The war comes home for Olmert

40 thoughts on “The war comes home for Olmert”

1. “The pain you caused us by your failure has succeeded in unifying us.”
   They are not protesting the war. They are protesting the “handling” of the war. Their beef is that Olmert failed to achieve the ethnic cleansing of Southern Lebanon, a goal they would have considered worthy of their sacrifice. Where does sympathy come from?

2. “The pain you caused us by your failure has succeeded in unifying us.”
   They are not protesting the war. They are protesting the “handling” of the war. Their beef is that Olmert failed to achieve the ethnic cleansing of Southern Lebanon, a goal they would have considered worthy of their sacrifice. Where does sympathy come from?

3. The sympathy comes when you know of a parent who has lost a son/daughter.
   Is there no heart in you? Are you the same as those you condemn?
   Empathy is dead in America. Somehow we have completely lost the ability to feel the pain of others. There really is no difference between the administration and many who oppose it.
   We are doomed.
   .

4. John is correct that these are not “anti-war” protesters. They are protesting the way that the war was carried out and that their sons and daughters were sacrificed, they believe, in a war that could have been fought better and won more decisively.
   The “ethnic cleansing” part is pure bunk, and insulting.
   BTW, Helena, most of the reservists in the Alexandroni, Carmeli and other brigades called up could have gotten out of service had they wanted to. What is impressive is that, just as in Operation Defensive Shield, over ninety percent willingly answered the call.

5. “The “ethnic cleansing” part is pure bunk, and insulting.” I would have thought by contrast that it is the precise truth: the only way that Hizbullah can be removed from South Lebanon is by removing the population. Evidently there are still some in Israel who have not yet understood.
   I think the way that French policy changed since the beginning of the war is a good indicator of their slowly dawning realisation of the position of Hizbullah. At the beginning of the war, and at the time of the first draft of the Security Council resolution, they were quite anti-Hizbullah. I have no doubt they were influenced by all those Maronite and other Christian expatriates in Paris. Those people were certainly telling the Affaires Etrangeres how awful Hizbullah were, but they no longer represent the majority in Lebanon, if they ever did. Then the Lebanese government objected to the first draft, showing the unity of the country, and the French moved their position, but still said they were going to lead the UN Force. Now they have understood that the UN force if it were to effectively police the area (as Israel appears to want) would have to fight Hizbullah, and they have to a large degree withdrawn from that as well, in order to preserve their position in Lebanon. I doubt the Italians will fight, whatever they may say. So when is the start date for the next Israeli invasion of Lebanon, JES?

6. Of course, Alastair, I wholeheartedly disagree. I don’t believe that Israel ever sought, desired, intended, or would commit ethnic cleansing as a means of defeating Hizballah. I also don’t think that this is necessary.
   In my opinion, Hizballah’s popularity is based more on patronage and its ability to fire rockets at Israel than on any superficial Lebanese nationalistic messaging that Nasrallah may have employed over the past month. Take away its ability to effect patronage with Iranian money and to fire Syrian and Iranian rockets, and Hizballah probably becomes for most Lebanese what it actually is: a reactionary, religious militia seeking to foist its own brand of revolutionary Islam on the entire population of Lebanon. One need only watch Hassan Nasrallah’s semi-official addresses to the nation on TV to understand that what he is attempting is a coup de’etat by which Hizballah will replace the elected government of Lebanon.
   I also disagree with your assessment of the French position. I don’t think that the French government is any less anti-Hizballah today than they were three weeks ago. I believe that the reason that the French, and other European governments, have changed course on their willingness to deploy troops results mainly from the fact that their initial committments were based on the assumption that Israel would significantly disarm and weaken Hizballah prior to the deployement of those troops. I fully agree that neither the French nor the Italians – or any of the UN member states who have thought about participating – have the stomach to implement UNSC Resolution 1701 when it comes to disarming Hizballah.

7. I get the impression that there are quite a number of Israelis who believe that Hizbullah is a minor, extremist and irrelevant phenomenon. It says more about Israeli mentalities than it does about what Hizbullah is.

