I am not close enough to Gaza to be able to say anything definitive about the clashes that have occurred there the past couple of days. Yesterday, Abu Yousef Abu Quka, described as a senior commander in the Popular Resistance Committees, was killed in a car bomb; and after that there were some related clashes that have so far killed three people and wounded 36.
I find it interesting and significant that it is Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh who has been speaking out about the need to end the clashes and, as this AP report says, to have the
- security forces … try to “pull our civilian gunmen off the streets,” though he did not specify which armed men or elaborate on a plan.
It is still not entriely clear to me which of the five main PA security forces will be reporting to Haniyeh’s Interior Minister, Saed Siyam, and which to President Mahmoud Abbas. But it’s notable that Abbas has so far not been quoted as saying anything public about these intra-Palestinian clashes or the need to contain and end them.
This seems like an early security challenge for the new Hamas-led government. What role have the various Fateh security bosses been playing in provoking them, I wonder? And how many of them will be prepared to cooperate with Hamas in ending the internal fighting?
Maybe this is the ‘Altalena’ for the new government. But the out-of-control gunmen they need to contain come from a number of different factions and sides, many of them affiliated with Fateh.
(When I interviewed FM Mahmoud Zahhar on March 6, he expressed confidence that most of the Fateh-affiliated people in the various PA structures would work honestly to continue to help the PA project succeed under its new management. I guess that we will now see whether that is indeed the case.)
Unlike Israeli factions after WW2, Palestinian guerillas are intensely penetrated by hostile(Israeli) special services. So, they can’t and don’t need to unite under one central command. This would make them more vulnerable for Israeli attacks.
Henry James,
What you write is true if the Palestinian Arabs never want to reach a settlement with Israel. If, however, the goal is to bring the dispute to an end, then monopolizing power is a minimum necessity for Palestinian Arabs or the Israelis will have no confidence that a peace deal has any meaning.
“If, however, the goal is to bring the dispute to an end…”
If the goal is to bring the dispute to an end then Israel needs to end its policy of colonization, abide by international law, and withdraw from the Palestinian areas it illegally invaded in 1967. These areas can form a Palestinian state.
edq,
Law is a two way street. To obtain equity, you must do equity. That is as true for the Palestinian Arabs as it is for Israelis.
Consider: the Palestinian Arabs, by their rulers official position, reject International law on principle.
Consider: the Palestinian Arabs, by their rulers official position, seek to destroy a member state of the UN – against the UN Charter.
Consider: the Israelis, under International law, have no obligation to cede all of the territories conquered in the 1967 war.
Consider: the Palestinian Arabs, in contraversion of International law and just war theory, use the massacre as the war tactic of choice.
So, edq, stop lecturing nonsense. The position of the HAMAS is the position of rejection of peace and rejection of compromise and rejection of negotiations and rejection of non-Muslim rule on principle – as they state explicitly -. It is not a just position. It is a morally bankrupt position that forms out of a morally bankrupt world view.
What you write is true if the Palestinian Arabs never want to reach a settlement with Israel. If, however, the goal is to bring the dispute to an end, then monopolizing power is a minimum necessity for Palestinian Arabs or the Israelis will have no confidence that a peace deal has any meaning.
Posted by Neal at April 1, 2006 11:42 AM
What I write is true as an interpretation of available news and historical stories – whether we like them or not. All the rest is political activism. I can like or resent it, but this is not my business.
Henry James,
I was not questioning your facts. I was questioning the wisdom thereof, if I understood you correctly.
Now, since, in fact, the Palestinian Arabs do not wish to settle – and likely never did -, your point is well taken. But, if they really wanted to end the dispute, they would work toward a monopoly of violence and also work to build a civil society.
Frankly, the Palestinian Arabs, if they really wanted a state, could do both of the things I suggest. People facing more difficult times than the Palestinian Arabs have done exactly that.
Neal, you stop lecturing nonsense. Israel’s legal obligations do not depend on the Palestinians. Israel needs to withdraw from the areas it illegally invaded in 1967. Period.
I was not questioning your facts. I was questioning the wisdom thereof, if I understood you correctly.
If certain “wisdom” can’t explain the facts, then just let it go and get over with it. For example, now we have more clashes in GS, and, apparently, the only way for the Palestinain leadership to stop this is to take more negative position on Israel. Is not this simple?
Fighters defy Hamas plea for calm http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/595D2D28-64FC-4F0B-A968-4FD2BCCC19DA.htm
edq,
But the 1967 invasion was not illegal. Were it illegal, the UN would have told the Israelis merely to withdraw. UN 242 says something a bit different. It tell those involved to come to terms on security and boundaries.
Henry James,
Well, things are never simple. But, as a matter of long term strategy, if the Palestinians really want to end the dispute – and, frankly, only fools believe they do -, they better do a bit better than blaming Israel for anything and everything. They need to, as I said, monopolize violence and build a civil society. And, if there is to be reconciliation and peace, come to realize that Jewish nationalism is a legitimate cause.
Neal,
I am familiar with UNSC 242 and it does require Israel to withdraw. Of course the invasion was illegal. What is more illegal then a country seizing territory by force? Are you telling me that you support this?
“if the Palestinians really want to..”
Neal, I think you are the last person qualified to advise the Palestinians. Save your patronizing advice.
edq,
As I understand International law, there was a state of war at the time Israel attacked in June of 1967. That state of war began with two events, the removal of UNEF from the Sinai – and its replacement by Egyptian troops – and the announcement of a blockade of the Strait of Tiran.
