Over on this JWN discussion board, Israeli commenter JES and I (and others) have been having a good discussion. In particular, JES asked, “What might have constituted a ‘proportionate’ response to the shelling of Israeli civilians?”, and that question provoked a useful and informative further discussion.
I do admit, though, that in my contributions to this discussion, I did not answer the specific question that JES asked. After all, how could we even start a discussion as to whether Israel’s killing of 800-plus Lebanese civilians might be considered “proportionate” to Israel’s having suffered 39 civilian deaths from the 33 days of Hizbullah shelling? To even enter such a discussion would be obscene. Would the killing of just 39 Lebanese civilians been ‘proportional’? Or what other ratio, other than that of pure human equality, might we seek to put on the value of a Lebanese life as per that of an Israeli life?
Actually, how about killing ‘zero’ other civilians, anywhere, being the best response to the killing of one’s own civilian compatriots? Or even, not killing anyone– soldier or civilian– but addressing one’s grievances (as the UN Charter and good sense both urge) through a strong pursuit of diplomacy?
So instead of getting into his ‘proportionality’ argument re Israel’s truly horrible civilian casualties, I reframed the question in my own mind to be one that asked the completely legitimate question of how, indeed, might Israel’s society and leaders best seek to ensure that Israeli civilians are not once again subjected to Hizbullah’s scary shelling of some Israeli civilian communities?
I know that a lot of Israelis are asking themselves this question right now. (And believe me, on the Lebanese side, a lot of Lebanese are asking how their society might also best be protected from any repeat of the terrible harm that Israeli inflicted on it during the 33-day war.)
Looking at this question now, I want to make one first broad and very important argument: The lives and wellbeing of Israelis and of all their neighbors will surely best be assured in the context of a sustainable and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. That has to be, surely, what we all work for! Absent that, seemingly “small” incidents like the Hizbullah operations of July 12 — or like the incursion that Israel launched deep into Lebanon just a few days ago– will always have the potential of jack-knifing the whole region back into a paroxysm of ghastly, ghastly violence.
Thank God the ceasefire of August 14 seems so far to have been sticking remarkably well… But we can’t rest on our laurels. Efforts for the broader Arab-Israeli peace (as called for in the ceasefire resolution) still need to be redoubled.
Pending that, though what we have in the Israeli-Lebanese theater is a situation of mutual military deterrence. Highly asymmetrical (in Israel’s favor), but still, mutual. Hizbullah is certainly acting as though it is deterred from renewing its lobbing of any of its rockets into Israel; and Israel is acting, for now, as though it is deterred from launching any resumption of the large-scale destructive operations that it mounted against Lebanon right up to the time of the coming-into-force of the August 14 ceasefire. It is evidently not any threat of punitive action by any other forces– whether the Lebanese Army or UNIFIL– that has achieved the general calm the region has seen since August 14. It has been mutual deterrence.
(Such a situation can certainly always be built upon, by diplomats of vision and good intent, if they want to achieve a sustainable resolution of the conflict in question… as per the transformation of the US-Soviet relationship from one of mutual deterrence to one of peace, cooperation, and cooperative threat reduction. But in the Lebanese-Israeli case this will also, necessarily, involve Israel making peace with Syria as well as with Lebanon.)
In the meantime, so long as both parties– the IDF and Hizbullah– still retain the power to inflict significant harm on each other’s “home communities”, then we should hope that the ceasefire holds, and becomes as much strengthened as possible. Let’s underline here that Hizbullah did completely cease the shelling of Israeli civilians the moment the ceasefire went into effect August 14 (and previously, during the 48-hour humanitarian pause called by the UN, Hizbullah had– unlike Israel– ceased its cross-border attacks almost completely.)
Since August 14, Hizbullah has maintained its discipline re refraining from shelling Israel. This, even after the eruption of a couple of small, localized firefights in contested areas of the south (one of which left four Hizbullah fighters dead), and even after the IDF’s pathetic botched incursion into that village north of Baalbek a few days ago, which also I believe left some Hizbullah dead.
