I’ve been pulling together materials for a big article on the whole 33-day war that I need to write for Boston Review this week, and guess what, Nasrallah comes out with his big almost-mea culpa this afternoon.
Naharnet reports it thus:
- “We did not think, even one percent, that the capture [of two Israeli solderis on July 12] would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not,” he said in an interview with New TV station.
Hizbullah’s own Arabic-language website doesn’t have that same exact wording (and they don’t have any version of this on their English site yet.) But both these versions were reporting on a verbal interview Nasrallah gave to New TV, which could explain the small discrepancies. Anyway, for now I’m happy to go with the pre-translated Naharnet version.
I’ve been trying to figure out his motivation in making what could be read as a fairly damaging admission of the Hizbullah leadership having taken a very momentous decision based on a deeply flawed judgment regarding Israel’s likely response.
Of course, way back in the middle of the war– or even before the middle of it– a second-level Hizbullah cadre had also said in public that “we never expected an Israeli response of this magnitude.” So the argument had already been field-tested, as it were.
But really, what would Nasrallah hope to be gaining from making this admission in his own name now?
I’m guessing two things:
- (1) In the rest of the interview, he is extremely careful to portray Hizbullah as very cautious and determined not to over-react, even to any blatant Israeli provocations. (For example, in the New TV interview he also said, “If the Lebanese army encounters any armed person, it has the right to confiscate their weapons.”) But some fellow-Lebanese might justifiably argue that his present “cautious” stance is non-credible, given the recklessness with which he acted on July 12. So now he’s trying to tell them that Hizbullah honestly didn’t believe they were acting in a reckless way July 12.
(2) Also, as so often in the past, he is expressing a point of view that is studiedly modest and humble. He doesn’t quite come out and say, “We made a ghastly mistake.” Far less does he say to the Lebanese who have suffered so greatly from the war, “We are really sorry about that.” On the other hand, Hizbullah has been doling out large contributions and has made a huge commitment to the rebuilding effort– which could, perhaps, be seen as offering “reparations” for the war damage that the soldier-capture op of July 12 indirectly brought down upon their heads…
Please note here that I do not think for a minute, and am not trying to argue, that Hizbullah should be held responsible for the damage that the Israeli military caused to Lebanon and its people. Israel’s military and its national command authorities must be held fully responsible for their own actions, including for the horrendous damage and suffering those actions inflicted on the Lebanese people, and for the decisions they had knowingly made to take those actions. Many other avenues were open to them after the soldier-capture of July 12, but they knowingly chose from among those options the one that was probably the most lethal and destructive option.of all of them. (Hizbullah can and should be held responsible for the damage it caused in Israel.)
Anyway, Nasrallah’s eagerness to reassure his compatriots that Hizbullah intends to to act very cautiously in the coming period is evidently connected to his continued desire to work very closely indeed with the lawful government of Lebanon.
This alliance has been paying off very well for Hizbullah over the past five weeks or so. UN chief Kofi Annan confirmed on Friday that the beefed-up UNIFIL force will not be stationed along the Lebanese-Syrian border to interdict arms shipments coming in to Hizbullah, as Israel and the US had wanted it to be. But as Resolution 1701 stated, UNIFIL would only undertake such missions “at the request of the Lebanese government” (Art.14)… And the Lebanese government has made quite clear that it is not about to request that.
And on Friday, PM Fouad Siniora said this to Canadian Broadcasting about the goal of disarming Hizbullah:
- it will be “through dialogue, through co-operation,” with Hezbollah that the goal of no weapons in the region is achieved.
“It’s not a matter of disarming. It’s through dialogue that we have to reach that point. And I think this can be achieved while at the same time you see, trying to find out how to integrate the numbers of Hezbollah that want to really get integrated within the Lebanese army,” he said.
So, there’s the first post-July 12 mention I’ve found of that older idea of folding Hizbullah’s fighters into the national army. It is not such a crazy idea, at all. After all, how did South Africa end the insurgency that the ANC’s military had launched against it? How did Mozambique end the insurgency that Renamo’s (extremely rights-abusing) military had launched against it? Why, by integrating the fighters from the former opposition forces into a reconceived national army, that’s how.
(Let me tell you, too, that the Renamo Special Forces had committed atrocities far, far worse than anything that anyone in Hizbullah has ever been accused of: mutilations, tortures, child-abductions, sexual enslavement, etc etc… But once the peace agreement was reached, the guy who’d been head of those Special Forces became head of training for the intergrated national army; he did a good job there, then quit to go to law school and get a law degree. I interviewed him in Maputo in 2003, and was disarmed to find him extremely articulate and thoughtful… )
Anyway, that’s by the by.
