I see that Boston Review has now posted on their website the text of an article by veteran MIT security-affairs professor Barry Posen, titled “Exit Strategy”. This is one of those pieces for which BR has solicited “responses” from a range of other commentators… Among them, as it happens, myself. You can find the whole list of those contributing at the top of the page there.
Well, I sent my editors at BR my response piece yesterday, and I guess I shouldn’t steal their fire by posting it here before they release it. I will just note here, though, that one of the most damaging flaws I find in Posen’s analysis is his identification of Iran as being one of those powers that needs to be deterred from acting against the new Iraqi government…
It has been clear to me for sometime now that the present, US-nurtured political order inside Iraq is– just like any foreseeable successor regime that may emerge in Baghdad after the dec. 15 elections– one that the mullahs’ regime in Tehran is extremely happy with.
So why would they seek to undermine it?
This significant failure of Posen’s diagnosis then leads him to make some very flawed policy recommendations. (His essay has other flaws, from my perspective, as well. For example, he seems to see it as only right and natural that everyone else in the world should recognize and accommodate to a hegemonic US role in the Persian/Arabian Gulf… )
Anyway, you can read my whole response on the BR website soon, I hope.
Meanwhile, on this question of the US’s relations with Iran over the ever-developing situation inside Iraq, Juan Cole pointed me to an interesting piece in today Financial Times, which reports what the FT’s writers describe as a “mixed response” coming from Iranian officials to Washington’s recent decision to authorize Amb. Zal Khalilzad to speak to his Iranian counterpart in Baghdad about common concerns in Iraq.
FT reporters Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth write this:
- Hamid-Reza Asefi, the [Iranian] foreign ministry spokesman, said yesterday Tehran saw “no need” to discuss Iraq with the US, and Ali Larijani, the top security official, on Saturday dismissed the idea as “propaganda”.
But Mohammad-Reza Bagheri, deputy foreign minister, said that while “the general instructions are not to talk to Americans”, Tehran could consider the US initiative.
“We’ll think about it,” he said, after giving a speech to the Gulf Dialogue, a conference in Bahrain organised by London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Juan characterizes this Iranian position this way: “After a showy refusal to talk to the Americans about Iraq by high Iranian officials, lower-level middle managers are now saying that Iran will ‘think about’ such contacts.”
I think that’s a misleading characterization of what’s in the FT report. Bagheri is, after all, a deputy foreign minister, not a “lower-level middle manager.” Neither he, nor Asefi, nor Larijani is going to say anything on such a sensitive subject that goes outside the bounds of what is permitted by the regime leadership. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that the US overture to Teheran is one that has intrigued the rulers there, and to which they seem slowly starting to fashion a cautiously semi-positive response.
Some of the other language that Bagheri used at the IISS conference seems to back this up:
- In his address to an audience including US civilian and military officials, Mr Bagheri said Iran had been bitterly disappointed by its inclusion in President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” despite its active co-operation with Washington in Afghanistan over the toppling of the Taliban regime.
He said Tehran was nonetheless willing to help stabilise Iraq – without specifying how – and that it expected a “sincere” reaction to its role.
After issuing a general call for the removal of foreign troops from the Gulf, where the US has military bases, Mr Bagheri referred to the American military presence in Iraq, saying Iran backed a “gradual” pull-out.
Ha! Only a ‘gradual’ pullout there, indeed?
Then, there is this, contributed presumably by Gareth Smyth, who was reporting from Teheran–
- A senior official in Tehran considered a regime insider said he believed Iran had already offered intelligence co-operation in regard to Iraq in return for Washington easing the pressure over Iran’s nuclear programme, most clearly in not pressing last month’s meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council.
“This has been going on for a couple of months,” he said. “There seems to be co-ordination against al-Qaeda, and you will notice that attacks against the British in southern Iraq [attributed to Shia militants] have reduced. In return, US agitation over the nuclear issue has diminished.”
The official said there was co-operation despite the belligerent rhetoric of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, Iran’s fundamentalist president, who he said had “very little role” in security policy.
Fascinating stuff, huh? You can almost hear the neocons’ agendas regarding Iran toppling like a house of cards. (Or with the satisfying clack-clack of a tumbling row of dominos?) The anti-Teheran hawks in Israel and Washington must be grinding their teeth in despair.
Meanwhile, you will note in Barry Posen’s piece that he argues that:
- The interest of the United States in oil is not to control it in order to affect price or gain profit but to ensure that potential adversaries do not control it and use the profits and power to harm others. It is also to ensure that oil reliably finds its way to market. Thus, the United States acts to prevent the consolidation of oil production [in the Gulf region] under the control of one or two states…
H’mmm. That’s a classic statement of the “realist” view of the value of US hegemony. But wait. Extensive Iranian influence over the oil-producing portions of southern Iraq sure sounds like the “consolidation of Gulf oil production under the control of one or two states” to me.
(You might want to check out my December 2003 “Geopolitics of the Gulf 201” or its March 2003 predecessor “ditto, 101” for some background there.)
Helena
Extensive Iranian influence over the oil-producing portions of southern Iraq sure sounds like the “consolidation of Gulf oil production under the control of one or two states” to me.
Interesting little place called Kuwait that has been keeping the head down for some time hoping nobody will notice them. If you look carefully it is just in the southwestern part of Iraq.
Extensive Iranian influence over the oil-producing portions of southern Iraq sure sounds like the “consolidation of Gulf oil production under the control of one or two states” to me.
I’m not sure how “Iranian influence” equates to “control over oil resources.” Why would enhanced diplomatic relations between Iraq and Iran imply direct [or indirect] control over Iraqi production? This suggestion is quite frankly bizarre. And if by “two states” f you mean Iran and Saudi Arabia, you’re neglecting Kuwait (>2 mm bb/day), UAE (2 mm bbl/day), and Qatar (1 mm bb/day) each of which produces more oil than Iraq’s southern fields (only half of Iraq’s overall production).
You can almost hear the neocons’ agendas regarding Iran toppling like a house of cards.
The most prominent neocon I can think of is AEI’s Reuel Gerecht, who has been writing against “regime change” in Iran for at least 2 years. Which neocons are you speaking of here?