As for supporting the invasion, it was perfectly moral and justified under both International law and just war theory. Here is what the BBC wrote at the time:
BBC News, June 5, 1967.
In simple terms, the Israelis were well within their rights. Note Nasser’s statement: “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight.”
They need to, as I said, monopolize violence and build a civil society. And, if there is to be reconciliation and peace, come to realize that Jewish nationalism is a legitimate cause.
The problem is, this is old Oslo language. But Olso is dead, and this language is dead togther with it. IMO, now it is time for new songs.
2006-03-31 The dead cat ideology
Henry James,
Well, the Palestinian Arabs will do as they may. Do not expect them to have favorable press so long as they sing the HAMAS song. The world is slowly catching on to what that song really means – and it is not peace -.
Neal
I am surprised to hear that Hamas is more bellicose than Israel. Do you have evidence?
edq,
Of course Neal will not save his patronizing advice. He is a classic orientalist. Orientalism depends on the assumption that “orientals” – in this case Arabs and Muslims – are a primitive, completely different, and greatly inferior form of human being from westerners, and that it is a duty of the west to bring civilization to them by any and all means, of which delivering patronizing advice is by far one of the most benign.
Shirin,
My theory is entirely unknown to you. As it is, I think that the ideology of the region is not very modern. On the other hand, the Arabs are quite capable of their own thoughts. And, listening to as wide a variety of views is the sign of maturity. Evidently, that is something you do not understand.
The world is slowly catching on to what that song really means – and it is not peace -. Posted by Neal at April 1, 2006 02:51 PM
Sorry to repeat myself, but this is Oslo language again. Fatah and Iranian reformers cared about the UN and international opinion. Even Hussein cared – and what happened to all this crowd? Now they are all gone and situation is completely different.
2006-03-30 Why Hamas blasts the Quartet http://inplainview.monitor.us.tt/comm.ME06.htm
Helena
I find Leila al Hadad’s blog of being under fire from F-16s and naval gunfire heartrending.
http://a-mother-from-gaza.blogspot.com/
F-16s in a built up area. Has the world gone completely mad?
Neal, I am sufficiently conversant with orientalism to recognize it – and be nauseated by it – when I see it. I am also sufficiently conversant with the ages old Israeli line of propaganda, particularly the sort that ignores all the by now well-known facts and realities – to have grown quite tired of hearing and debating it. Virtually every word you have put on this page is a repetition – sometimes verbatim – of the standard classic, Zionist-orientalist line. Much if not most of it flies in the face of well-documented information that has been public for ages now. It is strangely amusing to see some of these arguments trotted out again and again in this day and age as if they still held water. It reminds one of those fabled Japanese soldiers who were discovered on isolated islands years and years after WW II ended, and who thought the war was still going on.
Shirin: exactly, especially about the Japanese soldiers.
Neal, your problem is not what you don’t know, but what you know that ain’t so.
Also, you shouldn’t hijack threads, especially new ones, with increasingly off-topic posts. It keeps people from ever starting squarely on-topic discussion. If you are interested in posting at such length, my suggestion is to go to some older, more relevant or already hijacked-off-topic thread. I think this would be less likely to annoy Helena, and might be a reasonable way to get your say in somewhere.
Viz:
the Palestinian Arabs reject International law on principle … seek to destroy a member state of the UN etc. This just is not true. You should really try to get out of the propaganda alternative universe and see what is happening on Earth. (The PLO and the PA led by Abbas is still the official voice of the Palestinians. The Palestinians very sensibly all quote international law a lot, because it is on their side. As many posts here detail, even many Hamas figures are trying to downplay rejectionism and behave sensibly with their unexpected responsibilities. )
Your history of 1967 is similar. Hardly anyone, especially military analysts believes that the Arabs were going to attack Israel then. Nasser and others behaved stupidly, but not that stupidly. Blockading the straits was probably illegal, but arguably not in the heated conditions of the time. The Israeli attack, when Egypt was looking to get out of the box it put itself in, would have been much more likely to be ruled illegal by a neutral court – e.g. The postwar debate in the UN was between those who accused Israel of aggression and those who didn’t (led by the US). Nobody seriously accused the Arabs of aggression.
Neal,
“if the Palestinians really want to end the dispute – and, frankly, only fools believe they do”
(Sarkasm alert here) Thank you for calling me – among others – a fool. It definitely validates your well-reasoned argument and I’m sure you are making helluva lot of friends here
I see have a few critics. Some of you merely state I am wrong. Some of you insult me. Well, where is the beef?
Now, you guys want to call me an orientalist. Hurray, you have labelled me. My suggestion is that you examine the data, not the labels. I might also suggest that the group which follows the school of thought popular in some circles predicted, as Dr. Esposito did, that the Jihadists were not all that violent. Perhaps, such scholarship is flawed.
The school of thought I actually follow is the school championed by those, Christians and Jews, who grew up in the Muslim regions. Such people reject Saidism as dishonest and not merely wrong. I add my voice to that view. But I am not an orientalist. Sorry to disapoint.
One word about Egypt: no one knows whether or not they would have attacked Israel. At the time, the Israelis thought they would, as did the US, among others. So your point – even if Egypt had secret plans not to attack – is irrelevant to what Israel did as Israel is not required to read the mind of Mr. Nasser. By the way, which of his archives have you found evidence about his true intentions. If you have, that is news to the entire world.
Neal,
It is you, not the rest of us, who need to “examine the data”. As for your claim to follow “the school championed by those, Christians and Jews, who grew up in the Muslim regions”, there is simply no such “school of thought”.
