This is especially true if there is a declared timetable for withdrawal — With a timetable, the enemy will just wait you out even if you bring in a million troops.
    You cannot win a limited war against a determined enemy. They are fighting an unlimited war, with all means at their disposal, and they have no timetable for withdrawal!
    Adding more troops without adding an intelligence capability will do nothing. Without an intelligence capability it is like playing football where your side is blind. You are just giving the enemy more targets.
    The ISG report illustrates the problem of USA Iraq “strategy” – it is based on no facts we didn’t know. It is just anecdotes and advice. Without knowledge it is not possible to reach reasonable conclusions.
    Neither ISG nor anyone else can tell us who is funding the guerillas (terrorists, insurgents) who is leading them, why the Iraqi army is still not ready, or where all the money went. This makes it difficult to fight a war, but equally difficult to appraise the situation and decide what to do. It is like arguing about the dark side of the moon.
    Those who want to abandon Iraq however, should take into account that the consequences will not be localized as in Vietnam.

  31. First thanks to Helena and Reider Vissar for an interesting discussion.
    I have to say that I side with Helena. I understand that in Reider Vissar’s mind his proposal is fundamentally different from the Bushist surge, because a timetable would be set before the surge and because a national reconciliation will have to occur before this surge.
    1) There is an act of faith in both proposals, whether immediate withdrawal or momentarily surge before withdrawal. In both cases the supporter of the scenario believe that Iraquis will compromise a) When the Americans leaves in the first case b) when the Americans promise to leave in the second case.
    2) At first sight, the second proposal sounds more “realist” and more compassionate. However this is a lure IMO, because a) I’m not sure that Iraqis will be convinced by mere promises. b) It’s not clear how many troops will be needed, neither whether the US will be able to provide enough troops. There may be a dilemna : providing too many troops may let the Iraqis think that they are fooled; not providing enough may not produce any difference with respect to the actual situation. c) As long as the Americans are around the Iraqis will remain very suspicious and d) the Americans will try to influence the process if they stay, ruining/contradicting the very prospect of disengagement.
    3) In fact Reider Vissar is probably a proposal with most appeal to the Democrates. They would at the same time a) avoid to be seen like those who proposed a withdrawal, accepting an humiliating defeat. b) Look compassionate to the Iraqis and use the humanitarian war argument, a better one than the pre-emptive war, for their own party members. c) Finally come out with an alternative proposal in face of the Rep. d) may be even retain some control over the political future of Iraq (a cheap dream IMO).
    4) On the ground, I don’t think that this surge would be able to do any good to the Iraqis. Adding more arms, more troops won’t diminish the chaos and insecurity for the Iraqis, on the contrary.
    5) So what would be the outcome in case of an immediate withdrawal, as avocated by Helena ? IMO : there will be a fall of the actual government in the Green zone. The actual government is already powerless, so this won’t change much for the Iraqis. Then the militia would remain, each with their strongholds. I think that Muktada Al’ Sadr will be strong in the South and in Baghdad. The Badr brigades in Najaf and around, with some constests with the Sadrists. May be that they would negotiate some agreements ? Al Sadr’ may be able to negotiate with Sunnis; the religious network of social aid and jurisdictions will be the stem of a new state structure. If Al’Sadr and Sunni religious structure mixes with the former Baathists professionals they may be able to build the nucleus of a new state. That is if the rumors of sectarian mischieves are merely US psy op and if Al’Sadr’s call for unity with the Sunnis are serious. They may decide to rebuild the former army. Then they will have the needed forces to stem violence progressively. Things would go much better if the US and the coalition are condemned to pay due war reparations to the Iraqis.
    But things may turn worse too, leading to a failed state, like in Somalia, or in Afghanistan. The US has been blowing on the fire and the divisions she has unleashed may not calm down easily.
    6) Unlike Helena, I’m not too optimistic concerning a UN action. The Americans have constantly tried to instrumentalize it and they have also helped to discredit it in the eyes of the Iraqis. So she may not be able to undertake much now in Iraq.
    7) Concerning the Namibia plan.. Helena, I don’t find the name very appealing and IMO it accounts in large part for the few echo your plan has had on the net. You should rather find a name deriving from the content of the plan, not a geographical name which makes one wonder what Namibia has to do with Iraq, or what Africa has to do with ME.
    PS : Sorry for the bad English