It is simply amazing for Posen to state “The interest of the United States in oil is not to control it in order to affect price or gain profit …”, but rather “to ensure that oil reliably finds its way to market.”
Contrast this with what Kenneth Pollack, who was responsible for Middle East affairs in Clinton’s National Security Council, wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2003: “The United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively cheaply ..” He says that the global economy “rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil”. And since oil is important globally, the US must be in a position to exert decisive influence.
Posen seem oblivious to the fact that what is crucial is the rate at which oil finds its way to market. That determines the price. The US wants assured access to oil, but not at $200/barrel. It has cultivated client regimes in the Persian Gulf to influence production and stabilize the oil price according to its preferences. The Saudis with their spare capacity have done most of the work, most of the time.
(The Saudis may now have reached the limits of their spare capacity, so that the US can no longer be able to exert much influence on prices.)
It has cultivated client regimes in the Persian Gulf to influence production and stabilize the oil price according to its preferences.
The same client regimes that imposed a crippling embargo upon the US in 1973? I think their influence over global oil prices is less than you imagine. Canada and Mexico ship more oil to the US than Saudi Arabia [Gulf states are only 2 of the top 10.]
http://www.rppi.org/110801.html
Pollack states explicitly that “the fact that the United States does not import most of its oil from the Persian Gulf is irrelevant.” It is overall production affects the world price, including the price of oil from Canada and Mexico.
This world oil market has been in place since the oil crises of the 1970s. The Saudis have been more cooperative with the US since that time and in return the US has helped to protect the regime, not least against its ‘internal enemies’ (Pollack’s expression).
We do know, since the documents have been released, that the US was prepared to seize the Saudi oil fields in 1973 if the embargo continued for long. In fact, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who was Colin Powell Chief of Staff when he was Secretary of State, said recently “We had a discussion in policy planning about actually mounting an operation to take the oilfields in the Middle East, internationalize them, put them under some sort of U.N. trusteeship and administer the revenues and the oil accordingly. That’s how serious we thought about it.”
We regard to Iraq he said “If you want those resources and you want governments that aren’t inimical to your interests with regard to those resources, then you better pay attention to the area and you better not leave it in a mess.”
This is the US goal: governments that aren’t inimical to its interests with regard to those resources.
This is the US goal: governments that aren’t inimical to its interests with regard to those resources.
Colonel Wilkerson has a knack for stating the obvious. This sinister goal is shared with just about every country on earth (ok, maybe not the vatican.)
It’s in OPEC’s interest to have high oil prices which they tried unsuccesfully and against US wishes to obtain from 1990-2002 through many ineffecual production cuts and overtures to non-OPEC states Norway Mexico and Russia. I suppose it was US influence that induced OPEC to cut production all those times in the eighties and 90’s as well?? Surely you realize that the Saudis were the most influential price hawks from OPEC’s inception.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1872
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1654437.stm
It is overall production affects the world price, including the price of oil from Canada and Mexico.
Sure, but OPEC has had minimal control over world oil prices for over 10 yrs. They’ve not only failed to keep the price low when it’s high, theyve failed to bolster it with cuts when it was very very low (as recently as 3 years ago). Look at their ridiculous history of unenforceable quotas and busted price targets. they can’t enforce any of their quotas because member states , lacking diverse economies, simply need the revenue. Ecuador and Gabon dropped out for this reason in the mid 90s.
“That’s how serious we thought about it.”
The US almost certainly has plans cooked up to invade every country on earth including Vatican city. And yet the US didn’t invade Saudi Arabia in 1973, nor again in 1975-1980 when the Saudi government nationalised all the US-built drilling rigs belonging to ARAMCO. Was this another US decision, to give away its entire stake in Saudi oil production? Some colony!
This is the US goal: governments that aren’t inimical to its interests with regard to those resources.
Colonel Wilkerson has a knack for stating the obvious. This sinister ambition is shared with just about every country on earth (ok, maybe not vatican city.)It’s in OPEC’s interest to have high oil prices which they tried unsuccesfully and against US wishes to obtain from 1990-2002 through many ineffecual production cuts and overtures to non-OPEC states Norway Mexico and Russia. I suppose it was US influence that induced OPEC to cut production all those times in the eighties and 90’s as well.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1872
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1654437.stm
It is overall production affects the world price, including the price of oil from Canada and Mexico.
Sure, but OPEC has and has had minimal control over world oil prices for over 10 yrs. They’ve not only failed to keep the price low when it’s high, theyve failed to bolster it with cuts when it was very very low (as recently as 3 years ago). they can’t enforce any of their quotas because member states , lacking diverse economies, simply need the revenue. Ecuador and Gabon dropped out for this reason in the mid 90s.
“Thats how serious we thought about it.
The US almost certainly has plans cooked up to invade every country on earth including Vatican city. And yet the US didn’t invade Saudi Arabia in 1973, nor again in 1975-1980 when the Saudi government nationalised all the US-built drilling rigs belonging to ARAMCO. Was this another US decision, to give away its entire stake in Saudi oil production? Some colony!
Vadim stated that “Colonel Wilkerson has a knack for stating the obvious. This sinister ambition [ME governments that aren’t inimical to your interest] is shared with just about every country on earth.”
Perhaps, but only the US nvaded and is using military force to achieve this aim.
Wilkerson was trying to explain why the US can’t leave Iraq. To paraphrase, he said that since the US consumes the preponderance of the world’s resources, it needs to have friendly governments in place in the Middle East. In effect, Washington is fighting a resource war in Iraq.
His views probably represent the thinking of many within the US foreign policy community. Losing what influence they have over the flow of oil is part of the strategic disaster that is feared if the US leaves Iraq. Pollack, for example, expresses the fear that a “reduced American presence could … giv[e] Iran, say, an unhealthy degree of control over oil flows.” As Helena pointed out, this may indeed be an outcome of the Iraq war.
“he said that since the US consumes the preponderance of the world’s resources, it needs to have friendly governments in place in the Middle East.”