Sooner or later those who falsely claim to have “expertise” will reveal the true amount, nature and source of what they “know”, because they just don’t know when to stop talking. In your case it came sooner.
“no one knows whether or not they would have attacked Israel.”
Not true. It became clear very early on that Nasser did not want a war, was trying desperately to find a way to get out of the situation without appearing to back down under pressure, and had no intention of attacking Israel.
“At the time, the Israelis thought they would…”
False. The Israeli government knew Nasser did not want a war with Israel, and top Israeli officials have admitted as much, as you would know if you had any actual expertise.
“So your point – even if Egypt had secret plans not to attack – is irrelevant to what Israel did as Israel is not required to read the mind of Mr. Nasser.”
“Secret plans not to attack” – that’s a good one!
Actually, Israel is required to abide by international law. Specifically, as a member of the UN Israel is obligated to abide by the UN Charter, according to which “preemptive” wars are not permitted except in the case of a threat to national security so imminent and so dire that there is no time to go to the UN for intervention. An examination of the facts shows that there was clearly no such threat in 1967.
Israel’s attack on Egypt was opportunistic as were its invasions of the Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights (documents from Moshe Dayan have made the opportunistic nature of the attack on the Golan Heights unquestionable). Documentary and testimonial evidence shows that the Israeli government and military had been closely monitoring Egypt’s military capabilities, and knew that Egypt posed no threat at that time. It also shows that Israel did not intend to allow Egypt to become strong enough to become a threat, and planned to cut it down to size before that happened. The challenge, of course, was to do that without looking like the aggressor if at all possible, and the events of 1967 provided a good, if slightly premature, opportunity for just that. And of course Israel also helped things along with some provocations of its own.
“As I understand International law, there was a state of war at the time Israel attacked in June of 1967.”
Then you do not understand international law.
“That state of war began with two events, the removal of UNEF from the Sinai – and its replacement by Egyptian troops – and the announcement of a blockade of the Strait of Tiran.”
That Israel unilaterally claimed a state of war existed does not make it so.
“As for supporting the invasion, it was perfectly moral and justified under both International law and just war theory. ”
Oh really? Well, if it was morally and legally justified, then why did the Israelis find it necessary to lie to the UN and the world in order to justify it? Why did Abba Eban stand in front of the Security Council and broadcast to the world the blatant lie that Israel attacked Egypt only after Egyptian bombers were actually in the air heading toward Israeli airspace? And why did Abba Eban make the demonstrably false claim that Egypt had actually bombed sites in Israel – sites that on examination had clearly not been attacked? If it was morally and legally justified, why didn’t the Israeli government simply tell the truth?
“Here is what the BBC wrote at the time:”
The fact that the BBC or any other news source has published something does not make it fact or truth. Nor, according to what you quote below, does the BBC make any judgment about who started the war, or whether Israel’s attack was justified. They merely list certain events, and repeat certain Israeli claims.
“The attack follows a build-up of Arab military forces along the Israeli border.”
True enough, but that unnuanced statement does not mean the attack was either necessary or in any way justified morally or legally. It is helpful to know 1) what led to that build-up of troops (in large part, it was Israeli provocations), 2) whether the troops were in defensive or offensive positions (according to a statement by ben Gurion and others, they were in defensive positions), and 3) whether they were of sufficient numbers and strength to actually pose a threat (according to statements by Israeli officials and others, they were not).
It is also useful to know that the series of events that led to Israel’s attack on Egypt began with aggressive actions and threatening statements on the part of Israel against its neighbors.
“The Arab states had been preparing to go to war against Israel with Egypt, Jordan and Syria being aided by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Algeria.”
That is a very misleading statement. The preparations for war were a result of the buildup that began in the spring of 1967 following Israeli provocations, including very serious threats and an air attack by Israel deep into Syrian territory, just outside Damascus.
“On 27 May the President of Egypt, Abdel Nasser, declared: “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight.””
If bellicose rhetoric were an act of war or even a justification for an attack the human race would have wiped itself out by now.
“Egypt signed a pact with Jordan at the end of May declaring an attack on one was an attack on both. This was seen by Israel as a clear sign of preparation for all-out war.”
This was clearly a mutual defense pact in case of an attack by Israel, not a declaration of intention to attack Israel. Concern about a possible attack or attacks by Israel was very realistic at that time. The pact was clearly a reaction to recent threats and aggressive actions on the part of Israel. States make mutual defense agreements all the time, and it is not reasonable to interpret them as “preparation for all-out war”, but rather as a way to band together to defend against an attack. That Israel claimed to interpret it that way speaks volumes about Israel’s intentions.
“In simple terms, the Israelis were well within their rights.”
In simple terms, they were not.
“Note Nasser’s statement: “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight.” ”
If bellicose rhetoric were an act of war or even a justification for a military attack the human race would have wiped itself out by now. And do note that Israeli officials knew that Egypt did not have what it took to defeat, let alone destroy Israel, and that the Israeli government had made some very severe provocations.
Just a few things to add to Shirin’s post:
“As I understand International law, there was a state of war at the time Israel attacked in June of 1967.”
Then you do not understand international law.
Neal (bold) is actually more right on this point. Since 1948 both sides claimed that there was a state of belligerency and had explicitly used this to justify otherwise clearly illegal actions. In the words of the early 1950s SC resolution on freedom of navigation through the Suez and the straits, the armistice agreements however made this state of belligerency “inactive.”
