I’m very happy to publish the following commentary from Reidar Visser. Please disseminate it widely. Be aware that all material published on JWN is published under a Creative Commons license, and be aware of what that entails.
There Is No Biden Plan
by Reidar Visser, October 26, 2006
- Reidar Visser is the author of Basra, the Failed Gulf State and editor of the Iraq website http://historiae.org.
To an outsider with no particular affection for the foreign policies of either US political party, the chief interest of the mid-term elections lies in their ramifications for the rest of the world. One of the most striking features of current Iraq discussion in the United States is that much of what is being said is based on the false premise that there exists a radical “third way” territorial solution to the Iraq crisis: a tripartite division of the country.
This option, often referred to as the “plan” of Senator Joseph Biden, would involve active American policy steps to bring about a three-way separation of Iraq’s ethno-religious communities – a Kurdish north, a Sunni Arab west, and a Shiite Arab center–south. These entities would form part of a loose confederation, with sharing of oil revenues as the glue that binds the system together. The senator has repeatedly stressed the supposed “constitutionality” of his plan.
The published accounts of this “Biden plan” reveal, however, that it violates the Iraqi constitution in two significant ways. Back in May, Sen. Biden boldly declared that he wanted the establishment of “one Iraq with three regions”. The problem here is that whereas the Iraqi constitution does establish federalism as a general principle of government for Iraq, it leaves the demarcation of any new federal units outside Kurdistan to the Iraqi people – who are empowered to create federal entities “from below”, through referendums. This means that no outsider can dictate any particular future Iraqi state structure – it might be two federal entities, five, or fifteen, or for that matter a unitary rump Iraq federated with a decentralized Kurdistan, all depending on the choice of the Iraqi people.
More recently, Biden seems to have realized this deficiency in his plan, and last month he admitted that “the exact number [of federal states] should be left to the constitution”. Still, he offered the “guess” that there would be three entities. But subtract the guesswork, and the bottom falls out of the plan.
Biden’s second point, oil distribution, is based on his first: he wants to see an agreement on sharing of oil revenues between his three imagined Iraqi sub-communities; presumably this would be inserted in the constitution through the planned revision process. But again, this is in dissonance with the Iraqi legal framework. The revision of the constitution is to be completed before October 2007, whereas no federalization is supposed to take place before April 2008. Hence, the only oil revenue settlement that would be politically neutral and could avoid pre-empting any subsequent popular initiatives on federal entities would be one based on the existing 18 governorates.
The remaining points in Biden’s plan are of less interest, either because they already enjoy cross-party support, or because they will be of limited significance to achieving political stability. “More Aid, But Tied to the Protection of Minority and Women Rights” is all fine, but frankly this is not something that will make or break the Iraqi reconciliation process. “Engage Iraq’s Neighbors” is a good point, but one that already enjoys increasing support among realist Republicans and, reportedly, in the State Department. That leaves us with the final item on Biden’s agenda – withdrawal of US forces – which in turn means that we are back to where we started: if Biden wishes to adhere to the Iraqi constitution, then he simply does not have a policy alternative that is truly distinctive. It considerably weakens the whole American debate on Iraq – and that of the Democratic Party in particular – if an illusory and spurious policy proposal like Biden’s is allowed to remain dominant.
But despite these contradictions, Biden continues his campaign, perhaps believing he can goad the Iraqis into adopting his own ideas. That too is problematic. In today’s Iraq, there exists far more diversity than the simplistic three-community model would suggest, but through his black-and-white discourse Biden bulldozes this pluralism and chases the Iraqis further into the mental prisons of sectarianism. For instance, within the Shiite community singled out by Biden for separate treatment, some voices in fact completely reject the idea of federal subdivisions among the Arabs of Iraq, whereas others are calling for several non-sectarian sub-entities among the Shiites instead of a single unit. (Does the senator know that a single governorate – Basra – holds more than 80% of what he describes as “Shiite” oil reserves?) Why are these groups not to be given a democratic hearing in the new Iraq? Why should they be forced to accepting an ethno-religious formula that could easily produce ethno-religious dictatorships if internal tensions within the federal units (say, Sadrists versus SCIRI) are ignored? It is alarming that on questions like these, people like Sen. Biden should be allowed to muddle Democratic Party discourse (and the US debate in general) by adopting an approach that was fashionable in the times immediately after the First World War but in recent years has been the preserve of neo-conservative fringe writers.