A seriously naive remark. The US government is on unfriendly – borderline hostile – terms with the government of Venezuela, yet the US remains Venezuela’s single largest export partner (55% overall) by a rather wide margin. The US imported nearly 800k barrels of oil per day directly from “unfriendly” Iraq in 2001 ie almost twice what it imports now and at a fraction of the per barrel cost!
As you noted yourself oil is a fungible commodity and non-comprehensive embargos are routinely circumvented as the case of Marc Rich demonstrates. US buyers almost certainly receive oil of Iranian provenance to this day. Diplomatic relations are almost 100% irrelevant to the balance of global petroleum trade and its ultimate price on the world market.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/info/twip/twiparch/020807/twipprint.html
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html
Just a quick reminder that Iran and the U.S. have a tradition of back-door negotiation dating from right after the Iranian revolution (thank-you, Iran-Contra!!). No surprise it’s happening now.
Vadim,
I think it is wrong to measure the decision of the US to invade Iraq at the light of the past experiences with OPEC. There are two new elements since then :
1) The demand of oil is climbing both in China and India, creating a new situation and exerting a real concurrence for that ressource.
2) Many oil drills are aging and have reached their peak, so in a foreseable future, just while the demand is climbing, the offer will probably sink.
So the invasion of Iraq wasn’t made with the short term in mind, but in view of the midterm or longterm.
It seems somewhat contradictory to me to say on one hand that all governments (and in particular the US) naturally desire to have in place ME “governments that aren’t inimical to your interests with regard to those resources” and to hold the view that diplomat relations are 100% irrelevant to the oil trade.
I think the first position is true and that Wilkerson’s views, which I believe to have to presented here accurately, are broadly representative of the US foreign policy community. Perhaps Wilkerson (who is supposed to be from the realist school) and his colleagues are deluding themselves and that it’ not really necessary, but there is enormous evidence that this is just how they look at the world.
I think it’s interesting to look at Baker Institute Study #15 which was commissioned by the Bush administration in preparation of the National Energy Strategy of May 2001. It was written by the Council on Foreign Relations and a group of oil company executives and it’s a document that is rich in information. Among other things it mentions “Gulf allies are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests increasingly at odds with US strategic considerations, especially as Arab-Israeli tensions flare. They have become less inclined to lower oil prices in exchange for security of markets. … A trend toward anti-Americanism could affect regional leaders’ ability to cooperate with the US in the energy area.”
Consequently, one the of study’s recommendations is to “Develop a diplomatic program ensuring GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] allies remain prepared and willing to maintain stable prices to promote global economic global and also to fill any unexpected supply shortfall in times of turmoil in the oil markets whether created by accident or by the adverse political actions by any producing nation.” The report mentions the “extremely important” role played by the Saudis in providing compensating supplies to stabilize markets as Iraq had “effectively become a swing producer, turning its taps off when it has felt such action was in its strategic interest.”
(Lots of other similar passages that could be cited, but that might try the patience of this group.)
Develop a diplomatic program ensuring GCC allies remain prepared and
willing to maintain stable prices….
I’m surprised that wishful thinking like this passes for “realism” — oil is now more than twice OPEC’s $28 price ceiling and its ministers long ago conceded their powerlessness. Whatever “diplomatic programs” were implemented since 2001 have been more or less irrelevant to the flow of oil trade and price of oil. I think youd agree that diplomacy much less invasion can’t summon new production capacity when OPEC and every other producer worldwide is tapped out. It can’t enforce quotas or embargos very well & it can’t diminish Chinese or Indian demand.
Fwiw Yergin (one of the authors of the paper you cited) wrote a piece in the NYT before the war highlighting Iraq’s irrelevance to world oil prices:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/oilprice.htm
This spring, Iraq unilaterally cut off exports for a month, trying to instigate a new oil embargo. The world hardly noticed. And other exporters were grateful for the chance to fill the gap, sell more oil and make extra money.
Oil was a key consideration a decade ago when Iraq seized Kuwait and threatened the Saudi oil fields. But the focus even then was not so much on access to oil as on the ability of a Greater Iraq to transmutate oil into economic, political and military power
And of course James Baker himself was against the Iraq invasion.
“that might try the patience of this group.”
agreed! apologies to Helena for dragging this conversation so far off course.
http://www.energybulletin.net/2348.html
“”It is absolutely true that oil has no nationality,” Lippman said. “It’s also true that the record shows that even states or state producers in countries with which we have terrible relations will continue to sell oil to us because they need the money. It was true in Libya, it was true in Iran.”
“So the invasion of Iraq wasn’t made with the short term in mind, but in view of the midterm or longterm.”
Christiane, the [second] invasion of Iraq was first discussed seriously in the mid-1990’s, during an unprecedented glut of crude oil worldwide. The ‘Iraq liberation act’ was signed in 1998, just as oil was touching its inflation-adjusted all-time low.
framing political discussions in terms of natural resources in my view obscures more than it reveals. “war for oil” makes no sense for many reasons, but these are the main ones:
1.) if the US were interested foremost in Iraqi oil it would have been better served leaving Hussein in place and removing sanctions. Before GW1 Iraq supplied over 6% of US imports. After that war the US backed sanctions that limited the volume of exports to the US. Iraq now sells even less oil to the US than under oil-for-food.
2.) The US oil supply doesn’t depend on friendly relations with oil producers or direct control over their reserves. Nations hostile and friendly sell oil to the US (& intermediaries) entirely in their own interests and at the global price. This price is determined (as you noted) more by Chinese and Indian buyers than by OPEC or Saudi Arabia. It isnt negotiated at gunpoint but in a competitive and transparent world market. “Access is secured” by paying the highest price, not by military coercion. US firms routinely compete with (and lose to) British, Swiss, Indian, Chinese & Russian firms for the same crude oil. In fact US bidders are currently losing out to Japanese and Chinese buyers in the Gulf markets.
Vadim- remind me why you think we invaded Iraq.
remind me why you think we invaded Iraq
The only reasons worth addressing are those articulated in HJ res. 114 of 2002 and HR 4655 of 1998, since these are the legal and public justifications for invading.
Beyond being merely far-fetched and illogical the oil argument is a circumstantial ad hominem ; few in favor of the war believe it, and no author of policy is likely to defend it.