Eban’s statements, which he repeated for decades after, are clear evidence that he understood international law the usual way, that only something like bombers flying toward you can make an attack preemptive; since there were no such Egyptian actions, this means he thought the attack was not preemptive and thus almost certainly illegal.
Of course neither the Israelis nor the US really thought Nasser would attack; Neal is the one who needs to show new archival research that backs up his accounts, rather more extreme than the standard propaganda versions, and which contradict the accepted scholarly opinions Shirin and I have been presenting.
Just to show there’s always something to be gained from discussion: Considering the lack of public knowledge of the UN Charter nowadays, maybe it should be called “The Secret Plan To Not Attack” instead. 🙂
John C.,
Yes, you are correct about the (inactive) state of belligerency that had existed since 1948. However, Neal incorrectly insists that the state of war began with the removal of the UNEF troops, and the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, and that is what I was remarking on.
Arguably, if a state of (active) war had existed it would have more rationally (and legally) been as a result of Israel’s aggressive May, 1967 bombing raid that reached nearly to Damascus, combined with public threats by the Israeli government to march to Damascus and remove the government (or words to that effect – working from memory here). After such an attack the Syrians and their allies would have been perfectly justified under the UN Charter to take defensive military action against Israel. They would not have needed a professional liar like Abba Eban to make false claims in order to justify it.
Reasonable experts can, and d, disagree about the legality of the blockade of the Strait of Tiran. An examination of the facts (as opposed to Israel’s false propaganda) shows that, although foolishly provocative, it was most likely not illegal. In any case Israel’s claim that it would cripple its economy is bogus. Only about 5% of Israel’s shipping went through the Strait of Tiran, and that small amount could have been rerouted for the duration if necessary. In reality, however, rerouting was not necessary. Contrary to Israeli claims, the blockade was not total, and enforcement was very lax. Only goods with a military purpose were barred from passage. States are allowed under international maritime law to prevent a belligerent state from transporting military goods through their territorial waters – in other words, Egypt is not required to allow Israel to transport over its territory goods that can be used to attack Egypt (or its allies as I recall). In any case, as I said enforcement was very lax, and the Egyptians only interfered with a small handful of ships passing through the Strait. As far as I know a few ships were boarded, and none were actually turned back (I could be misremembering on this detail).
There is a lot one could say about the removal of the UNEF forces and the much overblown “buildup of forces on the Israeli border”. The book The Sinai Blunder, written by UNEF Commander Indar Jit Rikhye, who was there at the time, is a fantastic source, and I am fortunate enough to have this very scarce book in my personal library. Maybe if this topic is still active when and if I have the time and inclination, I will write something about it.
It is also worth mentioning that Nasser made his bellicose statements, blockaded the Strait, and sent troops to the border largely in response to pressure from the Arab states and the Arab (and Egyptian) “street”. They were extremely and vocally critical of the fact that the man who claimed to be the great leader of all the Arabs took no action at all in response to Israel’s aggression against his ally, Syria. So, it was in reality an attempt to save face – albeit a very foolish one, since it also served as a provocation for Israel, and provided Israel with the opportunity to attack its neighbors and sieze coveted territory.
Eban’s statements, which he repeated for decades after, are clear evidence that he understood international law the usual way, that only something like bombers flying toward you can make an attack preemptive; since there were no such Egyptian actions, this means he thought the attack was not preemptive and thus almost certainly illegal.
I suggest you take a look at Michael Oren’s Six Days of War for a different view of Nasser’s plans and the incursion of Egyptian warplanes prior to June 5, 1967.
the facts are incontrovertible…
Egypt ordered the UN peacekeepers out of the Sinai (May 16)
Egypt and Syria mobilized their armies and deployed them at Israel’s border (May 21)
Egypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran, an international waterway (May 22)
Jordan indicated that Iraqi and Saudi forces would be admitted into its country to do battle with Israel (May 25)
Egypt publicly announced its objective to be the “destruction of Israel” (May 27)
Egypt and Jordan entered into a defense pact (May 30)
Iraq’s President Aref declared his goal of “wiping Israel off the map. (May 31)
Egypt and Iraq entered into a defense pact (June 4)
Wm Peele,
Incontrovertible or not, the “facts” as you present them, are selective, incomplete, and do not constitute a legal or moral justification for starting a war.
Ironically, as I have mentioned already, Israel’s air attack on Syria that May absolutely did justify a defensive military response from Syria and its allies.
Neal, after the 1956 war Israel was careful to develop propaganda to justify its future agressions. You are just rehashing Israel’s excuses for the 1967 attack.
Just to add to what has been written above, here are some quotes from Israeli officials spilling the beans about this land grab:
Shortly after the war Yitzhak Rabin admitted in Le Monde:
“I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinaion May 14 would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.”
Several years later General Matityahu Peled stated in Haaretz:
“To pretend that Egyptian forces massed on our frontiers were in a position to threaten the existence of Israel constitutes an insult not only to the intelligence of anyone capable of analysing this sort of situation, but above all an insult to the Zahal {Israeli army].
Finally, in 1982, Israeli Prime Minister Begin told the Israeli National Defense College:
“The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”
You seem very comfortable with the notion of a country siezing/colonizing territory. Where do you stand on this subject?
JES, can’t you do better than a blatantly slanted piece of propaganda that has been shredded to bits by one scholar after another?
JES, can’t you do better than a blatantly slanted piece of propaganda that has been shredded to bits by one scholar after another?