And sometimes there is an even more assertive Biden, one that does not restrict himself to “guessing” the outcome of the Iraqi federalization process. A few days ago, an angry voice could be heard on television: “Like heck we can’t tell the Iraqis what to do.” This was Joseph Biden, the Democratic senator! Yes, it is probably true that, if the United States seriously wishes to enforce a division of Iraq – by circumventing the Iraqi constitution – it has the military capability to do so. But it would be a tragic outcome of the supposed democratization of Iraq if Washington should choose to exit by neo-imperialistically imposing a particular state structure on the country. It would alienate huge sections of the Iraqi population. It would be a gross provocation to most of Iraq’s neighbors, who view a tripartite federation as a particularly brittle state structure and a powder keg in terms of potential regional instability. And it would be the ultimate gift to al-Qaida – who would finally get the manifest evidence they have been craving in order to back up their conspiracy theory of the US as a pro-Zionist force bent on subdividing the Middle East into weak and sectarian statelets. Senator Biden would do well to consider the long-term damage to American interests that would follow from such reactions before he annexes Basra to the Middle Euphrates, merges Diyala and Kut, and rips the heart out of Mosul.
It isn’t just that Visser is right. The mere fact that this “Biden plan” is taken seriously in places like the Council on Foreign Relations and the Democratic Party should be a warning how dangerously superficial and opportunistic this “debate” has become in our whole system.
Iraqi Nation is bleeding and killed in name of “CONSTITUTION” what a carp.
Is the Iraqi having their right now? No
Is Iraqi living in secure environments to decide what their desire now? No
Is it these law and bills passed in parliament bey those hired members by occupation represent in any way Iraqi desire? NO
What a freak discussion and blind when all we knew it’s a show running by occupiers
Is it enough to stope these freaking scenarios and make these research/reports and all of this carp.
Democracy will be succeeded when the people have their rights and live in secure environments and can say their voices loudly without fear.
Read this just from the mouth of Al-Maliki, no more freak discutions, where is the “CONSTITUTION” that gives him his authority to be PM areal PM?
“«بصفتي رئيسا للوزراء انا القائد الاعلى للقوات المسلحة، لكنني لا استطيع تحريك كتيبة واحدة بدون موافقة التحالف”
http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=3&article=389281&issue=10195
Under “CONSTITUTION” Country oil be looting all the resources looted and country destroyed under “CONSTITUTION” what a disastrous “CONSTITUTION”
Mr. Visser, if Sen. Biden’s “plan” is deficient or does not really exist, what is the Visser Plan? Please elaborate. Would you give your plan a quantifiable liklihood of success? Or is any plan at best a long shot? Any comment on the Eliot Cohen assertion that there can be no Plan B whatever? Were the US simply to duck out, would chaos ensue? This is what E. Cohen, P. Bergen, and P. Marr assert. Or do you concur with Ms. Cobban’s quixotic belief that Iraqis would work things out with assuredly less violence or death than what we see at present?
Reidar-
I once heard it explained that Hakim and Sciri were able to push through the recent federalization law primarily because of a split within the Da’wa party: one faction remaining opposed to federalism along with the Sadrists, and the other faction going along with Hakim. Is this true?
I know the parliamentary vote to approve the law was disputed, and thus may have been illegitimate, but what is the significance of the split within Da’wa? Is it the difference between al-Jaafari and al-Maliki? If not, what is the cause of the split? And in your mind is it truly important in the debate over federalism, or does Sciri have other allies on this issue … other than the Kurds of course?
“Were the US simply to duck out, would chaos ensue?”