Let’s do some more underlining here: Hizbullah is notably NOT composed of a bunch of wild-eyed crazies who shell Israeli civilians for fun. They are a very disciplined body of armed men who use (and refrain from the use of) violence in a disciplined way and for clearly political purposes.
(As anyone would have learned who read the study I published on the organization last year.)
All the prima facie evidence– not just from the most recent war but from the whole history of IDF-Hizbullah encounters since 1993– clearly indicates that concluding a ceasefire agreement with Hizbullah, even if the negotiations for this are only indirect, is a very effective way for Israel to protect civilians from the threat of being shelled or otherwise attacked from Lebanon.
The fact that Israel (and the US) worked so hard and so long to delay the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement in the recent war– during long weeks in which the government of Lebanon, with the concurrence of Hizbullah, were actively working for one– means that the governments of Israel and the US must bear a lot of responsibility for all the pain and suffering that happened during that period when they were delaying the ceasefire.
I want to re-examine, too, the longer chronology of the many interactions between these two fighting parties. (And thanks to commenter Vadim, who provided the link to the George Monbiot article I shall consider next. It clarified considerably for me some of the precise points about what happened on July 12 that earlier I had apparently gotten wrong. I apologize for that. I was on vacation in France at the time and had lousy access to the news.)
Monbiot has pored through past UNIFIL reports and come up with this brief summary of the 2000-2006 period:
- Since Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, there have been hundreds of violations of the “blue line” between the two countries. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) reports that Israeli aircraft crossed the line “on an almost daily basis” between 2001 and 2003, and “persistently” until 2006. These incursions “caused great concern to the civilian population, particularly low-altitude flights that break the sound barrier over populated areas”. On some occasions, Hezbollah tried to shoot them down with anti-aircraft guns.
In October 2000, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) shot at unarmed Palestinian demonstrators on the border, killing three and wounding 20. In response, Hezbollah crossed the line and kidnapped three Israeli soldiers. On several occasions, Hezbollah fired missiles and mortar rounds at IDF positions, and the IDF responded with heavy artillery and sometimes aerial bombardment. Incidents like these killed three Israelis and three Lebanese in 2003; one Israeli soldier and two Hezbollah fighters in 2005; and two Lebanese people and three Israeli soldiers in February 2006.
Rockets were fired from Lebanon into Israel several times in 2004, 2005 and 2006, on some occasions by Hezbollah. But, the UN records, “none of the incidents resulted in a military escalation”.
On May 26 this year, two officials of Islamic Jihad — Nidal and Mahmoud Majzoub — were killed by a car bomb in the Lebanese city of Sidon. This was widely assumed in Lebanon and Israel to be the work of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency. In June, a man named Mahmoud Rafeh confessed to the killings and admitted that he had been working for Mossad since 1994. Militants in southern Lebanon responded, on the day of the bombing, by launching eight rockets into Israel. One soldier was lightly wounded.
There was a major bust-up on the border, during which one member of Hezbollah was killed and several wounded, and one Israeli soldier wounded. But while the border region “remained tense and volatile”, Unifil says it was “generally quiet” until July 12.
Regarding this last judgment, see para 2 of this UNIFIL report, which says: “The situation in the UNIFIL area of operation remained tense and volatile, although it was generally quiet during most of the reporting period [ i.e., since January 21, 2006]. This situation completely changed on 12 July, when the current hostilities broke out and the area was plunged into the most serious conflict in decades.”