Evasion, vadim. Pathetic.
Ad hominems are evasive, Dominic. That’s why they’re categorised as fallacies of relevance. If you expect me to defend US imperial ambitions in Iraq I’ll have to pass, since facts and elementary logic don’t support their existence, and I don’t share such ambitions myself. “How often do you beat your wife” isn’t worth answering either.
As far as discussing HR 4655 or res. 114, I recommend you read them carefully and then maybe we can debate their merits and shortcomings on another thread.
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/bliraqreshouse.htm
I hope this is helpful.
One more thing: the full context of the Pollack remark cited above:
“This fact has nothing to do with the conspiracy theories leveled against the Bush administration during the run-up to the recent war. U.S. interests do not center on whether gas is $2 or $3 at the pump, or whether Exxon gets contracts instead of Lukoil or Total. Nor do they depend on the amount of oil that the United States itself imports from the Persian Gulf or anywhere else.”
Pollack’s article by the way was written after the invasion. It notes that “ironically, with Saddam Hussein gone, the problems are actually going to get more challenging in some ways.”
It also notes that “The best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum, or even to withdraw entirely.”
vadim…reading your posts is like inhaling a breath of fresh air…the agenda-driven politically correct here can get apoplectic when confronted with irrefutable logic that doesn’t fit their biases.
Vadim,
Why did you leave out the first sentence from Pollack, the one just before “This fact …”?
For those who are not familiar with this article, it is called “Securing the Gulf” and these quotes are from the first section after the introduction. That section is entitled “It’s the oil, stupid”. The section opens with this sentence (the one Vadim omitted) “America’s primary interest in the Persian Gulf lies in ensuring the free and stable flow of oil from the region to the world at large.” As mentioned above, Pollack then states that it is essential that the oil continue to flow from the Gulf copiously and relatively cheaply. He argues for an ‘over the horizon’ US presence to ensure this. However, he also worries that this could give the Iranians an “unhealthy degree of control over oil flows.”
BTW, I started out above by criticizing the article by Posen (cited by Helena) for making the incredible statement that the US has not sought to exert control over oil prices. On this count it is easy to marshall lots of evidence against Posen’s contention. Vadim seems to believe that this is illogical and that the market alone determines prices and the US has no special influence. Whether this is true or not (and I think it’s only partly true), it is obvious that US foreign policy elites, by and large, do not hold such views and they act otherwise. Wilkerson’s views, for example, are likely representative, and he thinks that the US needs to stay in Iraq to make sure that the outcome isn’t a government that’s inimical to US interests with regard to those resources. (Vadim perhaps could explain to the Council on Foreign Relations that this is a matter which need not concern them.)
Vadim, you can’t be serious. The official US government rationale for the war is the only one worth discussing? Well my goodness, stop the presses! No more need for investigative reporting. All we need to know is what the government tells us.
Since oil is a fungible commodity with a market price, there is no reason for anyone to be concerned about control over the source of supply, eh? Even though it’s a finite resource on which our economy is totally dependent. You think the US government is perfectly happy with just anybody taking over those Iraqi oil fields? No problem, we can just buy oil from Al Qaeda or Tehran. This is not believable, Vadim.
Vadim,
I’m with Hammurabi. It’s been a real pleasure reading your posts.
In case you didn’t notice, Vadim, the article you cited from the Energy Bulletin web site included this account, which certainly doesn’t seem to support your position:
[CERA energy analyst] Placke, who has monitored Saudi oil sales for decades, said Saudi Arabia’s traditional large share of the U.S. oil market has been a function of the country’s special close relationship with the United States — a tie that may be weakening.
“Saudi Arabia has been at the top for several decades, and that’s by design. To the Saudi establishment, that position was an important element in maintaining what was known as the ‘strategic relationship,'” Placke said. He said the Saudis used subtle methods that are no longer in place to lower the prices of their oil for U.S. customers and increase their market share in the United States.
Placke said Saudi Arabia’s turn away from the U.S. market began at the end of 2002 as the United States was preparing to go to war in Iraq.
“I think, while there was what has generally been described as a sufficient degree of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States, (the invasion of Iraq) clearly was not in tune with Saudi Arabia or really anyone else in the Arab world for that matter,” Placke said.
The Nazi Charles Krauthammer has stopped even pretending that Iraq is a sovereign country. In his nauseating op-ed in today’s Washington Post, he laments the decision “we” made to put Saddam on trial, instead of just shooting him “like a dog” (how would you like to be Mr. Krauthammer’s dog?). He excuses the poor, hapless Iraqis, who couldn’t be expected to handle anything as complicated as a trial on their own, but demands to know why “we” gave Saddam “control of the stage . . . afforded him by us?” He is absolutely irate that the defendant is actually be allowed to defend himself! The last paragraph includes two Krauthammer classics:
“Our only hope, as always with Hussein, is that he destroys himself with his arrogance and stupidity.” (at least we’ve given him a good role model)
“Only Saddam Hussein can save us from our own incompetence.” (did he really say that???)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/08/AR2005120801310.html
John C,
First, I think that you should probably restrain yourself when calling people “nazis”. Charles Krauthammer is not a nazi, and it is unfair of your to label him one.
Secondly, I think that you should at least take the trouble to read and comprehend the article prior to taking off on its author (largely based on what appears to be your false reading of what he wrote).
Krauthammer never suggests that the US should not have put Saddam on trial or that he should have been “shot like a dog” instead of being placed on trial. Krauthammer merely expressed what many Iraqi Shi’ites and Kurds have expressed – that Saddam deserves to be killed for his crimes.
Please read the article again. Krauthammer does not suggest that Saddam should not be allowed to defend himself. He simply maintains that he shouldn’t be allowed to dictate procedures and question the authority of the court (which is what he has clearly been doing up until now).
“First, I think that you should probably restrain yourself when calling people “nazis”. Charles Krauthammer is not a nazi, and it is unfair of your to label him one.”
“A supporter of the Project for the New American Century’s campaign pushing for war with Iraq, Krauthammer’s op-eds regularly berate liberals and Democrats, champion intervention in the Middle East, and defend the neoconservative agenda.”