In a comment I put onto this discussion yesterday afternoon, I’d noted that during the 33-day war,
- [Nasrallah] and the Olmert government were both fighting for exactly the same thing: the loyalty of the Lebanese government to their respective projects.
He won, I think.
But I also think he’s being very attentive to making sure that that victory doesn’t slip out of his hands.
I just want to bookmark a couple more things before I go to bed…
One is a snippet from this Daily Star article from yesterday or today, which could throw additional light on how the Hizbullah leaders were interpreting Israel’s actions once they understood that Olmert was mounting a n unexpectedly large assault against them after the July 12 op. It’s some quotes from Hizbullah’s deputy secretary general, Sheikh Naim Qassem:
- “We were expecting the Israelis would respond at the most by bombing for a day or two or some limited attacks or targeting certain places, such that it would not go beyond three days and some limited damage,” Qassem told An-Nahar daily [publ. August 26.]
Instead, Israel bombed Hizbullah targets and Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure for over a month in a war which displaced more than 900,000 people.
Two days after the war began, Hizbullah learned that Israel and the United States had been planning an attack in September or October, he said. “Israel was not ready. In fact it wanted to prepare for two or three months more, but American pressure on one side and the Israeli desire to achieve a success on the other … were factors which made them rush into battle,” Qassem said.
And the other important thing to bookmark is this oped from the WaPo of friday August 25. It’s by Yoram Peri, who used to work for Davar, and who is a very good analyst of civilian-military relations in Israel. (His book From Bullets to Ballots, which was a study of the incredibly heavy role former generals had played in the Israeli political system, was published by Cambridge University Press in the mid-1980s right after they published my book on the PLO.)
Anyway, in that oped, which is titled, Israel’s Broken Process, Peri writes:
- The civil branch of Israel’s government and its decision-making machinery must be made strong enough to balance the military’s input. Otherwise, there will only be more events like the one this summer, in which no well-reasoned alternatives were presented to cabinet ministers to compete with the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) recommendation to embark on a broad campaign in Lebanon.
This military option was discussed in the cabinet for less than three hours, was not countered by any diplomatic option and was approved in a conceptual void. Moreover, once a path of action was adopted, something went terribly wrong in making and implementing decisions.
Rectifying this situation is easier said than done…
The problems this summer stemmed from more than the generals’ traditional power. The circumstances were unusual. The IDF had a monopoly on intelligence. The country had an inexperienced prime minister and lacked a strong National Security Council. These things, along with other structural weaknesses in the machinery of civilian control of the military, resulted in a weak Israeli government that hastily bowed to the generals’ emphatically stated position…
The focus of controversy in coming weeks will not be whether the war was justified; the overwhelming majority of Israelis, including myself, are convinced it was. Rather, the question will be whether it was wise to opt for full-scale war as Israel’s response to the kidnapping of two soldiers. And if a military operation was indeed the appropriate response, what should have been its timing, nature and scope?
The military will undoubtedly draw the professional conclusions about this war, as it has in the past. The public will eventually punish the political leaders for their conduct of it. But Israel’s fundamental security posture will not improve until the pattern of relations between its generals and political leaders is dramatically altered and a better decision-making mechanism in national security matters is established.
Wars really are too serious a matter to be left to either fervent generals or weak politicians.
Well, there it is. I’m sure we’ll learn more details in the days ahead about the way the decision to launch the “massive retaliation” plan was taken back on July 12. But what Peri writes does confirm my own original hunch that it had been taken very hastily, without any time for due consideration either of any alternative plans, or of the chances this plan had of succeeding– and also (most likely) in a spirit of great emotionalism…
As’ad Abukhalil seems to downplay the “mea-culpa” saying “This admission was important because some supporters of the Syrian regime are engaged in bombastic rhetoric in that regard…”
That apparently is what he said, or at least it’s what the three major networks here said. I know that I saw Channel 10’s Tzvika Yehezkeli translating it in realtime during the live broadcast.
Wouldn’t you agree that there might just be a small chance that Nasrallah, crafty politician that he is, understands that there may be large segments of the Lebanese population who may feel that Hizballah was victorious, but that the cost for that victory was paid primarily by them?