So then, on July 12, what happened? Para 3 of the UNIFIL report says this:
- The crisis started when, around 9 a.m. local time, Hizbollah launched several rockets from Lebanese territory across the withdrawal line (the so-called Blue Line) towards Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions near the coast and in the area of the Israeli town of Zarit. In parallel, Hizbollah fighters crossed the Slue Line into Israel and attacked an IDF patrol. Hizbollah captured two IDF soldiers, killed three others and wounded two more. The captured soldiers were taken into Lebanon. Subsequent to the attack on the patrol, a heavy exchange of fire ensued across the Blue Line between Hizbollah and IDF. While the exchange of fire stretched over the entire length of the Line, it was heaviest in the areas west of Bint Jubayl and in the Shab’a farms area. Hizbollah targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns south of the Blue Line. Israel retaliated by ground, air and sea attacks. In addition to airstrikes on Hizbollah positions, IDF targeted numerous roads and bridges in southern Lebanon within and outside the UNIFIL area of operations. IDF has stated that those attacks were to “prevent Hizbollah from transferring the abducted soldiers”. At least one IDF tank and an IDF platoon crossed into Lebanon in the area of the Hizbollah attack in an attempt to rescue the captured soldiers. An explosive device detonated under the tank, killing four more IDF soldiers. An eighth IDF soldier was reportedly killed in fighting that ensued during an attempt to retrieve the four bodies. That night, the IDF issued a warning to UNIFIL that any person – including United Nations personnel – moving close to the Blue Line would be shot at.
I might disagree with the wording there in one respect: to describe only the IDF’s shelling as “retaliatory” is, I think to be very one-sided.
But my conclusion from looking at this general record is to judge that when Hizbullah’s leadership decided to undertake the operations of July 12 they were (1) knowingly violating, by their shelling of the Israeli civilian areas of that morning– even if that shelling was intended mainly as a a tactic to divert the IDF’s attention from the soldier-snatch operation– the general agreement that had existed since 1996, under which both sides agreed to restruct their operations to purely military targets, but also probably, (2) doing so with some expectation that Israel’s response, while tough, might yet be similar to the scale of earlier exchanges that had occurred since 2000.
But Olmert’s response was, as we now well know, in no way commensurate with the kinds of exchanges that had taken place over the preceding six years…
So now, looking at the generally chronology above, let’s ask again when where the periods in which Israeli civilians were most secure and when were they least secure? The answer, surely, has to be that they were most secure when Israel had a working ceasefire on the ground, with Hizbullah, in Lebanon.
Mutual deterrence: It’s not a satisfactory situation to live under over the long term. But where it provides for calm, it sure beats the carnage that we saw over the past 7 weeks.
Helen wrote:
“Mutual deterrence: It’s not a satisfactory situation to live under over the long term. But where it provides for calm, it sure beats the carnage that we saw over the past 7 weeks.”
Over the long term, I believe, Israel wishes to annex southern Lebanon, and all the carnage followed by calm will continue until the Lebanese leave southern Lebanon, too littered with bombs to live in.
I also believe Israel over the long term has absolutely no intention of leaving the West Bank or Gaza. Or Golan Heights. The ruling class of Israel wants and intends to have these places as part of ‘Greater Israel’.
How to deal with this implacable plan is the problem.
AM: Israel’s actions in southern Lebanon are a direct result of violations of numerous treaties designed to give Lebanon sovereignty over its own southern territory. For example, read article 4 of the May 17, 1983 treaty between Israel and Lebanon:
ARTICLE 4
1. The territory of each Party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other Party its territory or its people.
2. Each Party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces armed bands organizations bases offices or infrastructure the aims and purposes of which include incursions or any act of terrorism into the territory of the other Party or any other activity aimed at threatening or endangering the security of the other Party and safety of its people. To this end all agreements and arrangements enabling the presence and functioning on the territory of either Party of elements hostile to the other Party are null and void.
This was 1983. Still in 2006 Israel has to deal with the presence of parties in Southern Lebanon that are in direct violation of such treaties.
Israel has no intention of “annex(ing) southern Lebanon.” They are trying to accomplish what was promised to them in numerous treaties and then violated repeatedly. For this we mostly have Iran and Syria to thank.
Helena said that Hizbullah executed its attack on Israel and did “so with some expectation that Israel’s response, while tough, might yet be similar to the scale of earlier exchanges that had occurred since 2000.”