JES- You’re right, I probably should restrain myself, and Krauthammer is not literally a Nazi. However, he and his ilk have brought my country as close to Nazism as we have ever been, and I’m mad as hell about it.
I did read his article again at your request (gag, gag).
Krauthammer said “Hussein deserves to be shot like a dog.”
When you come here and claim that K never suggested Sadddam should have been shot like a dog, that undermines your credibility. Why don’t you understand that?
K did not want a trial, JES, he wanted a show. The problem, as he sees it, is that the wrong guy turned out to be the star of that show (“why was he given control of the script?”).
JES, you’re a smart guy. Why do you defend this lowbrow thuggery?
John C,
Please read again what I posted:
Krauthammer never suggests that the US should not have put Saddam on trial or that he should have been “shot like a dog” instead of being placed on trial. Krauthammer merely expressed what many Iraqi Shi’ites and Kurds have expressed – that Saddam deserves to be killed for his crimes.
In general, I am against capital punishment. However, if there are cases where the sheer volume and brutality of murder warrant such a harsh punishment, then those of Saddam Hussein certainly do fit the bill, in my opinion. (Did you ever, for example, see the film of Saddam speaking to a revolutionary council meeting where he read out names of people who were then taken out of the auditorium and then, reportedly, shot?) What do you think Saddam Hussein deserves for decades of murder?
I think that Krauthammer’s point is valid. Why is Saddam Hussein allowed to behave as if he is the “elected President of Iraq” and to carry on in clear contempt of court. He has a team to defend him, yet he insists on using the prisoner’s dock as his personal podium, in defiance of the court. In any other courtroom, such a defendant would have either been barred from the courtroom.
As to your statement that Krauthammer “and his ilk have brought my country as close to Nazism as we have ever been….”, I think that this is hyperbolic to say the least.
JES – I don’t have time right now to fully answer you, but I will just remind you that there is an issue of sovereignty here, to which I alluded in my original post, and which you have ignored. Krauthammmer certainly couldn’t care less about Iraq’s sovereignty, but I wouldn’t expect him to. I hold you to a higher standard.
JES – here is a more complete answer. First of all, let’s dispose of a non-issue. I agree that Saddam is a bad guy – OK?
Now let’s deconstruct K’s article a bit more. This will be a good exercise and we both might learn something. As usual, there is more than one level of “message” in the article. K writes:
“Although Hussein deserves to be shot like a dog — or, same thing, like the Ceausescus — we nonetheless decided to give him a trial.”
Now you interpret this passage to mean that (i) Saddam is a really bad guy, but (ii) he should be given a fair trial. That is what I would call the “official” meaning. But let’s look closer. Why does K say Saddam “deserves” to be shot like a dog, and that we “nonetheless” decided to try him? Well, what does it mean when people say the US troops in Iraq “deserve” our support, and then reluctantly acknowledge that opponents of the war “nonetheless” can’t be silenced completely? The real message is that if this were the kind of morally upright, straight-talking, no-nonsense kind of world that the “right” kind of people understand and prefer, then there would be no need for any sissy trial, and we would have just shot Saddam in his “spider hole.”
In the same passage, what is the meaning of the reference to the Ceausescus? Well, it so happens that they were executed by firing squad after a two-hour emergency “trial” at a secret military installation. (http://century.guardian.co.uk/1980-1989/Story/0,6051,110504,00.html) The real message is that the Romanians know how to shoot dogs, and we should learn something from them.
Nowhere in the article does K suggest that the “trial” of Saddam Hussein has anything to do with discovering the truth, or determining questions of guilt or innocence. Instead, he makes it abundantly clear that this was supposed to be a theatrical event, the purpose of which was “to demonstrate the justice of [the] war.” He describes the courtroom as a “stage” and wonders why Saddam was given “control of the script.” He even has harsh words for the costume designers! Saddam should have looked like he did when we pulled him out of the spider hole, but instead “with every appearance, he dresses more regally.”
But the real issue is sovereignty, and Krauthammer stomps all over that. His article is all about “we” and “us” and makes it very clear – I actually give him credit for this – that the whole process is being stage managed (or mismanaged) entirely by the Bush administration, and that the “Iraqi Government” hardly has a clue about what is going on. He quotes the Vice President of Iraq saying “I don’t know who is the genius who is producing this farce.”
I could go on, but I think that’s enough. At least perhaps you will now give me credit for having read the article?
All these people think about is propaganda, JES. We are simply drowning in propaganda here in the US. I am seriously appealing to you as a person of intelligence not to go along with this. We don’t have to agree about everything, but let’s not just abandon the search for truth.
Peace.
Why does K say Saddam “deserves” to be shot like a dog, and that we “nonetheless” decided to try him? …. The real message is that if this were the kind of morally upright, straight-talking, no-nonsense kind of world that the “right” kind of people understand and prefer, then there would be no need for any sissy trial, and we would have just shot Saddam in his “spider hole.”
Not quite. I think that the message is much closer to the apparent meaning (which is the sign of a good, expository writer). Krauthammer’s message is: If we were living in a world without rule of law, or conversely, in a world of tyrannical rule (like that of Saddam or Nicko Ceaucescu), then Saddam would have gotten what, in our guts we feel he deserves. (Which, by the way, is exactly what he would have gotten had he, for example, been set loose in a Shi’ite neighborhood in Baghdad). I think that you have to do a hell of a lot of twisting of Krauthammer’s words to get to your “sissy trial” rendition – which may say more about your own, preconditioned view of Krauthammer “and his ilk” than about Krauthammer himself.
In the same passage, what is the meaning of the reference to the Ceausescus? Well, it so happens that they were executed by firing squad after a two-hour emergency “trial” at a secret military installation. The real message is that the Romanians know how to shoot dogs, and we should learn something from them.
Please see above. I don’t think so. I think the use of the comparison is Krauthammer’s literary device for showing what a people, abused for decades do with their abusers when they get their hands on them (i.e. they deal with the former tyrant as he would have dealt with them), and Krauthammer clearly sees that this is wrong. He could have used another example, for example Mussolini and his mistress. He might have even contrasted this with the Nuremberg trials.
