So Iraq has a new government— sort of.
That is, in Baghdad today, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki presented an intricately negotiated list of 37 government members to the parliament, which then approved it. What the list lacked, however, were names for the two positions most crucial to the wellbeing of the country’s people: Interior Minister and Defense Minister.
Ever since the entry of the US and coalition forces into the country and the accompanying collapse of the Saddamist power structures, the country’s most glaring problem has been the atrocious lack of public security. Without public security, the work of none of the other ministries has any chance of success. Therefore, I would say that until we see ministers in those two still unfilled positions (and I gather there is also a third unfilled position for national security affairs, too?) and moreover, until we see that these ministers and their ministries are capable of doing their jobs and empowered to do them, then the establishment of this “government” has little meaning.
This government, if it is ever to be able to govern Iraq, needs to succeed in addressing four tough challenges:
- (1) to broker and then embody a real inter-Iraqi entente on the way the country will be governed;
(2) to codify that entente in a final version of the as-yet-incomplete national Constitution;
(3) to rebuild administrative structures for the ministries and all other government entities that are effective and capable (and preferably also fully democratically accountable– but see below) ; and
(4) to negotiate the modalities of the (preferably very speedy) withdrawal of all foreign forces and to take whatever other actions are needed to guard Iraq’s national sovereignty and independence from outside influence.
I have been thinking a lot recently about the status of the whole discussion in the west about the “democratization” project in Iraq. I have come quite strongly to the conclusion that the way the Iraqis govern themselves is really none of our business. I still feel very satisfied with the way the Allies forces used their occupations of Germany and Japan after World War 2 to help midwife the institution of robust democratic orders in those two countries, and I guess I have hoped that the same might be the case in Iraq.
But there were two crucial differences between those occupations of 1945 and the post-2003 occupation of Iraq:
- (1) The broad strategic/historical context those earlier occupations was different. In 1945, the US and its Allies ended up in military control of Germany and Japan at the end of a bitterly fought war in many theaters which had been sparked by the antecedently aggressive and expansionist policies of the Axis powers. But in 2003 it was the US and its Allies which initiated the completely avoidable and gratuitous war which resulted in the US occupation of Iraq. In the present war/occupation, the US has no valid claim to be able to “impose its will” on the people of the occupied country by way of some form of “punishment” for the aggressive actions of their (previous) government.
(2) The policy of “imposed democratization” that the Allies pursued in Germany and Japan in 1945 was embedded in a broader, and very successfully implemented, policy of seeking the rebuilding and rehabilitation of those two societies. In Iraq, there may (or may not) have been some desire on the part of the Bush administration to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraqi society. But if there was such a desire, the actual policies pursued (and the resources deployed) were woefully unequal to the task. Once again, therefore, absent any serious and successful US commitment to the rehabilitation of Iraqi society, the US really loses any claim it might otherwise have had to be able to determine the shape of Iraq’s political future.
For me, therefore, at this time, the issue of Iraqi self-governance trumps the issue of whether Iraq is to be “democratic” or not. Don’t get me wrong. I sincerely hope the country can be democratically ruled, since I am strongly convinced that without having robust democratic governance mechanisms and strong norms of commitment to the democratic resolution of internal differences, then it will be hard for Iraqis to escape from the cycle of violence into which the events of the past three years have pushed them.
But honestly, since I am a citizen of the “occupying country” (okay, actually of two of the occupying countries), I have to say that what the Iraqis do right now is their business. It is none of my business except inasmuch as I can help persuade my government to undertake a withdrawal of its occupation armies from Iraq that is speedy, total, and generous.
(We also have many very urgent democracy-rebuilding tasks we need to undertake back here in the US… And if we focus our attentions on those more closely, that can have good effects for everyone involved, at home and abroad.)
In line with the above conclusion, I have decided to replace the “Democracy denied in Iraq” counter that I used to have up on the sidebar here with an “Occupation of Iraq” counter, that counts the days since the beginning of the US invasion and occupation of the country. I thought I should complement that with an “Occupation of Palestine and Golan” counter, since it is clear that we are talking about the same phenomenon of rule of a territory and its indigenous residents by a foreign military apparatus in both (all) of these cases. As we can see from the counters, after around 200 more days, the US occupation of Iraq will have lasted 10 percent of the time of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and Golan.
… So I wish Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki well. I hope most fervently that he and his colleagues can accomplish the four tasks I have described above. And I will follow their efforts with just the same degree of interest in the future.
The main difference between post-WW2 occupations and the Iraq occupation can be summed up in one word: legitimacy
The other point about rebuilding is also quite acurrate. I don’t believe that the Bush administration intended to rebuild Iraq and institute good social support networks to make sure the Iraqi people were okay. I believe they meant to ruin the country and make it safe for the corporations to run it, and keep the money from Iraq’s natural resources.
I never believed in the imaginary WMDs either. That was also a pure pack of lies.
All wars start with lies, and the ones starting the wars are the liars.
All wars start with lies, and the ones starting the wars are the liars.
They killed more than 100,000.0 Iraqis they destroyed a State of Iraq they should brought to justices for their war crimes
Helena, I would like to respond to some of your points:
“…until we see ministers in those two still unfilled positions…and moreover, until we see that these ministers and their ministries are capable of doing their jobs and empowered to do them, then the establishment of this “government” has little meaning.”
