Steve Negus wrote in the FT yesterday about the distinctly rumpish-looking session the Iraqi “parliament” held yesterday to discuss changes in the Constitution that will specify and facilitate the devolution of many powers to “regions”. (Hat-tip to Juan for that.)
Negus wrote that there were “approximately 140” MPs present. Az-zaman apparently wrote that there were 138. 138 is the minimum needed to form a majority (and therefore also a quorum? info on quorum requirements, please?) in the 275-member body. Negus wrote that all the legislators present at yesterday’s session voted for a law that would,
- allow Iraq’s 18 governorates to hold referendums on whether to amalgamate into federal regions similar to the Kurdistan self-rule zone in the north, which has its own regional government and security forces.
He notes that,
- Shia and Sunni leaders agreed last month to delay the law’s implementation for at least 18 months, postponing the creation of any new autonomous regions until 2008.
However, it’s not clear to me what will be gained from this delay, except yet more bloodshed, given the extreme bad faith with which the proponents of radical devolution (also sometimes misnamed “federalism”) in Iraq have been acting. Including in the way they rushed to convene this session.
Beyond that, given the horrendous situation through which most Iraqi communities are now living, I wonder what the meaning and true impact of this “legislative act” really is. Will it make any difference to the lives of Iraqis? My understanding, from poll data and other sources, is that the vast majority of non-Kurdish Iraqis, including probably a majority within the Shiite community, want to keep Iraq as a unitary state (but that if the Kurds want to grab a lot of powers to their region, at least the non-Kurdish parts of the state should stick together.)
In the period of mayhem and civil conflict that almost certainly lies ahead (given the trend line under US occupation so far), what difference will this “legislation” make? And indeed, what is the relevance of this whole, Green Zone-bound Iraqi “parliament” at all, at this stage?
What relevance it has at this stage derives, I believe, almost solely from international factors. Most evidently, from the support it gets from the US occupying force, which has been able to shoe-horn the present, parliament-derived Iraqi “government” into a degree of international “legitimacy”. (This is similar to the way the US has been working, regarding Somalia, to shore up the international “legitimacy” and recognition of the warlord-dominated, Baidoa-based government, rather than that of the Mogadishu-based Islamic Courts regime, which seems to have considerably more popular support than Baidoa.) In times of civil turmoil, “recognition” by external governments is an important political asset that can be parlayed into further political/diplomatic support, military support, the ability to conclude lucrative contracts (as the Kurds have been doing with the oil supplies in their region), etc etc.
So much for the longheld American idea that the legitimacy of a government derives from the consent of the governed, eh?
So in the present circumstance, regarding the present Iraqi parliament and government, it seems clear that 138 MPs are on board this dangerous “legislative” campaign to split the country. But if 138 (or 140) is the greatest number the splittists can muster, then I think that is fairly pathetic. At the very least, it means that any procedures they enact in the field of devolution will have poor popular support. Either these procedures will die on the vine, or they will be highly contested and yet another cause for internal discord. Either way, they do not point the way, in Iraq’s ethnic-Arab areas, to any orderly progression toward a robust and popular supported devolution of powers. All that this “legislation” really does is give more legislative support and “legitimacy” to the Kurds’ own, already-existing march toward very robust autonomy.
I imagine some quite considerable amounts of money passed hands to ensure the convening of this session.
However, it’s not clear to me what will be gained from this delay . . .
I have a theory.
Eighteen months puts it in spring 2008. The details of the partition arrangements will have to be worked out, and then there will be elections for the new regional governments. These elections could be held shortly before, or some time after, our own elections in November 2008.
When the present Iraqi government was chosen by the first legislature elected under the new constitution, many of us observed that there were no more milestones, no more corners to be turned in expectation of seeing that light at the end of the tunnel. The regional elections will provide one more corner, one more ‘X’ to put in ‘things will get better after X’. It will come when it’s needed most, to give Republican candidates, especially the presidential candidate, a boost in 2008.
My understanding, from poll data and other sources, is that the vast majority of non-Kurdish Iraqis, including probably a majority within the Shiite community, want to keep Iraq as a unitary state . . .
That’s my impression also, for what it’s worth. I’m sure your information is more extensive than mine.
However, preserving national unity takes more than wanting it in theory. The problem is lack of social trust between Sunni and Shia. It seems clear by now that there will be no agreement on sharing power, and neither side is strong enough to dominate the other. It seems the ultimate resolution must be some form of partition, regardless of how much or little blood is shed on the way to reaching it.
The Bush administration and Prime Minister Maliki may try to spin this development, so be wary (apparently Bush is starting to warm up to the federalism concept). The fact remains that not much changed yesterday. The bill basically says that 18 months from now, super-provinces with more autonomy from Baghdad can be formed if a majority of the affected provincial voters approve.
All of the critical issues were left unresolved. What will happen in multiethnic cities like Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk? How will oil profits be distributed? How will the Sunnis be protected so that the other sects don’t seek revenge? As James Baker said this week, “Experts on Iraq have suggested that if we do that [create semi-autonomous regions], that in itself will trigger a huge civil war because the major cities are so mixed.”
The Sunni Arab blocs and some Shiite and secular legislators, who had united last month to block the legislation, boycotted the session on Wednesday in an unsuccessful effort to prevent a quorum. While I believe the federalism scheme has potential, consensus was definitely NOT reached yesterday by the lawmakers who will ultimately put it into effect.
Reidar Visser has his usual thorough treatment of this at his website
I try and assess the weird variations in the reported vote-count at my blog
http://c4ss.org/content/14
^ three states? how about NO state?
There are only three US requirements for any national or regional Iraqi government:
1. It must be willing to sign the contracts drafted by US oil company lawyers.
2. It must have a sufficient claim to “legitimacy” under formalistic international legal standards to satisfy the lawyers representing the customers of US oil companies.
3. It must either provide adequate security to US oil companies’ in-country operations, or sign a satisfactory “status of forces” agreement allowing US mercenary soldiers to act with impunity in providing that security.
So what’s the big problem? #2.
Of Major Interest:the head of the British Army, Sir Richard Dannat, has openly turned against the Blair Government.He warned the public that the wars are endangering UK. As I see it, this a revolt. Do we think he is isolated in the military? I doubt it. This man is a Lord and a conservative Christian. Stay tuned for the next act whatever that will be.
Guys
Interesting to note that the US press hasnt picked up the General being nasty about the Iraq adventure despite it being announced at 10pm uk time last night.
what they do have is this discussion of some desperate measures.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/12/AR2006101201669.html
Outrage please, and don’t forget some of you can vote next month. I can’t so remeber the basic rule of Irish Elections “Vote early, Vote Often”