Nowhere in the article does K suggest that the “trial” of Saddam Hussein has anything to do with discovering the truth, or determining questions of guilt or innocence. Instead, he makes it abundantly clear that this was supposed to be a theatrical event, the purpose of which was “to demonstrate the justice of [the] war.” He describes the courtroom as a “stage” and wonders why Saddam was given “control of the script.” He even has harsh words for the costume designers! Saddam should have looked like he did when we pulled him out of the spider hole, but instead “with every appearance, he dresses more regally.”
I have to agree with Krauthammer in most of this statement. I don’t think there’s any “deconstructing” needed here to get at the meaning. In fact, you yourself seem to agree with your first sentence, in that you have already stated that you agree that Saddam is a bad guy. Look, this isn’t another murder trial where guilt has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a show trial where the real jury – the public – has already seen and judged all the evidence. We saw, on film Halabja, and we saw that film I cited earlier where Saddam ordered men to their deaths, in front of the camera. And we all saw the Iran-Iraq war for 10 years. Now, if you have any other suggestion what this trial is supposed to do, then please come forward with it, but I think that Krauthammer is 100% on target here when we’re talking about war crimes trials of figures like Saddam Hussein. The purpose is not to try the individual, but rather to document and record the crimes.
I do disagree with the last part of Krauthammer’s statement. I think that he fails to understand the society in which Saddam Hussein is being tried. To our eyes, Saddam never looked better. He has a nicely cut suit. He looks trim. And he has one hell of a great haircut! What Krauthammer doesn’t seem to realize is that, while being svelt with a great “doo” is the ultimate in Hollywoodized America, in Baghdad the old Saddam with a gut, a fat face and a beret commands much more respect than does the “pansy” looking guy standing in the dock holding the Qur’an.
But the real issue is sovereignty, and Krauthammer stomps all over that. His article is all about “we” and “us” and makes it very clear – I actually give him credit for this – that the whole process is being stage managed (or mismanaged) entirely by the Bush administration, and that the “Iraqi Government” hardly has a clue about what is going on. He quotes the Vice President of Iraq saying “I don’t know who is the genius who is producing this farce.”
What sovereignty? You and others here go on about Iraq being occupied (which, for the time being, it is). Helena even has a number up on this Web site of the number of days that Iraq has been without sovereignty. We can disagree as to whether or not the war needed to be fought, whether it should have been fought, whether it was just, or what it was about, but the fact is that it was fought, the ruling regime was toppled and the country today is occupied. Germany was also occupied after World War II, and the war crimes trials were carried out under Allied, not German sovereignty. The Allies were pretty damn clear about why they were having those trials, and it didn’t have a lot to do with proving guilt. In that respect, I don’t see a great deal of difference, except for the fact that I hope that Iraq won’t be occupied for over 10 years, as was West Germany (or for nearly 50 years as was East Germany).
So John, I don’t think that this is a matter of Charles Krauthammer producing propaganda. He’s pretty much stating his opinions based on the facts that most of us already “know” – that Saddam is guilty and should be punished, and that a good number of the people he once ruled would probably (and understandably) not waste their own tax money on a trial, and that, further, war crimes trials are different in kind from the O.J. Simpson trial.
Now, what would be much more interesting here than a “deconstruction” of Charles Krauthammer would be to hear how you would suggest Saddam Hussein should be dealt with. Should he be tried and be proven guilty “beyond reasonable doubt”? If convicted, should he be sent to prison to be “rehabilitated”? Should he, perhaps, just be cut loose in the streets of Baghdad and allowed to fend for himself? Or, perhaps he should be sent to Elba or St. Helena?
“If we were living in a world without rule of law, or conversely, in a world of tyrannical rule (like that of Saddam or Nicko Ceaucescu), then Saddam would have gotten what, in our guts we feel he deserves.”
Instead, in our civilized world, we have a show trial first, and then carry out the predetermined sentence.
“This is a show trial where the real jury – the public – has already seen and judged all the evidence.”
What public would that be, JES? The American public? The Israeli public? Or are you presuming to speak for the Iraqi public, a rather significant percentage of which appears violently opposed to the whole idea?
“the old Saddam with a gut, a fat face and a beret commands much more respect than does the “pansy” looking guy standing in the dock holding the Qur’an”
Good point! 😉
“What sovereignty?”
OK then, we agree on that.
“Now, what would be much more interesting here than a “deconstruction” of Charles Krauthammer would be to hear how you would suggest Saddam Hussein should be dealt with.”
I think my primary point is that it should not have been any of my business, or yours, how the people of Iraq chose to deal with the problem of Saddam Hussein. If you want to make comparisons with WWII, I would say this is more like what would have happened if the Nazis had prevailed on the Eastern front, and put Stalin on trial for crimes against humanity.
Hey, you made some good points really. Thanks for the discussion!
“Not quite. I think that the message is much closer to the apparent meaning (which is the sign of a good, expository writer). Krauthammer’s message is: If we were living in a world without rule of law, or conversely, in a world of tyrannical rule (like that of Saddam or Nicko Ceaucescu), then Saddam would have gotten what”
In the same taken why then Jamal Abdul Nasser said and Israel take it his world and start 1967 war, or Iranian Ahmmadinajd recent talk about Israil why should Israel take it as a big things.
If the people saying worlds and they means different things then that the case then….
JES,
One observation:
“And we all saw the Iran-Iraq war for 10 years”
At which US was (more or less) officially alied with Iraq (yes, that brutal tyran, Saddam Hussein), at the same time secretly selling weapons to Iran (Iran-Contras scandal) -looked like good, pragmatic business. It didn’t bother many in US then, but now (20 or so) years later suddenly crocodile tears for all those victims of that war. How conveeenient ! – Church Lady (Deana Carvey) from old SNL would have said.
Andrew,
First of all, I think that to be accurate, the “US was (more or less) officially alied with Iraq,” is a misstatement. The US – along with a variety of other nations, including Germany, China and principally France and the USSR – provided some support to Iraq. (The USSR provided assistance to the tune of several billions of dollars.) This does not mean that the US was “officially allied” with anyone. Further, US dealings with Iran were a little more involved than being “pragmatic business”. Forgetting, for the moment the Contra side (which is a whole different issue), a major part of the negotiations during the Iran-Contra period had to do with coming to arrangements concerning hostages held by Iranian supported or controlled groups in Lebanon.