8. I don’t think I said anywhere that I believe that Hizballah is either minor or irrelevant!

9. Warren, I certainly did express, and still feel, my sympathy for the parents of Israelis (and Americans) who have lost children as soldiers– even in wars of which I heartily disapprove. That doesn’t alter the grief of the parent.
   At a different level, though, I think there is a likely moral distinction to be made between someone who voluntarily joins a military apparatus, entering the status of “combatant” that explicitly allows that individual to kill other people (preferably, only other combatants) and also exposes him/her to the risk of being killed, and someone who is conscripted into that role.
   When the choice to enter the status of combatant is made voluntarily and in full knowledge of the risks involved, then the killing of that individual — while horrifying for all loved ones who survive, and who most likely had no part in making that choice– might certainly be seen as morally different than the killing of a noncombatant. Certainly, under international law those two forms of killing carry very different weight.
   I repeat, though, that for the bereaved families, Israeli or American, the pain and the need for comfort are just the same…
   Re “ethnic cleansing”, we should note, first that this is not a fixed or defined term under international law, but that it would seem to involve the same kind of specifically anti-“group” intention that genocide does– with the group being ethnic, sectarian, religious, or whatever.
   I believe that intention can be clearly seen from the content of Israeli government communications during the war, which explicitly called on all residents of areas of south Lebanon to leave. And also from the IDF/IOF’s actions in some villages, e.g. Aita al-Shaab, where according to that AP report from Wednesday, this is what happened during the war: First came the tanks. Then came the warplanes. Then came the bulldozers. A monthlong Israeli assault and weeks of fierce ground combat between Israel and Hezbollah fighters have reduced this once-vibrant tobacco farming village and Hezbollah stronghold to a wasteland of rubble, scorched trees and unexploded bombs — a snapshot of the destruction the 34-day war wrought across southern Lebanon.
   Of course, since “ethnic cleansing” is not a technical term in international law, Israel can’t explicitly be accused of it in any law court. However, the IOF’s actions in places like Aita al-Shaab, and the content of the leaflets and Israeli broadcasts do combine to make a powerful case that Israel reacted quite disproportionately and failed to take the care required to avoid damage to civilians and their vital infrastructure– i.e., committed war crimes.

10. I don’t think that you can call encouraging civilians to temporarily leave a combat zone so as to avoid harming them during combat can be construed as “ethnic cleansing”, no matter how imprecise or undefined in international law that term might be. I would be interested to know how you would suggest that Israel might have taken “the care required to avoid damage to civilians” while those civilians remained in areas from which combatants were firing on IDF troops. And again, what might have been a “proportionate” response by Israel to the shelling of its civilians?

11. Hey, JES, this is almost as good as IM-ing…
    The use of bulldozers and reducing the village to “a wasteland of rubble” indicates a strong desire that the inhabitants of Aita al-Shaab not return to their homes (what homes?) any time soon.
    As the ICRC and numerous other authorities on the laws of war have stated, giving civilians “warnings” to get out of zones where there may be military ops doesn’t absolve the commanders from taking the care necessary to avoid damage to them. Also, attempting to clear whole zones of their civilian population is not justified by ‘military necessity’ when military necessity requires operations against only limited areas within those zones.
    Of course, over in Baghdad right now, Saddam Hussein has been making exactly the same kinds of arguments about his army’s need to “clear” whole zones of northern Iraq from their (as it happens, Kurdish) civilians in order to be able to pursue its by that time purely defensive campaign against a much more significant military threat… Not many people are convinced by his argument, and I don’t see why you should expect folks to be convinced by yours?

12. The use of bulldozers and reducing the village to “a wasteland of rubble” indicates a strong desire that the inhabitants of Aita al-Shaab not return to their homes (what homes?) any time soon.
    Umm, I think it might be more indicative of attempting to minimize the degree of risk to IDF troops tasked with destroying launchers and other offensive weapons. As I recall, the battle for Ait ash-Shaab went on for the better part of two weeks, and that IDF troops had to repeatedly enter the town to clear out Hizballah “fighters”. I don’t think taking reasonable steps to protect these troops, after almost all the civilian population left, can be construed as “ethnic cleansing”.
    As the ICRC and numerous other authorities on the laws of war have stated, giving civilians “warnings” to get out of zones where there may be military ops doesn’t absolve the commanders from taking the care necessary to avoid damage to them.
    I don’t recall anybody saying that it does absolve the commanders. But, by the same token, you can’t accuse the commanders of “ethnic cleansing” because they attempted to clear the towns with the stated intention of “taking the care necessary….” and then accuse them of not taking necessary care because some civilians were killed.
    Also, attempting to clear whole zones of their civilian population is not justified by ‘military necessity’ when military necessity requires operations against only limited areas within those zones.
    This is true. So, for example, the General in charge of the Northern Command stated that Bint Jbayl was not taken earlier in the war because there were still civilians in parts of the town, including a functioning hospital. Futher, I haven’t seen any evidence whatsoever that would indicate that “military necessity require[d] operations against only limited areas” within many of these towns.
    Of course, over in Baghdad right now, Saddam Hussein has been making exactly the same kinds of arguments about his army’s need to “clear” whole zones of northern Iraq from their (as it happens, Kurdish) civilians in order to be able to pursue its by that time purely defensive campaign against a much more significant military threat…
    I would say that this is probably a very inapt comparison. First, Saddam claimed to be combating an internal insurgency; he was not responding to a foreign incursion onto Iraqi soil or to the shelling of civilians by a militia from foreign soil. Secondly, not only did Israel not target and kill tens of thousands of Lebanese civilians; it also did not use chemical weapons.
    Finally, I would ask again, what might have constituted a “proportionate” response to the shelling of Israeli civilians? Also, do you think that Israeli commanders have a duty to protect their troops to the best of their ability within the constraints of international law?