The point to war is to pummel your enemy into submission – nothing more and nothing less. Responding to an enemy that has sworn to wipe you off the face of the earth with a “proportionate” response is to act in a self-defeating manner. What should Britain have done in WWII when Germany started lobbing rockets at London? What would have been a proportionate response in that case? If your enemy starts a war, then you have no choice but to respond until they give up or until you are defeated when their ultimate goal is to eliminate your country and its citizens.
The border between Lebanon and Israel is not like the border between Italy and Switzerland or the one between the Costa Rica and Mexico. It will remain fraught with peril until truly sovereign governments exist on both sides of the border.
Truesdell,
truly sovereign governments exist on both sides of the border.
What you mean here, is it Israeli government not a “sovereign government”?!!
“What you mean here, is it Israeli government not a “sovereign government”?!!
No – the point, Salah is that lebanon’s government isn’t sovereign if it can’t control its militias. do you think unelected militias should have the right to negotiate international treaties & wage war on neighboring countries? forgetting that it’s inhumane, wouldn’t you agree that it’s highly undemocratic?
Uh oh. The evangelical Christians are turning on the Republicans:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/24/washington/24cnd-religion.html?hp&ex=1156478400&en=5c2b899f445f1c30&ei=5094&partner=homepage
What a surprise. Of course, they can’t actually do anything about the Republicans (they aren’t about to go vote for Democrats). That will make them very frustrated. Who will they turn on next?
Helena,
Isreal has a bitter future unless they attempt that ‘comprehensive peace plan’ you mentioned. That is the only way they can TRUELY protect their citizens. The reason is because everyone has been shown the method of Isreal’s destruction. Missiles/rockets. A true guidence system is the next logical step. After that step Isreal is under permanent threat from ALL its neighbors. Everyone was shown that air power cannot stop these rockets. Everyone was shown how their use can cause tremendous disruption in Isreal.
These rockets are a true threat to the Isreali way of life, yet overpowering bombbardment (by Isreal) will only increase the likelihood of a neighbor having them, for the deterance factor.
It is amazing how Isreal’s problem is so similar to America’s. Both countries actions, rather than forcing opponents to disarm, have simply shown how being armed can DETER military action.
.
I just want to bookmark these two additional UNIFIL reports, since I have found them hard to locate, and here looks alike a good place to do so.
This one is UNIFIL’s report for the period 22 July 2005 thru 20 January 2006.
This one is the Sec Gen’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, for the period August 11-17, 2006.
In the latter one, Annan reports (based on UNIFIL’s reporting to him), as follows:
[para 4.] …[A]s of the writing of the present report, the parties are generally complying with the cessation of hostilities called for in paragraph 1 of resolution 1701 (2006).
He lists some fairly minor infractions/incidents that occurred over the days that followed. Then, this, in para 18:
18. By mutual agreement, it was decided that a phased approach, by groups of sectors at a time, would be the most appropriate course of action. As per the understandings reached, in the first phase IDF vacated three sectors [of 16 ‘pockets/sectors’ previously idnetified] on 16 August. UNIFIL confirmed the withdrawal, established checkpoints and immediately commenced patrolling those areas. At the time of the writing of the present report, the Lebanese Armed Forces have deployed more than 1,500 troops, with vehicles of the 6th, 10th and 11th brigades, in the three sectors from which the Israel Defense Forces have withdrawn. UNIFIL checkpoints are now in place for monitoring the second phase withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from two additional sectors on 18 August. UNIFIL verification of the withdrawal is being carried out. The Lebanese Armed Forces plan to deploy additional units into the three sectors, as well as deploy their forces into the two additional sectors on 19 August. Contrary to the understanding of the 14 August meeting, whereby IDF would withdraw from the remaining sectors in the third phase on 16 August, Israel indicated that the withdrawal from the remaining sectors would not be carried out in one stage. On 17 August, IDF presented a revised map dividing the remaining 11 sectors into up to four subsectors, from which withdrawal would take place on a step-by-step basis.