That anyone can say that with a straight face is astonishing and baffling. What, exactly, do you think is “ensuing” there right this moment? Stability? Order? Security? My friend, what the US has brought to Iraq is death, destruction, instability and chaos on an unimaginably massive scale. Every day that the US has remained in Iraq the situation has grown worse, not better. Every “pacification” operation the US has attempted has ultimately resulted in more violence, more death, more destruction, and more chaos. As the polls indicate, the majority of Iraqis understand quite well that the occupiers are exacerbating the situation. A number of other official and non-official observers have stated quite bluntly that, at the very least, the occupiers are creating more problems than they are helping. What part of this is not completely obvious to anyone who is paying attention at all?
Things will continue to get worse and worse and worse in Iraq until the Americans and their so-called “coalition” withdraw completely – all official presence ended. Only then is there any chance at all that Iraqis can begin to put their country, and their lives back together.
This is not rocket science.
“Biden Plan” = ” The Balfour Declaration in1917″
History Replay, nothing “constitutionality” in both cases, both is liars and supported by the nations living in democracy!!!
Democracy of liars……
Shirin-
Anyone who points to Eliot Cohen as offering an alternative view on the Middle East is among those buying into the whole MSM contraption that surrounds American politics like a sterile bubble.
These folks don’t recognize the problem that America’s occupation creates in Iraq because they honestly think Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza provides a support role in the wider “war on terrorism.”
They are Leo Straussian fantasists…you know, they live in the “real world” as opposed to the world the rest of us live in after they finish trampling the earth. For them it is a sign of intellectual maturity to entertain ideas like “might makes right,” domination = security, war = peace.
Not in Orwell’s worst imaginings could such absurdity pose as truth.
The only reason Joe Biden has this partition plan is so he can blame Bush for not following it. The only reason Bush has his “stay the course” or “get the job done” plan is so he can blame the Democrats for not following it. I disagree with Reidar’s statement that “if the United States seriously wishes to enforce a division of Iraq . . . it has the military capability to do so.” I think everybody in Washington (with the possible exception of Dick “No Brainer” Cheney) has now concluded that we’ve lost control over Iraq and we have to find a way to get our troops out of there. Now it’s all about positioning the blame. Losing Iraq might be worrisome to the political elite, but not nearly as worrisome as losing domestic political power. What eventually happens to Iraq will have nothing to do with any “plans” made in Washington. It will depend on who wins the war after we leave.
“Isn’t it interesting that Iraq now — this Muslim country that 10 years ago nobody even heard of, all right, is now impacting on how we live in America.”
http://mediamatters.org/items/200610270004
The published accounts of this “Biden plan” reveal, however, that it violates the Iraqi constitution in two significant ways.
Which constitution? The one that was shred to pieces by Paul Bremer, the former American proconsul of Iraq, or the one that was imposed on Iraq by the Americans?
But it would be a tragic outcome of the supposed democratization of Iraq if Washington should choose to exit by neo-imperialistically imposing a particular state structure on the country. It would alienate huge sections of the Iraqi population.
1. “Democratization” or “supposed democratization”? If it’s “supposed”, it isn’t “democratization” at all. It’s just PR (which is exactly what it is, in my opinion).
2. “choose to exit by neo-imperialistically imposing…” What’s the assumption here? That the invasion and occupation of Iraq itself was not “neo-imperialistically imposing” (facts on the ground)? Well, it only wasn’t if one believes that “democratization” was the point of the exercise, instead of oil, plunder (Halliburton, Bechtel, etc), or whatever the real reasons might have been.
3. “It would alienate huge sections of the Iraqi population.” Which sections of the Iraqi population are not alienated (from the Americans, or from the “democracy” they brought)?
To Reidar Visser,
Iraq’s constitution: Recipe for disaster
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/238197_iraqconstitution.html
THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION: A Referendum for Disaster
http://www.ips-dc.org/comment/Bennis/tp34constitution.htm
mr Visser, (about my reaction to your article, see above): having read your article again, and this time seriously, I have to admit that my reaction was based on a misinterpetation of your words. It was a case of “react first, then read”, so to speak. I hereby declare my words null and void. My apologies.