  32. Several commenters appeal to realism – is it likely that the US forces will be able to act in a positive capacity etc. In the first place, yes this is possible. I have quoted earlier the case of Hilla, where US forces have been supporting an Iraqi nationalist police commander against attacks by Shiite sectarian militia.
    (See http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/02/opinion/02bull.html?ex=1304222400&en=70ca24fcd3eddfba&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss)
    But a more fundamental aspect concerning realism is this: it is almost certain now that the president has made his mind up and there will be an increase of troops anyway. Which strategy, then, is more realistic – to call for an immediate withdrawal of all US forces, or to try to make sure that if there is a troop surge, then at least this is accompanied by some positive factors such as a timetable for withdrawal and some concrete moves towards national reconciliation? My text was written on the assumption that the second of these alternatives is the more realistic one. I’m not saying that it is an ideal solution, and I’m not defending the US presence in Iraq as such. But the troops are there, and it currently looks as if George Bush is going to add more forces without achieving anything in the way of national reconciliation or institutional reform in Iraq. Apparently he prefers a change of personnel (the “moderate coalition”) instead. This would be an arrangement fraught with risks, and this is why I propose that the surge – which looks inevitable – should at least be done in a manner that would ensure some real steps (i.e. constitutional ones) towards national reintegration in Iraq. It’s like saying to the Iraqis, “We all see that there are severe problems in Iraq right now. We’d be happy to try to contribute extra military personnel to help resolve the security situation. At the same time, we believe part of the problem is that you are being too slow and not sincere enough about this issue of constitutional reform. So if you want those extra forces that’s fine, but only on condition that you revise the constitution first. You decide how, but just get on with it. Then you’ll have those extra forces, and, as we now realise that these forces can’t stay around in Iraq forever, at the same time you’ll get a timetable for their full withdrawal as part of the deal. Are you interested?”

  33. Reidar, you imagine that a marginal quantitative change in the number of young US boots on the ground in Iraq will produce a crucial qualitative change in the situation.
    Further, your imaginary change is to be induced in the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, and not located in any material factor.
    Then to prove you are after all a realist, you set up the case of one police commander against the entire disastrous history of the criminal US invasion and the Iraqi response to it, and hold down the balance with your thumb on that side.
    You are not a realist, you are something else, and you are leading with your literary chin. Why don’t you take a hint, and take a break? Stop trying to insult peoples’ intelligence, please.

  34. “Those who want to abandon Iraq however, should take into account that the consequences will not be localized as in Vietnam.”
    Now that should have been taken into account PRIOR to the invasion. If it was not, then that is 100% the fault of the pro-invasion and pro-occupation crowd.
    and the consequences of raising a child need to be taken into account PRIOR to getting pregnant or giving birth.
    “such as a timetable for withdrawal and some concrete moves towards national reconciliation?”
    so what magic wand do we wave to make Bush do that? hey, I doubt if he has the smarts to understand your plan, and if he does, I doubt he cares to do so. He CERTAINLY DOES NOT PLAN to withdraw US troops since he and his buddies plan to dominate the region. And this is the basic reason why we need a simple plan presented in overwhelming, insistent, non-stop unison:
    TROOPS. OUT. NOW.

  35. Reidar,
    I think that your solution is only realist for the US and calibrated for the US policy conditions, in particular it offers an alternative to the Democrates, as I outlined in my point 3). Your last mail goes clearly in that direction.
    My point is that it looks realistic only to the eyes of the Americans, but not for the Iraqis.
    Also you write that the Iraqis are requesting a surge of troops, but which Iraqis ? Mmm this leaves me doubtful : of which Iraqis are you speaking ? of those politicians in the Green Zone, or of the ordinary Iraqis ? It’s mainly the Rep and the White House who are speaking of a surge and it comes as an alternative to the progressive withdrawal requested by the Dems after the mid-term elections.

  36. It seems the newspaper columnists are playing fantasy poker with the surge.
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=1TWMXFVVMTHSDQFIQMGCFGGAVCBQUIV0?xml=/opinion/2007/01/03/do0302.xml
    The comment on BBC radio is the army really only wants to get out before it all falls apart and go and reinforce the beleaguered Commandos in Afghanistan. The excuse for not baling out is that the americans needs someone to guard the convoy routes from Kuwait and won’t let them go.