Shredded to bits by whom? Shirin, you are very long on ad hominem attacks, but very short on facts.
edq,
Who is citing propaganda? Your selective use of out-of-context quotes does not explain the fact that the historical record shows that the Government of Israel was not prepared to go to war, did not want to go to war, and made good-faith attempts to avoide the necessity to go to war in 1967.
The quote you provide from Yithak Rabin is quite interesting. If the Chief of Staff knew that there was no threat of attack, then why did he collapse and why was he treated for nervous exhaustion just prior to the war – an episode thta haunted him until the end of his life.
JES,
1. I have a four year old relative who knows how to access and use Google, so I am sure you are capable of using it to locate some of the criticisms of Oren’s book.
2. I suggest you review the meaning of ad hominem and how to identify an ad hominem attack because you clearly have no idea(And you are not alone in this lack of understanding). Hint: Stating that a book contains blatantly slanted propaganda that has been shredded by a number of scholars is not in any aspect, in any way, or to any degree an ad hominem attack.
JES,
What rubbish! Israel “was not prepared to go to war, did not want to go to war, and made good-faith attempts to avoid the necessity to go to war in 1967” in the same manner and to the same degree that the Bush administration did not want to go to war and made good-faith attempts to avoid the necessity to go to war in 2003.
1. I have a four year old relative who knows how to access and use Google, so I am sure you are capable of using it to locate some of the criticisms of Oren’s book.
Well, then maybe your nephew would like to discuss this! As expected, you’re spouting hot air.
Oren’s research was based on extensive work with archival information in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Former Soviet Union, along with interviews with the prinicpals. Now, if you have something to say in regard to this research and the extensive evidence that Oren presents, then please do. But please don’t insult my intelligence or instruct me to go and prove your bogus assertions for you!
And, by the way Shirin, I believe that Bernard Lewis and other qualified historians have “shredded”, or at least placed in its proper perspective, Edward Said’s “Orientalist” polemic quite well. Perhaps your nephew can find these for you.
JES, why are you afraid to read the criticisms of Oren’s book?
And by the way, if Israel’s attack on Egypt was legally justified, why did the Israeli government send Abba Eban to New York to lie to the Security Council and the world – lies which I heard with my own ears, and which the Israelis subsequently admitted were lies? Why didn’t they just tell the truth?
JES, we are discussing the events that led up to Israel starting the June, 1967 war. Why do you suddenly out of the blue throw out the red herring of Edward Said vs Bernard Lewis?
PS You don’t listen well. I did not mention or hint about the child’s gender or relationship to me.
Of course everyone sensible agrees that both sides had a case about the blockade. (I phrased what I said purposefully to avoid the murky factual issues.) I used to agree with Shirin, but now I think that if it had somehow gone to the World Court (and the outcome would probably have depended somewhat on how it got there) that Israel would probably have won on the basic freedom of navigation, with probably some face saving bones thrown to Egypt however. As much as anything else, I base this on the fact that the general trend in international law (e.g. Corfu Channel) was pro- navigation and against belligerency rights. But in any case it was at most a minor illegality, not justifying a full scale war.
A point that is often missed is that only 6 years later, in the 1973 war, Bab-al-Mandeb, further down, was blockaded during and for a few months after the Yom Kippur war. Israel accepted this continued blockade of Eilat after the ceasefire, until the first disengagement agreement. This shows that the 1967 blockade could hardly have been as actually serious as the pro-Israeli side made it out to be.
Here’s a review of Oren by Finkelstein
http://www.ussliberty.org/orenbook.htm
basically the same is in his book, Image and Reality, but with lots of footnotes. (One of which, though, is the pot calling the kettle black.) I would be interested, Shirin, in any other reviews you think are good. (BTW, I’m John R, not John C, the same John that posted once every year or so to the J-P encounter but somehow managed to rub Maria the wrong way every time.) An interesting thing that Oren shares with Rabinovich’s more recent history of the 73 war is that they both seem to be pre-emptive strikes – written before major archives are opened, not after. Hmmm.
Jes: Israel was not prepared to go to war, did not want to go to war, and made good-faith attempts to avoid the necessity to go to war in 1967.
Well, this is not all that good a summary. Israel certainly was well-prepared for war – it won very easily after all – and this is a fact that seems to be invariably forgotten in discussion of Israel’s hypothetical security problems in a 2 state solution. Israel did make one good faith attempt to avoid war, the multinational flotilla, but there were plenty of others it didn’t try, though they were legally and morally bound to, because they might not have left Israel looking like the neighborhood tough guy. It seems clear that although Israel was not planning a war just then, in this situation Israel preferred immediate war to other resolutions; many speculate that the crisis was winding down and a diplomatic solution would have been reached. Israel did not send a test ship throught the straits, as Meir Amit suggested, and which would have at least delayed and thus perhaps avoided conflict.
I have to disagree with Shirin about the comparison to the Iraq war. The usual and IMHO accurate assessment of the 6-day war is that it was the war that no one wanted, at least consciously, that was caused by both sides’ brinksmanship; that at most Israel wanted it sort of unconsciously, but not in a planned war of aggression way. The Iraq war is unquestionably a planned and criminal war of aggression, just like Hitler’s invasion of Poland or Russia, and overwhelming, airtight evidence bears this out, with basically no evidence or non-absurd arguments on the other side. I think Iraq would well justify Nuremberg-style war crimes trials for its instigators, even in light of Helena’s criticisms of war crimes trials, but I don’t think one should say the same about the 6 day war.