Jkoch, before we start talking about plan Bs, I think there are certain things that could be done to implement plan A (with its avowed aim of restoring complete sovereignty to the Iraqis and then exit) more efficiently and faster. I think part of the problem is that whereas the US officially is seeking to bolster Iraqi nationalism and a unified, multi-ethnic state, its practical policies fail to build on the considerable Iraqi nationalist sentiment that still survives in the country (albeit perhaps to a larger extent among the population generally than among parliamentarians.) Such steps by the US administration could include:
1. Distribute US contacts and interaction with Iraqi political parties more equitably, instead of talking only to those it considers to be Washington’s traditional partners (frankly those parties have not exactly been at the forefront of national reconciliation efforts lately). OK, it is a problem that some of these parties who claim to be Iraqi nationalist (like the partisans of Muqtada al-Sadr) are also unwilling to talk to the Americans, but there are others, such as Shiite independents and the Fadila, who are prepared to interact. This has been abundantly clear in the south, where the Fadila, both in Amara and Basra, have shown an interest in dialogue despite a more anti-Western attitude on part of their Najaf-based religious leader. Fadila based its opposition to the recent law on implementation of federalism on the view that the law would be inappropriate right now in view of the ongoing efforts to achieve national reconciliation; that is precisely the kind of compromise attitude the United States says it wants to see prosper in Iraq.
2. Washington maintains it wants an Iraqi nationalist attitude to prevail, consequently it must also allow true Iraqi nationalist leaders to emerge. It should accept that Iraqi leaders may wish to make a distinction between guerrillas who have been involved in the killing of Iraqis and those who have consistently focused on fighting the Western forces. It should once and for all abandon the idea that “public gratitude to the United States for liberating Iraq” should be a prerequisite for good bilateral relations. And it should steer away from encumbering the Iraqi government with talk or even rumours of “bases” or “advisers” – two concepts that most Iraqis are allergic to due to past experiences with the British. In other words, Washington should value what a nationalist government can deliver in terms of regional stability and the preservation of the existing state structure in the Gulf, but abandon any dreams of imposing a particular ideological colour on the new Iraqi state (i.e. beyond a “nationalist” attachment to the preservation of the Iraqi state as an independent unit) – whether in terms of economic doctrine or in the question of secularism versus Islamism.
3. The United States could seek to activate nationalist sentiment among the population at large by putting elite politicians under pressure. The problem right now seems to be that whereas the population wants the foreign forces to withdraw and a truly nationalist regime to emerge, elite politicians are not taking any serious steps to facilitate this – instead they seem to be exploiting the presence of the Americans to maximise their own power and petty fiefdoms. What Washington could do, for instance, would be to make a public declaration that would put public pressure on Iraqi elite politicians to act in a conciliatory manner, by linking such behaviour to the early withdrawal of foreign troops (i.e. remunerating moderate nationalism with troops reductions). Thus, Washington could for instance announce that as soon as the committee for constitutional revision has managed to complete its work, the United States will start reducing its troops presence immediately. (Technically, the committee has a one-year mandate, but such a public announcement would finally produce some popular pressure on the elite politicians to get their act together.) If the politicians go on sabotaging, they will increasingly come under pressure from below.
4. The idea about greater regional engagement (already favoured by a growing number of US policy-makers and politicians – including Biden) could be used to get capitals in the region to instil moderation in their Iraqi protégées, in a bid to preserve the existing state structure and thereby regional stability – which most neighbouring states probably prefer in the long run. In general, thinking regionally should open up a large number of options; Eric Davis has for instance some interesting ideas here.
Sd, you’re right in that some Daawa members appear to have shifted position in the federalism question over the summer. In particular the Tanzim al-Iraq branch (which used to be anti-federal) has lately become increasingly pro-SCIRI. I still have no reliable info on exactly how the members of Maliki’s “main branch” chose to deal with the vote, but I’m pretty sure that support from the Tanzim al-Iraq faction was instrumental in getting the bill through. I suppose the big question concerning the Daawa is to what extent Maliki will move towards a pro-SCIRI position. I think it is still too early to draw any conclusions on that.