So there it goes again… Israel dragging its feet on a previously agreed withdrawal from occupied Arab land. Have we seen this movie before or what?
Helena, we may soon look like fools for all this hoping that Israel will learn from its mistakes and make peace with its neighbors. The reality is starkly different:
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525933028&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
These people didn’t even notice that they just lost a war against a few thousand irregulars. They are still eager to attack a nation of 70 million.
“After all, how could we even start a discussion as to whether Israel’s killing of 800-plus Lebanese civilians might be considered “proportionate” to Israel’s having suffered 39 civilian deaths from the 33 days of Hizbullah shelling?”
This isn’t really the point. “Proportionate” force is not based on how much damage the other side in a war has done. Proportionality measures the potential harm in relation to the military objective. The laws of war are designed to prevent humanitarian atrocities, not to set a point spread.
To some extent, the capability of the other side does play a role. If Hezbollah, or some other enemy, had nothing but, say, pea shooters, then there really is no legitimate objective in dropping bombs. But a country has a right to respond to a bona fide threat, even if it is clumsy or not yet likely to be realized.
After crossing the border and capturing two Israeli soldiers, Hezbollah decided to lob a couple of thousand rockets into Israel. They were not particularly accurate, and not particularly damaging (though if you want to take your chances being near a warhead loaded with ball bearings, then I wish you luck). They are a threat to the lives of those on the Israeli side of the border, and Israel had the right to take action to try and prevent this threat from manifesting itself in further loss of life. (Not to mention damage to the land. You’ve heard a lot about the disastrous oil spill in Lebanon. How many people have heard of the deforestation of the north, which it will take an estimated SIXTY YEARS to replace!)
Helena also says that because there was a shaky cease fire, that this was preferable to the escalation of hostilities. As a purely discrete matter, I think this is correct. But we can’t look at this in a vacuum.
Israel pulled out of Lebanon, COMPLETELY, in 2000. It took as long as it did because it had for years insisted on a peace treaty (heaven forbid!) as part of any withdrawal. It withdrew anyway because it figured that it just wasn’t worth it to wait for a peace treaty. “Just get out” said many people. Including myself.
Since then, Hezbollah has used the Israeli withdrawal as political capital to boost their standing. And, more troubling, it began to arm itself heavily. The only thing which prevented complete disaster in Israel to mirror Lebanon is that the warheads themselves are not that advanced. But the missles and their range demonstrated capability to hurt and destroy.
Given how Hezbollah has used the past six years to largely increase its capability to cause death and destruction in Israel, it is legitimate to take action to at least reduce, if not eliminate, that capability.
I think the bottom line is that Israelis take the threats of Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, and Hamas seriously, even if those groups don’t YET have the capability to make good on their threat.
We have seen blatant eliminationist rhetoric frin the above groups which goes almost unnoticed. Meanwhile, Dov Weinglass makes some stupid comments and they are treated like insight into the Israeli government’s master plan.
It’s quite the double standard. Inconsistent with the mantra of “human equality now.”
vadim,
do you think unelected militias should have the right to negotiate international treaties & wage war on neighboring countries?
No I don’t.
There is no right for “unelected militias” but hay this expression “unelected militias” it’s not real, we can’t find this in real world, where you find elected militias?
There are a “Resistance” People defending their land like in Lebanon and Iraq.
What you need to understand those who fought you not necessary all under Nasralah umbrella but they are normal Lebanon’s who defending their land same as if you defending your country, isn’t Vadim?
The other thing you need to understand here the capture of two solders they are POW under international law, so if you see this act as a “wage war on neighbouring countries” I thins you are quite not right in this, taken in mind Israeli for years violated the international law by sending the fighters over Lebanon passing the sound barriers over the Lebanon skies which defiantly insults and offensive to any country.