13. Also, attempting to clear whole zones of their civilian population is not justified by ‘military necessity’ when military necessity requires operations against only limited areas within those zones.
    Which limited areas might those be? Katyushas are truck-mounted ie fully mobile. Hezbollah has been firing them from densely populated civilian centers. Retaliation is certainly “harm within the risk.” I’m eager to read what a “proportionate response” to Hezbollah missile attacks on civilian centers, from civilian centers, is meant to resemble.
    Not many people are convinced by his argument, and I don’t see why you should expect folks to be convinced by yours?
    Sorry Helena, but that analogy seems a bit absurd. How do Israeli actions compare in any meaningful way to Hussein’s mass executions, ‘Arabization’, and poison gas costing 180,000 Kurdish civilian lives?

14. JES, actually Saddam does claim he was facing the incursions of a foreign army– and credibly so, since by that time the Iranians had turned the tides of the Iraq-initaited war and were threatening Iraq from its own soil…
    Finally, your good questions: what might have constituted a “proportionate” response to the shelling of Israeli civilians? Also, do you think that Israeli commanders have a duty to protect their troops to the best of their ability within the constraints of international law?
    re #1: first let’s note a couple of important facts: (a) Hizbullah did completely cease the shelling of Israeli civilians the moment the ceasefire went into affect August 14 (and previously, during the 48-hour humanitarian pause called by the UN it had ceased its shelling almost completely, unlike Israel.) Hizbullah has maintained its discipline re not-shelling well since August 14, even after the IDF’s pathetic botched incursion into that village north of Baalbek. Hizbullah is notably NOT composed of a bunch of wild-eyed crazies who shell Israeli civilians for fun. They are a very disciplined body of armed men who use (and refrain from the use of) violence in a disciplined way and for clearly political purposes.
    All the prima facie evidence– not just from the most recent war but from the whole history of IDF-Hizbullah encounters since 1993– clearly indicates that concluding a ceasefire agreement with Hizbullah, even if the negotiations for this only indirect, is a very effective way of protecting israeli civilians from the threat of being shelled from Lebanon.
    The fact that Israel (and the US) worked so hard and so long to delay the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement in the recent war– during long weeks in which the govt of Lebanon (with the concurrence of Hizbullah) were actively working for one– means that these two governments must bear a lot of responsibility for all the pain and suffering that happened during that period when they were delaying the ceasefire.
    We also need to keep in mind (b) the precise chronology of what happened at the beginning of the recent war. Firstly, the IAF has repeatedly been violating Lebanon’s airspace since 2000, including by on occasion launching low-flying sonic booms over populated areas which I can tell you are dangerous and terrifying; and Hizbullah, in response, once or twice sent a fairly primitive drone buzzing over Israel…
    (Please note that I now retract the next paragraph and the one starting “Note that until… “, in line with new info supplied by friend Vadim. However, to keep the integrity and intelligibility of the discussion that follows I shall leave them in here. ~HC, 3:20 p.m. Thursday.)
    Secondly, on July 12, Hizbullah violated Israel’s territorial integrity by sending in a squad to capture some serving IDF soldiers, and in the process they killed two more. Olmert declared this an “act of war” not terrorism. (If so, what did the preceding israeli violations of Lebanese airspace constitute, I wonder?) But ok, it was by general admission not an act of terrorism.
    Thirdly, Olmert launched a failed chase-and-rescue ground incursioon into Lebanon, which was an operational fiasco. Fourthly– and apparently out of pique, adamaged amour-propre, an excess of testosterone, or whatever– he ordered a massive aerial bombardment of many sites deep inside Lebanon.
    Note that until that point, Hizbullah had still not launched any shells into Israel. It was only after the IAF started its largescale assault against many infrastructure targets inside Lebanon that Hizbullah responded by shelling areas inside Israel, including civilian areas.
    This was in line with the understandings exchanged between the two sides in 1996, which have obtained between them ever since then, that they would refrain from attacking civilian areas so long as the other side also did so.
    I hope that, as of now, that understanding has been well reinstated.
    But let’s look at that chronology above. How might the shelling of Israeli civilians be prevented?? H’mm… maybe we can see the answer??
    And to your question #2: “within the constraints of international law” would seem to be something you and I can certainly agree on.