John R,
That fact that Israel easily won the war does not, of course, indicate that Israel planned or wanted to go to war. From your statements, it appears that you agree here. Further, a great deal of the ease with which Israel won also had a lot to do with how the other side fought.
Of course, as you say “in this situation Israel preferred immediate war to other resolutions”. This may very well be true. One major reason for Israel’s ultimate decision to go to war was the belief that the country and its economy could not sustain a full level of mobilization for very long, and it is, in fact, this mobilization of virtually all of Israel’s reserve forces that enabled the quick and decisive victory (a fact that, in my opinion, tends much more to be “invariably forgotten” in discussions of the war). In this regard, it is important to consider the aggressive actions – primarily those of Egypt and Syria – that led up to this mobilization.
Regarding Finkelstein’s criticisms, I think that it is well worth pointing out that Image and Reality was originally published several years before Oren’s book, and I would expect Finkelstein to respond seeing as how Oren’s analysis significantly undermines Finkelstein’s arguments in his chapter there on the Six Day War. The article you linked to (which, by the way, appears to be the main critique that I have seen on the Internet) is interesting. Finkelstein appears to confuse contingency plans with plans to wage an aggressive, expansionist war. Likewise, he confuses quite understandable statements of readiness by military leaders with the political decision to go to war. One would do well to remember that Egypt, Jordan Syria and Iraq all had “contingency” plans that involved cutting Israel in two, sending armor into the area dividing East and West Jerusalem and bombing Israeli population centers as well as the nuclear facilities at Damona. In addition, I think that arguing about the precise number and caliber of shells that fell in the Sharon or in West Jerusalem, as well as attempting to minimize a Syrian cross-border incursion into Israel are disingenuous, to say the least. The same is true of his suggestion that oil shipments to Eilat could have been diverted to Haifa – a contingency that, along with the prolonged state of mobilization, would probably have had catastrophic effects on the Israeli economy.
As to your statement that:
in the 1973 war, Bab-al-Mandeb, further down, was blockaded during and for a few months after the Yom Kippur war. Israel accepted this continued blockade of Eilat after the ceasefire, until the first disengagement agreement. This shows that the 1967 blockade could hardly have been as actually serious as the pro-Israeli side made it out to be.”
I think that this calls for closer examination. First of all, this blockade would have far less economic impact than did the earlier blockade of Sharm ash-Sheikh. Israel had been energy independent since 1967 due to the Sinai oil fields. More important, was US and Soviet intervention forcing a ceasefire. Ultimately, what happened in 1967 does not in any way indicate that the 1967 blockade had in any way been less serious than was made out.
Finally, exactly which “major archives” had not been opened or examined by Oren. He is pretty specific about his sources in the introduction to his book. I believe that he was working with a great deal of archival information that had not previously been available, and I think that it is rather presumptuous to imply that he was trying to “pre-empt” the release of future (unspecified) information.
Helena’s article wasn’t about the history of the 6-day war but about the current situation in Gaza.
A glance at the current Palestinians and Israeli political situations reveals that neither side is making sense. Hamas has an impossibilist agenda that can easily lead the entire Palestinian enterprise into absolute ruin and devastation. Israel is incoherent and has “Convergence” plans that are so long-term as to be hypothetical or even poetic. We can guess that an outburst of radical violence from Hamas will coalesce the Israeli position into focus but I doubt this will come to pass.
The only common thread between the Israeli and Hamas/PA positions is that they both seem to be trying to wiggle out of influence and domination by the Quartet and other international players. They also don’t like each other.
I see no signs that the Israeli electorate is committed to their current leaders or policies for any length of time. The Palestinians are showing a some long-term preference for rejectionism but not much support for Islamism, so the long-term prospects for Hamas in charge aren’t much different from Kadima.
Unity of military command is perhaps one definition of government, if Hamas/PA cannot or will not establish a monopoly on violence then they simply are not in charge. Another definition is the ability to tax. What this means in a statelet totally dependent on international donors is not yet clear. Perhaps a monopoly on spending will suffice.
” If the Chief of Staff knew that there was no threat of attack, then why did he collapse…”
Probably because he was nervous about the attack Israel was about to launch.
” ..the fact that the historical record shows that the Government of Israel was not prepared to go to war, did not want to go to war, and made good-faith attempts to avoide the necessity to go to war in 1967.”
These are your assertions, not facts.
JES, you seem to be forgetting the aggressive actions and statements of Israel, in addition to Egypt and Syria that led up to the crisis. No serious military analyst, to my knowledge, has ever considered that Israel was in real danger.
Again Israel had an obligation to not wage war, unless it was the target of an armed attack. The UN charter is intentionally very clear on this; it is conceivable that nation A could commit actual aggression against nation B in some way other than armed attack, but legally nation B still has to go to the Security Council to solve the problem. If nation B launches its own armed attack, then both are legally at fault.
Finkelstein’s article is in the second edition of his book, with footnotes that double its size.
He doesn’t seem to confuse contingency with aggression plans or political decisions with “understandable statements of readiness” with to me, the last often called bellicose statements comparable to the other side’s.
On archives and Oren’s claims, Finkelstein says: “all the Arab and most of the crucial Israeli (and Soviet) archives remain closed, while the U.N. archives have been accessible for many years. The only substantially new documentation Oren brings to bear comes from U.S. archives” Also, when Oren wrote, the most important US source, the FRUS volume on the period, was not published – it took longer than usual, but has been published since. Oren did do a lot of new interviews, but they’re harder to analyze. I find it odd for books to come out a little too early. AFAIK, the FRUS volume supports the usual “war nobody wanted” story.