John C.,
John form you link, the heading is:
“Israel may ‘go it alone’ against Iran”
I have feeling Iran will never be bombed, the realty on the ground they giving a good support to US/Israeli either they are stupid like our Saddam, or they delusional despite the surfaced disagreements and all those talks.
It’s very obvious in Iraq and recently in Lebanon, when Lebanon state brought down and Nasralah free celebrating his victory with Iran
Helena,
You seem to begin with the a priori assumption that, while the military power is assymetrical, everything else is perfectly comparable. This is simply not the case.
Why don’t you try to answer this – for yourself and your own clarity of mind: Why does Lebanon even need Hizballah? According to the UN, not one square inch of Lebanon was occupied by Israel prior to July 12, 2006, so who are they trying to fool by calling Hizballah “the resistance”? And shouldn’t the legally elected government of Lebanon be handling education and welfare issues?
They may not be “wild eyed fanatics”, and they may be highly diciplined, and Muhammad Afif may even be extremely charming with journalists, but Hizballah is still a reactionary movement that maintains a private militia and has, as far as I can see, no legal standing to either enter Lebanon into a state of war or to negotiate peace.
“According to the UN, not one square inch of Lebanon was occupied by Israel prior to July 12, 2006,”
I think you mean the most recent occupation did not begin until that date.
The prior decades of occupation arguably lead to this one. I imagine there was a good reason for that prior one too, but even so.what we need is no reason for another one.
No Roland. What I meant is what I wrote: Not one square inch of Lebanon had been occupied by Israel since May 2000. It was the actions of the so-called “resistance” that resulted in the reoccupation. That’s a strange thing for a “resistance” movement to do. Unless they are “resisting” something else (in this case, I believe what the “Party of God” is actually “resisting” is the 21st century, but that’s a different topic).
JES,
It was the actions of the so-called “resistance” that resulted in the reoccupation.
I think other way more close to real case, the occupation resulting to the resistance….
So what is the “resistance” for if there are or is no occupation and enemy on the homeland?
BTW, Shebaa Farms still under Israeli occupation JES, so there are 25sqkm occupied by Israeli “not one square inch of Lebanon”
“During the 1967 Six Day War Israeli forces seized a piece of Lebanese territory called the Shebaa Farms, a 25 square kilometer area consisting of 14 farms located south of the Shebaa,”
not one square inch of Lebanon was occupied by Israel prior to July 12, 2006,”
I forgot the 21st century is your century JES. But I am glad you still remember the occupation of Southern Lebanon (1982–1985), then border areas (1985–2000) by Israel, that both occured prior to 2006. And then those animals had the temerity to attack you, on what was, (unless one can read UNIFIL reports like the one from that dead canadian UN soldier), a peaceful border.
“Israel has defended its right to use cluster bombs and says it only deploys them in accordance with international law. It has not specified whether it used them in the Lebanon war.”
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-08-25T030706Z_01_N2479291_RTRUKOC_0_US-MIDEAST-ISRAEL-USA.xml
With all due respect Roland, I think I was pretty clear and that the problem lies in your reading comprehension.
Let me repeat: Following May 2000, not one square inch of Lebanon was occupied by Israel. (That’s right Salah, not one square inch. Check with the UN!) In other words, between May 2000 and July 12, 2006 there was nothing for the so-called “resistance” to resist. Instead, the brought about through their direct actions the reintroduction of Israeli troops onto Lebanese soil.
If you can tell me what they were “resisting” then please do. For example, what were they resisting in October 2000 – six months after the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanon – when they kidnapped and apparently murdered three Israeli soldiers (while the UNIFIL congingent filmed the incident)? What were they resiting when they sent an armed band across the border to fire on civilian traffic on the Northern Road?