15. Note that until that point, Hizbullah had still not launched any shells into Israel.
    http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=280118&area=/insight/insight__international/
    There is also some dispute about when, on July 12, Hezbollah first fired its rockets, but Unifil makes it clear that the firing took place at the same time as the raid — 9am.

16. But let’s look at that chronology above. How might the shelling of Israeli civilians be prevented?? H’mm… maybe we can see the answer??
    http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=737825
    Simultaneously with this ambush, Hezbollah also launched a diversionary attack: a barrage of mortar shells and Katyusha rockets on communities and IDF outposts in the western part of the border area. That assault wounded five civilians

17. I do not see how anyone can, with a straight face, deny that Israel was conducting ethnic cleansing during its recent attack on Lebanon. Aside from the obvious facts on the ground in Lebanon, Zionism/Israel has a very clear and well-documented history of ethnic cleansing, both violent and “quiet”. In fact, we have unambiguous documentary evidence that from the very earliest days of Zionism there was awareness of the need to remove at least a major portion of the native non-Jewish population of whatever land they took over for their hoped-for Jewish State. To this end there were a number of suggestions, and even some very specific plans, as to how this cleansing of the land should be conducted.
    As far as I have been able to determine, none of the early suggestions and plans involved violence. Instead, they depended on a more “humane” carrot and stick approach based on the typical western colonialist self-serving, ignorant – and racist – assumption that “the Arabs” did not have any sense of connection or feel any ties to the land on which they had lived for centuries. Therefore, Zionist leaders believed that if provided with the right set of negative and positive incentives, “the Arabs” would cheerfully pack up and go elsewhere. (And of course, imbedded in all this is the assumption that European Jews who had never set foot in Palestine – indeed in most cases probably never seriously considered setting foot, let alone living there – felt more ties to the land than the native people who had generations of family history there.)
    Israel’s history in Palestine of violent ethnic cleansing, as well as the intent behind it, is so well known and so well documented, that it should be unnecessary to go into it in detail. Its history of mostly “quiet” ethnic cleansing of areas inside the green line is also well documented, as is its sometimes “quiet”, sometimes violent ethnic cleansing in the OPT, particularly East Jerusalem.
    What is less well-known is Israel’s most successful ethnic cleansing operation to date – the systematic (and very selective) cleansing of the Golan Heights in which Israel rid the area of some 95% of its Syrian population, and destroyed 96% of its villages. The systematic and selective nature of this ethnic cleansing becomes clear when you know that when then they conquered a town or village they would have the Druze line up on one side and the Arabs on the other, and expel only the Arabs. (For those who do not know, the Druze religion requires that they cooperate with whatever rulers they get stuck with, and the Israelis apparently believed that it would be advantageous to allow a small, compliant group of natives to remain. They were not entirely correct in their expectations of the Druze, but they have been able to suppress dissent pretty well so far.)
    Based both on their statements and their actions, it is clear that Zionist and Israeli leaders have, on the whole, felt no compunctions whatsoever about using both violent and “quiet” means of ethnic cleansing whenever and wherever they felt it served their interests. This record speaks louder than any self-serving protestations to the contrary.

18. “what might have constituted a “proportionate” response to the shelling of Israeli civilians?”
    In this particular case, the best way to prevent Hizballah from shelling Israeli civilians might have been for Israel not to attack Lebanese civilians. Some of us seem to conveniently forget that this latest of Israel’s wars did not begin with an attack on Israeli civilians, but with an attack on a clearly military target. Israel then “responded” with a series of massively destructive and deadly attacks on civilians and civilian targets.
    A more appropriate question, then seems to be “what might have constituted an appropriate response to Israel’s attacks on Lebanese civilians?”.

19. JES: you are completely wrong about Nasrallah.

20. PS Further on the subject of attacks on civilians and “proportional responses”:
    I recall some years ago a conversation I was involved in that included a Lebanese Christian, a Lebanese-American Druze, and three Israelis who had been part of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. One of the Israelis took great umbrage when the Druze used the term terrorist in relation to Hizballah. All of them were very clear that Hizballah was not a terrorist group but rather a guerilla resistance group. They were all equally clear that Hizballah focused on military targets inside Lebanon – i.e. occupation forces – with one exception only. According to their experience and observation Hizballah’s only attacks on Israeli civilians were clearly responses to Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians.
    If one carefully and impartially examines events in the years since Israel’s partial withdrawal from Lebanon it looks very clearly as if Hizballah’s shelling of civilians has usually, if not always, followed an Israeli incursion or attack in which Lebanese civilians were harmed.
    There is also strong evidence that Hizballah’s shelling since the recent Israeli attack has been mostly, if not entirely, in the vicinity of Israeli military targets. The mere fact that the majority of Israelis killed and wounded by Hizballah were military and not civilians, and the overwhelming majority of Lebanese killed and wounded (1/3-1/2 children), and property damaged by Israel ARE civilian, gives the overwhelming impression that it was Israel, and not Hizballah, that was targetting civilians. When you combine that with Israelis’ vastly superior ability to target their weapons accurately, you are left with a very clear picture that either the Israelis were systematically targetting civilians, or they are the most incompetent military in the world, and could not hit the side of a barn with a cannon at close range.
    For those of you who are preparing your poison pens to accuse me of approving of attacks on Israeli civilians, don’t waste your time. I do not approve of attacks by anyone at any time for any reason on civilians, or on attacks in which civilians, their property and infrastructure are likely to be harmed.