  37. Reidar, I’m interested to learn this basis for your argument: it is almost certain now that the president has made his mind up and there will be an increase of troops anyway… I propose that the surge – which looks inevitable – should at least be done in a manner that would ensure some real steps (i.e. constitutional ones) towards national reintegration in Iraq.
    This raises some intriguing and tough questions about how far people who– like me and also I think you– who are both idealists and realists should go in any circumstances to “compromise” with a political situation that we find deeply disturbing. (The fact of the extremely harmful continuing exercize of US power in Iraq.)
    I have Israeli friends who say, for example, that “since the IDF is going to be controlling and imprisoning young Palestinians it is better that I, as a person of conscience, should be there with myreserve unit to participate and thereby mitigate the brutality of that control.” I understand, and at one level respect, that argument. But I deeply disagree with it. Far too many such people, it seems to me, make such a claim but anyway get sucked into either condoning the brutal practices involved or at the least providing them with a broader political ‘cover” than they deserve.
    But anyway, in your case, I contest your foundational premise there. I do NOT think Bush has yet made up his mind for a troop surge– as I wrote here.
    I do know– which most readers here probably don’t– that you had written the essay/op-ed that leads this post a week or more ago. But I think the strength of the anti-surge forces on Capitol Hill has become much clearer since then. (Not to say, yet, that they will prevail… But we do have a reasonable basis for hoping so.)
    If you were to agree with my assessment that the surge issue has NOT yet been decided in US politics, would that change your position on the whole surge issue?
    Also, if we (you) try to fashion an option of “a humane, constructive surge”– doesn’t that run a strong risk of distracting from the still continuing discussion of whether there ought to be a surge at all?
    Also, with Christiane, I ask where is the evidence that any Iraqis of any political credibility whatsoever, inside or outside the Green Zone, have been asking for a US troop increase??
    That does also seem to be an important foundation of your argument, as expressed there.

  39. No matter what school of thought is expressed, Americans seem to have trouble talking about consequences. Susan from NC notes that the consequences of this invasion should have been discussed in advance — absolutely true, just as child rearing should be discussed before conception. And maybe it’s satisfying to say I told you so, but it’s unhelpful with the current predicament. I agree that the American occupation is part of the problem, but does that necessarily mean an immediate, total withdrawal is the right answer? If there’s a bloodbath, are you okay with that? If it destabilizes or empowers other nations in the region in ways that will harm others in the region and around the world, are you okay with that? I thought this invasion was a horrible mistake from the very beginning, but I will not be okay watching thousands more Iraq civilians slaughtered in the streets and the outbreak of regional war, clandestine or open. Maybe that won’t happen (the dominoes did not, after all, fall around Vietnam), but there’s an even chance it will.
    America shouldn’t make the mistake of being as clumsy in the withdrawal as it was in the invasion: it’s time to plan a withdrawal, with the Iraqis, the UN, other nations in the region — a new coalition of the willing (or not so willing), perhaps. This has to be done right, or as right as is possible. No matter how you feel about the stupid decision to get into this, the US bears some responsibility for what happens when it leaves — the US must leave as well as is possible.

  40. FUCK. Looks like you got your was, Visser. Another 20,000 troops to Iraq. But don’t expect this to be a short-term thing.

  41. Many thanks Christiane for engaging with the substance of my text. Please note though that this is not a proposal to do yet another deal with a tiny Iraqi elite selected by Washington. In fact it is the opposite. The idea would be to publicly offer a package containing elements that most Iraqis (if not necessarily the political elites) as well as the US administration agree on: 1. Reining in the militias with the help of extra US troops in a surge. 2. Cease the petty squabbling over sectarian pet projects, make a constitutional deal and get this oil-rich country up and running again. 3. A full withdrawal of US troops. I believe this would resonate among ordinary Iraqis if it were offered as a complete package, along with a public statement that this is a change of course prompted by the failures of the past.
    Helena, I fully accept your argument. I was against sending those troops there in the first place. I could keep on repeating that, of course. But I simply don’t think that I have any original contribution to make in that direction anymore. People who are far more articulate and eloquent than I am can do that. My comments, as you say, were based on a belief that the president would go for a surge (actually, my hunch is that he is still going to do this), and I felt I had a few ideas on this subject which could possibly be of use, in order to at least make the debate a little bit more nuanced.
    Mike, has that figure you refer to been verified? It must be breaking news if that’s the case. Anyway, does it come with a timetable for a full withdrawal and a demand for constitutional reform? If not, please remember that I am just as opposed to it as you are.