The establishment of this “government” has no meaning at all with or without the unfilled positions as long as the Americans remain in Iraq in any official capacity. This “government” is no more than an empty shell painted with the colours of a government in order to provide George Bush with something to point to as a sign of success.
“This government, if it is ever to be able to govern Iraq, needs to succeed in addressing four tough challenges:
(1) to broker and then embody a real inter-Iraqi entente on the way the country will be governed;”
Ever since the Americans “entered” Iraq (interestingly gentle choice of words, by the way), the issue has never been the way the country will be governed, but which ethnic/religious group will hold the positions of supposed power. The Americans have consistently, strongly – and perhaps calculatedly – fostered this very, very destructive politics of identity.
When I looked at the New York Times list of ministers, what struck me in the most horribly gut-wrenching way was that each name was followed by the ethnic or sectarian identity of the individual, as if this was what qualified them, and as if this, and not simply being Iraqi, is what defines us. This kind of thing should no longer surprise me, but when I see it in such a starkly clear manner, it is shocking to the point of inducing nausea. Maybe Salah is the only one here who can appreciate just how foreign this is to us.
When I set aside the terrible emotion this arouses in me and call upon my strong pragmatism I come to the conclusion that as long as we define ourselves politically as Shi`i, Sunni, Kurdi (and by the way whatever happened to all the other Iraqis who are “none of the above” and yet are every bit as validly Iraqi?), there will never be any entente of any kind on anything.
“the US has no valid claim to be able to “impose its will” on the people of the occupied country by way of some form of “punishment” for the aggressive actions of their (previous) government.”
But of course, the whole point of the aggression against Iraq was in order that the US could impose its will. The agenda was to deconstruct and transform Iraq economically, politically, and socially into a dependent, compliant client state in order to use it as a base of military, economic, and political operations.
“In Iraq, there may (or may not) have been some desire on the part of the Bush administration to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraqi society.”
The desire was not to “rebuild and rehabilitate” Iraqi society – as if the United States or anyone else has such a right under any circumstances – the desire was to deconstruct and transform Iraqi society strictly to serve the interests of the United States.
I am in full agreement with Antonia Juhazs’ (author of The Bush Agenda: Conquering the World One Economy at a Time) statement in a recent interview – or perhaps she is in agreement with me since I do not know who had the idea first. She said “…it’s a myth that there was not a post-war planning done by the Bush administration. The reason why it failed was because the interests it was serving were U.S. multinationals, not reconstruction in Iraq.”
“I am strongly convinced that without having robust democratic governance mechanisms and strong norms of commitment to the democratic resolution of internal differences, then it will be hard for Iraqis to escape from the cycle of violence into which the events of the past three years have pushed them.”
Then you must by necessity oppose the politics of identity so strongly pushed by the invaders since this is so blatantly anti-democratic.
“…what the Iraqis do right now is their business. It is none of my business except inasmuch as I can help persuade my government to undertake a withdrawal of its occupation armies from Iraq that is speedy, total, and generous.”
Of course! And further to that, any and all official US presence must be terminated until a truly Iraqi government comes about that has the power to decide what kind of relations, if any, Iraq will have with the country that has tried to destroy it.
“I have decided to replace the “Democracy denied in Iraq” counter that I used to have up on the sidebar here with an “Occupation of Iraq” counter, that counts the days since the beginning of the US invasion and occupation of the country.”
May I suggest that you include the concept of democracy denied? After all, democracy is being denied by the occupying power.
“I thought I should complement that with an “Occupation of Palestine and Golan” counter…
Thank you so much for not forgetting about the fact that Israel has, almost without notice, successfully occupied – and colonized – the Golan.
Inside Iraq’s hidden war
That, despite the huge amounts of money the US has always had available to hand out bribes to Iraqi political figures!
Show Me The Money? From where that money “the US has always had available”?
I had doc., written by Iraqi Minister of Finance stated that the oil export during 2005 till know is 1.8-2Million B/D, “Helena if you like to see the report I can send it to you”.
Like Belfor declaration in 1917 givted not his own land to the people without land
وهـــب الامـــير بمــا لا يمــلك”
Apologies my last post shouldn’t be here….
This WAPO article, “Iran’s Iraq Strategy”,
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/19/AR2006051901761_pf.html)
that appeared over the weekend mentions some things that bear upon your 4th point that Iraq’s government now call for the timely withdrawal of U.S. troops. The writers, Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh, are identified as senior fellows in Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
They state that if the U.S. were to attack Iran, the latter could retaliate against the U.S. in Iraq by pressuring the Shiite clergy and leaders to call for U.S. troops to leave the country: “Iran’s clerical regime could complicate matters for Washington even more by pressing its Shiite allies in Iraq to demand a U.S. withdrawal.”
At the end, they add “Nonetheless, the burden under which the United States now labors in Iraq would become exponentially heavier, with the pressure to exit threatening to overwhelm the strategic need to stay.”
I’m sure this view of a “strategic need to stay” is widely held in U.S. policy circles. It implies the stationing of U.S. troops in Iraq over the very long term, i.e., over many decades. We can expect the U.S. to do whatever it takes to squelch any moves by the Iraqi government to get U.S. forces out.