I heard Yediot Ahronot’s Ron ben Ishai on radio yesterday. He just returned to Israel from Lebanon and had some interesting things to say. For example, he described the damage in Beirut as pretty much limited not just to the Dahiye, but also the the Haret Hreik neighborhood, and while this damage was horrible – he compared it to what he had seen in Grozny – he estimated that upwards of 70% of Beirut was virtually untouched. Ben Ishai also said that he noticed minimal structural damage to the airport. But he said that in the south towns such as Bint Jbail and Qana are pretty much completely razed. What is most interesting, he said, is what he described as an extensive ad campaign with posters and billboards everywhere from Beirut to the south. His explanation, for what he estimated at millions of dollars that must have been spent, was that Hizballah is still actively trying to convince the population outside the Dahiye that they won. I’m looking forward to reading the article that he’s currently preparing for this Friday’s Yidiot.
At any rate, it could very well be that Nasrallah’s recent admission could be evidence of his realization that he may have won the battle, but that he could very well lose the war.
One explanation for Nasrallah’s comments is that it is almost certainly true that he was surprised by the ferocity of the Israeli response and the resultinmg destruction in Lebanon. The question is really why he would choose to make this admission at this time. It may very well be that he realizes that this semi-apology to the Lebanese people while he is still basking in the glow of the perceived victory will go over much better than if he waits until the glow recedes and the general Lebanese population, especially the non-Shia, really realizes the extent of their infrastructure and economic setback losses. Politically speaking, getting out there early with any sort of apology is almost always better than spinning or stonewalling – compare GWB and Iraq or Katrina.
Jack – Are the Lebanese really not aware yet of the full extent of their losses? I think that Lebanese have understood all too well, since about July 15, the nature of their loss. They’re just being very stoic about it. My uncle said to me on the phone from outside Sidon, two days after the ceasefire began “It was very difficult here. But we are Lebanese. We are used to it.”
The focus of controversy in coming weeks will not be whether the war was justified; the overwhelming majority of Israelis, including myself, are convinced it was.
A remark, typical for the attitude of many (if not most) Israelis. The war may have been wrong, but only because it wasn’t effective enough. They almost never criticize the war because of its illegal, brutal, murderous, destructive character. Slaughtered civilians and an destroyed civilian infrastructure in Lebanon are almost never part of the equation.
Gideon Levy wrote a good article about it:
Fed up with the whiners
But I also think he’s being very attentive to making sure that that victory doesn’t slip out of his hands.
That’s what I wanted to write in the comments of your previous entry : who won the war isn’t yet clear. Much depends upon how the new FINUL will be implemented. The difficulties still marking the building of this force shows that things aren’t yet clear. Why were the French so reluctant to provide troops ? what where the terms of the negotiations ? It’s not easy to read the few elements of information offered. Among them :
1) No army is keen to go there and get fired at, whether directly or in a crossfire. The Israeli have targetted the FINUL and killed/wounded several of its men during the just finished war. Kofi Annan said that the FINUL command post which was bombed phoned not less than six times to the Israeli telling them that they were firing to near of them.
2) There was probably a discrepancy between the two French ministers, that of the foreign affairs (Douste-Blazy) and that of defense (Alliot-Marie). Apart of the recent shooting on the FINUL, the French military had two other bad experiences refraining them to accept : a) The Beirouth attentate in the seventies, in which they loose about 50-60 soldiers b) The Bosnian experience with the UNtroops where they had to stand without being allowed to fire, while the Serbs were massacrating the young men of Srbrenizca.
3) But what lies behind the negotiations concerning the “mission” and the “rules of engagement” of the new force ? What is it that the French wanted to get ? and now that they have accepted to send more troops, did they get satisfaction, or did they comply only because they want to rewamp their image ?
4) Well concerning the mission of the new FINUL, it looks like a win for the Hezbollah, since it is now clear that the new FINUL won’t have the task to disarm it; on the contrary, Siniora is now talking of integrating the Hezbollah fighters in the Lebanon army. Another point however is still unresolved : the controll of the Syrian border by the FINUL; the resolution says that the FINUL can only check the border with Syria if the Lebanon government asks for its help. Since Lebanon doesn’t seem to ask it, Israel is maintaining an unlawfull blocus on the Lebanon maritime routes. But now Syria is threatening to block the border, should the FINUL control it.. the result isn’t yet clear, but Lebanon risks being caught in a economic war after the military one.
5) Concerning the rules of engagement it’s difficult to understand what is going on under cover. Some speculated that Paris was looking for warranties from Syria and Iran that they won’t allow the targeting of the FINUL, but that they weren’t successful in their quest. Others think that they were looking for the permission to target Israel should it make incursion in Lebanon or breach the cease-fire ? IMO, the FINUL can only be successfull if it shows evenhandedness and doens’t allow for double standards moral.