21. Shirin: read some history. Why are there now over a million Arabs living in Israel if the Israelis are set on ethnic cleansing?
    Why did the mayor of Haifa beg the Arabs in that city in 1948 not to leave but to stay and continue their commerce and lives in Israel?
    At the Lausanne conference which took place from August to September 1949, Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees even without a peace treaty with the attacking Arab states.
    Do these sound like the actions of a state that is intent on ethnic cleansing? Now ask yourself: How many Jews are there today in the surrounding Arab countries? Where is your outrage at this overt, explicit ethnic cleansing by Arab governments?

22. Guilty parties always love to quibble over details, hoping to distract attention from the big picture. In this case, we know what the war plan was, because Israel’s leaders, in their hubris, told us quite clearly with their words and deeds. They intended to (1) force the mostly Shiite population of Southern Lebanon out of their homes and make them flee North of the Litani River, so that they could (2) declare anyone remaining South of that line to be a “terrorist” by definition (these people would be exterminated), (3) destroy anything of value that could conceivably be used to support another indigenous militia, and (4) establish a “buffer zone” under their direct or indirect military control, which would effectively serve as a giant concentration camp for any survivors allowed back in after steps 1-3. JES can call this whatever he likes. I call it ethnic cleansing. Of course the plan failed, which is what these “protests” are all about.
    This Amnesty International report tells the story pretty clearly:
    http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde180072006
    “Any vehicle of any kind travelling south of the Litani River will be bombarded, on suspicion of transporting rockets, military equipment and terrorists.”
    – leaflet addressed to “the Lebanese people”, signed the “State of Israel”, 7 August 2006
    “All those now in south Lebanon are terrorists who are related in some way to Hezbollah.”
    -Israeli Justice Minister Haim Ramon, July 27, 2006
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5219360.stm
    Warren, I hope there is still some heart in me. On one level, I can sympathize with any parent’s loss of a child, having suffered that myself. But I cannot sympathize with the genocidal fury some people choose to fill the holes in their hearts. That is a choice they have made, and I condemn it.

23. Helena,
    Please don’t think my post was refering to you! I have been here long enough to know better than that. I was refering to the post above mine. It seemed to me to imply only those people of a certain viewpoint deserve sympathy when they lose a loved one. A certain ‘meanness’, if you will.
    We have too much of that in the world right now, on all sides. Nobody seems to be willing to show empathy for those they oppose. I fear for my country, which I always believed wanted to do ‘right’, when the majority can’t give sympathy to others.
    I will quote Gandalf;
    ‘Me? I pity even his slaves’.
    Or if you prefer a more common source;
    ‘Forgive them Father, for they know not what they do’
    .

24. Vadim, thanks for the clarifications, which will certainly help me to make my argument much better authenticated and more convincing. In particular, the Monbiot piece you linked to gives some very helpful references to a number of UNIFIL reports.
    It seems from the UNIFIL reporting, which I have no reason to doubt, that Hizbullah did indeed launch some rockets into Israel at the same time as (and as a diversion from) the soldier-capturing operation. That did violate the 1996 understandings… But then, as Monbiot so extensively indicated, Israel had significantly violated those understandings many, many times since 1996 and indeed since 2000.
    So now I can reframe my argument and make it better. Thanks.
    I guess the main question now for Israelis might be the forward-looking one of, “How can we best be assured that we shan’t be subjected to Hizbullah rocketing again?” I would say, given the experience of the past nine days (and the past ten years) that the best answer to this quite legitimate question would be to seek (1) the continuation and strengthening of the ceasefire, and (2)the conclusion of a sustainable final peace agreement with all of Israel’s neighbors.
    JES and other Israeli readers, do you have a better plan than this?

25. Shirin,
    As always, a pleasure.
    I believe that the first case of post-Zionist violent ethnic cleansing in Palestine was in 1929 in Hebron and Kfar Silwan.