WarrenW you’re absolutely right, the thread has been hijacked and all of us who have participated should kick ourselves. That’s what usually happens when you talk about the conflict, though this is a particularly bad example.
John R,
I found your response interesting. You claim that:
No serious military analyst, to my knowledge, has ever considered that Israel was in real danger.
I find that claim highly questionable. I think that any military analyst who did not recognize and account for real danger to both sides in a military conflict would be anything but serious! This is especially true in the case of Israel on June 4, 1967. Not only were the Egyptians and Syrians superior in numbers, but, in many classes and types of weapons they had represented a real threat. Add to this the fact that Egypt, less than a year before, had actually used chemical weapons in the Yemen (a little imperial adventure that seems to have been forgotten), and I find it hard to believe that any reasonable analyst would claim that Israel was never in real danger.
I read Finkelstein’s article on the Web yesterday, and I certainly believe that he does confuse these issues. In fact, it’s a polemic and not a scholarly critique, in my opinion, but we’ll get to that in a minute. I find it telling that you point out that, in the second edition of his book, Finkelstein’s “critique” of Oren features “footnotes that double its size.” This is the same comment that I have heard often, most recently in regard to Mearsheimer and Walt, and it is meant to praise the work or somehow validate it academically. Let me note here that the mere presence of footnotes – even copious footnotes – does not indicate anything (other than the use of ink). Just check in at any revisionist Web site and look at the articles purporting to “prove” that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz. Many of these also have voluminous footnotes. And in most cases they are simply fluff.
And now for the issue of Finkelstein. Well, I hired my own four year old and came up with some interesting critical reviews of Oren’s book. You might just want to take a look at three that I found particularly interesting:
http://www.hsje.org/six_days.htm
http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,12084,728941,00.html
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0CE1D7163DF935A25755C0A9649C8B63&sec=&pagewanted=1
The first two are from not particularly pro-Zionist scholars: Tony Judt and Avi Shlaim. What is interesting is that none of these fault Oren on his scholarship or use of archival materials. In fact, all three of them praise both his use of significant and newly available materials (not just from US archives), and on his analysis. None of them accuse him of being a propagandist. The opposite is true, at least two (Judt and Bass) go out of their way to point out how even-handed Oren is, and that he endeavors to tell both sides of the story. Certainly none of the three do anything that could be construed as “shredding” Oren or discrediting his work as mere propaganda. That, from my brief search, seems to be the sole task of Norman Finkelstein and the pro-Arab Lobby who endlessly cite him on the Web.
And it makes perfect sense. Not only is it Finkelstein’s style, but the analysis presented by Oren does severe damage to the assertions that Finkelstein made in Chapter 5 of Image and Reality (at least in the first edition, which is what I read). And, if you recall, that analysis asserts that, not only was the war not one that “nobody wanted”, but according to Finkelstein it was a premeditated aggressive war of expansion by Israel.
Shortly after the war Yitzhak Rabin admitted in Le Monde:
“I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinaion May 14 would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.”
It is possible that two divisions would not be sufficient to launch an offensive. However, by the time the war started, there were six Egyptian divisions (plus change) in the Sinai, and accordng to Oren, Israel had intelligence several more brigades were being pulled out of Yemen.
Finally, in 1982, Israeli Prime Minister Begin told the Israeli National Defense College:
“The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”
Except that the very next paragraph of the speech says
This was a war of self-defence in the noblest sense of the term. The government of national unity then established decided unanimously: We will take the initiative and attack the enemy, drive him back, and thus assure the security of Israel and the future of the nation.
Eyal, that is a wonderful series of quotes that to me illustrates very succinctly:
(1) the degree to which the Israeli decision to luanch the preemptive/preventive strike in 1967 was not actually, strictly speaking, a matter of ‘self defense’ (but only ‘self defense’ “in the noblest sense of the term”, whatever that is supposed to mean), and also
(2) more broadly, the way in which the justification of a decision to use violence on grounds of alleged ‘self defense’ is actually a slippery slope that (a)can be bent and stretched to nonsensical lengths (as also in, GWB’s decision to go to war ‘preventively’ against Iraq) and (b) gives decisionmakers broad permission not to spend much time looking for peace ways to resolve outstanding issues (ditto).
Thanks so much for contributing those quotes to the discussion
Well, I didn’t contribute them (edq did) – I just pointed out they’re not as damning as he (or you, apparently) assume.
John R.,
“I have to disagree with Shirin about the comparison to the Iraq war.”
You are right. It was not a good comparison. I agree with your assessment of the aggression against Iraq, and your comparison with Hitler’s invasion of Poland, and 1967 does not compare. I was living in the ME at the time of the 1967 war, and even with all the overblown propaganda we were subjected to (thank heaven we could get the BBC for a modicum of balance!) it was obvious that brinkmanship was a big factor. However, it is clear that the GOI was not all that eager to avoid a war, turned up its nose at opportunities to defuse the situation, and contributed more than its share of provocation. Maybe it was that Israel wanted the war only “unconsciously”, but they must have wanted it on some level.
Oh – and sorry if I called you John C. It isn’t that I cannot tell the difference between you. :o}
And I do think I remember you from the Spanish narcissist’s (classic textbook case of the disorder – no kidding!) website. I take a quick look at it maybe a couple of times a year and depart after five minutes or so. Same crowd, same subjects, same arguments, same everything. No one seems to have moved forward, or backward even. The place is fossilized. Amazing.