Just to refocus again on Helena’s question of alternative Israeli responses (alternative to absurd escalation, that is), it might be helpful to hear from some senior Israeli figures and researchers. For example, Giora Eiland, retired general and until a short while ago national security advisor to both Sharon and Olmert, disclosed publicly that he believed the war was avoidable. He points to an initiative he suggested a year and a half ago to Sharon which would have involved a package deal in which Israel would leave Shaba Farms, release Lebanese prisoners and agree to respect the Lebanese border (from overflights and incursions) in return for fully implementing resolution 1559 (disarming of Hezbollah, Lebanese army to the southern border).
His idea was to take advantage of the new dynamic in Lebanon (the “Cedar Revolution”)with a powerful Israeli diplomatic initiative (when’s the last time we heard about one of those?!) Of course Sharon, who was (always) pumped up on the idea of Israeli unilateralism solving all, rejected the idea.
You can see Eiland’s inteview in Der Speigel here:
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,429341,00.html
Also of interest is research conducted by Daniel Sobelman of Tel Aviv University, which highlights Helena’s points about the pragmatic nature of Hizbollah and the complex reality along Israel’s northern border. One can clearly infer from his research that escalation was not inevitable (“what other choice did Israel have but to respond massively…?)but rather a policy choice (and an obviously foolish one, in hindsight.)
Two of his research papers on Hizbollah can be seen at:
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n2p5Sob.html
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v8n1p4Sobelman.html
Hizbullah is notably NOT composed of a bunch of wild-eyed crazies who shell Israeli civilians for fun.
“the mullahs of Iran. Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian official often credited with creating Hizbullah, described Nasrallah and his men this way in a recent interview with the Iranian newspaper Shargh: “They are students who went even further than their teachers.””
The Real Nasrallah
Stephen,
Israelis thinks they can resolving the problems by divided it as separate disputes “problem / occupation”
The main point is the Palestine case it’s the root of the other conflict / problem / borders issue.
The Israeli polices for decades trying to divide the main problem to individual cases and to be resolved with individual “states/boundaries”.
Some argue the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are done and will lasting, but in reality is their any independent researchers/poll tried to see if these peace agreements have any credible bases in the minds of the people of these two courtiers, we saw the reaction on the street of Cairo and Amman with the heavy handed policy.
Similarly if Israelis tried to solve the problem with Lebanon only without Syria which this long standing issue between them until withdraw of Syrians from Lebanon, Lebanon case have some complicity as Hezbollah supported by Iran which make the case harder to be resolved we can take Iraq case and understand Iran influence.
I believe the main key point here is starting to resolve the Palestinians crises and live in peace first and all the other conflicts and disputes will follow but solving in other way will be harder and I think the peace will not lasting forever
BTW, Res 1559 have a lot of objections inside Lebanon not just Hezbollah.
Salah,
I think your point is well taken. I agree with the core conflict analysis you’ve proposed – I was only trying to point out some support for Helena’s contention that there were serious alternatives to impulsive escalation and that those alternatives were even understood in some policy circles in Israel.
I think the main thrust is that managing tensions has to be a stepping stone to a just resolution of the central issues (peace with Syria, end to occupation) through diplomacy, and not a substitute for that resolution.
JES, it appears you may not have picked up that my second post was different to my first one, and was a reply to yours. While I may have been just a little too subtle, or you may have just had a knee jerk reaction to the requote at the top, it appears I did ackowledge you had “remembered” (or ‘specified’ if you prefer) the year 2000 end date of the first occupation, subsequent to my pointing out your original glaring ommission. By the way you musn’t worry about questioning my comprehension, we all work with the tools we have.
Anyway Salah and Stephens conversation directly above, I have to admit, is far more important. I hope it’s added to.
Stephen, I also found the following from Giora Eiland interesting:
SPIEGEL: Could this war have been prevented?
Eiland: Probably, yes. Israel had several options. In the past years, we practiced a policy of containment. We showed restraint, even when Hezbollah provoked us from time to time. The second choice would have been to do what we are currently doing in Lebanon, but to have done so two or four years ago. And there were plenty of similar events like the kidnapping two weeks ago that could have provided the opportunity. The advantage would have been that Hezbollah was weaker four years ago. If we only had these two options, I favored the policy of containment. As far as I remember no one in the security establishmet questioned it.