26. Helena, you’ll have to excuse me for disagreeing with your chronologies. Let’s start with the most recent:
    Note that until that point, Hizbullah had still not launched any shells into Israel. It was only after the IAF started its largescale assault against many infrastructure targets inside Lebanon that Hizbullah responded by shelling areas inside Israel, including civilian areas.
    What you claim here is simply not the case. Hizballah used a volley of rocket fire as cover for the kidnappings. These rockets were aimed at (or at least hit) Shlomi, a cooperative farm, and clearly a civilian target. You can check back to the Reuters wire service notice that I posted here a while back. Although, in typical fashion, they try to confuse the issue, but it is clear that Hizballah launched an incursion into Israel under cover of rocket fire against Israeli civilians to kidnap Israeli soldiers.
    Beyond this, your longer range chronology seems to leave certain things out. For example, this was not the first incursion by Hizballah. In 2000, without any provocation, Hizballah “fighters” kidnapped three Israeli soldiers and also held them for ransom. It is clear that they were alive when captured. Israel’s response was, as you and Kofi Annan, like to say more “proportionate”. It took almost four years for Israel to get four bodies back, and it is still not clear how or why these three died or what they may have gone through prior to their deaths.
    You also choose to forget the fact that a couple of years after the kidnapping of those soldiers, Hizballah “fighters” again crossed the border, set up an ambush on the Northern Road, and began firing on cars. Several civilians and an IDF officer were killed as a result.
    You bring up sonic booms – which I think would be a very measured response to aggression, which has included regular firing on Israeli military emplacements on territory clearly defined by the UN and international community as not being part of Lebanon. What you fail to mention is the fact that Hizballah “fighters” on the border hav regularly fired anti-aircraft guns over the Israeli side of the blue line, with the fall back causing structural damage, fires and, I believe, at least one injury.
    All of these things seem to have escaped your chronology, and you still have not said what you would see as a “measured” response (not to mention whether or not Israeli commanders have a right and a duty to protect their troops).
    Of course you imply clearly what you think would be a “proportionate” response, without saying so, by your constant references to how “reliable” Hizballah is in sticking to agreements (although you don’t mention that, from 1996 through 2000, at the same time that they didn’t fire on Israeli civilian targets, they used the cover of Lebanese civilian targets to kill scores of Israeli soldiers). In other words, what you’re suggesting is that instead of letting his “testosterone” decide, Olmert should have sat down with Nasrallah (who presumably does not have a testosterone problem) and negotiated.
    Well my question is: Why the hell should the State of Israel negotiate wit Hizballah. Hizballah is not the government of Lebanon. Hizballah has not been appointed by the government of Lebanon to negotiate. Perhaps Hizballah would like to negotiate with the remnants of Kakh!
    That is the crux of the problem. As I stated several weeks ago, it is a travesty for a state to talk about its sovereignty when it has avoided exercising that sovereignty for years and allowed a reactionary militia to run its border for the past six years.

27. the conclusion of a sustainable final peace agreement with all of Israel’s neighbors
    I have no problem with that. That should be negotiated with the Government of Lebanon, and I am encourged that Fouad Siniora has raised this possibility at least twice over the past three weeks. A peace agreement with Lebanon, however, should not be negotiated with a private militia, nor should it be negotiated with Syria or Iran.
    Now, perhaps you’d like to tell us what would have been a “proportionate” response to the kidnapping of two of our soldiers and the shelling of a civilian community?

28. JES: you are completely wrong about Nasrallah.
    Susan: Really? Exactly what is it about him that I have wrong? And how do you know?

29. And, one more thing, Helena.
    I think that you fail to see that none of the civilians and combatants on either side would have been killed, and none of the damage incurred had Hizballah not initiated its attack and kidnapping in Israel!
    You may not be able or willing to see this, but I am certain that there are many Lebanese who feel that Nasrallah has claimed his “victory” on their backs.

30. “I am certain that there are many Lebanese who feel that Nasrallah has claimed his “victory” on their backs.”
    You are certain? Based on what, outside of wishful thinking? You cite no evidence, of course, because all the evidence points to the reality that the overwhelming majority of Lebanese – including the vast majority of Sunnis, and even the majority of Christians – view Nasrallah as a national hero. And if the polls are any indication at all, that majority is growing, not shrinking, among all major groups.

31. “I believe that the first case of post-Zionist violent ethnic cleansing in Palestine was in 1929 in Hebron and Kfar Silwan.”
    Your desperation is showing, JES. Those were indeed tragic and terrible criminal acts, but are hardly of the same nature or anywhere near the same scope as Zionism/Israel’s continuous, vast, and ugly history of multiple major ethnic cleansing operations throughout its history – operations that are going on even as we speak.