I know that you will start spouting the usual stuff about pictures of Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam (I’ve seen film of Chirac kissing the SOB), but this is all irrelevant.
But the fact that the US may have done something bad does not excuse what Saddam Huessein has done or make it any less of a crime.
Finally, for John C, the only “significant percentage of [the Iraqi population] which appears violently opposed to the whole idea” of a trial for Saddam are those who have been demonstrating to get the trial over with and hang him.
JES,
thanks for your quality respone – just one thing, I wouldn’t: “you will start spouting the usual stuff…” – please don’t put words in my mouth as I don’t do it to you, we are here far above that (level). Again, what I meant by my comment was that I understand all those dealings you mentionned (it was still Cold War era, and many different games were played at that time) and I found these decisions to be well-pragmatic.
What I don’t like is that we shed crocodile tears now – 20 plus years later, playing, to some degree, innocents, which we were not (I mean allmost all parties to tragic, Iraq-Iran war).
Patrick and John C.,
Sorry for the very late response; I tried posting something a few days ago but it was blocked -hope you’re still reading.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15401-p0/kenneth-m-pollack/securing-the-gulf.html
Here’s the full Pollack article, discussing three different ways to reduce the US military presence in the Gulf. I’m baffled that it might be interpreted any other way. I’d ask anyone interested to read it closely, paying special attention to pages 4 and 5 and the recommendations made therein.
“The best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum, or even to withdraw entirely.”
“Over the horizon” refers to no physical US presence which we all might agree is a good thing. How this could be read as any sort of apology for US imperialism is beyond me.
What about “it’s the oil stupid?” On this score both Pollack and Posen’s remarks address the impact oil has on the global economy — not the US economy. It has next to nothing to do with prices paid by US firms or US control of production as both Pollack and Posen make quite clear.
Beyond bankrupting the Gulf States themselves, global economic depression would result if Gulf oil were taken off the market altogether through some regional cataclysm or large scale sabotage. Pollack: “if Saudi oil production were to vanish, the price of oil in general would shoot through the ceiling, destroying the American economy along with everybody else’s.” This is what Pollack means by “free and stable flow of oil.” You might think it an arrogant, hegemonic or patronising stance, but it addresses a much broader imperative than cheap oil for the US.
There’s some difference between freely electing to cut production by 30% (as Saudi Arabia has done in many vain efforts to manipulate the world price) and seizing or destroying Saudi oil fields completely (a credible threat to the world economy.) Saddam Hussein set all Kuwait’s oil wells on fire in 1991. Had he destroyed any major Saudi fields, there might have been widespread famine and worldwide economic collapse. The worst effects would have been concentrated in the developing world esp. India and China.
John C.: unearthing secret (and completely irrational) government motives really doesn’t answer any worthwhile question. “Appeal to motive” is a logical fallacy of relevance. Investigative reporting is useful for uncovering facts, not opinions or motives. This is more than a debating-team quibble. No one (neither I nor Pollack nor Posen nor any architect of US policy) is defending the war on commercial much less imperial grounds (Wilkerson seems to have opposed the war), so the claim is really an conversation-ender.
Andrew,
Point taken on my uncalled for remark. Sorry.
Hi Vadim – You may not be interested in unearthing the motives of government officials, but I am. I don’t care if it’s a “logical fallacy” or not. I’m just here to exchange views on subjects that interest me. I think investigative reporting is very useful in answering the “why” questions, as well as the “who, what, when and where” questions. I understood you to be arguing earlier that control of Iraq’s oil resources (and by extension, those of other gulf states) was not an important consideration behind the US invasion of Iraq. I was disputing that. I think it was a major consideration, though not the only one. Maybe I misunderstood your point. Anyway, I did not mean to imply that going to war over oil made economic sense for the US. The war is an economic disaster. Perhaps we agree on that? I think the Bush gang was willing to risk at least a short-term economic penalty (although they grossly underestimated the risk) to achieve some of their long-term objectives, which most definitely included total military dominance of the gulf oil region.* There was actually a high degree of bi-partisan consensus on the latter, and it was not a “secret,” although it was probably irrational (at least it seems so to me). I use the past tense here because things have turned out so badly in Iraq that a lot of rethinking is going on.
*and also the rest of the world and “outer space,” if you believe the National Security Strategy – http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss9.html
John,
Of course, inquiring into motives is not a logical fallacy. It is natural and a meaningful thing for us to do. It is, for example, done all the time in the legal courts.
The fallacy of relevance associated with motive goes like this:
Ms. X puts forward proposition P.
Ms. X has good (bad) motives.
Therefore proposition P is true (false).
Obviously the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises, hence the inference is a fallacy.
However, if Ms. X is known to have ulterior motives and has told a lot of falsehoods in the past, then it may be perfectly justified to suspect anything said by Ms. X. In that case, it would not be sensible to take at face value statements put out by Ms. X. This is one of the reasons why we to try to understand motives.
Vadim seems to hold the position that because it makes no sense that the US should engage in military action to secure resources, then this can’t be the case. It is a conclusion that does not follow from the premise. In fact, as I have emphasized, Col Wilkerson has told us explicitly that the US can not leave Iraq because it is essential to secure a government there that isn’t inimical to US interests with regard to those resources. His view on the matter is likely representative; it is certainly not an outlier in the spectrum of elite opinion.
(BTW, it is irrelevant if Wilkerson was a supporter of the decision to invade or not. Now that they are in, he feels they can’t leave until a government is in place that is minimally friendly to the US. Why? Because of those resources.)
Similarly candid views have been expressed by others in positions of access and authority, for example this statement:
“We will probably need a major concentration of forces in the Middle East over a long period of time. That will come at a price, but think of the price of not having it. When we have economic problems, it’s been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies.”
was made by Donald Kagan, who was the co-chair of the Project for a New American Century (and a war supporter). To my mind it a succinct statement of one major objective of the Iraq war.