  42. Sorry for not providing the link. It has not been confirmed, but it has been confirmed that Bush is going to call for 20,000 more troops. It’s on NBC:
    http://rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kare11.com%2Fnews%2Fnews_article.aspx%3Fstoryid%3D145711
    Frankly, I fail to see how Congress or anyone can stop the Commander-in-Chief from having his way, short of blocking funding for the war.
    I respect your position that the surge should be temporary, but let’s be realistic here. If we surge these troops, it will create more resentment against occupation and more violence against them. In that context, for someone to ask for us to withdraw while our troops are under even more fire, will be politically dangerous and will give the neocons an excuse to stay in Iraq and “control security”. It’s a vicious cycle.
    I know you’re presumably opposed to what I linked to, but I think that it’s going to be inevitable that, with any surge of troops, we’re just making the stakes that much higher for a war we lost a while ago, and make it that much harder to defeat Bush’s ego and leave Iraq. After reading article after article (especially Sidney Blumenthal’s on Salon), I am convinced that Bush’s ego is the main obstacle to withdrawing.

  43. Reidar, Helena, and Badger – I very much respect your knowledge of the area. I gather each of you to some extent believes that there remains a significant chance for national reconciliation. I would very much appreciate your comments on Pat Lang’s recent despairing assessment:
    “That reason is simple. We do not have “politics” in Iraq. We have tribal warfare expressed through; elections, constitutions, militias, the Shia partisan nature of the “security” forces, the Maliki government, terrorism, oil allocations, tribal fury at executions.
    There is no Iraqi People. There once were the beginnings of such a people, but that is gone now, swept away, “Gone With the Wind.”
    Now there is only tribal warfare among the Shia Arabs and the Sunni Arabs while the Kurds wait to see if we are going to screw them as we (I) have so many others.
    Since compromise is viewed by the tribal contestants as weakness, dangerous weakness by the “tribes,” there will be little of that.
    So, forget the political reconciliation. What a silly idea.”

  44. Pat Lang:
    “That reason is simple. We do not have “politics” in Iraq. We have tribal warfare expressed through; elections, constitutions, militias, the Shia partisan nature of the “security” forces, the Maliki government, terrorism, oil allocations, tribal fury at executions.,
    We do not have “politics” in Iraq. We have occupation expressed trough: invasion, humiliation, a constitution that was shredded to pieces by the occupier and replaced by an American text, the partisan nature of the “security” forces that were created under American tutelage, the puppet government, state terrorism, the stealing of oil and other resources by the occupier, fury at public, televised lynchings.
    But of course, it’s all because they’re tribal and primitive, completely unlike us, who even after 3 years don’t understand how much they appreciate us, so much so, that they undoubtedly would want us to stay, to force them to love each other. O, what would the world be without us!
    (a better place maybe)

  45. I agree that the American occupation is part of the problem, but does that necessarily mean an immediate, total withdrawal is the right answer?
    YES IT DOES.
    If there’s a bloodbath, are you okay with that?
    THE LONGER YOU WAIT THE WORSE THE BLOODBATH WILL BE.
    If it destabilizes or empowers other nations in the region in ways that will harm others in the region and around the world, are you okay with that?
    THE LONGER YOU WAIT THE WORSE THE BLOOTHBATH WILL BE.
    I hope that was clear. And I take no pleasure in saying “I told you so” AND I HOPE TO GOD I NEVER GET THAT OPPORTUNITY TO SAY IT AGAIN.
    BUT I WILL.
    BECAUSE, BECAUSE, BECAUSE, BECAUSE –
    THE LONGER YOU WAIT THE WORSE THE BLOODBATH WILL BE.
    THEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS NOT CAPABLE OF FIXING THIS EVIL THEY STARTED. AT THIS POINT, THEY CAN ONLY STOP IT FROM GETTING WORSE –
    AND IF THEY DON’T IT WILL GET MUCH, MUCH, MUCH WORSE.
    and I will get to say “I told you so” again some day. On top of a few million dead bodies, a lot of them caught on film. The USA’s legacy to the world: bringing them freedom and democracy, one snuff film at a time.