Reidar, you are a rational thinker trying to apply rational principles to a completely irrational situation. I wouldn’t want to discourage you, because this kind of thinking will be useful again at some point in the future, but not until two very unpleasant things happen: (1) the position of US forces in Iraq becomes so dire that we are forced to evacuate without any semblance of having achieved anything, probably destroying a large part of our remaining heavy equipment in place, and (2) the ensuing regional war eventually resolves into a new balance of power, probably at a cost of millions of lives.
I think that Reidar’s point that Senator Biden’s plan for a breakup of Iraq is unconstitutional is almost certainly true (I don’t have the competence myself to check the point), but it is also irrelevant. The US possesses the skills and resources to bring about a breakup of Iraq if it so wishes. It is not a question of overtly imposing a breakup, but rather one of influencing, threatening, or blackmailing persons in so-called legitimate authority to act in the way desired.
I have been reading a rather ancient book, Philip Agee’s “CIA Diary”, an account of his days as a CIA agent in South America in the 1960s. Whether or not his account is entirely accurate (certainly not), it reminds us (1) that the US is capable of putting enormous resources into influencing local politics. Even minor persons could be followed. Three observation points, not one, were maintained outside Soviet embassies, in order to photograph people entering or leaving, or talking in the garden. Numerous members of governments were paid salaries by the US. Coups d’Etat were launched. (2)that the experience of South and Central America is available to be applied to Iraq. Negroponte is the best known case. Iraq is such a big problem now that any means in the US arsenal could well be used to resolve it.
There is no doubt in my mind that some in authority in Washington would like a breakup of Iraq. Not all. In the old days, post-2003, one would have said that it was a Likud plot to destroy Iraq as a potential opponent of Israel. Perhaps still true.
The crucial event was the bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra in February. That was the point when sectarian strife really took off. It was a strange event, technically speaking completely different from anything that has happened before or since. In a town entirely surrounded by US observation points, and an earth wall with three controlled entry points. Strange indeed that what happened was unknown to the US authorities. Strange again that the Iraqi journalist Atwar was murdered the same day for investigating too closely. Never happened in the same way before or since. There is certainly more to come out on the event in Samarra. A very curious event.
No-one doubts that separatist tendencies exist in Iraq, they do in all countries. The question is to what extent they have been stimulated by external factors.
Alison,
The question is to what extent they have been stimulated by external factors.
They are totally and fully “stimulated by external factors” like Ahakim and others.
I also fully agree with your brave reading of Samura’a Bombing “Askariya shrine” I second your thoughts in this, I would add here at that time the city was under curfew from 8pm till 7.30am, some people saying 6am on that morning the saw some US trucks sounded “Askariya shrine” for an hour, then the left the place just before 7.30., and killing Iraqi journalist Atwar {God Bless her) defiantly have some thing related to real story in addition she asked the people surrounding here for help from those killers but you know every one in Iraq will be killed shout any fear or reason but she dragged and she murdered….
“A Replay of Colonial Patterns”
“Gertrude Bell and her superior in the administration of British rule in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, were charged with creating a nation out of whole cloth that would serve British colonial interests.[4] They did their job well. They created a Kurdish buffer against Turkey in the north under their control, rather than as an independent state. They installed favored Sunni rulers in Baghdad, with a Hashemite King, Emir Feisal of Mecca, at the head. Most importantly, they institutionalized repression of the Shi’ites in the South. The British governance of Iraq was, according to historian Charles Tripp, a combination of “direct and indirect rule.”[5] This sounds suspiciously like Grossman’s “limited sovereignty.” If American’s don’t know their history, Iraqis definitely have a strong sense of theirs, and they see the United States as directly continuing the policies of Great Britain.
From the perspective of Iraqi Shi’ites, the United States is neither better nor worse than the British seventy years ago.”
To:Reidar Visser,
Read this letter sent on 22 Oct2006.
Reidar, Iraq is experiencing a proxy federalization process between Iran’s supporters and Iraqi Shiites.
I think there will be revival in some stage for this process even it pass soon, read the letter, tells you those who support Iraqi federalization process are US brought poppets/ Iranian supporters, they using all the tools/ways includes criminal acts against Iraqis whom appose this sick thoughts.