Obviously the policy of containment and relative restraint did not work. I think that it is also debatable whether or not Eiland’s suggestion of essentially meeting all of Hizballah’s demands (Shabaa, prisoner release, etc.) would have had the desired effect. This is true particularly in the case of implementation of 1559. If both the Lebanese government and the Europeans are unwilling to disarm Hizballah today, following a severe setback in their military strength, what makes Eiland, or you, feel that they would have been any more eager to act to controll a Hizballah that had obtained both Shabaa and Samir Qantar?
It seems the only real deterrence the IDF has now is the threat to kill lots of innocents.
Israel would have been much better served by aerial attacks that did not target irrelevant infrastructure, Southern Beirut, and convoys of fleeing civilians. Had it given evidence that it was taking care, its standing in the world would be much higher.
JES, I have a question for you. How can Israel talk about the “threat to civilians” after what Israel has just done to Lebanon? Done to all of Lebanon, not just Hezbollah. Bear in mind that in the years since Israel withdrew from Lebanon (with the contested exception of Shebaa Farms), just one Israeli civilian had been killed on the Lebanese border, and that was by shrapnel from antiaircraft fired by Hezbollah at an Israeli plane violating Lebanese airspace.
First of all, No Preference, Israel can talk about threats to its civilians precisely because Hizballah openly threatens Israeli civilians and has demonstrated over the past month its ability to carry out those threats. So long as Hizballah remains armed with thousands of rockets capable of reaching civilian targets, then it constitutes a threat to Israeli civilians (without the quotes). The fact that Hizballah, during the past month, didn’t manage to kill or wound more civilians in Israel with the more than 4,000 rockets that it fired in no way proves that they did not intend to do more damage.
While we’re bearing things in mind, the incident in which an Israeli civilian was killed by AA fallback was not an isolated incident. Many of the scores of previous incidents where Hizballah gunners fired AA over Israel (which is odd, considering that the puported violations were of Lebanese airspace) took place when Israel claimed, in its protests filed with UNIFIL, that no overflights had taken place . Apart from this, you seem to neglect the incident on March 12, 2002 when Hizballah “fighters” crossed the border and set up an ambush, firing at random on civilian vehicles on the Northern Road. Six Israelis, five of them civilians, were killed and another seven were wounded. So that means that six innocent Israeli civilians were killed by Hizballah between May 2000 and July 12, 2006. How many Lebanese civilians were killed during the same time period?
I think that making regular threats and having the ability to carry out those threats constitutes a clear danger, and Israel is fully justified – and, in fact, obligated, to deprive Hizballah of the opportunity to harm its citizens.
I think that making regular threats and having the ability to carry out those threats constitutes a clear danger, and Israel is fully justified – and, in fact, obligated, to deprive Hizballah of the opportunity to harm its citizens.
Sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander here JES, don’t you think?
But as I said in the main post, Efforts for the broader Arab-Israeli peace (as called for in the ceasefire resolution) still need to be redoubled. I really think that is what we should all be focusing on.
Sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander…
I never said otherwise. I have maintained all along that, if Lebanon perceived a threat from Israel, then it was up to the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army to counter that threat along its own borders, and not a reactionary, private militia acting as a self-proclaimed “resistance” organization.
Apart from this, you seem to neglect the incident on March 12, 2002 when Hizballah “fighters” crossed the border and set up an ambush,
Actually this attack was claimed by the Palestinian al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. It’s Israel that now attributes it to Hezbollah. Scanning the web I found many pro-Israeli propaganda sites blaming Yasser Arafat for the incident, but now that he’s dead it’s apparently more useful to attribute the attack to Hezbollah.
In exchange for a fake Hezbollah incident, here’s a real Israeli one – the killing inside Lebanon of a teenaged shepherd earlier this year. Unfortunately the UNIFIL site doesn’t seem to be working at present, but here’s a news story.