6) In order to know who won the war, we also need to know why did Israel undertake it ? why was it so wild and destructive and why did the US/UK support it, allowing it to last more than one month.
a) Clearly, if Israel only wanted to get the captured soldiers back, it has lost, it seems that diplomatic talks are going on right now concerning a prisoners exchange, exactly what Israel didn’t want.
b) If Israel wanted to disarm Hezbollah, is has not won, since the Hezbollah was able to resist. However, depending on how the new FINUL is implemented, it may get to the same result in the end, although it doesn’t seem so for the moment.
Now, what about the hidden agenda of Bush/Blair who supported this all out war ? Their agenda isn’t clear either, but this war may have suited two currents in the US administration : a) That of the neocons who wants to start a war with Iran and are preparing their opinions with lots of spin. b) That of a more realistic current, who is looking for oil and want to install a “peace force” between Lebanon/Israel in order to secure a passage for a pipeline bringing oil from Kirkuk to Tel Aviv (see Le Moineau for more on this subject).
Whether they will won here isn’t yet clear. Only time will tell, whether the realists or the hawks get their way. If the main US/UK/France goal it to get a calm Lebanon in order to allow the transport of oil, it’s not impossible that the final winner will be US/UK. But they may impose restraint on both Israel and Hezbollah. Then the winner would be the oil industry, aka capitalism/colonialism.
7) What I note in all this, is a great lack of transparency among all the world leaders. They all have secret agendas which aren’t disclosed to the ordinary people. This is not the mark of democracies, it’s a very bad sign.
But both these versions were reporting on a verbal interview Nasrallah gave to New TV
Today Alsharqalawsat report this news about Nasrallah
نصر الله: لو علمنا أن عملية أسر الجنديين كانت ستقود إلى هذه النتيجة لما قمنا بها
I heard Yediot Ahronot’s Ron ben Ishai on radio yesterday. He just returned to Israel from Lebanon
His mission most liklly is secret eye and spy for Israelis, he entered with non-Israeli passport, he landed in Beirut airport from Jordanians airplane,his accommodation was commodore Hotel and then he went to see whats on the ground to spy to tell us the normal journalist news this just by pass for his mission which planed well with JORADN ARABIC HASHEMITE KINGDOM..
They almost never criticize the war because of its illegal, brutal, murderous, destructive character. Slaughtered civilians and an destroyed civilian infrastructure in Lebanon are almost never part of the equation.
Why should they?
Any one can tell me how Jewish state created? Under which legal system or matter this state created?
There is nothing we need to be surprised, it’s a matter of facts this state created on piles of “illegal, brutal, murderous, destructive character. Slaughtered civilians and an destroyed civilian”
This should be understood by those who support and step beside and giving all the support to this state which represented by “illegal, brutal, murderous, destructive character. Slaughtered civilians and an destroyed civilian infrastructure” State.
Unlike AP, BBC, etc, Haaretz added this to their article about the New TV interview with Nasrallah:
“He reiterated the Hezbollah claim that Israel planned to carry out an offensive against the organization in September, and explained that the decision to attack Hezbollah immediately following the raid forced the IDF into a premature operation that had been stripped of its element of surprise”
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/755225.html
Salah, I hardly think that Ron Ben Ishai could have entered Lebanon with an Israeli passport! (This is against Lebanese law.) Ben Ishai has been in Iraq several times (before, during and after the US invasion), and he has also been in numerous other Muslim countries over the years. His reports tend to be very accurate first-hand accounts, as far as I can tell. I hardly think that there is any basis for accusing him of being a spy, and I’m not sure as why his hotel is of any relevance.
Lisette,
I don’t see the importance of this part of Nasrallah’s interview. He has maintained this all along (as the article points out), but I don’t see anything to substantiate this. It also tends to undercut his current claim that he did not foresee the intensity of the Israeli response, when during his previous “address to the nation” he made the same assertion about foreknowledge of Israeli intentions and claimed that Hizballah’s intent was to preempt by drawing Israel into an open conflict earlier.
“We didn’t know what hit us,” said one of the soldiers, who asked to be
named only as Gad. “In seconds we had two dead.”
“Evidently they had never heard that an Arab soldier is supposed to run away
after a short engagement with the Israelis, ” said Gad.
“We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs – that was the intelligence we
were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a
well-equipped network of tunnels.”
As daylight broke the Maglans found themselves under fire from all sides by
Hezbollah forces who knew every inch of the terrain and exploited their
knowledge to the full.
I love it, if this right what Gad said ” that was the intelligence we were given” to their troops.
It reminds me with Khomeini during Iraq/Iran war 1980 who gave his solders the key for their castles in Haven…..
Each Iranian solder killed he promised, the key for his castle hanged around his neck….