ألاخ العزيز أحمد حفظكم الله
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته و دعائي الى المولى عز وجل ان بحفظكم جميعا من كل سوء
هذه رسالة قصيرة أ وجز لكم بها بعض الاخبار. نحن في طريقنا الى الاستقرار حيث لم يمض علينا سوا أسبوعين ونيف في الدار المستأجرة و الاربعاء الماضي وصلت سيارتي من الجنوب مع سيارة جلبت بعض الحاجيات ملابس شتائية و وسائد و أغطية شتائية و بسط وقد تطلب هذا كتاب أذن من محافطة دهوك التي لاقيت منهم كل الترحيب والاحترام حيث تطلب الامر ان تمر المعاملة على الشؤون الداخلية ويكون عادة مديرها ضابط شرطة برتبة متقدمة يرتد زي مدني الذي أجلسني في غرفته و أمر الحاجب ان يكمل المعاملة الشئ الذي لم أعامل به في البصرة طيلة حياتي مرة واحدة وتحديدا لدى مراجعة مثل هذه الدائرة في الجنوب أيام صدام حيث في الغالب كانت تتولى من قبل طائفتة الجغرافية( وليس كما تنفث سمومها الافاعي الجديدة عندما تريد ان تصف صدام حيث تصفه بطائفي فقط وتترك الباقي للمستمع أن يفسرها بالطائفية المذهبية بعد ما مهدت لهذا الفهم وبذلك اججوا النار الطائفية) أما الان فأن الشؤون الداخلية في البصرة فهي بيد اهل البصرة كماأرادوا ولكن هي بيد العتاة المجرمين وأن راجعتهم لاسامح الله سوف لن يتوانوا بتمرير الخبر لزبانيتهم(التكملة في نهاية الرسالة)( الكلام ليس اتهام جزافا أرجوا أن تنظر للاتهامات المتبادلة سابقا والان بين السيد محافظ البصرة , ابن البصرة , و الجهات التي يتنازع معها و كلاهما في السلطة ولكن أحدهم يمتلك مقاليد نوع من الشرطة والاخر يمتلك نوع ثاني من الشرطة , القصة طويلة وحقيقة غير مفهومة ألا ان نقول انها عصابات . وان كان هذا صدفة في البصرة فكيف مثله يحدث الان في العمارة ربما تابعتم الاخبار في اليومين الاخيرين حيث حصلت اغتيالات لمسؤلين في الجرائم الكبرى و مستشار قانوني في محافظة العمارة ولكن الله يريد ان يفضحهم فلم تلفق الاتهامات للبسطاء من مذهب اخر أو جهة سياسية غير حاكمة بل وجههوها لبعضهم وحصل ما حصل ( والله يمكن هذه حوبة الصيدلي من عائلة النجدي الذي قتل قبل شهرين في العمارة من قبل فرسان فرق الموت البطلة أخزاها الله وأسكنها فسيح سقر ). نعود الى كتاب موافقة دهوك الذي حصلت عليه وكنت قد نويت التوجه الى اربيل لاستقبال السيارة لان كان باعتقادي ان المشاكل ستبدا من هناك و توجه معي أبنائي ويفضل الهواتف النقالة التي تعمل في مناطق محددة من دهوك و التي تقترب من الموصل علمنا ان ضابط برتبة مقدم مسؤل عن معسكر و نقطة سيطرة في قضاء طوزخرماتو قبل كركوك لايقبل بمرور سيارة العفش ويطلب كتاب اذن من محافظة كركوك فوصلت اربيل قرابة الساعة الحادية عشر و تركت الأبناء مع صديق من أهل أربيل كان يتابع معنا العملية الاستيرادية للمعدات الثقيلة توجهت الى كركوك ووصلتها قبيل الساعة الواحدة الى أن توجهت الى المحافظة اوشك الدوام ينتهي أما شرطة المحافظ في الداخل فكان أثنين منهم يدخنان ربما لانهما لم يسمعا , أذا ابتليتم بالمعاصي فأستتروا, فقرأت السلام على أنجاز الكتاب الذي اصر سكرتير المحافظ على تهيئتة غدا لان الموظفين غادروا الساعة الواحدة عندها قررت التوجه الى طوزخرماتو التي تبعد ساعة عن كركوك و أقناع الضابط الذي أكتشفت أنه كما يقال عندنا هذه الايام قافل وتحدث معي باسلوب حرصه على أمن كردستان و كلام كثير أخر كان بودي مجادلته لكن الوقت ضيق وانا في حيرة في امري هل نبيت في طوزخرماتو ام نحاول مع السيطرة التي تبعد عن معقله مائة و خمسين متر وأخيرا مكننا الله من أقناعهم وان يغم الله على أعين الضابط الغيور واستقبلتنا سيطرة ثانية وثالثة وأيضا مكننا الله من اقناعهم والاكتفاء بكتاب دهوك لنصل الى اربيل الساعة السابعة وشئ عندها تناولت وجبة الافطار في صلاة العشاء وغادرنا أربيل الساعة الثامنة لنصل دهوك الساعة الثانية عشر ليلا. نعود الى البصرة فبعد الاغتيال الذي حصل ل