Eyal,
I quite agree with you. These quotes appear – generally along with fraudulent or misleading quotes – on a large number of anti-Zionist Web sites. I would like to see the Rabin quote in context, because, as you point out he was apparently talking about a different situation on the ground (in mid-May) than that existing on June 4, 1967.
As far as the Begin quote goes, it takes on a whole other meaning when viewed within its actual context. I don’t mean whether or not Begin believed that there was a threat to Israel’s exisitence when he voted for a preemptive strike. That’s only one, rather small issue, as he did not make the decision alone, and the records of those cabinet meetings are among the new documents examined by Oren in researching his book.
In this address to the National Defense College, Begin is using the example to justify another war – one for which he was largely responsible. What he is clearly saying is that the only real proof in 1967 that Nasser intended to attack would have been if he had actually begun the attack. Granted, it’s a bit self-serving, because in 1982 most Israelis recognized that the PLO’s presence on the northern border did not in any way mean that they were going to invade Israel. This, however, was not the case in 1967, and I really think that even if preemption shortened the war by a week (which was what US intelligence estimated, prior to the war, would be the effect of Israel taking the initiative), it was the option that had to be taken.
In any event, nothing that either Rabin or Begin said really supports claims that Israel carried out an aggressive war of expansion, let alone that Israel consciously provoked the war.
BTW, in relation to Helena’s second comment on the quotes, part (b), the amount of time needed to decide on whether or not to use violence as opposed to diplomacy is one of the justifications given by those who opposed returning the Sinai, and is still used today as a reason for not returning the Golan and the West Bank. They call it “strategic depth”, meaning that you can actually see your enemy moving toward you before he’s on top of you. (MK Yuval Steinitz of the Likud will talk about this to pretty much anyone who’s willing to listen.) Apparently the issue is, indeed, a slippery slope.
YNet. Martin Sherman. Corrupt kleptocracy vs. tyrannical theocracy
A central tenet of prevailing conventional wisdom regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict is that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the territory that came under Israeli administration in 1967 – the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza – is a sine qua non for a resolution of a seemingly intractable dispute.
It is highly doubtful that the radical Islamists who have now assumed power will be able to remedy this condition. Almost half a century after the establishment of their “national liberation” movement, the Palestinian leadership has provided its people with a harsh choice between two distinctly unpalatable alternatives: the corrupt kleptocracy of the former regime or tyrannical theocracy of the present one.
In light of these grim and grisly facts, it seems only proper that the international community pause to reflect on the feasibility and desirability of persisting with the idea of a Palestinian state as if it were an axiomatic inevitability.
It seems not only proper, but pressing, that the international community begin to seriously consider scenarios for the resolution of the Middle East conflict that do not include the creation of a Palestinian state.
…the recent events in the Palestinian administered territories – particularly the widespread lawlessness and factional gunfights – suggest that the Palestinian people may soon be forced to face a third alternative even more uninviting than the previous two – that is the prospect of a descent into chronic chaos and anarchy.
Eyal, Rabin made this statement after the war; he made it with the complete knowledge of Egypt’s actions throughout the war. I am not familiar with Oren’s “fact” but it isn’t clear that it contradicts Rabin’s judgement.
As JES notes, Begin’s remark was made during a speech defending his decision to invade Lebanon. He was argueing the 1982 invasion was similar to previous Israeli agressions.
Shirin and John R,
I am not familiar with the evidence that the 1967 attack was not a planned, premeditated affair. However, I don’t agree that it was necessarily different from the Iraq war just because there was a lot of brinksmanship; how many governments are as arrogant, stupid, and brazen as the Bush administration; can one always expect an aggressor to proceed in such a blatant fashion? After the 1956 aggression Israel paid more attention to its PR. In the run-up to the 1967 war Israel goaded its neighbors with a series of provocations.
I also believe that Rabin was fully aware of Egyptian actions. I am also certain that the oft-cited quote was taken out of a much broader context, and it is quite clear from the quote that Rabin was speaking of the situation on May 14, more than two weeks prior to the start of the war. I think it is also pretty clear that there were more than two Egyptian divisions in the Sinai by May 27.
As to provocations, I think that there is a tendency to telescope what happened prior to the war and to interpret these events according to one’s predisposition. It is clear that Israel held a different view about the DMZ zones on the Syrian border, and that it tried to establish “facts on the ground” by cultivating these areas. This is hardly provocation for an all-out war. It is also a matter of record that the Syrians attempted to divert the Jordan river, and that they supported Palestinian fedayeen and did not attempt to prevent them from crossing the border to carry out attacks. These are also clear provocations. Further, the provocations immediately leading up to the war were largely those of Egypt, Syria and Iraq that included massive, threatening troop movements and overtly aggressive public statements. If Israel carried out anything that might be construed as a provocation, it was the mobilization of its reserves – clearly a defensive act (and we know what the results were of a failure to call up the reserves six years later, in October 1973).
I can accept that Nasser did not want a war on May 14. I can also see that he might very well have been convinced, by Amer and others, to go to war between the 14th and the 27th of May. As Oren shows, Nasser even believed for a time that his forces were winning and on their way to Tel Aviv based on reports from Amer and other commanders in the field, and he conveyed this to his allies.
Finally, regarding Begin’s statement: Yes, he was arguing that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was somehow similar to the decision to go to war in 1967. He probably even believed this. But this does not make it so, and the record from the cabinet meetings at the time and extensive interviews with many of the principals presented by Oren indicate that Begin’s view was not widely held by cabinet members when they made the decision to launch a preemptive attack on June 5th.