Sadly this is the pictures most of westerns have in their minds about Arab; they are living in tents with four wives and the camel out side…..
من تلك الخسائر المادية تدمير 30 منشأة من المنشآت الحيويّة، بما فيها مطار بيروت الدولي والموانئ وخزانات المياه وخزانات الوقود ومحطات توليد الطاقة الكهربائية، وتدمير ما ينيف على 100 جسر، و630 كيلومتراً من الطرقات، و23 محطة لتوزيع الوقود، و7000 مسكن مع مساكن أخرى في جنوب لبنان والضاحية الجنوبية لبيروت ومنطقة بعلبك.
والمصانع سجّلت خسائر كبرى أيضاً فقد دمر ما يقارب 9000 مصنع ومحلٍ تجاري، منها مصنع «ليبان ليه» الذي يعدّ واحداً من أكبر مصانع مشتقات الحليب، ودمرت أكثر من 450 شاحنة، والعشرات من المزارع التي تعد من أهم مصادر الدخل في لبنان منها على سبيل المثال مزرعة «تنمية» لتربية الدواجن التي تعد ثاني أكبر مزرعة لتربية الدواجن في لبنان والتي فقدت وحدها ما يقارب 90 طناً من الدجاج.
http://www.alriyadh.com/2006/08/28/article182288.html
Yes, and had the Israelis bunker-busted those complexes from 15,000ft AGL, you’d be accusing them of war crimes…
The crucial factor which seems to be fueling the pan-Arab triumphalism is that Israel is now faced with a threat that can only be countered by Syrian-style, Hama-style, Ikhwan-style destruction, and it is well known that it is the ONLY state in the region with tremendous cultural inhibitions of mass destruction, democide, and loss of life. Israel has therefore entered an era in which it is facing threats it cannot counter, and the enemy’s goal is, as always, the destruction of Israel as a polity. The sea, however, is the same sea, something I find strangely comforting…
Eurosabra wrote :
and it is well known that it is the ONLY state in the region with tremendous cultural inhibitions of mass destruction, democide, and loss of life.
Yes, of course you are entirely right and I’m sure that the Lebanese who have just experienced 33 days of these tremendous cultural inhibitions will agree with you.
Come on Eurosabra, look at things how they are. With this disproportionate bombing of civilians infrastructures, the Israeli have lost all their high moral grounds, they have shown that they aren’t better than the folk who tried to exterminate them in Germany. It was there for all to see.
The claim that Nasrallah would have not kidnapped the soldiers if he knew the reaction is nonsense. He could have returned the soldiers 2 hours later and said sorry Charlie.
These speeches are like the lawyers joke, how can you tell when he utters lies? When he moves his lips.
Helena,
I wanted to tell you that I read your article in the Boston Review and thought it was wonderful. It answered a lot of questions I had. I am glad I found your blog. It has great analysis. The only downside is that some people get pretty nasty when reacting to other people’s comments.
And since this is the first time I ever participate in a blog, it feels a bit weird. I guess I’ll get used to it.
Anyway, this is an excerpt of an article on reaction to the interview in Tyre.
TV star Nasrallah impresses people on all sides in hopeful Lebanon-from UK newspaper Telegraph
By Patrick Bishop in Tyre–(Filed: 29/08/2006)
The leader of Hizbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, became one of the most widely admired leaders in the Middle East overnight after a broadcast in which he impressed audiences of all persuasions…It was watched by almost everyone in Lebanon and dominated coffee shop conversation yesterday. In Nasrallah’s home village of Bazouriyeh, near Tyre, Shia residents were proud of the impression he had made.
“He has calmed the situation and people believe him,” Hassan Sourour said. “Unlike all the other politicians, he is not a liar.”
Christians were also impressed. “He is a good man, there is no doubt about it, “said Dani Khayat, a small businessman from Tyre. “He has a very trustworthy manner and lots of charisma.”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=RDG05VDHPBMI3QFIQMFSFF4AVCBQ0IV0?xml=/news/2006/08/29/wmid29.xml
Hi, Lisette, thanks so much for summoning up the courage to contribute here. It can get quite fractious– I have friends who say they can’t even bear to read the comments because of that– but still, I am fairly pleased with the way we’ve been able to keep a cross-cultural, cross-belief discussion going here and have staked out a few areas of common ground and increased uynderstanding along the way.
Thanks, too, for sending the link to that Patrick Bishop piece, which certainly gives some important context for any consideration of Nasrallah’s t.v. performance. I’ve seen him giving other speeches on t.v., and he really is very good at it…
Anyway, stick around and be well!