  46. “America shouldn’t make the mistake of being as clumsy in the withdrawal as it was in the invasion: it’s time to plan a withdrawal, with the Iraqis, the UN, other nations in the region — a new coalition of the willing (or not so willing), perhaps. This has to be done right, or as right as is possible. No matter how you feel about the stupid decision to get into this, the US bears some responsibility for what happens when it leaves — the US must leave as well as is possible.” – Sharon
    I think you need to get over your fantasies about America and take a look in the mirror. What you will see is a stupid people who think bombing and invading and occupying a foreign country just for the (public unstated) purpose of stealing their resources and controlling the world — will somehow benefit those people. That they will somehow one day appreciate it – well, if only they were not barbarians.
    It is time you recognized it is Americans who are the barbarians, and all the nice smelling soaps will not change that fact.
    What you will see in the HONESTLY mirror is the Americans of 1830 who thought moving the native people to the west would be an okay kind of thing. You will see the Germans of 1930’s thought their government and military’s invasion of other countries was “all for the good” since “god was with them” and who cared if people got sent to detention camps (happening today! in America! to ship “illegals” back to their country. Have not yet started killing them…….)
    We are no different from those Germans. We do not note, nor little care how many Iraqis we kill in this ridiculous lie that we are bringing them “freedom and democracy”. Take a note of any US reporter who was injured in Iraq and HOW THEY PRAISE THE US TROOPS FOR THE MEDICAL CARE and how they praise the US troops via feel-good stories about some little inconsequential thing they have done……
    AND HOW LITTLE THEY NOTE WHAT IS HAPPENING TO IRAQIS.
    HELL, WE DON’T EVEN COUNT THE PEOPLE WE KILL THEY MEAN SO DAMN LITTLE TO THE AMERICANS.
    And you think we are going to “FIX THINGS”???? These assholes that don’t notice who the foreigners they kill are somehow, someday, going to take care of them and treat them decently and stop lying to them?
    GET OVER THESE FANTASIES.
    A full withdrawal of US troops. -Reidar
    You may be including that as a condition, but Bush will not get the troops out of there EVER. It would defeat the whole purpose. Which is why we have to ALL be united in saying:
    TROOPS. OUT. NOW.
    Only Americans can stop this upcoming genocide, just like only Germans could stop the genocide in the 1940’s. And it looks to me that the Americans will not do this and I will get to say “I TOLD YOU SO” yet again.
    Now excuse me while I go throw up.

  47. Susan is absolutely right. The notion that the US military is capable of playing the kind of role “liberal surgers” suggest is simply nonsense. The US military is an extremely blunt force neither trained nor interested in the subtleties of peacekeeping, arbitrating amongst competing interests. It does not even speak the language, it shoots first and imprisons anyone asking questions afterwards. There is currently a bloodbath in Iraq born not of sectarian hatreds but of the same impresarios who brought on bloodbaths in Guatemala, El Salvador and half of the other countries in the world, the same firm getting things warmed up again in Somalia and Eritrea. Any support for a troop “surge” will simply obscure the unanswerable case to leave bag and baggage, bimbashi and contractor, puppet and poodle.
    As to the consequences of this war they are already in train, the fuse is lit. As in 1914 the lights have been put out, we may never seem them on again.

  48. Susan is sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick,sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick,sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick,sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, sick, of being right.
    I hope I wake up tomorrow and realize I was completely wrong and that peace and happiness is breaking out all over.
    But that is not reality.
    Anyone who thinks the US troops should stay in Iraq one more minute is flying in the face of history, current events, logic and common sense. It is like claiming the rapist should stay and sew up his victims wounds, rather than leave the victim alone, except in this case the rapist does not even know there is a victim.
    The Iraq people mean NOTHING to Bush and his administration. Even the US troops mean very little.
    All we are doing is investing a trillion dollars or two in snuff films. So, if you support the continuation of this war and occupation, you are investing and supporting snuff films.

  50. A CURRENCY IN DECLINE
    How Dangerous is the Dollar Drop?
    By Christian Reiermann

    The oil price is mainly set in dollars worldwide. If the dollar declines, the same amount of oil costs Europe fewer euros, and the money the Europeans save can be spent on other goods.

    The perils of a currency crash are not nearly as great as they were in the days of the dollar’s absolute dominance 30 or 40 years ago. Globalization has led to the development of a number of growth centers in the world economy which share the burden of turbulence. Gone are the days when an American finance minister could boast: “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”


    Hay, US will stay in Iraq, whatever we stating here they are staying why?
    It’s the economy survivals, How US to continue with sold economy where there are many sings that oil will play major part for 5-20 coming years.
    The control of rich oil fields in ME specially Iraq (of course Iraq because very Cheep to get out and a huge reserves“70 Virgins Oil fields, and more” bear in mind that some Saudi oil files start declining and suffering (Oil technical things of digging and pumping oil) so the grantor for good US Dollar and good economy, there is nothing than the oil and nothing like Iraq..
    So you arguing now but let say no mistake this for your future generations, what about Iraqis, who cares let them “Go to the Hill”..

  51. Mike,
    I agree with you. Bush reminds me of the pipsqueak Prince Farquardt in the kids movie “Shrek” who, when sending his troops off to fight his battle proclaims “…Some of you will die, but that’s a sacrifice I’m prepared to make.”
    Mya

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