د. عبدالله حامد الفضل معاون عميد كلية الطب و من أهل ابي الخصيب في أيلول 2003 وترك زوجة طبيبة واطفال اغتيلت اخت الزوجة وهي صيدلانية قبل شهرين ومن اهل ابي الخصيب ليعودوا فرسان فرق الموت الاشاوس اغتيال د. يسرى زوجة المرحوم د. عبدالله قبل اربعة ايام في البصرة علما انها تركت الى مصر بعد الاغتيال وعادت منذ شهور . لم يعرف اي انتماء سياسي للنساء ولاسف الاتهامات جاهزة في البصرة فتارة يصفونهم بالوهابية وتارة بتمويل الارهاب وهي اتهامات هذه الايام عادة ماتلصق بالضحية لتزيد الطين بلة أو ان متلقي الخبر سعداء به لتصديق التهمة مهما كانت ساذجة او بعيد عن المنطق و الواقع. تغمد الله ارواحهم وبقية الشهداء برحمته الواسعة واسكنهم فسيح جناته. و دمتم بحفظ الله
I wounder how many of the westerns think as same as these guys even he lived 18 years in the region he still blind about Iraq and its society, wounder how they can solve Iraqi chaos no wonder that their mistakes grows day by day.
The transforming vision is not, to put it mildly, the consensus among those with long experience in the Middle East. “It is so divorced from any historical context, just so far out of court, that it is laughable,” Chris Sanders told me. “There isn’t a society in Iraq to turn into a democracy. That doesn’t mean you can’t set up institutions and put stooges in them. But it would make about as much sense as the South Vietnamese experiment did.”
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200211/fallows
” Chris Sanders, an American who worked for eighteen years in Saudi Arabia and is now a consultant in London,”
Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?
A few weeks ago, I took the F.B.I.’s temperature again. At the end of a long interview, I asked Willie Hulon, chief of the bureau’s new national security branch, whether he thought that it was important for a man in his position to know the difference between Sunnis and Shiites. “Yes, sure, it’s right to know the difference,” he said. “It’s important to know who your targets are.”
That was a big advance over 2005. So next I asked him if he could tell me the difference. He was flummoxed. “The basics goes back to their beliefs and who they were following,” he said. “And the conflicts between the Sunnis and the Shia and the difference between who they were following.”
O.K., I asked, trying to help, what about today? Which one is Iran — Sunni or Shiite? He thought for a second. “Iran and Hezbollah,” I prompted. “Which are they?”
He took a stab: “Sunni.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html?ex=1318737600&en=c5709a9fc1e31b3f&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
Salah, just to say that I am as concerned as you are about the killing of innocent inhabitants in Abu al-Khasib and the displacement of civilians from Basra and the south. It is the kind of violence that often goes unreported in the media because it happens in the dark without any bombs and explosions but it is of course equally tragic.
Reidar,
that often goes unreported in the media because it happens in the dark without any bombs and explosions but it is of course equally tragic.
I wonder if you have any idea and more details either if you visited the area before or some one he reported to you from there, which is the element that’s working in the dark in Basra as you said.