32. “I am certain that there are many Lebanese who feel that Nasrallah has claimed his “victory” on their backs.”
    
    Hoodwinked by Hezbollah — Turning the stench of defeat into the smell of victory
    Michael Young is writing from Lebanon.
    Shirin, I’d be interested to see the poll you’re citing re: Nasrallah’s heroism — got a link?

33. Vadim, I have to say your use of Michael Young is hilariously off the mark. His piece you link to there gives zero data about the attitudes of Lebanese except to write that most of them do (in his view, misguidedly) claim that Hizbullah won a victory in the war.
    You want data about Lebanese attitudes? Well, you’ll need to read Arabic to read this report from the respected Beirut Center for Research and Information. It presents the results of an opinion poll carried out by the Center between August 18 and August 20, with 800 respondents chosen for their representativity.
    The questions are good ones, and I wish I had the time to translate them all and the whole report here. If any commenters want to do a longer translation of this report for me to put onto a new full post on JWN, please gmail me (hcobban-at).
    But the first question was “Do you consider that the resistance emerged victorious from this war?” The responses were: 72% yes. (Broken down, if you’re interested, as: 79.8% of Sunnis saying yes; 96.3% of Shias, 62.8% of druze, and 59.7% of Christians.)
    So this looks a little more authorittative than Michael Young’s desperate and as always heavily ideologized rantings, wouldn’t you say?
    Also, if you want other assessments from other people writing in the western media about Lebanese attitudes, check out e.g. Rami Khouri or Nick Blanford.

34. You want data about Lebanese attitudes?
    JES’ claim was “I am certain that there are many Lebanese who feel that Nasrallah has claimed his “victory” on their backs” — and your poll actually confirms this: over one fourth the country -including half the Christian population- feels Hezbollah didnt win anything. Young’s piece counters unseemly triumphalism with hard facts. (For those who care to read it more carefully than Helena apparently has, his “hilarious” piece doesn’t address popular opinion but the tangible consequences of Hezbollah’s aggression, the demonstrated hollowness of its “deterrence,” and the revealed cost to Iran of its Lebanese catspaw.) As for poll data presenting Nasrallah as “national hero,” it’s not there either.

35. Vadim, about Michael Y’s piece, you write: his “hilarious” piece doesn’t address popular opinion. I think that was my point exactly.
    Also, since when did 40.3% of anything constitute “half”? Gosh, I’m glad I’m not your accountant.

36. Gosh, I’m glad I’m not your accountant.
    Touché. Of course 28% of 3.8 million is still 1.07 million Lebanese – “many” in both Arabic & English. & last time I checked Hezbollah had 14 of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament, not exactly a mandate to wage international war.

37. Yes, if I were Nasrullah I’d be a bit worried about the softness of my support among the Christians and Druze… but on the whole, given all that’s happened, I’d feel pretty satisfied to have come with the poll numbers looking this good.
    If, on the other hand, I were Ehud Olmert, I would be extremely worried about these very recent poll numbers in Israel. (Were they of all Israelis, or just of “Jewish Israelis”, as that country’s opinion polls so frequently are, I wonder?) Anyway, that report tells us this:
    Some 74 per cent of Israelis asked thought Olmert’s performance during the month-long war was ‘bad’, and 63 per cent said he should resign as a result, said the poll commissioned by the biggest-selling Yediot Ahronot daily.
    Clausewitz 101: “War is an extension of politics by other means.” I.e., what really counts is the political outcome, not the kill ratios or other metrics of damage caused.
    At the level of politics we now have Nasrallah supported by 72% of his public and Olmert supported by either 37 or 26 percent of his (depending what you look at.)
    And the winner is— ?
    By the way, re the continuing leadership chaos in Israel, let me just reiterate my previous warning:
    The disunity in Israel’s national command authorities could allow some devastating military adventurism to arise there. This, in a country with (by conservative estimates) some 100 to 200 nuclear warheads… Please, will the adults in the international community pay attention to this risk and exert all possible efforts to end the long-festering irresolution of three vital strands of the Israeli-Arab conflict before things get even worse?