Yeah, what Patrick said!
😉
“Vadim seems to hold the position that because it makes no sense that the US should engage in military action to secure resources, then this can’t be the case.”
Not what I said: it’s completely irrelevant to any worthwile discussion of policy whether the motive makes sense or not, since the policy isn’t being defended on these grounds by any architect of future or present policy, nor among that segment of the populace in favor of the war. Arguing pro or con motive X is totally unproductive if no one (including myself) is willing to argue pro.
Wilkerson is not an architect of policy (nor is Kagan.) He doesn’t represent some mythical monolithic viewpoint shared among ‘elites’. Showing me one or five or fifty context-free remarks doesn’t advance the point that meangingful numbers of US citizens or policymakers thought “we invaded Iraq for its oil, and that’s a good thing.”
“His view on the matter is likely representative”
You’ve said this before but it makes no sense at all. Wilkerson is an opponent of the war and his view are unrepresentative of those in favor of the war. There are as many motives for invading Iraq as people in the United States in favor of the war. Not all of these motives are worth addressing, least of all the ones no one will admit to.
I would think a responsible anti-war party would make it a priority to tackle the BEST arguments and not the WORST surrounding the decision to go to war. This tone-deafness is in my view a major failure of the “anti-war” party. “No blood for oil” is worse than sanctimonious, afactual or insulting. It’s irrelevant to the question: “should the war in Iraq have occurred?” It ends the conversation by implying your conversation partner is either a venal liar with a bad grasp of economics or a dupe to such people.
“When we have economic problems, it’s been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies.”…”
I can’t find the original source of this nutty and bizarre remark (plus I’ve never heard of this guy in my life and lord knows I’ve read plenty of neoconservatives…) A link would be appreciated.
NO BLOOD FOR OIL!
Donald Kagan is a scholar at Yale Univ. and a well known neo-conservative; he’s also the father of Robert Kagan, an even better known neo-conservative who has co-authored articles with William Kristol. The quote from Donald Kagan is drawn from an article written by Jay Bookman and published Sept. 29, 2002 in the Atlanta-Journal Constitution. (I think this is Atlanta’s largest daily.) It is available here:
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2319.htm
Bookman is a deputy editor at the A-J Constitution. I wrote to him regarding an article published shortly after the fall of Baghdad in which he stated “In part, we were motivated by concern for our oil supply”. I asked “Is that really how it’s regarded, as ‘our oil’? Does the U.S. government believe that it is ‘our resources’ that are at stake in the Middle East?” His answer: “Yes, unfortunately that is how it’s regarded, without question. We will let nothing stand between us and that petroleum.”
Donald Kagan is a scholar at Yale Univ. and a well known neo-conservative
right, he must be one influential guy. Weird that I’d never heard of him before this. Strangely he seems have never written a single policy paper on Iraq or for that matter the modern Middle East. He seems never to have served in government (or worked in any commercial enterprise involving oil.) But he’s in PNAC & the father of someone slightly more famous so I guess that makes him some kind of a heavy hitter, neo-con-wise. He must speak for ‘the elites’ judging from how aggressively this apocryphal soundbite was peddled by the anti-war collective (500+ hits on Google and not a single original citation – nor was it picked up by any pro-war / ‘neocon’ publication…odd how little airtime the neocons afford such a heavy hitter as ol’ Don Kagen of the PNAC)
I must say this is an entertaining way to discuss politics. Find an sinister soundbite attached to a sinister acronym. Claim all parties associated with said acronym secretly believe opinion contained in soundbite. It’s almost like thinking!
By the same ridiculous line of reasoning we might choose to believe that Martin Luther king was a communist, since many prominent (and obscure) communists were involved in civil rights. We might also believe that the president of Iran speaks for all Shiites (perhaps all Muslims) when he declares the holocaust a hoax and Israel a stain on the face of the world. Ahmadinejad after all isn’t some obscure academic at a right wing think tank — he’s the president of the worlds most populous Shiite country. His candid remarks were publicised by every news agency in the world. This must be what animates those Shiites, naked anti-semitism.
Fun! Almost like thinking.
http://www.memri.org/
Look, a whole page devoted to ridiculous antisemitic soundbites by prominent and not so prominent Muslims! It’s clear to me that secretly all Muslims are animated by a secret urge to kill Jews and eradicate Israel. Patrick at JWN has told me that ad hominem reasoning like this –far from being foolish and counterproductive — is actually revealing and insightful. Well done patrick! I wrote some guy at DEBKA and he confirmed my worst fears: Arabs are all anti-semites. I save the email in case anyone doubts me.
ps for the literal minded among us the last posts were labeled /DEEP DEEP SARCASM! I believe those things no more than I believe GWII is an oil war because some classics professor said so.
Now Now Vadim – it seems to me that your writing is now bordering on the ad hominem!
My arguments are based, in part, on authority. However I maintain that these are legitimate authorities who, because of the positions they have occupied and the access to power that they enjoy, provide us with a window into the reasoning and motives of those in power. It seems to me that in these matters we must invariably make some appeal to authority.
Wilkerson was Secretary of State Powell’s right hand man. He is telling us that the US can not now leave Iraq, in part, because of US dependence on the Middle East’s resources. (I’ll provide the full context of this remark if there is interest.) I strongly suspect that this reasoning is reflective of the private reasoning of many within the Bush administration, in particular Dick Cheney. Do you seriously doubt this?
Kagan was the PNAC co-chair responsible for producing their seminal policy document ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses’. This document reads like a blueprint for the actions of the Bush’s administration’s first term. PNAC membership included the top three positions in the Pentagoan, the Vice President and his Chief of staff and many others. Is Kagan totally out to lunch here? I don’t think so.
We will never know all the motives of those who advanced the war until all the official documentation is released, which may never happen. Still I think it is worthwhile matter to consider these motivations. And I also think that this is useful to interpret events on the ground in Iraq. For example, it’s apparent that the US was determined to put down permanent miitary bases – which is what Kagan was advocating. (And this has, in fact, been corroborated by Larry Dianmond who was in Iraq as Paul Bremer’s senior assistant – another person in a position to speak with authority.)