38. Well, Vadim, once again I am shocked and amazed at your apparently complete unawareness of certain inconvenient realities that have been widely publicized even in the mainstream American media. I believe even the TV network newcasts have mentioned the fact that Israel’s inhuman attacks have vastly bolstered Hizballah’s and Nasrallah’s standing throughout all sectors of Lebanon, and all over the Arab and Muslim world. Yet somehow you have managed to miss it completely.
    Of course, if you rely on the likes of Michael Young and Hassan Fattah as your sources, it is no wonder you are so poorly and inaccurately informed.
    Information about the utter failure of Israel’s pathetically misguided attempt to turn the Lebanese people against Hizballah and Nasrallah is everywhere if you are willing to see it. For complete poll results look here.
    Or read this from The Christian Science Monitor, July 28:
    “The stakes are high for Hizbullah, but it seems it can count on an unprecedented swell of public support that cuts across sectarian lines.According to a poll released by the Beirut Center for Research and Information, 87 percent of Lebanese support Hizbullah’s fight with Israel, a rise of 29 percent on a similar poll conducted in February. More striking, however, is the level of support for Hizbullah’s resistance from non-Shiite communities. Eighty percent of Christians polled supported Hizbullah along with 80 percent of Druze and 89 percent of Sunnis.
    “Lebanese no longer blame Hizbullah for sparking the war by kidnapping the Israeli soldiers, but Israel and the US instead.”
    From Juan Cole July 29:
    “As for the Israeli hope of getting the Lebanese to turn on Hizbullah, that doesn’t seem to be working out very well. 87 percent of the Lebanese expressed support for Hizbullah’s retaliatory attacks on northern Israel. 70 percent supported Hizbullah’s capture of Israeli troops to force Israel to release Lebanese prisoners. Support for this move actually rose to a clear majority even among Christians. Only
    the Druze among Lebanese ethnic/religious communities mostly disapproved (they are 6 percent of the population). 63 percent expect Hizbullah to be victorious over Israel.”
    From Wikipedia:
    “According to a poll released by the “Beirut Center for Research and Information” on 26 July during 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, 87 percent of Lebanese support Hezbollah’s fight with Israel, a rise of 29 percent on a similar poll conducted in February. More striking, however, is the level of support for Hezbollah’s resistance from non-Shiite communities. Eighty percent of Christians polled supported Hezbollah along with 80 percent of Druze and 89 percent of Sunnis, while according to another poll, from July 2005, 74 percent of Christian Lebanese viewed Hezbollah as a resistance organization.”
    From Asia Times.
    “Certainly, then, the poll shows that many Sunni Muslims (and Maronite Christians as well) support Nasrallah. All talk about him having zero support in non-Shi’ite districts is nonsense.
    “Nasrallah has outgrown his Shi’ite identity and transformed himself into a pan-Lebanese, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic leader. The fact that he is a cleric, a Muslim and a Shi’ite is actually of little importance at this stage of his war with Israel.”
    Shall I go on, or is that enough for you?

39. Vadim,
    No doubt you have also missed this rather important bit of information from The New York times:
    “At the onset of the Lebanese crisis, Arab governments, starting with Saudi Arabia, slammed Hezbollah for recklessly provoking a war, providing what the United States and Israel took as a wink and a nod to continue the fight.
    “Now, with hundreds of Lebanese dead and Hezbollah holding out against the vaunted Israeli military for more than two weeks, the tide of public opinion across the Arab world is surging behind the organization, transforming the Shiite group’s leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, into a folk hero and forcing a change in official statements.
    “The Saudi royal family and King Abdullah II of Jordan, who were initially more worried about the rising power of Shiite Iran, Hezbollah’s main sponsor, are scrambling to distance themselves from Washington.
    …
    “Even Al Qaeda, run by violent Sunni Muslim extremists normally hostile to all Shiites, has gotten into the act…
    “This week, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt emphasized his attempts to arrange a cease-fire to protect all sects in Lebanon, while the Jordanian king announced that his country was dispatching medical teams “for the victims of Israeli aggression.” Both countries have peace treaties with Israel.
    “The Saudi royal court has issued a dire warning that its 2002 peace plan — offering Israel full recognition by all Arab states in exchange for returning to the borders that predated the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — could well perish.
    …
    “In Lebanon, Rasha Salti, a freelance writer, summarized the sense that Sheik Nasrallah differed from other Arab leaders.
    ‘Since the war broke out, Hassan Nasrallah has displayed a persona, and public behavior also, to the exact opposite of Arab heads of states,’ she wrote in an e-mail message posted on many blogs.”

40. Well, it seems the server ate my rather lengthy post regarding the well-publicized boost that Israel has given to Hizbollah across all groups in Lebanon. I hesitate to try to recreate it for fear it gets eaten again. Amazing that you managed to miss it, Vadim, since information about the dramatic increase in support for Hizbollah in general, and the poll results in particular were published by, among other things, the New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, Wikipedia, Asia Times, Reuters, Knight Ridder, AP, AFP, and on and on and on. I think I even saw mention of it on the American radio and TV network news.
    It never ceases to amaze me, Vadim, how you manage to miss inconvenient information no matter how easily available it is. Perhaps it is a case of seeing only what you want to see.
    In any case, here is a link to the results of the first poll in English. This is the only one I could find in English, so you will have to be satisfied with this one. You can search for the articles yourself.

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